The 2026 Iran war has been analysed in terms of its possible military and political consequences for the Islamic Republic of Iran, and from international legal and geopolitical standpoints.
Military analysts have generally described Iran as being more resilient to US-Israeli attacks than anticipated, and have identified several unanticipated consequences of the attacks for US global interests, chiefly the disruption of international trade brought about by Iran's closure of the Strait of Hormuz. Many experts argue that the war is illegal under US law, [1] a claim that the Trump administration has rebuked, citing the precedent of unauthorized military actions by prior presidential administrations. [2] In international criminal law, experts have identified the attacks as a crime of aggression, [3] [4] specifically as a war of aggression. [5] [6] Numerous critics and analysts identified the US-Israeli attack with a more open embrace of expansionism [7] [8] and imperialism by the Trump administration, [9] [10] and a departure with the norms of the liberal international order. [11]
The quicker Iranian response relative to that of the Twelve-Day War suggests a change in Iran's command structure. [12] [13] [14] [15] According to senior adviser to the UAE president Dr. Anwar Gargash Iran's strategy was actually to make the Gulf states' security closer to the US. Iran's targeting of Gulf states may also be intended to increase energy prices globally, further putting global pressure on the US. [16]
The war unexpectedly showed Iran's most important tool is neither its missile program nor its nuclear program, but the ability to close the Strait of Hormuz, which quickly put pressure on US and its allies. [17] International Crisis Group's Iran Project director Ali Vaez stated, "In the attempt to try to prevent Iran from developing a weapon of mass destruction, the US handed Iran a weapon of mass disruption" in the form of weaponized control over the Strait of Hormuz. [18] Multiple sources compared the closure of the Strait to the Suez Crisis, suggesting that it would similarly result in a strategic failure for the US. [19] [20] [21] According to Frank Gardner, Iran has effectively "broken out of its box". [22]
On 17 April 2026, Abdullah Mohtadi of the Komala Party of Iranian Kurdistan viewed the Islamic Republic as having been "[in]sufficiently weakened" by the war for Iranian Kurdish groups to take action towards their goal of federalism in Iran, which, according to Mohtadi, they see as necessary for democratisation. [23]
Many legal and military experts said that US actions in Iran are a type that require congressional authorization. They also noted the frequent use of the word "war" in Trump administration communication about the strikes, adding further credibility to the claim that the Trump administration had bypassed congressional war powers. Rubio said that the Trump administration had followed the War Powers Resolution, but questioned whether it was legally binding. [1] Multiple American presidents and administrations have launched wars or military operations without congressional approval. [24] Legal experts have argued that Trump's actions in Iran can be distinguished from prior non-authorized uses of force because the "speculative pre-emptive" justification for this war is comparatively weak when measured against past domestic and international legal rationales. [25]
On 13 March, the US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth stated "... no quarter, no mercy for our enemies." Aside from being "especially prohibited" in international law to "declare that no quarter will be given," it is also prohibited in the US Department of Defense's own law of war manual. Hegseth's statement likely violates US War Crimes statute 18 U.S.C. § 2441. [2]
On 5 April, Trump repeatedly threatened to bomb all of Iran's bridges and power plants if it did not agree to a deal to end the war, setting a deadline of 8:00 p.m. EDT (Eastern Daylight Time) on 7 April. Trump wrote in a Truth Social post that "a whole civilization will die" if Iran refused to comply. [26] Lieutenant Colonel Rachel VanLandingham, a professor at Southwestern Law School, told PBS News, that targeting electricity systems could affect many civilian facilities including hospitals and access to clean water, and cause the civilian population to feel terrified of such potential broad impacts. VanLandingham said Trump's rhetoric could constitute a violation of U.S. law, which prohibits "measures of intimidation against a civilian population", including primarily trying to "sow terror amongst that civilian population". [27]
The joint US-Israeli attacks on Iran are widely considered illegal under international law, as they violate the UN Charter's prohibition on the use of force, because the attacks fail to meet the criteria for self-defense and lack authorization from the United Nations Security Council. [28] [3] [4] There is no recognized legal basis for preventive war or forcible regime change. [29] The attacks have been, therefore, considered a war of aggression, [11] [30] <refref name="AFSC-20260309"/> [6] which is the supreme war crime. [31] [32]
Ben Saul, United Nations special rapporteur on Human Rights and Counter-terrorism, stated that Iran had not enriched uranium to the point of building a nuclear device, that experts agreed Iran did not possess a nuclear weapon, and that the case was nowhere close to being self-defense against an imminent attack. [28] Don Rothwell, a professor of international law at the Australian National University, stated that the UN Security council did not pass a resolution to attack Iran and had no legal basis for justifying use of force. [28] The Law Society Journal noted that striking Iran during active negotiations was against the principles of good faith outlined in Article 2(2) of the UN Charter. [33]
According to The Guardian , under international law, Iran has the right to attack US and Israeli military targets following their attacks on Iran, however, Iranian attacks against civilians and against countries not party to the conflict are illegal. [3] The blocking of the strait of Hormuz by Iran was described as a violation of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. [34] Amnesty International declared Iran's recruiting of child soldiers as a war crime. [35] [36]
U.S. President Trump had threatened to destroy all the bridges and power plants in Iran and said the country will be brought "back to the Stone Ages, where they belong," if it does not agree to a deal to end the war or reopen the Strait of Hormuz. [37] [38] [39] According to legal scholar Tom Dannenbaum at Stanford Law School, Robert Goldman, a war crimes expert at the American University Washington College of Law, and Sarah Yager, the Washington director of Human Rights Watch, targeting Iranian infrastructure, including power plants, would violate international law if it causes harm to civilians that is excessive in relation to the anticipated military advantage. [40] Although immediate prosecution of Trump administration officials for alleged war crimes is unlikely (similar to Benjamin Netanyahu over the Gaza war), such prosecutions in principle can be brought by any country exercising universal jurisdiction at any time in the future. [41]
Luis Moreno Ocampo, the founding chief prosecutor of the ICC, argued that threats by Donald Trump to destroy Iranian infrastructure, alongside mutual attacks on energy infrastructure by Iran and Israel, do not constitute legitimate military targets under international humanitarian law and are war crimes under the Rome Statute. Ocampo likened these actions to the Russian attacks on Ukrainian energy infrastructure that led to ICC indictments. [42] Stephen J. Rapp, former U.S. ambassador-at-large for war crimes issues, said that such conduct risks making the U.S. a rogue state. He and two other international law experts interviewed by NBC News said that Trump's threats alone could potentially constitute a war crime. [39]
More than 100 international law experts signed an open letter in Just Security , [2] expressing "profound concern" over "serious violations of international law", namely: [4]
Numerous critics and analysts identified the US-Israeli attack as a more open embrace of expansionism [7] [8] and imperialism by the Trump administration. [9] [10] The US–Israeli attack is widely considered a "war of choice". [43] According to the founding chief prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC) Luis Moreno Ocampo, the U.S. war on Iran is comparable to Russia's war in Ukraine, adding that the world is going from the "rules-based system" to the "rule of the man", which is "not a viable world". [11] A number of US and Israeli officials, including Hegseth, [44] have made religious justifications for the war. [45] [46]
The Washington Institute said that the war had been a setback for Russian influence in the region. However, they also noted that it may distract the United States from the war in Ukraine. [47]
Analysts argued that deliberate reductions to US intelligence capacity in the period preceding the conflict had created structural limitations on American operational effectiveness, with the rescue of the downed F-15E crew exposing the extent to which institutional erosion was constraining strategic outcomes across multiple theatres. [48]
The war has been described as having various benefits and drawbacks for Chinese geopolitical interests. The BBC reported that the closure of the Strait of Hormuz and the war in Iran may weaken Chinese interests in countries that rely on Gulf countries' oil. [49] US aggression in Iran played into Chinese rhetoric that frames China as "a pillar of stability in contrast to an unpredictable America." Analysts noted that China has interests both in Iran and in the Gulf states, and that Gulf states may seek closer ties with China after facing attacks from Iran because of their US-alignment. However, analysts also pointed to the loss of discounted sanctioned oil and the inflationary impact of oil scarcity as potential economic drawbacks to the war. [50] Ashok Swain suggested that Trump's coercive diplomacy and expansionist actions against Iran would erode American power due to overstretching its resources in favor of China. [51]
Gilbert Achcar said that the US was practicing a modernized version of gunboat diplomacy. [52] Gokay and Hamourtziadou connected the attack on Iran with a longstanding pattern of US interventions in the region. They also connected the attack on Iran in the midst of negotiations to the history of United States treaty-breaking during westward expansion. [53] Saeed Shah wrote that many in the Global South do not view the war as having the moral purpose that the US and many of its allies asserted, and that they instead see the war as a failure of diplomacy, and an act of aggression against a weaker nation. International relations experts said that the erosion of international law was making nations in the Global South feel insecure, and more likely to support a coalition against US interests. [54]
Based on the Israeli political landscape and enthusiasm for the war, Daniel Levy wrote on 30 March that its interests may be opposed to all who are seeking an end to the war. He said the Lebanon theatre of war was another campaign with no clear endgame. He concluded that "Israel will continue to encourage and provoke escalation and to undermine any negotiation or ceasefire talks, including nudging the US towards ground operations." He said Israel's actions accelerate US global decline. [55]
Analysts at Eagle Intelligence Reports argued that the strikes reinforced North Korea's nuclear deterrence calculus, with Pyongyang interpreting the military action against a non-nuclear Iran as strategic validation of its own weapons programme as essential to regime survival, and that the conflict would accelerate North Korean nuclear expansion while making denuclearisation talks "almost unimaginable in the foreseeable future". [56]
Over a century earlier, the Ottoman Empire entered World War I. Several factors conspired to influence the Ottoman entry into World War I. [57]
According to Kemal Karpat:
The start of the 2026 Iran War has been described similarly. [8] [ failed verification ]
'Trump is clearly an imperialist president. He's clearly someone who is infatuated with his own power in terms of being able to deploy our military,' New Jersey Democratic Senator Andy Kim said
One could say that the United States has shifted under Trump, in his second term, to a modernized version of the nineteenth-century 'gunboat diplomacy', when major powers forced their will over weaker states by threatening to bomb them, or by actually bombing them if recalcitrant. There was then no concern about the nature of governments — only the naked will to crudely impose imperialist interests on weaker countries.
The current US diplomacy with Iran can be characterised as an extension of an imperial modus operandi, reflecting a pattern in which agreements serve as leverage points, contingent upon full compliance and discarded when paramount interests necessitate escalation. Critics contend that the approach adopted by the Trump administration, integrating military operations with a binary choice between capitulation and conflict, exemplifies historical imperial patterns of dominance.
Siphamandla Zondi, professor of politics at the University of Johannesburg, said that in the west, wars were viewed as having moral purpose, while in the global south, conflict was seen as evil and a failure to behave as adults. He said that the US and Israel had cajoled some countries through the Abraham Accords for diplomatic recognition of Israel, and used force against others. 'This is a war of domination and subordination, therefore it has imperialist undertones and motives,' said Zondi. 'It makes the world unsafe for all of us.'