| Wreckage of N8984E at the accident site | |
| Accident | |
|---|---|
| Date | September 11, 1974 |
| Summary | Controlled flight into terrain |
| Site | Near Douglas Municipal Airport, Charlotte, North Carolina, United States 35°09′14″N80°55′34″W / 35.15389°N 80.92611°W |
| |
| Aircraft | |
| N8983E, an aircraft similar to the one involved | |
| Aircraft type | McDonnell Douglas DC-9-31 |
| Operator | Eastern Air Lines |
| IATA flight No. | EA212 |
| ICAO flight No. | EAL212 |
| Call sign | EASTERN 212 |
| Registration | N8984E [1] |
| Flight origin | Charleston Municipal Airport, Charleston, South Carolina |
| Stopover | Douglas Municipal Airport, Charlotte, North Carolina |
| Destination | Chicago O'Hare, Chicago, Illinois |
| Occupants | 82 |
| Passengers | 78 |
| Crew | 4 |
| Fatalities | 72 |
| Injuries | 9 |
| Survivors | 10 |
Eastern Air Lines Flight 212 was a scheduled domestic passenger flight from Charleston Municipal Airport, South Carolina, to Chicago O'Hare, Illinois, with an intermediate stop in Charlotte, North Carolina. On September 11, 1974, the aircraft operating the flight, a McDonnell Douglas DC-9, crashed during approach to Charlotte Douglas International Airport in North Carolina, killing 72 of the 82 people on board. [2]
The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) conducted an investigation and determined that pilot error was the primary cause of the crash. During the approach, the flight crews were engrossed by incessant and unnecessary conversations instead of monitoring their flight instruments and altitude, enabling the aircraft to descend way past the safe minima. The aircraft eventually crashed miles before the runway. The investigation resulted in the issuance of the sterile cockpit rule, which prohibited pilots from interactions irrelevant to the flight during critical phases, such as landing and takeoff. [2]
The aircraft was a five-year-old McDonnell Douglas DC-9-31 registered as N8984E with serial number 47400. It was manufactured and delivered to Eastern Air Lines on January 30, 1969. In its five years of service, it had logged a total of 16,860.6 hours of flying time. [3] [2] : 25
The aircraft was carrying 78 passengers and 4 crew members. There were 4 children on board. Most of the passenger were residents of Charlotte and many were members of the U.S Navy. [4] [5]
Among the passengers was Rear Admiral Charles Cummings, commandant of the Sixth Naval District of North Charleston; the vice president for academic affairs of the Medical University of South Carolina, James William Colbert Jr., [6] and two of his sons, who were the father and brothers of future television personality Stephen Colbert; [7] and WCIV television anchorman Wayne Seal, a former secretary for South Carolina Governor Robert Evander McNair. [4]
There were two flight crew aboard Flight 212:
The other crew members were cabin crews Eugenia Kerth, 25, and Colette Watson, 26. [8]
Eastern Air Lines Flight 212 was a regularly scheduled flight from Charleston to Chicago with an intermediate stop in Charlotte. The flight was supposed to take under an hour before it reached its intermediate stop in Charlotte. First Officer Daniels would be in command of the flight, while Captain Reeves would be the pilot non-flying. On 11 September 1974, the aircraft took off from Charleston at 07:00 local time. The takeoff and cruise were uneventful. While en route, the crew sought information from the Automated Terminal Information Service (ATIS), which stated that the weather in Charlotte would be partially obscured with broken clouds with visibility of about 1.5 nautical miles due to ground fog. The flight proceeded normally until the approach. [2] : 4–5
At 07:25 a.m., the crew got contacted by Atlanta ATC asking for their altitude, which was responded to by the crew, "We're slowing at ten." Atlanta ATC then handed over the flight to the approach controller in Charlotte, who directed them to fly towards the airport's Very high frequency Omnidirectional Range (VOR) and descend and maintain 6,000 ft. Captain Reeves acknowledged the message and then completed the "in-range checklist," which was responded to by the first officer with "OK." Afterwards, instead of focusing on the approach, they began to discuss the Watergate scandal. Apparently, they had been accustomed to it because they had been regularly flying the aircraft to Charlotte. [2] : 5–6
The approach to Charlotte would have required the crew to do a double bend. The first bend would direct them towards the southwest, and the second bend would later direct them towards the northwest. After lining up, the crew would have to continue until it reached the airport's final approach fix (FAF), located 5.5 nautical miles from the runway, which was known as "Ross Intersection." After reaching said point, the crew would then be required to descend until the minimum descent altitude (MDA) of 1,120 ft and had to maintain such altitude until they visually spotted the runway. [2] : 5–6
As they descended to 6,000ft, Charlotte controller asked the crew to turn to heading 240, towards the southwest. Captain Reeves responded by giving the controller their altitude at 6,000ft. Afterwards, the crew got another clearance to descend further and maintain 4,000ft. They were travelling through the first bend and began to slow down their approach. The flaps were extended to 15 degrees and the airspeed slowed down to 220 knots. The flight was eventually handed over to Charlotte's final approach controller, which was on another frequency. The controller asked them to descend further to 3,000f and Captain Reeves read back the transmission. [2] : 5–6
After ending the conversation, both flight crews began to be engrossed into another conversations unrelated to the flight operation, ranging from politics and used cars, particularly focusing on the 1973 oil crisis. [2] : 5–6
| 07:29:46 | First Officer Daniels | One thing that kills me, is the goddamned mess and all crap that's going on now. We should be taking some definite direction to save this goddamn country. |
| 07:29:54 | First Officer Daniels | Arabs are taking over every damn thing, they bought, hell they got so much real estate, so much land, they bought an island for seventeen million dollars off Carolina, they... |
| 07:30:01 | First Officer Daniels | the [expletive] stock market, and the Swiss are going to [expletive] sink our money gold over there. |
| 07:30:23 | ATC | Eastern two twelve, reduce to 160 knots. |
| 07:30:26 | Captain Reeves | Okay |
| 07:30:32 | Captain Reeves | Yes, Sir. Boy, they got the money, don't they? They got so much [expletive] money |
| 07:30:35 | First Officer Daniels | That stuff is coming in at such a fantastic rate. |
The crew kept on discussing the matter until 07:31:09, when the final approach controller asked the crew to turn towards heading 350 degrees and cleared them for a VOR approach to Charlotte. The crew read the transmission back. They were now on the second bend of the route and were inbound for Charlotte's Runway 36. Since the controller had cleared them to descend down until the minima, the aircraft kept descending way past 3,000 ft. The crew was intending to fly the aircraft at an altitude of the airport's minimum descent altitude (MDA). [2] : 5–7
The altitude alert signal sounded, and the aircraft had passed 3,000 ft and kept descending. At 07:31 a.m., Captain Reeves noticed one of Charlotte's landmarks that was used by many pilots for landing, the Carolina SkyTower. The 80-meter tower, which sits several miles before the Ross Intersection, was also known colloquially as the Carowinds Tower. After telling First Officer Daniels that the object might have been the Carowinds Tower, a radio transmission from the ATC was relayed, telling them to switch to another frequency for the landing. After changing frequency, they were told that they were second in line for landing. Finishing the conversation with the ATC, the crew suddenly discussed the Carowinds Tower again. [2] : 5–7
| 07:32:13 | Captain Reeves | Carowinds |
| 07:32:17 | First Officer Daniels | Ah! That tower. Would that tower be it or not? |
| 07:32:20 | Captain Reeves | No I... Carowinds, I don't think it is. |
| 07:32:26 | Captain Reeves | We're too far in. Too far in. Carowinds is in back of us. |
| 07:32:27 | First Officer Daniels | I believe it is [Carowinds] |
| 07:32:29 | Captain Reeves | By God, that looks like it! You know, it's Carowinds. |
| 07:32:33 | Captain Reeves | Yes, that's the tower! |
First Officer Daniels then asked Captain Reeves to extend the landing gear in preparation for the landing. A few seconds later, the terrain warning sounded, indicating that the aircraft was flying below 1,000 ft. It was quickly silenced by the crew. Apparently, the alarm had been sounding regularly during their approaches and landings to Charlotte and was regarded as a nuisance, so the crew opted to turn it off. The crew eventually diverted their attention to the landing checklist. [2] : 6–8
The nose was then raised a bit to reduce their speed, which was still too fast, above the limit for landing. The rate of descent was reduced for a bit, and the speed started to gradually decrease. The aircraft eventually became nearer to Ross Intersection, the airport's final approach fix (FAF), in which they would decide on whether to continue the descent or go around. They were intending to reach the airport's minimum descent altitude (MDA) of 394 ft above the runway. [2] : 6–8, 10
| 07:33:17 | Captain Reeves | There's, ah, Ross... Now we can go, uh, down |
| 07:33:22 | First Officer Daniels | How about [flaps] fifty degrees, please |
| 07:33:34 | Captain Reeves | Fifty |
The aircraft eventually crossed Ross Intersection, and the crew increased their rate of descent. Captain Reeves eventually reported to the ATC that they were at Ross, and the controller cleared Flight 212 to land at Charlotte Airport's Runway 36. The message was acknowledged by Captain Reeves. After completing the landing checklist, he said "Yeah, we're all ready". [2] : 7–8
| External videos | |
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| CVR recording | |
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As the aircraft continued its descent, flight attendant Colette Watson had just taken her seat at her assigned station after switching positions with a coworker. In the cabin, passengers grew visibly alarmed as rows of trees loomed closer outside the windows. Captain Reeves initially remarked, "All we have to do is find the airport." Moments later, as the aircraft broke through ground fog, the crew suddenly saw the terrain rushing toward them at extreme speed. Reeves and Daniels shouted and pulled back on the yoke in a final attempt to raise the nose, but the aircraft was already too low to recover. [9] [2] : 6–8
| 07:33:52 | Captain Reeves | Yeah, we're all ready |
| 07:33:55 | Captain Reeves | All we have to do is find the airport |
| 07:33:57 | First Officer Daniels | Yeah |
| 07:33:57.3 | Commentary | (Sounds of shoutings) |
| 07:33:58 | Commentary | (Sounds of initial impact) |
| 07:33:58 | End of recording |
The right wingtip then impacted a tree, followed by another impact on the left wing, shearing a cluster of pine trees. It then continued for more than 550 ft before it slammed onto a cornfield with a slight angle to the left. The left wing then broke, causing fire to spill and creating huge trailing flames. The right wing and stabilizer then sheared off. The aircraft then broke into three sections: the cockpit and a part of the forward cabin, the main fuselage, and the tailplane, which also contained several rows of seats. [2] : 12–14
The aircraft continued to slide across. The cockpit section went into another direction, while the fuselage and the empennage remained lurching forward into a more wooded area, striking more pine trees in the process. At this point, the fuselage broke even more, causing many passengers to be thrown out. The tailplane, meanwhile, spun several times in loops before finally coming to a halt. Finally, the aircraft came to a stop approximately 995 ft from its initial impact point. [2] : 12–14
A total of 32 people were immediately killed upon impact, including Captain Reeves and flight attendant Eugenia Kerth, who was sitting in the tailplane, while another 50 initially managed to survive. First Officer Daniels had survived the crash, but both of his legs were severely injured. Meanwhile, flight attendant Colette Watson woke up to find that the majority of the cabin had gone and only a few rows of seats of the first-class cabin had survived alongside the cockpit. Frank Mihalek was the only passenger who survived in that cabin. After meeting the uninjured Watson, both of them went inside the cockpit and evacuated, alongside First Officer Daniels, through the cockpit window by Reeves' seat. In the main fuselage, many were burned by the ensuing fires. Several survivors managed to get out through breaks on the walls, while others succumbed to the smokes. [10] [4] [2] : 14–15
In Charlotte Airport, the ATC had just lost contact with Flight 212. At the same time, a plume of smoke could be seen to the south of the airport, ascending beyond the ground fog. Charlotte Airport immediately notified the airport's firefighting unit, and the first vehicle arrived at 07:40 a.m. There were difficulties in terms of accessing the crash site due to its location. Within 45 minutes after the first arrival, all survivors were evacuated to Charlotte Memorial Hospital for further assessment. The smoldering wreckage was able to be doused, and rescue efforts were completed by 10:30 a.m. [4] [2] : 14–15
A total of 14 survivors were found alive by the rescuers. One was uninjured, while the other nine were discharged with varying degrees of injuries. Another four were in intensive care due to extensive burn wounds. Among them were two teenagers aged 17, both of whom later succumbed to their injuries. One of the burn survivors later survived, and the other later succumbed to his injuries approximately 29 days after the crash, bringing the total death toll to 72. [11] [12] [13]
Since the aircraft was planned to use Charlotte's Runway 36 with an approach from the southeast, the established approach procedures required the crew to do a double bend while simultaneously descending before lining up with the runway. After completing the second bend, they were required to maintain a minimum altitude of 1,800 ft and reach the airport's final approach fix (FAF), which was known as Ross Intersection. When they reached Ross Intersection, they would then be expected to descend until they reached the minimum decision altitude (MDA) of the airport, which was at an altitude of 1,120 ft. They would only be cleared to land if they had successfully spotted the runway. [2] : 17–22
The crew, at the time, had followed the established procedures and had successfully made it through the bends. However, before reaching Ross Intersection, both pilots accidentally caused the aircraft to descend further than the altitude that was required for them to maintain. The aircraft kept descending, and neither pilot apparently realized that they had descended way past the prescribed altitude. While preparing for the landing, the aircraft still descended and even flew lower than the MDA. [2] : 17–22
Investigators noted how much impertinent conversation had occurred during the approach. Prior to reaching the first bend, the crew had been talking about the Watergate scandal, followed by other strings of political discussions. By the second bend, they talked about the 1973 oil crisis instead of monitoring their instruments. The most crucial part was when Captain Reeves noticed the Carolina SkyTower, a recently opened amusement attraction located in Charlotte's Carowinds Amusement Park nearby, right after completing the second bend. [2] : 17–22
Apparently, the conversation caused the flight crew to cause the aircraft to descend way past its prescribed minimum altitude. The sequence started as soon as Captain Reeves noticed the tower. His first comment on the tower was initially not responded to by First Officer Daniels. However, Captain Reeves later made another comment on the tower, roping in First Officer Daniels into the discussion. By then, the aircraft had descended below 1,800 ft, the minimum altitude for them to maintain before reaching Ross Intersection. [2] : 17–22
The altitude warning would've blared to warn the crew about their altitude, which was lower than they were supposed to fly at. The CVR recording showed that the warning did sound. However, the crew decided to turn it off as the warning was regarded as a nuisance. Ultimately, the aircraft kept descending. Even by then, the crew decided to increase their rate of descent to decrease their altitude further. [2] : 17–22
The investigation noted that the extraneous discussions that took place after the second bend were directly contributing to the cause of the crash. The aircraft kept descending past the prescribed minimum altitude. During that time, the crew should have arrested their descent until they reached the airport's FAF, where they would later be cleared to land after receiving visual contact with Runway 36. The sequence started when Captain Reeves first noticed the tower, which later caused First Officer Daniels to be involved in the discussion. [2] : 17–22
Following the discussion, First Officer Daniels overlooked his instruments and began observing the tower as well. Since both crews' attention was directed towards outside of the cockpit, their instruments were not monitored. This was worsened by Captain Reeves' fixation with the location of the tower. As both pilots were not monitoring their instruments, they failed to realize that the aircraft had descended past the minimum altitude of 1,800 ft, which should have been maintained until the FAF. At the time, they were still 1.5 nautical miles short of the runway. As the non-flying pilot, Captain Reeves should have monitored the instruments and made callouts to First Officer Daniels, but his attention was fixated on the Carowinds Tower. Since no callouts were made, First Officer Daniels was not made aware of their low altitude. [2] : 17–22
Investigators also theorized that there might have been a misreading on the aircraft altimeters. A post-crash interview with the surviving First Officer Daniels revealed that he had thought that he was flying higher than the actual altitude. Due to the misread, he thought that there were still several thousand feet available between the aircraft and the ground. This might have been caused by the setting and design of the altimeter itself. The altimeters had been set by Eastern Airlines according to the aircraft's height above the runway. The indicated altitude, therefore, should have been 1,074 ft. However, First Officer Daniels thought that the aircraft was flying at an altitude near 1,800 ft. [2] : 17–22
The design of the altimeter likely contributed to the crash as well. The drum-type pointer at the time was prone to misreading due to the design of the pointers, in which the pilots should determine their altitude by separately reading the "thousand feet" pointer and the "hundred feet" pointer. As First Officer Daniels was distracted by Reeves' statement, he failed to cross-reference the altitude indicated on his instrument. His altimeter showed "670 ft," but he likely believed that he was flying at an altitude of 1,670 ft. In actuality, the aircraft was flying far lower. [2] : 17–22
Even though the aircraft had descended past the minimum altitude, an alarm should have sounded warning the crew that there were only 1,000 ft left between the aircraft and the ground. According to the investigation, such altitude warnings usually blared whenever the crew was trying to land, and as such, it was regarded as a nuisance and was turned off. [2] : 17–22
The NTSB released its final report on May 23, 1975, [2] concluding that the accident was caused by the flight crew's lack of altitude awareness and poor cockpit discipline. [14] The NTSB issued the following official probable cause: [2] : 22–24
"The flight crew's lack of altitude awareness at critical points during the approach due to poor cockpit discipline in that the crew did not follow prescribed procedure".
The NTSB concluded that conducting such nonessential chatter can distract pilots from their flying duties during the critical phases of flight, such as instrument approach to landing, and recommended that the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) establish rules and educate pilots to focus exclusively on flying tasks while operating at low altitudes. [2] : 22–24
The NTSB also found that the crew's persistent attempt to visually identify the nearby Carowinds Tower, [15] which rose to an elevation of 1,314 feet (401 m), or 340 feet (105 m) above ground level (AGL), may have further distracted and confused the flight crew. The first officer was operating the flight controls, and none of the required altitude callouts were made by the captain, which compounded the flight crew's nearly total lack of altitude awareness. [2] : 22–24
Following the crash, it was later realized that the sterile cockpit environment should also apply to takeoffs; for example, the lack of a sterile cockpit environment was a contributing factor to the crash of Air Florida Flight 90 on January 13, 1982. The FAA, after more than six years of consideration, finally published the sterile cockpit rule in 1981. [16] [17] The rule was to be enforced during important phases of the flight, particularly during take-off and landing, as well as phases while the aircraft was flying under 3,000ft.
Several family members filed lawsuits against Eastern Air Lines, demanding compensation of up to $22 million USD. Jurors eventually awarded them $5 million USD, which verdict was appealed by the airline, arguing it as "excessive." The airline eventually settled the lawsuits outside of court for an undisclosed amount. [5]
For his role in the accident, First Officer Daniels had his pilot's license revoked by the FAA. Daniels resigned from Eastern Air Lines but filed an appeal in 1975, but the FAA's decision was upheld by an Atlanta judge. However, Daniels filed a second appeal in 1976. This time his appeal was accepted and the FAA reinstated his pilot's license in 1977. Daniels never flew for Eastern Air Lines but did fly chartered flights and cargo aircraft. He died in 2021 at the age of 83. [18]
Following the crash, family members of the surviving passengers and crew members decided to create a website to honor the disaster. Plans for a memorial eventually surfaced, and on 11 September 2025, an official memorial monument was erected in Charlotte's Airport Overlook Park, exactly 51 years after the crash. [19]
During the 50th anniversary of the crash, one of Charlotte's major newspapers, " The Charlotte Observer ", made a five-part documentary series commemorating the crash, titled "9/11/74: The Untold Story of Charlotte's Deadliest Plane Crash". [20]