In March, 1862, the AoP, commanded by the engineer, McClellan, embarked on the Peninsula Campaign. With the volunteer engineers' brigade under BGEN Henry Washington Benham, the 50th moved to Yorktown and worked digging trenches, constructing bridges, and earthworks until the evacuation of that city. At White House, the command was divided into several detachments, which were engaged in escort duty and bridge building until reunited at Dispatch Station on June 1, when the regiment was employed in providing for the passage of the troops over the Chickahominy. It accompanied the army through the Seven Days' battles to Harrison's landing, where it was again separated, one detachment being sent to Hampton. When the regimental headquarters was transferred to Hampton in August, a detachment was left behind at Harrison's landing, but on Sept. 3 the regiment was reunited at Washington.
Until July 17, 1862, the 50th was enrolled on the state records as an infantry regiment, but an act of Congress of that date accepted it as a regiment of the volunteer engineer corps, of the same rank as the regular army engineer corps.
The Bridges at Fredericksburg
After McClellan failed to pursue Lee's retreat from Antietam, Lincoln fired McClellan on Wednesday, November 5, 1862, and replaced him with MGEN Burnside on Friday. Formally taking command on Sunday, November 9, 1862, Burnside immediately received pressure from Lincoln to take aggressive action. In response to prodding from Lincoln and general-in-chief MGEN Halleck, Burnside planned a late fall offensive that the relied on quick movement and deception. Concentrating his army in a visible fashion near Warrenton, feigning a movement on Culpeper Court House, Orange Court House or Gordonsville, he would then rapidly shift southeast and cross the Rappahannock River to Fredericksburg, hoping to steal a march on Lee. The AoP would then move rapidly south along the Richmond, Fredericksburg and Potomac Railroad (RF&P) against Richmond.He chose this course lest he strike directly south from Warrenton, exposed to a flanking attack from LTGEN Jackson in the Shenandoah Valley and because he felt the Orange and Alexandria Railroad (O&A) would be an inadequate for logistics as well as the fact that Lee had blocked the O&A.
While Burnside began assembling a supply base at Falmouth, Washington reviewed the plan. Lincoln, correctly, saw the main goal was the destruction of Lee and his army and not Richmond, but despite this when Burnside presented his plan on Thursday, November 14, Lincoln reluctantly approved it. Halleck wired Burnside, "The President has just assented to your plan," adding for emphasis: "He thinks that it will succeed if you move rapidly; otherwise not."
Burnside saw the rapid movement of his army as key to catching Lee, off guard, and that the river crossing could be made before Lee could concentrate his forces at Fredericksburg and contest the crossing. The Rappahannock, a short river rising in the mountains, is not much more than a mountain stream until Warrenton where several tributaries swell it into a river, the principal one being the Rapidan. At Fredericksburg it is quite deep below the falls and can be crossed only by bridges. Opposite the northern end of Fredericksburg was a smaller town, Falmouth. They were both mill towns that had prospered grounding the local grains into flour. Powered by canals as well as the river, the mills tapped the river above the dam. In the antebellum era, bridges had connected the two towns but they had been destroyed during Johnston's withdrawal a year before. Any crossing would need to be done at a ford or with pontoon bridges. The 50th, like the other AoP engineers, were well-practiced in assembling pontoons as well as manipulating canals for various purposes.
Burnside went into action immediately. On Friday, November 15, he began to pull his army out of the Warrenton, Virginia area and head southeast towards Fredericksburg. That morning, AoP artillery roused the Confederates. IX Corps struck the Rappahannock River at Warrenton Springs, and I Corps demonstrated focusing on Freeman's and Beverly's fords to the east. Cavalry and infantry attacked Rebels at Rappahannock Station and captured the bridge there intact.
The sudden action on a wide front surprised Lee who began a pullback from his position in front of the Army of the Potomac. Unsure of the Federals’ destination, Lee had to hold back and see how the situation developed before he could make a countermove. Unsure about Burnside's movements, he sent an infantry regiment and an artillery battery to strengthen a small force stationed at Fredericksburg. If Burnside had already crossed and occupied the town, Lee would withdraw North Anna River. Anticipating that Fredericksburg could not be held, Lee got permission to destroy the railroad between Fredericksburg and Hanover Junction. Lee had yet to hear intelligence that AoP was rebuilding the wharves at Aquia Creek, so as Sumner’s troops approached Falmouth, Lee still thought it likely that Burnside would transfer his army south of the James River.
Burnside had moved rapidly on Friday and Saturday without Lee discovering his intent. On Sunday evening, when he heard Sumner’s men were approaching Falmouth, Lee immediately had Longstreet send two of his divisions toward Fredericksburg. As these units left their camps the next morning, Monday, November 18, Stuart’s scouts forded the Rappahannock arriving at Warrenton just as the last U.S. troops were departing.
In the meantime, when the AoP started from Warrenton, Sumner's grand division was given the advance; II Corps arrived on Sunday evening, the 17th at Falmouth, opposite the upper edge of Fredericksburg. Burnside had fooled Lee made it opposite Fredericksburg almost undetected. Next, he needed to get the army across the Rappahannock and push on to Richmond.
When Sumner arrived at Falmouth, Fredericksburg was occupied only by a small force. As soon as the Union troops appeared on the Stafford Heights, an artillery duel began. The Rebels were soon driven from the guns. Standing unmanned, the Rebel guns tempted Sumner to cross the river and capture them. Lest he incur Burnside's wrath,Sumner would not permit volunteers to go over and get them, but he did ask permission to take Fredericksburg, if he (Sumner) could find a crossing. [note 3] Burnside turned him down as he felt it unwise to take Fredericksburg before he had fully established his communications. He was also concerned that the increasing autumn rains would make the fording points unusable and that Sumner might be cut off and destroyed. He ordered Sumner to wait in Falmouth ending the matter, and the troops went into camp waiting for orders.
When the rest of the AoP arrived two days later, Hooker also suggested crossing, this time at United States Ford, just a few miles upriver. Burnside, mindful of McClellans problems when a river divided his forces in the Peninsula campaign, again worried that the high water would do the same to him and chose to wait.
Burnside became anxious, concerned that the increasing autumn rains would make the fording points unusable and that Sumner might be cut off and destroyed, ordering Sumner to wait in Falmouth.
Transporting the Pontoons to Fredericksburg
Before beginning his campaign, Burnside had arranged for the shipment of the pontoon wagon trains through the Union Army’s General in Chief, Henry Halleck. [note 4] Burnside had planned for the pontoons to arrive the same time as his first elements on Sunday evening, November 17, however, his plans began failing for the pontoon bridges and bridging materials had not arrived and were just leaving Washington.
The plan called for both riverine and overland movement of the pontoon trains to Falmouth. On November 14, MAJ Ira Spaulding of the 50th reported the pontoons ready to move but lacking the 270 horses needed to move them. Unknown to Burnside, most of the bridging was still on the upper Potomac. Communications between Burnside's staff engineer Cyrus B. Comstock and the Engineer Brigade commander Daniel P. Woodbury indicate that Burnside had assumed the bridging was en route to Washington based on orders given on November 6.
When Halleck visited Burnside it was agreed that they were to be rapidly transported south, to be used in crossing the Rappahannock. Halleck returned to Washington and resumed the duties of his office, evidently not understanding that he was to charge himself with this special duty, therefore neither Halleck nor Quartermaster General Montgomery Meigs, who was responsible for supplying necessary equipment and supplies for the pontoon trains, acted with the urgency needed. Just before he cut his communications with Washington on Sunday, November 17, to make his move, he had tasked his Chief Engineer LT Cyrus B. Comstock to check the status of the pontoons' movement. Receiving no answer before beginning his march, it would be two days before he found out where they were. In fact, when Sumner had army arrived opposite Fredericksburg, they were still at Washington, Burnside supposing that Halleck would forward them without delay.
Due to the miscommunication between Burnside and Washington in the planning stages, Comstock's queries caused confusion followed by sudden urgency. The 50th New York Engineers left Washington with one of two pontoon trains on November 19, traveling overland to Falmouth.
Lee, expecting an imminent advance across the Rappahannock, assume the next defensible position to the south, the North Anna River. But when he saw how slowly Burnside was moving (and Confederate President Jefferson Davis expressed reservations about planning for a battle so close to Richmond), he directed all of his army toward Fredericksburg. By November 23, the corps commanded by LTGEN James Longstreet had arrived and Lee placed them on the ridge known as Marye's Heights to the west of town, with Anderson's division on the far left, McLaws's directly behind the town, and Pickett's and Hood's to the right. He sent for Jackson on November 26, but his Second Corps commander had anticipated the need and began forced-marching his troops from Winchester on November 22, covering as many as 20 miles a day. Jackson arrived at Lee's headquarters on November 29 and his divisions were deployed to prevent Burnside crossing downstream from Fredericksburg: D.H. Hill's division moved to Port Royal, 18 miles down river; Early's 12 miles down river at Skinker's Neck; A.P. Hill's at Thomas Yerby's house, "Belvoir", about 6 miles southeast of town; and Taliaferro's along the RF&P Railroad, 4 miles south at Guinea Station.
Heavy rains turned the roads to mud and slowed progress. A second pontoon train had been sent down the Potomac River to the town of Aquia Landing; from there, the train would travel overland the last few miles. With the roads impassable due to the mud, the overland train was diverted to the Potomac River, the pontoon boats were formed into rafts, and towed down river to Aquia Landing. The engineers and equipment did not arrive at Falmouth until November 25. By this time Lee’s army was arriving, and the opportunity to cross the Rappahannock River uncontested was gone. Burnside still had an opportunity, however, because by then he was facing only half of Lee's army, not yet dug in, and if he acted quickly, he might have been able to attack Longstreet and defeat him before Jackson arrived. Once again he squandered his opportunity. The full complement of bridges arrived at the end of the month, but by this time Jackson was present and Longstreet was preparing strong defenses.
Burnside originally planned to cross his army east of Fredericksburg at Skinker's Neck, but an advance movement by Federal gunboats to there was fired upon and drew Early's and D.H. Hill's divisions into that area, a movement spotted by Union balloon observers. Now assuming that Lee had anticipated his plan, Burnside guessed that the Confederates had weakened their left and center to concentrate against him on their right. So he decided to cross directly at Fredericksburg. On December 9, he wrote to Halleck, "I think now the enemy will be more surprised by a crossing immediately in our front than any other part of the river. ... I'm convinced that a large force of the enemy is now concentrated at Port Royal, its left resting on Fredericksburg, which we hope to turn." In addition to his numerical advantage in troop strength, Burnside also had the advantage of knowing his army could not be attacked effectively. On the other side of the Rappahannock, 220 artillery pieces had been located on the ridge known as Stafford Heights to prevent Lee's army from mounting any major counterattacks.
On Tuesday evening of 9 December, Burnside presented his plan of attack to his subordinate. The army would cross at three sites simultaneously. Sumner’s Right Grand Division would cross on two pontoon bridges at the northern end of town and a third at the southern end. Once across, Sumner would clear Fredericksburg and advance to drive the Rebels from Marye’s Heights. Franklin’s Left Grand Division would cross on two bridges two miles below town. Hooker’s Center Grand Division would remain in reserve, ready to exploit any success. His artillery chief, BGEN Hunt, placed the army’s 312 guns, with 147 of them on the advantageous high ground of Stafford Heights, to support the crossing. Burnside was scant on specifics regarding follow-on actions, rebuffing his subordinates' lack of confidence in the plan. Despite the lack of detail, they reluctantly left the meeting with their reservations and began moving their troops into position Monday evening, December 10.
Constructing the Bridges
The engineer brigade moved out after dark. The 15th New York left camp at 20:00, the regulars at 22:00, and the 50th at 23:00. The engineers stopped briefly at the pontoon park and outfitted their trains for the night's assignment. The teams started for their assigned bridge sites by 23:50. As soon as the engineers stirred, the army "knew that the moment for action had arrived for the Pontoons were moving for the river." The 50th New York left the pontoon park first, followed by the U.S. Engineers and the 15th New York. For some unknown reason, the 50th New York started its march first even though the other engineers had farther to go to get into position. On the night of December 10, the 15th New York Engineers and the U.S. Regular Engineer Battalion quietly moved to a position about a mile down river from Fredericksburg. The engineers built two bridges at this site, facing little opposition. When the bridges were nearly complete, a small Confederate force charged the engineers and inflicted some casualties, but Union artillery fire drove the attackers away. The two bridges were finished by 11:00.
The 50th New York Engineers were charged with the task of building three bridges in two locations; one at the southern end of town and two at the northern end. The 50th New York Engineers rumbled along heavily rutted dirt roads with three bulky pontoon trains. With so many men, horses, and equipment in motion, secrecy was impossible as each caravan toted 34 pontoon boats on wheels accompanied by 29 support vehicles laden with lumber, tools, and forges. 189 wagons lurched into a ravine behind the Lacy house.
At the river's edge with no light to work, the men of the 50th settled down for quick a nap before building the bridges. The night was cold with the temperature in the mid-twenties and thin ice along the riverbanks. A thick fog covered the river. Brainerd rested in the parlor of the Lacy house, listening to the bell from Saint George's Episcopal Church toll 03:00, and wrote his goodbyes to his family. As soon as he was done, with the bell still ringing the hour, got his command moving.
Work began as the 50th moved the heavy pontoon boats down the muddy banks of Stafford Heights and into the icy waters of the Rappahannock. The 50th divided into three sections. CAPT Wesley Brainerd and CAPT George W. Ford kept two trains behind the Lacy house, while CAPT James H. McDonald led the third train south to the lower end of the city. MAJ Spaulding accompanied McDonald's crew to a point below the burned railroad bridge of the RF&P Railroad. Surgeons set up hospitals on Claiborne Run, while assistants selected forward aid stations closer to Stafford Heights.
On the opposite shore, BGEN William Barksdale alerted his commander, MGEN Lafayette McLaws, that Federal bridge building had commenced. McLaws instructed Barksdale to allow the construction to continue until the engineers were within close range. Barksdale moved his brigade, consisting of the 13th, 17th, 18th, and 21st Mississippi Infantry regiments, along with some reinforcements from the 8th Florida Infantry into position along the river. The men took cover in buildings, behind fences, and in rifle pits.
As the 50th went to work on the pontoons, they could make out the flickering campfires more than 400 yards away on the opposite bank but also noticed them being extinguished. Shortly after 05:00, the Confederates opened fire on the engineers working on the bridges and on the opposite riverbank. Initially, fog on the water provided some cover for the 50th, but as the light increased and fog dissipated three hours later, with one of the upper bridges and the middle bridge about two-thirds complete and the other upper bridge about one-quarter finished, Rebel fire increased at the engineers. The bullets the engineers, and a minié ball instantly killed CAPT. Augustus Perkins of the 50th. Wounded soldiers dove into the boats while others crawled back to safety to avoid the heavy musketry of the rest of Barksdale’s Mississippians. With Union infantry able to offer little support, the engineers retreated, regrouped, and tried again on the upper bridges. The Confederate musket fire killed one officer and two enlisted men on the northern bridge site, and wounded several others. The unarmed engineers ran for the shore and took cover as the enemy fire raked the Federal positions.
At the middle bridge, downstream from the ruined rail bridge, crews ventured out to complete the bridge four times but came scurrying back, and by 10:00 a.m. the 50th had suffered fifty casualties, including a seriously wounded CAPT Brainerd. BGEN Woodbury led 40 volunteers from the 8th Connecticut onto one of the bridges, but soon lost 20 men and hastily retreated. Two regiments in Hancock’s division also suffered casualties near the upper bridges.
Brigadier General Henry Hunt, the Army of the Potomac’s Chief of Artillery, had placed his batteries on Stafford Heights, east of the town. The artillery began firing at the Confederate positions in Fredericksburg. After considerable bombardment, the cannonade stopped and the engineers attempted to resume their work, only to be hit by more Confederate fire and again driven back. The artillery resumed blasting Fredericksburg, and when the firing eased, the engineers again tried to resume work, and were again driven back by Barksdale’s determined riflemen. Union infantry across the river also exchanged fire with the Mississippians.
This continued well into the afternoon. To break the stalemate, General Hunt suggested to Burnside that infantrymen be sent across the river in boats to secure a small bridgehead and rout the sharpshooters. Burnside agreed to the idea if Hunt would find volunteers for the risky venture. COL Norman J. Hall volunteered his brigade [note 5] for this assignment. Burnside suddenly turned reluctant, lamenting to Hall in front of his men that "the effort meant death to most of those who should undertake the voyage." When his men responded to Hall's request with three cheers, Burnside relented. At 15:00, the Union artillery began a preparatory bombardment and 135 infantrymen from the 7th Michigan and 19th Massachusetts crowded into the small boats, and the 20th Massachusetts and 42nd New York followed soon after. They crossed successfully and spread out in a skirmish line to clear the sharpshooters. Although some of the Confederates surrendered, fighting proceeded street by street through the town as the engineers completed the bridges.
With Hall's attack, the 50th were able to complete their bridges rapidly. Sumner's Right Grand Division began crossing at 16:30, but the bulk of his men did not cross until December 12. Hooker's Center Grand Division crossed on December 13, using both the northern and southern bridges..
The Regulars and the 1st New York detachments who had a comparatively easier time saw much less eventful crossings south of the city by Franklin's Left Grand Division. They had both bridges were completed by 11:00 on December 11 while five batteries of Union artillery suppressed most sniper fire against the engineers. Franklin was ordered at 16:00 to cross his entire command, but only a single brigade was sent over before dark. Crossings resumed at dawn and were completed by 13:00 on Thursday, December 12. Early on December 13, Jackson recalled his divisions under Jubal Early and D.H. Hill from down river positions to join his main defensive lines south of the city.
The clearing of the city buildings by Sumner's infantry and by artillery fire from across the river began the first major urban combat of both the war and American history. Union gunners sent more than 5,000 shells against the town and the ridges to the west. By nightfall, four brigades of Union troops occupied the town. These troops fresh from the bitter street fighting looted with a fury that had not been seen in the war up to that point. Most of the slaves left behind by the townsfolk, their erstwhile masters, took action and emancipated themselves by crossing the pontoon bridges in the other direction. [note 6] This behavior enraged Lee, who compared the AoP's looting with those of the ancient Vandals. The destruction and the escape of slaves also angered the Confederate troops, many of whom were native Virginians. Many on the Union side were also shocked by the destruction inflicted on Fredericksburg. Civilian casualties were unusually low given the widespread destruction; George Rable estimates no more than four civilian deaths.
The 50th had suffered all the fatalities of the Volunteer Engineer Brigade, 1 officer and 7 enlisted men killed with a further 3 officers and 39 enlisted men wounded. This was a heavy loss for the highly-trained men of the 50th, but they managed to persevere and complete the bridges. The 50th had learned a lot from the experience that would inform their tactics as well as those of the AoP in the future.
The next day was the scene of one of the AoP's most horrendous defeats on Marye's Heights.
