Arctic policy of China

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The People's Republic of China (PRC) published its first official Arctic policy in a white paper released in 2018 and declared itself a "near-Arctic state." [1] Analysts have also noted the development of People's Liberation Army (PLA) capabilities that could extend to the Arctic. [2] [3] Termed the "Polar Silk Road" of the larger Belt and Road Initiative, China's arctic policy has been understood by analysts to encompass geostrategic and economic objectives, such as providing options to bypass the Strait of Malacca and the Suez Canal while accessing the Northeast Passage. [4]

Contents

History

China's links to the Arctic date back to the early 20th century. In 1925, the Republic of China signed the Spitsbergen Treaty, granting access to commercial activity on Svalbard. [5] However, for much of the 20th century, China showed limited interest in the region, focusing instead on Antarctica after the founding of the PRC in 1949. [6]

Scientific engagement grew from the late 1980s with the establishment of the Polar Research Institute of China in Shanghai and the launch of the Chinese Journal of Polar Research in 1988. [7] The first expedition to the North Pole organized by Chinese scientists took place in 1995, and the first expedition organized by the Polar Research Institute of China took place in 1999. [8] China has conducted Arctic expeditions annually since 2016. [8]

China joined the International Arctic Science Committee in 1996, [9] and since 1999 has operated research icebreakers, including the Xue Long and Xue Long 2. In 2004, China established the Yellow River Station in Norway's Svalbard archipelago. While officially devoted to research, analysts have raised concerns about potential dual-use applications. [10] [11]

China hosted the Arctic Science Summit Week in 2005—the first Asian country to do so. By 2010, Chinese policymakers pursued a cautious Arctic approach to avoid alarming the Arctic coastal states, particularly Russia, which had resumed bomber patrols in the region and planted a flag on the seabed in 2007. [12]

In 2012, the Xue Long became the first Chinese vessel to traverse the Northeast Passage. [13] China was granted permanent observer status in the Arctic Council in 2013. [14]

In September 2015, Chinese navy vessels appeared near the coast of Alaska for the first time. [8]

2018 white paper

In January 2018, China released its first Arctic Policy white paper, which remains the most detailed official statement of its regional strategy. [15] The document describes China as a "near-Arctic state," a self-designation that has drawn criticism from Arctic governments and analysts. China argues that its geographic proximity, climatic vulnerability, and economic interests give it a stake in Arctic affairs. [16]

The paper emphasizes four principles: respect, cooperation, win–win outcomes, and sustainability. It highlights climate change, ecological protection, shipping routes, and resource utilization as areas of focus. China also commits to following international law, including the UNCLOS, and acknowledges that non-Arctic states lack territorial sovereignty in the region. [15]

Strategic objectives

Chinese interests in the Arctic can be grouped into four main areas:

Polar Silk Road

The concept of the "Polar Silk Road" (冰上丝绸之路) was introduced in the 2018 white paper and has since become a central theme in China's Arctic policy. [4] [16] It envisions Arctic shipping lanes as extensions of the Belt and Road Initiative, providing alternative trade routes between Asia, Europe, and North America and also leveraging melting ice for resource extraction. Chinese state-owned enterprises have participated in feasibility studies and infrastructure development along Russia's Arctic coast, including telecommunications projects under the Digital Silk Road. [19]

Supporters argue the Polar Silk Road could lower shipping costs and diversify trade flows, while critics view it as a vehicle for expanding Chinese influence into a region traditionally dominated by Arctic states. [1] [20]

See also

References

  1. 1 2 Ngila, Faustine (April 20, 2023). "China is cementing its position as an Arctic superpower through Russia". Quartz . Retrieved April 20, 2023.
  2. Brady, Anne-Marie (December 10, 2019). "Facing Up to China's Military Interests in the Arctic". Jamestown Foundation . Archived from the original on April 7, 2020. Retrieved 2019-12-13.
  3. Jüris, Frank (2020-03-07). "Handing over infrastructure for China's strategic objectives: 'Arctic Connect' and the Digital Silk Road in the Arctic". Sinopsis. Archived from the original on 2020-04-08. Retrieved 2020-05-09.
  4. 1 2 Bandurski, David (2026-01-19). "Polar Silk Road". China Media Project. Retrieved 2026-01-19.
  5. Tønnesson, Stein (2020). "China and the Arctic: Threat or Opportunity?". Clingendael Institute. Archived from the original on 2020-05-02. Retrieved 2020-05-12.
  6. Sun, Kai (2014). "Beyond the Dragon and the Panda: Understanding China's Engagement in the Arctic". Asia Policy (18): 46–51. ISSN   1559-0968. JSTOR   24905275.
  7. Lasserre, Frédéric; et al. (2017). "China's strategy in the Arctic: threatening or opportunistic?" (PDF). Polar Record . 53 (1): 31. Bibcode:2017PoRec..53...31L. doi:10.1017/S0032247415000765. hdl:20.500.11794/876. S2CID   131750098. Archived from the original (PDF) on 2017-12-02.
  8. 1 2 3 Lamazhapov, Erdem (2025-10-15). "Polar regions for global status: China's great power discourse and status-seeking practice in the Arctic and Antarctic". The British Journal of Politics and International Relations 13691481251378895. doi: 10.1177/13691481251378895 . ISSN   1369-1481.
  9. Wright, David Curtis (2011). The Dragon Eyes the Top of the World: Arctic Policy Debate and Discussion in China (PDF). Naval War College. Archived (PDF) from the original on December 23, 2024. Retrieved November 10, 2024.
  10. Tatlow, Didi Kirsten (2024-07-21). "China's expanding Arctic ambitions challenge the U.S. and NATO". Newsweek . Retrieved 2024-07-21.
  11. 1 2 Tang, Jane (November 7, 2024). "How Chinese nationalism is sending jitters through the Arctic". Radio Free Asia . Archived from the original on November 10, 2024. Retrieved November 10, 2024.
  12. "China Prepares for an Ice-Free Arctic" (PDF). Archived from the original (PDF) on 2013-02-20. Retrieved 2012-10-04.
  13. Icebreaker Xuelong concludes Arctic expedition Archived 2012-09-29 at the Wayback Machine China Daily
  14. Buixadé Farré, Albert; Stephenson, Scott R.; Chen, Linling; Czub, Michael; Dai, Ying; Demchev, Denis; Efimov, Yaroslav; Graczyk, Piotr; Grythe, Henrik; Keil, Kathrin; Kivekäs, Niku; Kumar, Naresh; Liu, Nengye; Matelenok, Igor; Myksvoll, Mari (2014-10-02). "Commercial Arctic shipping through the Northeast Passage: routes, resources, governance, technology, and infrastructure". Polar Geography . 37 (4): 298–324. Bibcode:2014PolGe..37..298B. doi:10.1080/1088937X.2014.965769. hdl: 2440/112024 .
  15. 1 2 "Full text: China's Arctic Policy". gov.cn . State Council of the People's Republic of China. 2018-01-26. Archived from the original on 2018-02-01. Retrieved 2018-01-31.
  16. 1 2 3 Woon, Chih Yuan (2020-04-01). "Framing the "Polar Silk Road" (冰上丝绸之路): Critical geopolitics, Chinese scholars and the (Re)Positionings of China's Arctic interests" . Political Geography. 78 102141. doi:10.1016/j.polgeo.2019.102141. ISSN   0962-6298. Archived from the original on 2022-10-20. Retrieved 2025-05-09.
  17. "China, Russia to deepen energy cooperation in Arctic". Reuters . 2018-11-07. Retrieved 2020-05-10.
  18. "China's Arctic Strategy and the Future of the Arctic". NATO Review . Retrieved 2020-05-09.
  19. "China, Russia eye Arctic digital link to Europe" . Financial Times . 2019-04-15. Retrieved 2020-05-09.
  20. Jakobson, Linda (2018-05-01). "China's Arctic ambitions". The Interpreter. Lowy Institute . Retrieved 2020-05-09.