Conscription in Rhodesia

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Conscription played a significant role in the history of Rhodesia, including during the Rhodesian Bush War. A national service scheme was implemented in 1957 and the relatively large size of the Rhodesian Security Forces, most of whom were conscripts, contributed to the government having the confidence to illegally declare independence in November 1965. Throughout the Bush War the Security Forces relied on conscripts from the country's small white population as well as the coloured and Indian populations. The great majority of the population, who were black, were exempt from conscription until shortly before the end of the war.

Contents

Young men who were eligible for conscription were required to undertake a period of full-time national service in the Security Forces. At the conclusion of this period, they remained liable for call up as members of the part-time reserves. This made conscription a major element in the lives of white Rhodesian men, though some evaded their obligations.

As the Bush War continued and Rhodesia's situation deteriorated, requirements on conscripts were increased. This included longer periods of mandatory national service as well as more frequent and lengthy call ups of reservists. Men from older age groups also became liable for service, with 60 year olds being required to serve in the Security Forces from early 1979. This placed a considerable burden on the white minority and contributed to high rates of emigration. It also harmed the Rhodesian economy. The declining white population further undermined Rhodesia's war effort and contributed to the transition to majority rule as Zimbabwe.

Background

A map showing Rhodesia's location in Africa Rhodesia.png
A map showing Rhodesia's location in Africa

Southern Rhodesia was a self-governing British colony located in southern Africa which had been founded by the British South Africa Company in 1890 and achieved self-government in 1923. [1] [2] Its economy and government was controlled by the small white minority of its population. [1]

From 1962 the Southern Rhodesian government was led by the Rhodesian Front political party, with Ian Smith serving as Prime Minister from 1964 until 1979. This party was deeply committed to maintaining the white minority's privileged status, and this motivated a decision to declare independence from the United Kingdom rather than submit to a transition to majority rule. [3] [4] Accordingly, the government issued Rhodesia's Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) from the United Kingdom in November 1965, and the colony became Rhodesia. [5] UDI was illegal and led to Rhodesia being internationally isolated and subjected to economic sanctions by other countries. [6]

The number of white people in Southern Rhodesia increased from 82,000 in 1946 to 250,000 in 1965 due almost entirely to immigration from mainly English-speaking countries. [2] The white population was always less than 5 per cent of Rhodesia's total population. [7] There were also around 30,000 coloured and Indians in Rhodesia. [8] Few of the white migrants intended to settle permanently, with there being high rates of both immigration into and emigration from Rhodesia during most years of the country's existence. This meant that many members of the white population did not have strong feelings of loyalty towards Rhodesia as they had migrated there intending to take up specific opportunities before moving to another country. [9]

UDI and Rhodesia's racial inequalities led to the Rhodesian Bush War. [5] [10] Guerrilla activities began in 1966, and mainly involved small groups of communist-armed and trained personnel operating in northern areas of Rhodesia. Until the early 1970s the Rhodesian Security Forces had little difficulty defeating the guerrillas. [11] Rhodesia's security situation deteriorated during the mid-1970s when the nationalists were able to establish bases in neighbouring Mozambique as Portuguese rule there faltered and finally ended in 1975. This caused rapid growth in the insurgency which the Security Forces were unable to contain. In March 1978 the Rhodesian Front government entered into the Internal Settlement with pro-western nationalists which led to the country transitioning to a form of majority rule in June 1979 as Zimbabwe Rhodesia. This government lacked legitimacy, including as the Rhodesian Front continued to have a strong influence on its priorities, and the war continued. By this time the conflict was escalating and costing 2,000 lives each month. [12] [13] International pressure and a desire by the government and nationalist groups to end the fighting led to the Lancaster House Agreement, which was signed in December 1979. Rhodesia transitioned to majority rule and became independent as Zimbabwe in 1980. [14]

Conscription of whites and other minority groups

Early years

Conscription was introduced in Southern Rhodesia in 1957 as part of the 1957 Defence Act. [15] All young white men were required to undertake a six week period of national service with the Rhodesia Regiment, during which they went through basic training. [15] [16] In 1960, when Southern Rhodesia formed part of the Central African Federation, Rhodesian conscripts were deployed to what is now northern Zambia in response to the Congo Crisis. [17] This crisis also led to the expansion of the Territorial Army, which was made up of conscripts who had completed their national service but remained liable for part-time service as reservists. [16] In the early 1960s the period of compulsory training was increased to four and a half months. Conscripts were required to then serve as reservists in the Territorial Army or the British South Africa Police's (BSAP) Police Reserve for a further three years. [18] [19] Reserve service involved training conducted over weekends. [19] In 1963, there were 15,000 reservists. [20]

At the time of UDI, the conscription scheme applied to white, coloureds and Indian Rhodesian men. The period of full time national service remained four and a half months. [17] In 1966 the Rhodesian government decided that liability for conscription would primarily be based on residence rather than citizenship. This meant that British subjects and South Africans living in Rhodesia were required to register along with Rhodesian citizens. [21] Full time national service was also extended to 35 weeks from April 1966. [22] [8] By 1972 all white men aged between 18 and 25 needed to undertake nine months training with either the Army or BSAP. They were then obliged to serve as reservists with the Territorial Army for three years, during which they could be called up for active service. [17]

From the mid-1970s shortages of white manpower were seen by the Rhodesian government as one of the main constraints on its war effort. The high proportion of white men who evaded conscription contributed to this; for instance, in 1973 half the eligible men who were called up managed to avoid serving in the Security Forces. Many white men also did not register for conscription and others did not report for duty when they were called up. [23] This led to multiple changes to reduce exemptions and options to defer military service. The Security Forces also lowered their medical standards over time. [23] Some steps were taken to address draft dodging. This included granting military police the power to require that white men demonstrate that they were registered for national service, which came into effect in 1973. [24]

Changes during the mid 1970s

The manpower shortages also led to multiple changes to the periods for which conscripts were required to serve and the eligible age ranges. [23] The historian Luise White has noted that she and other authors have found it difficult to summarise how the conscription scheme operated from 1972 onwards as arrangements became "cumbersome". [17]

A graph illustrating the increasing mandatory service period for national servicemen between 1957 and 1979 National service period in Rhodesia between 1957 and 1979.png
A graph illustrating the increasing mandatory service period for national servicemen between 1957 and 1979

In February 1974 the Rhodesian government announced a range of changes that aimed to expand the Army so that it could respond to the increasing number of attacks by nationalist forces. These changes included doubling the number of men who were called up for national service and requiring youths to undertake national service shortly after they completed schooling. Reservists aged over 25 became liable for call up periods for up to a month. The government argued that expanding the number of national servicemen would reduce the burden on reservists, as they would be called up less frequently. New white migrants to Rhodesia were granted a five-year exemption from being required to undertake national service; this was intended to bring Rhodesia's migration policy into line with comparable countries. [25] From 1974 all non-African men aged between 18 and 25 who had not completed national service were barred from leaving Rhodesia. [26]

In mid-1975 the national service period was extended to a full year and white reservists aged 25–30 became liable to serve for up to 59 days when called up. These changes were introduced after extensive public debate. The call up period was soon increased to 84 days. White men aged 30–38 were obliged to serve for shorter periods. [17] Also in 1975, the 'grace period' in which new immigrants to Rhodesia were exempt from conscription was reduced from four to two years. [26]

Final years of the Bush War

The conscription system was intensified in 1976. On 1 May the government announced that for three years following their completion of national service, reservists would be subject to "continuous call up" for the Territorial Army. This meant that the Army no longer had to specify the duration of active service periods for these men when they were called up; this change badly harmed morale in the Security Forces. [27] [28] Further changes were announced in May, including additional obligations for reservists aged 25 to 38 and the extension of the national service period to 18 months. [17] Young men who were going onto university had to serve for 24 months as they were exempt from reserve duties during their studies. [29] This change applied to men undertaking national service at the time, with their period of active service being extended by six months. [30] On 14 May it was announced that all exemptions from conscription which had been previously granted would be cancelled, and men applying to be reassessed would need to meet stricter criteria. [30] The National Service Act was amended during July and August 1976 to formalise these changes; this saw further changes introduced, including a requirement that boys aged 16 and over register for conscription (though the call up age remained at 18) and reforms to the administration of the conscription scheme. [31] The National Service Act was also amended in 1976 to ban boys aged 16 years and over from leaving Rhodesia until they had completed national service. [26] The government announced in November 1976 that continuous call up would be abolished, but in its place men who had completed national service would be called up for three months. [32] The changes to the conscription system over 1976 effectively put the country on a war footing and represented a significant burden on the white population. [33]

There were further significant changes during 1977. From April reservists aged under 38 were obliged to serve for up to 190 days annually. Men aged between 38 and 50 became liable for call up, and were required to serve for 70 days a year. Those aged over 50 were encouraged to volunteer for the Police Reserve, which had an obligation of at least 42 days service annually. Exceptions from national service and reserve duties were reduced. [34] [35] Following considerable debate, self employed men also became liable for short periods of service in the Police Reserve. [36] In September all student deferments were cancelled. [35] Also from 1977, employers were required to report on whether their white, coloured and Indian employees were serving in the Security Forces. [37] During the same year, a bonus payment was introduced for national servicemen who volunteered for a further year of full-time service. [17]

Reservists aged between 25 and 38 were the cohort most frequently called up during the late 1970s, and typically rotated between six week periods in the Security Forces followed by six weeks in their civilian occupation. During nationalist offensives these men were often required to rotate between their military and civilian roles every four weeks. [29]

From 1978 men aged 38 to 49 were subject to up to 10 weeks service annually in blocks of up to two weeks; in practice though, only those with the most military experience were required to perform active duty. [17] In January of that year, the 'grace period' for new migrants was reduced from two years to six months. The national service period was decreased from 18 to 12 months from October. [35] The Rhodesian Government considered greatly expanding the professional Army and ending the call up in 1978, but this was found to be impractical and too expensive. [17] [38]

In January 1979 the call up was further expanded when men aged 50 to 60 were required to serve as guards in cities for 42 days a year. Only 20 percent of these men reported for duty. [39] [40] They were nick-named "Mashford's Militia" as a reference to a prominent funeral parlour in Sailisbury, the Rhodesian capital. [35] In January 1979 the government considered requesting that men in vital occupations which made them exempt from conscription volunteer to serve in the Security Forces on weekends and after hours on weekdays. [41] In late 1979 the Zimbabwe Rhodesia government reduced the period of national service to 12 months and sought to reduce call ups of older men; these measures aimed to placate the white minority. The worsening war situation led to the continuation of large scale call ups though. [42]

Conscription was retained by Prime Minister Robert Mugabe in the period immediately after the end of the Bush War and Rhodesia's transition to Zimbabwe. Mugabe considered it necessary "until the outstanding dissident element had been rounded up". [43] Conscription was subsequently abolished and as of 1983 the Zimbabwe National Army was made up entirely of volunteers. [44]

Coloured and Indian conscripts

For most of the Bush War, coloured and Indian reservists were paid less than their white peers and also experienced other forms of discrimination. [45] For instance, they were not permitted to become officers until 1977. [46] This led to these men having low morale and being less effective than white soldiers. Until 1978 Coloured and Indian reservists were posted to protection companies in the Army or served as drivers. [45] The protection companies guarded infrastructure and the transport units moved supplies and troops; both duties were regarded as tedious by white military personnel. [47] After 1978 coloured and Indian reservists were generally assigned to the Rhodesian Defence Regiment, making up most of its personnel (the remainder being low quality white personnel). [45] The pay and conditions of coloured and Indian personnel were not equalised with those of white reservists until the final period of the war. [45]

Coloured men faced stronger incentives to report for national service and call ups than whites. As coloured households were typically less well off than whites, men could not afford to risk being imprisoned for draft evasion. [37]

Conscription of black Rhodesians

Exemption from conscription

Many black Rhodesians served with the Rhodesian Security Forces, but until the last months of the war this was almost entirely voluntary. [48] As of 1978, black men made up approximately two-thirds of the 10,000 volunteers serving in the Rhodesian Army and more had applied to serve but been turned away. [49] The amendments to the National Security Act in 1976 gave the government the power to conscript black men who were undertaking an apprenticeship or university studies, but this was not used imediately. [31] The Rhodesian Government considered conscripting black Rhodesians at various times, and serious proposals were put forward from around 1977. [50] There were concerns within the civil service and Army over extending conscription in this way. This was due to concerns that many black men would refuse to serve and that some of those who were successfully conscripted would be loyal to the nationalists. Overall, the Army favoured conscripting blacks as they could be paid less than white reservists and were likely to be just as effective in battle. [51]

The first time that black Rhodesians were conscripted was in October 1977, when 50 doctors were called up for national service. Some of these doctors reportedly resigned rather than serve in the Security Forces. Other doctors told the media that they would also resign if called up. [52] These objections led to the near-abandonment of efforts to conscript black doctors. [49] The Rhodesian government indicated in early 1978 that black apprentices would become liable for national service in the future. [52]

Introduction of conscription

The Rhodesian government decided in late 1978 that black Rhodesians aged between 18 and 25 would be required to undertake national service. [53] This was regarded as necessary by white Rhodesians given the country was now in theory racially integrated and whites considered it unfair to be required to undertake national service if blacks were not. [54] It was hoped that expanding conscription would help to convince foreign observers that the Internal Settlement represented a genuine transition away from racial discrimination. [55] Rhodesian Front members of parliament had previously opposed conscripting black men due to fears that they could revolt, but now supported doing so in the belief that these men would want to fight for the new government. [56] Abel Muzorewa, who headed the Zimbabwe Rhodesia government from its establishment, agreed with extending conscription in this way after being pressured by Rhodesian Prime Minister Ian Smith. [15] [57] As almost all able bodied white men were in the Security Forces, conscripting black men was also considered necessary to continue the war effort. [56]

In October 1978 the Rhodesian government published regulations setting out the arrangements for conscripting black men. All members of this cohort who aged between 18 and 25 were required to register for national service prior to 1 December that year. Those who had at least three years secondary education or were undertaking an apprenticeship would become liable for a one-year national service period from early 1979. [53] It was estimated that approximately 25,000 men met these criteria. [57] The Rhodesian Army lacked the ability to train the very large numbers of black conscripts that would have resulted from a broader national service requirement. [49] Some senior Army officers wanted to create a very large army made up largely of black soldiers led by whites had the war continued; this was considered impractical by Combined Operations, the headquarters responsible for coordinating the war effort. [54]

Young black people in Bulawayo and other locations protested against the imposition of conscription, arguing that they were being forced to fight for the white minority against the legitimate representatives of the country. These protests were quickly supressed by the police. Thousands of black men did not register for conscription, even though this could lead to a large fine or imprisonment for up to five years. [57] The historian Peter McLaughlin has described the arrangements to conscript black men as "cautious and limited", as the white authorities did not want to relinquish power and it was anticipated that there would be resistance to this measure among the black majority. [55]

There was a widespread boycott among black men of conscription when it began in January 1979. [40] Of the 1,544 men who were called up, only 300 reported. [58] All educated black men aged between 16 and 60 became liable for conscription in August 1979, but this was not fully implemented. [59]

Some black Rhodesians were forced to serve in the Security Force Auxiliaries from 1978, with recruitment for these forces being partially undertaken by press gangs. The Security Force Auxiliaries were private armies raised by the Zimbabwe African National Union and United African National Council, both of which formed part of the Zimbabwe Rhodesia government. Many Security Force Auxiliary units eventually came under the control of the Security Forces, but they were generally ill disciplined and ineffective. [60] They made an important contribution to security for the 1979 Rhodesian general election and fought well in some districts, however. [61] Some of the conscripted members of these units adopted a live and let live approach with the nationalist forces when they were posted to operational areas. [62] Those conscripted from urban areas also performed poorly when assigned to protect rural communities, with some committing serious crimes. [61] [63]

Administration of the conscription system

By early 1976 there were growing concerns among the White Rhodesian community over how the conscription system was being administered. This included concerns over draft evasion and inequitable periods of service. In April the government formed a subcommittee led by the Minister of Co-ordination, Reginald Cowper, to consider improvements to the system. It recommended establishing a government agency to administer conscription and computerising the call up system. The Cabinet accepted these recommendations, and on 17 May the Directorate of Manpower was formed. From this time, the conscription system operated by the minister determining the number of men to call up based on advice from the Security Forces and the directorate then selecting the men who this would apply to. [64] Commanders in the Security Forces had discretion to select which members of their units where were called up, and tended to most frequently select the most effective personnel. [65] The government also accepted an offer from a computer company to develop a database and 200 people volunteered to input paper records into it. Computerisation was not successful, as the records were often out of date. [66]

Despite these changes, concerns over the conscription system continued to increase. The government was able to refute allegations that sportsmen and homosexuals were able to evade conscription, but there was a perception that the sons of prominent citizens were not called up. Some members of parliament criticised the administration of the system, citing examples of conscripts' skills being wasted and men who were called up being sent to locations where conscripts were readily available. The business community also regarded the administration of the scheme as poor. Apprentices were particularly affected by the intensification of conscription requirements, as many were unable to complete their qualifications as they were called up during exam periods. [66] The underlying issue was that the Security Forces' demands for manpower exceeded what the white community could provide without seriously harming white Rhodesian society and the national economy. [67]

The increased conscription requirements announced over 1976 and in early 1977 and maladministration of the conscription system led to a backlash from the business and farming communities. The business community protested against calling up 38 and 50 year olds and provided examples of firms being crippled when almost all their male white staff were called up simultaneously. This led to Cowper being forced to resign and further changes to the administration of the conscription system. [68] A National Manpower Board was established as an independent body with the power to grant exemptions from conscription, including on economic grounds. It was also responsible for advising the government on the best use of manpower. Local exemption boards continued to operate, but could only grant deferments of up to 90 days. Responsibility for administering the National Service Act was transferred to the Ministry of Labour, which was redesignated the Ministry of Manpower, Industrial Relations, and Social Affairs. Rowan Cronjé was appointed as minister for this portfolio, and took a more collaborative approach with businesses than Cowper had. [69]

Problems with administrating the conscription scheme continued though, with the extension of call up requirements to self employed farmers in 1977 being poorly implemented. [70] This led eleven Rhodesian Front backbenchers to criticise the scheme in Parliament during October 1977. [71] Cronjé argued that the problems were due to human error rather than systematic issues, and noted that five different government agencies were involved in the conscription system. He acknowledged that this had led to many reservists not being called up while peers had been required to spend a large amount of time in active service. He implemented reforms that were phased in over late 1977 which aimed to provide greater predictability of call up requirements to servicemen and spread the burden more fairly. [72] In practice though, the scheme remained unfair and confusing as Security Forces unit commanders continued to be able to more frequently select their most effective personnel to be called up. [65] The Security Forces also found the conscription arrangements administratively burdensome, and by 1977 many officers reported that they spent more time handling call-ups than they did on operations. [27]

The Rhodesian government did not have a formal mechanism to track down men who did not report for military service. While desertion could be punished by death, this was not enforced. Most officers were not concerned about men in their units evading call ups or deserting. As late as 1977 the Army did not keep records of the men who deserted. [73]

There was tension between the Security Forces and government over the administration of the conscription scheme in the last years of the war. The Security Forces believed that too many exemptions were granted and enforcement of call up notices was lax. In late 1978 Combined Operations proposed that the civilian boards which assessed requests for exemptions be disbanded, with the Security Forces taking on this function. Combined Operations also proposed making it illegal to ignore call up notices, with this being enforced by military police and the BSAP, and a range of reforms be introduced to require more men to serve. The Minister for Manpower strongly rejected these proposals on the grounds that the Security Forces were not making good use of their manpower and were more generous in granting exemptions than the civilian boards. He agreed to require that exemptions boards include a retired military officer though. [74]

Women were not subject to conscription, despite proposals to institute this. The Rhodesian government argued that it could not afford the costs of establishing a female military unit. [75]

Impact

Rhodesian Army

The relatively large size of the Rhodesian Security Forces, most of whom were reservists, contributed to the Southern Rhodesian government's judgement in 1965 that a Unilateral Declaration of Independence would be viable. [76] This also deterred a British military intervention to quash Rhodesian independence. At the time of UDI, the Rhodesian Security Forces included around 20,000 white personnel. The British government believed that intervening would lead to combat. [77] There was considerable opposition to UDI and Smith's government in the regular elements of the Security Forces and it was unclear whether black personnel would fight. Support for independence was much stronger among reservists, and due to their numbers this provided a key source of support for the government. [78] The British military assessed that a larger force would be required to disarm the Rhodesian Security Forces and then administer the country than was immediately available, and the heads of the British military services recommended against intervening. [79] This advice was accepted by the British government, who also regarded an intervention as undesirable due to a lack of public support for this approach and economic problems the United Kingdom was experiencing at the time. [80]

The expansion of conscription enabled the Rhodesian Army to grow in size. From 1973, national servicemen were posted to the Army's regular units, independent companies and the support services. The Rhodesia Regiment lost its training role and its battalions became fully manned by reservists. The number of battalions in the regiment eventually grew to eight, with a total nominal strength of 15,000 men. [15] The Army's regular units, including the elite Special Air Service, Selous Scouts and Grey's Scouts, also included elements manned by reservists from 1973 onwards. Most members of the Rhodesian Intelligence Corps were reservists, including its commanding officer. [15] The historian Glenn Cross has written that national servicemen and reservists staffed the Rhodesian government's chemical and biological weapons program that was active between 1976 and 1979. [81] The Rhodesian Air Force was opposed to the call up scheme and only used reservists to protect its aircraft. The Air Force believed that it wasn't practical to train conscripts to perform technical tasks. [82]

Police Reserve and other security units

Armoured cars that were operated by the BSAP Police Reserve Marmon-Herrington Armoured Car Mk III (9685391849).jpg
Armoured cars that were operated by the BSAP Police Reserve

From the early 1970s, all white men aged between 38 and 60 were required to serve with the Police Reserve. Some younger conscripts who were judged to not be suitable for the Army were also posted to the Police Reserve. Farmers and men in certain other occupations also served in the Police Reserve rather than the Army. [15]

The Police Reserve had two components, 'A' Reserve and the Field Reserve. The 'A' Reserve undertook crime prevention tasks. The Field Reserve was mainly used to guard farms, key elements of infrastructure and protect convoys travelling by road. Field Reserve units were usually poorly trained, led and equipped. [15] At its peak size, the BSAP comprised approximately 11,000 regulars (most of whom were black) and between 30,000 and 35,000 reservists. [16]

From 1975 some reservists were posted to the newly created Guard Force. These were mainly young white national servicemen who had been assessed as being of low quality and elderly reservists. The Guard Force was responsible for the protected villages which the Rhodesian Government had forced many black people to move into. The Guard Force received little training and its members often committed crimes against the residents of the protected villages. [45]

The Rhodesian Defence Regiment which most coloured and Indian conscripts were posted to from 1978 was poorly trained and equipped and had a reputation for indiscipline. [45] As the security situation deteriorated for Rhodesia, coloured and Indian personnel assigned to protection units faced increasing dangers. They believed that they were treated as cannon fodder, which deepened their opposition to the Rhodesian Front government. [46]

Impact of conscription during the Bush War

The Rhodesian Security Forces often did not make good use of conscripts. The Army struggled to find enough instructors to train reservists in the Rhodesia Regiment throughout the war, though standards in these units gradually improved. [45] Conscription gave the Security Forces access to men with a wide range of skills, and many young white men had learned to shoot and other basic military skills in their youth. [83] Despite this, reservists were often assigned tasks that did not make good use of their capabilities. [45] The regulars who made up the majority of the Rhodesian Light Infantry treated conscripts who were posted to the unit with disdain. [84] By 1977 the Security Forces were struggling to administer the national service scheme and equip the large number of conscripts. The Police Reserve could provide weapons, radios and transport vehicles to less than half the number of conscripts it was able to call up. The Guard Force lacked the staff needed to administer regular call-ups. Many soldiers believed that the Army and the broader war effort were highly inefficient. [85]

Military discipline among national servicemen was often relaxed and some refused to wear standard uniforms. [86] Following the Internal Settlement many white conscripts became less willing to risk their lives for a multi-racial government, especially as the war had entered a stalemate. This led to some evading active service by getting sympathetic doctors to provide them with grounds for a medical exemption. [87] There is evidence that by 1979 many conscripts were exhausted from active service and saw the war as futile. [88]

The fundamental limitation of the conscription system throughout the Bush War was a shortage of white manpower. This problem was made worse by high rates of emigration from Rhodesia. [89] While many contemporary European countries had longer periods of national service, often lasting for two years, this was impractical for Rhodesia due to the small size of the white population and the important role white men played in the economy. [90] By the late 1970s the Rhodesian Security Forces had access to large numbers of personnel, but due to economic constraints could only mobilise a minority of them at any given time. In general, around 25,000 men were on active service, with this peaking at around 60,000 (including the Security Force Auxiliaries) to provide security for the April 1979 election. [91] As there was a need to guard farms, infrastructure and protected villages, most conscripts had to be assigned to BSAP and military units tasked with defensive duties. This meant that the Security Forces had to rely on the small number of majority-regular units to undertake offensive operations. [92]

Social and economic impact

The national service scheme was supported by most white Rhodesians. Parents typically expected their sons to undertake national service and draft dodging was seen as dishonourable. [93] These views were common across families with different political opinions, as national service was often seen as being in the interests of Rhodesia rather than the Rhodesian Front government or the cause of sustaining white minority rule. [94] As a result, conscription was a major element in the lives of white Rhodesian men with most serving in the Security Forces. [95]

Most young men undertook national service because they were legally required to. Some where enthusiastic about serving in the Security Forces while others were uncommitted. [73] There was little sympathy for conscientious objectors from conscription, and none of the 34 applicants for this status in 1972 were approved. Men who refused to undertake national service due to their beliefs were gaoled or fined. In October 1973 a magistrate sentenced a juvenile to be caned for conscientious objection; this penalty was criticised by five judges of the High Court and rescinded, but by then the boy had been beaten. [96] By 1978 it was also an offence to advocate for conscientious objection. [97]

Calling up young men for military service affected the Rhodesian economy. Firms and industry associations expressed strong concerns over the absence of young white men, including as they were often managers in factories. [98] Many business operated by sole traders failed due to their call up obligations. [99] This damaged the Rhodesian economy, which was also faltering for other reasons. [100] National servicemen were commonly concerned about the impact which call up periods would have on their careers once they became reservists. [101] The extension of the call up to men aged between 38 and 50 was particularly economically harmful, as they often held important positions in businesses. Some companies paid their employees who had been called up the difference between their usual wage and what they received from the Security Forces, and this became more burdensome when senior staff members became liable for reserve service. [102] Some firms developed a preference for hiring black workers over whites as they were not liable for call ups. [99]

The increasing requirements of the Security Forces in the final years of the war were seen as unreasonable and not in line with the expectations of white Rhodesian families. They placed strain on families and contributed to a high divorce rate. Many conscripts developed post-traumatic stress disorder. This led to increasing evasion of call up requirements, particularly among older men. [103] [104] Many white Rhodesians who did not support the war sought to avoid all forms of conscription. [82] The extension of call up obligations to older men in the last months of the war caused many Rhodesians to conclude that the war had been lost. [105]

Conscription and emigration

Net migration of white people in Rhodesia between 1965 and 1975 Net migration of white people from Rhodesia between 1965 and 1979.png
Net migration of white people in Rhodesia between 1965 and 1975

The increasing burden of conscription on white Rhodesian men as the war continued forced them to make a decision to remain in Rhodesia or emigrate. Staying would involve more frequently being required to fight in a war that appeared lost. [107] Many white men and their families became unwilling to accept the burdens call ups imposed. [108] This choice was typically not available to coloured Rhodesians, as they did not hold foreign citizenship and families could not afford send their sons outside of the country. [37]

The Rhodesian government was aware that conscription was causing white men to emigrate from the country, and attempted to balance this against the Security Forces' needs. [89] All changes to national service requirements were debated within the government due to the impact they would have on emigration. [17] During the late 1970s emigration was usually discussed during meetings of the Rhodesian government's Manpower Committee. As one way of limiting the impact of conscription on emigration, in 1977 the Manpower Committee decided that the terms of military service should be obscured. This was only partly successful, as the increasing requirements continued to motivate white men to depart the country. [89]

The Rhodesian government also attempted to reduce the numbers of white men of military age leaving the country. In 1974 it became an offence for men to depart Rhodesia after being called up for service. At around this time, opportunities to travel or study outside of Rhodesia were also reduced and the Rhodesian government requested that South Africa extradite draft dodgers. [109] Later that year non-black Rhodesian men aged between 18 and 25 who had not completed national service were banned from emigrating. From 1976 the South African government began deporting some white Rhodesians for technical violations of immigration rules, though it publicly denied having a deal with Rhodesia to deny residence to white Rhodesians of military age. [26] From 1977 the sons of adults who were preparing to emigrate from Rhodesia were required to complete national service if they were called up before their parents completed the necessary paperwork to leave the country. [98] These restrictions led many white Rhodesians to feel like prisoners in the country, and encouraged them to leave when they could. The restrictions also reduced immigration into Rhodesia. [26]

In October 1976 the British government made a commitment to sympathetically consider requests for visas from British subjects who were seeking to evade conscription requirements in Rhodesia. [110] However, the British Home Office did not automatically grant asylum to men seeking to ender the UK to avoid fighting for the Rhodesian government, with applications being assessed on their individual merits. One Rhodesian conscript told The Guardian in 1977 that his request for asylum had been rejected as he was serving in the armed forces of Rhodesia, and thus considered to be a supporter of the illegal Rhodesian government. [111]

During the late 1970s Rhodesia experienced what the historian Josiah Brownell has described as "a self-sustaining cycle of increased service demands, increased white emigration, and a worsening military situation". [89] The declining white population contributed to the increased military obligations on those who remained, which in turn led to further emigration. The Manpower Committee noted that reservists who were required to undertake long periods of service were particularly likely to emigrate. Following considerable internal debate, in 1978 the Rhodesian government concluded that the white population was insufficient to meet the Security Forces' needs and further increasing their national service requirements would be counter-productive. [89]

The declining white population hindered Rhodesia's war efforts during the last years of the Bush War. Manpower shortages led to the abandonment of some intended military measures and forced others to be delayed or reduced in scope. The Rhodesian Security Forces were unable to undertake large-scale operations, and mainly used special forces style tactics. Insufficient manpower also undermined the protected village program and meant that plans to garrison the Tribal Trust Lands could not be enacted. [89] Brownell has noted that the "deteriorating security situation, largely as a result of white manpower constraints, finally forced the regime to negotiate its own demise". [112]

See also

References

Citations

  1. 1 2 Evans 2007, p. 177.
  2. 1 2 White 2004, p. 103.
  3. ↑ Evans 2007, pp. 178–79.
  4. ↑ Moorcraft & McLaughlin 2010, p. 27.
  5. 1 2 Pattenden 2021, p. 777.
  6. ↑ Evans 2007, pp. 181–182.
  7. ↑ Brownell 2020, p. 163.
  8. 1 2 Beckett 2011, p. 173.
  9. ↑ Brownell 2008, pp. 595, 598–99.
  10. ↑ Evans 2007, p. 182.
  11. ↑ Evans 2007, pp. 182–84.
  12. ↑ Evans 2007, pp. 184–91.
  13. ↑ Beckett 2011, p. 164-166.
  14. ↑ Evans 2007, p. 191.
  15. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Moorcraft & McLaughlin 2010, p. 57.
  16. 1 2 3 MacDonald 2013, p. 12.
  17. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 White 2004, p. 105.
  18. ↑ Moorcraft & McLaughlin 2010, pp. 56–57.
  19. 1 2 Good 1973, p. 56.
  20. ↑ Evans 2007, p. 179.
  21. ↑ White 2015, p. 180.
  22. ↑ Fellows, Lawrence (26 March 1966). "Rhodesia Widens Defense Efforts; Directs All Men to Register and Extends Training". The New York Times. Retrieved 19 October 2025.
  23. 1 2 3 Brownell 2008, p. 601.
  24. ↑ Brownell 2008, pp. 601–602.
  25. ↑ Miller, Henry (7 February 1974). "A bigger army for Rhodesia". The Guardian. p. 4. Retrieved 24 October 2025– via Newspapers.com.
  26. 1 2 3 4 5 Brownell 2008, p. 605.
  27. 1 2 White 2021, p. 12.
  28. ↑ Godwin & Hancock 1993, pp. 158–159.
  29. 1 2 Moorcraft & McLaughlin 2010, p. 56.
  30. 1 2 Godwin & Hancock 1993, p. 158.
  31. 1 2 Godwin & Hancock 1993, p. 159.
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  33. ↑ Godwin & Hancock 1993, pp. 156, 159, 185.
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  35. 1 2 3 4 Beckett 2011, p. 174.
  36. ↑ White 2015, p. 191.
  37. 1 2 3 Seirlis 2004, p. 86.
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  40. 1 2 Moorcraft & McLaughlin 2010, p. 157.
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  44. ↑ Mathews 1983, p. 683.
  45. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Moorcraft & McLaughlin 2010, p. 58.
  46. 1 2 Seirlis 2004, p. 78.
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  48. ↑ Stewart 1998, p. 25.
  49. 1 2 3 Mills, Ian (18 September 1978). "Blacks protest at Rhodesian conscription plan". The Guardian. p. 6. Retrieved 8 November 2025– via Newspapers.com.
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  51. ↑ White 2004, p. 119.
  52. 1 2 "Mission teacher dies". The Guardian. 1 July 1978. p. 5. Retrieved 6 November 2025– via Newspapers.com.
  53. 1 2 "New Year Draft for Blacks". The Daily Telegraph. 27 October 1978. p. 4. Retrieved 24 October 2025– via Newspapers.com.
  54. 1 2 White 2004, p. 120.
  55. 1 2 McLaughlin 1991, p. 268.
  56. 1 2 Kenrick 2019, p. 236.
  57. 1 2 3 Burns, John F. (4 January 1979). "How Blacks View Their Lamer Role in Rhodesia's Army". The New York Times. Retrieved 4 November 2025.
  58. ↑ Cilliers 1985, p. 49.
  59. ↑ Beckett 2011, pp. 174–175.
  60. ↑ Moorcraft & McLaughlin 2010, pp. 59–60.
  61. 1 2 Preston 2004, p. 74.
  62. ↑ Cilliers 1985, p. 208.
  63. ↑ Cilliers 1985, p. 214.
  64. ↑ Godwin & Hancock 1993, pp. 159–161.
  65. 1 2 Godwin & Hancock 1993, p. 207.
  66. 1 2 Godwin & Hancock 1993, pp. 160–161.
  67. ↑ Godwin & Hancock 1993, p. 162.
  68. ↑ Godwin & Hancock 1993, pp. 184–185.
  69. ↑ Godwin & Hancock 1993, pp. 185–186.
  70. ↑ Godwin & Hancock 1993, pp. 197–198, 205.
  71. ↑ Godwin & Hancock 1993, p. 205.
  72. ↑ Godwin & Hancock 1993, p. 206.
  73. 1 2 White 2021, p. 18.
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  75. ↑ Godwin & Hancock 1993, p. 88.
  76. ↑ Evans 2007, pp. 179–180.
  77. ↑ Good 1973, pp. 55–57.
  78. ↑ Good 1973, p. 57.
  79. ↑ Good 1973, p. 58-60.
  80. ↑ Good 1973, p. 64.
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  92. ↑ Beckett 2011, pp. 175, 177.
  93. ↑ White 2004, pp. 109, 111.
  94. ↑ White 2004, pp. 109, 112, 114.
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  97. ↑ Walker, Martin (28 February 1978). "Analysis of Smith security forces". The Guardian. p. 6. Retrieved 8 November 2025– via Newspapers.com.
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  99. 1 2 Moorcraft & McLaughlin 2010, p. 130.
  100. ↑ White 2004, p. 112.
  101. ↑ White 2021, p. 16.
  102. ↑ White 2015, p. 183.
  103. ↑ Moorcraft & McLaughlin 2010, pp. 130–131.
  104. ↑ White 2004, pp. 111–112.
  105. ↑ White 2015, p. 190.
  106. ↑ Brownell 2011, p. 125.
  107. ↑ Pattenden 2024, pp. 690–691.
  108. ↑ Moorcraft & McLaughlin 2010, p. 131.
  109. ↑ Brownell 2008, pp. 604–605.
  110. ↑ "Rhodesia: Military Service". Hansard. UK Parliament. 5 May 1977. Retrieved 18 October 2025.
  111. ↑ Linscott, Gillian (19 March 1977). "Asians in Catch-22 on Rhodesia call-up". The Guardian. p. 4. Retrieved 24 October 2025– via Newspapers.com.
  112. ↑ Brownell 2008, p. 603.

Works consulted

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