Alitalia Flight 45

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Alitalia Flight 45
Vickers Viscount Alitalia I-LAKE 28-03-1964.jpg
The wreckage of the aircraft
Accident
Date28 March 1964 (1964-03-28)
Summary Controlled flight into terrain
Site Mount Somma, Campania, Italy
40°49′18″N14°25′34″E / 40.82167°N 14.42611°E / 40.82167; 14.42611
Alitalia Flight 45
Aircraft
Aircraft type Vickers Viscount 785D
Operator Alitalia
IATA flight No.AZ45
ICAO flight No.AZA45
Call signALITALIA 45
Registration I-LAKE
Flight origin Turin-Caselle Airport, Turin, Italy
Last stopover Rome Fiumicino Airport, Rome, Italy
Destination Naples International Airport, Naples, Italy [1]
Occupants45
Passengers40
Crew5
Fatalities45
Survivors0

Alitalia Flight 45 was a scheduled flight operated by Alitalia with a Vickers Viscount 785D from Turin to Naples with a stopover in Rome. On 28 March 1964, while landing at Naples International Airport, the aircraft crashed into the slopes of Mount Somma due to poor weather conditions, causing the deaths of all 40 passengers and 5 crew members on board. [1]

Contents

Aircraft

The aircraft involved in the accident was a Vickers Viscount 785D with the registration number I-LAKE, powered by four Rolls Royce Dart 510s. It made its first flight on 18 August 1957 and was delivered to Alitalia on 1 October of the same year. [2] It was the first Viscount to operate for the airline. [3]

Flight

The flight left Turin-Caselle Airport at 7:15 PM bound for Rome with 49 passengers, landing at Rome Fiumicino at 8:20 PM. In Fiumicino all passengers disembarked, and 4 passengers from Turin along with 36 from Rome boarded the Vickers Viscount bound for Naples.[ citation needed ]

Due to bad weather and a technical problem which led to the replacement of the oil temperature indicator of the turbine of Engine No. 1, the take-off which was scheduled for 9:25 PM was delayed until 10:10 PM. The departure used Runway 25 with authorization from the Rome ACC. [4]

At 10:11 PM the pilot, at the invitation of the Fiumicino Tower, had established regular contact with the Rome ACC on frequency 123.7. [4]

At 10:28 PM the pilot had made contact with Naples ATC on frequency 120.7 and asked for the weather report which was as follows: [4]

"6/8 coverage - 2/8 CU at 2000 ft. - 3/8 SC at 3000 ft. - 2/8 AC at 7000 ft. - visibility 6 Km - QNH 29.65 - Runway in use 24 - QFE 29.31 - wind from the south 180/210 12 knots with runway 24 - temperature 11°"

Explanation:

"6/8 cloud coverage - 2/8 Cumulus at 2,000 ft (610 m) - 3/8 Stratocumulus at 3,000 ft (910 m) - 2/8 Altocumulus at 7,000 ft (2,100 m) - visibility 6 km (3.7 mi) - QNH 29.65 inHg (barometric pressure at sea level) - runway in use 24 - QFE 29.31 inHg (barometric pressure at airfield elevation) - wind from south (direction 180 to 210 degrees) at 12 knots aligned with runway 24 - temperature 11° celsius"

Original excerpt:

"6/8 copertura - 2/8 CU a 2000 ft. - 3/8 SC a 3000 ft. - 2/8 AC a 7000 ft. - visibilità 6 Km - QNH 29.65 - Pista in uso 24 - QFE 29.31 - vento da Sud 180/210 12 nodi con pista 24 - temperatura 11°"

At 10:32 PM the aircraft was cleared to descend from 7,000 ft (2,100 m) to 5,000 ft (1,500 m) and then at 10:34 PM to 4,000 ft (1,200 m) and was asked if it intended to use ILS. The aircraft replied: "we don't think so because we can see it" ("non crediamo perché si vede"). At 10:35 PM the aircraft reported directly above a beacon (beacon LD). Naples ATC asked what type of approach it intended to make and received the following response: "let's see, now we're turning downwind, leaving 4,000 feet directly on visual" ("vediamo, adesso viriamo sottovento lasciando 4000 direttamente on visual").[ citation needed ]

At 10:36 PM Naples ATC replied: "received... have the runway in sight from LD cleared for visual. Return to downwind and on final wind 180/210° 12 knots" ("ricevuto...avendo la pista in vista da LD autorizzato al visual. Riportate sottovento e in finale vento da 180/210° 12 nodi"). At 10:37 PM the aircraft communicated that it was leaving the vertical alignment of the LD radio beacon. This was the last radio communication from the aircraft crew with which the pilot Pasquale Umana confirmed the choice of a visual approach flight rather than using the ILS. [4]

Shortly after 10:37 PM, Alitalia Flight 45 flew past Naples, heading towards the sea at a southeast trajectory. At 10:39 PM, 30 seconds before impact, the aircraft flew over the town of San Sebastiano al Vesuvio on a 90° heading, with the landing gear retracted, engines running, and landing lights on, in heavy rain. At approximately 10:39 PM the aircraft impacted the slope of Mount Somma, which was covered in clouds at an altitude of approximately 610 metres (2,000 ft) with a heading of about 90° and a bank of approximately 20° left. The time of impact was established by averaging the readings of three watches found among the wreckage and taking into account the testimonies and the chronological sequence of the final phase of the flight. During the impact the aircraft disintegrated, projecting debris for 80 metres (260 ft), causing small fires to break out. [4]

Some farmers heard the noise of the plane crash and identified it as having occurred in the wooded area of the municipality of Somma Vesuviana. They alerted the Carabinieri station of Sant'Anastasia, triggering the search and rescue operations which proved difficult due to the bad weather and unfortunately useless for the 45 victims who all died on impact and in the resulting fire. [5]

The failure to stop the visual flight, despite the absence of the minimum visibility conditions required, had caused the pilot to make a turn that was too wide while on approach to Naples Airport, moving further south and to an altitude that was too low leading to a controlled flight into terrain.

Causes

The inquiry into the disaster concluded that the pilot's behaviour and the maneuvers he performed were influenced by the following factors:

  1. The weather conditions in the area surrounding the airport (cloud cover and precipitation) were variable and worse than those at the airport itself which were made known to the pilot by the field bulletin;
  2. An unaccounted for westerly wind pushed the Viscount towards Mount Vesuvius while the pilot had presumably planned an approach taking into account the southerly wind indicated in the field bulletin
  3. Possible excessive confidence of the pilot in command, Pasquale Umana, in his knowledge of the orographic characteristics of the area, a confidence derived from the fact that he had carried out many scheduled flights with stopovers at Naples Airport. [4]

Victims

List of passengers and crew members: [6]

Crew

Passengers

See also

References

  1. 1 2 "ASN Aircraft accident description Vickers 785D Viscount Alitalia I-LAKE". Aviation Safety Network. Retrieved 16 October 2025.
  2. "Viscount c/n 328 operational record". vickersviscount.net. Retrieved 16 October 2025.
  3. "I-LAKE". AZ Fleet. Retrieved 16 October 2025.
  4. 1 2 3 4 5 6 De Luca, Lamberto. Air Accidents and Flight Safety. Rome: Carpentieri. pp. 250–251.
  5. "L'aereo Torino-Roma-Napoli si schianta nella notte sul Vesuvio con 45 a bordo" (in Italian). La Stampa. 29 March 1964. Retrieved 16 October 2025.
  6. "L'aereo Torino-Napoli si è schiantato per una nube che copriva la vetta del Vesuvio" (in Italian). La Stampa. 31 March 1964. Retrieved 16 October 2025.