Conciliationism

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Conciliationism is a view in the epistemology of disagreement according to which one should revise one's opinions closer to one's epistemic peers in the face of epistemic disagreement. Nathan Ballantyne and E.J. Coffman define the view as follows: [1]

Conciliationism: In a revealed peer disagreement over P, each thinker should give at least some weight to her peer’s attitude. That is, each thinker’s confidence should change to some extent: neither thinker is justified in staying exactly as confident as she initially was regarding whether P.

Philosopher David Christensen has been a prominent defender of this view. [2] [3] Others have argued in its favor as well. [4] Some have discussed the implications of this view for religious belief. [5]

A standard objection is that conciliationism is self-undermining because most philosophers do not accept it. [6] A number of responses have been offered. [7] [8] A second objection is that if a person encounters multiple people who disagree, and applies conciliationism serially, the procedure violates commutativity. The order that the person encounters the other people affects her resultant doxastic state. [9]

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References

  1. Nathan Ballantyne; E.J. Coffman (2012). "Conciliationism and Uniqueness" (PDF). Australasian Journal of Philosophy. 90 (4): 657–670. doi:10.1080/00048402.2011.627926. S2CID   7176580.
  2. David Christensen (Sep 2009). "Disagreement as Evidence: The Epistemology of Controversy" (PDF). Philosophy Compass. 4 (5): 756–767. doi:10.1111/j.1747-9991.2009.00237.x.
  3. David Christensen (Mar 2011). "Disagreement, question-begging, and epistemic self-criticism". Philosophers' Imprint. 11 (6).
  4. Wang, Torrey. "The Total Evidence View as a Case for Conciliationism" (PDF). Archived from the original (PDF) on 26 August 2014. Retrieved 22 August 2014.
  5. John Pittard (2014). "Conciliationism and Religious Disagreement" (PDF). Challenges to Moral and Religious Belief: Disagreement and Evolution. Oxford University Press. ISBN   978-0-19-966977-6.
  6. "Christensen's 'Disagreement as Evidence: the Epistemology of Controversy' – Part 4". Philosopher's Workshop. 9 Oct 2012. Archived from the original on 26 August 2014. Retrieved 22 August 2014.
  7. Shawn Graves (Jan 2013). "The Self-undermining Objection to the Epistemology of Disagreement". Faith and Philosophy. 30 (1): 93–106. doi: 10.5840/faithphil20133015 .
  8. John Pittard (Jun 2014). "Resolute Conciliationism" (PDF). Retrieved 22 August 2014.
  9. Gardiner, Georgi (2014). "The Commutativity of Evidence: A Problem for Conciliatory Views of Peer Disagreement". Episteme. 11 (1): 83–95. doi:10.1017/epi.2013.42. ISSN   1742-3600. S2CID   145293979.