Accident | |
---|---|
Date | December 28, 1978 |
Summary | Fuel exhaustion due to pilot error (lack of situational awareness) and maintenance error with landing gear |
Site | Near Portland International Airport, Portland, Oregon, United States 45°31′21″N122°29′59″W / 45.5225°N 122.499722°W |
Aircraft | |
Aircraft type | McDonnell Douglas DC-8-61 [1] |
Operator | United Airlines |
IATA flight No. | UA173 |
ICAO flight No. | UAL173 |
Call sign | UNITED 173 |
Registration | N8082U |
Flight origin | John F. Kennedy International Airport, New York City, New York, United States |
Stopover | Stapleton International Airport, Denver, Colorado, United States |
Destination | Portland International Airport, Portland, Oregon, United States |
Occupants | 189 |
Passengers | 181 |
Crew | 8 |
Fatalities | 10 |
Injuries | 24 |
Survivors | 179 |
United Airlines Flight 173 was a scheduled flight from John F. Kennedy International Airport in New York City to Portland International Airport in Portland, Oregon, with a scheduled stop in Denver, Colorado. On December 28, 1978, the aircraft flying this route ran out of fuel while troubleshooting a landing gear problem and crashed in a suburban Portland neighborhood near NE 157th Avenue and East Burnside Street, killing 10 people on board. [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
The accident prompted the development of crew resource management in aviation.
The aircraft involved was a McDonnell Douglas DC-8-61, powered by four Pratt & Whitney JT3D engines and delivered new to United Airlines in May 1968. [7] The aircraft was registered N8082U and was the 357th DC-8 built at the Long Beach assembly plant. [7] The 60 series was a stretched version of the DC-8 that was 36.7 ft (11.2 m) longer than the DC-8 series 10 through 50. [8]
Flight 173 was piloted by an experienced cockpit crew, consisting of Captain Malburn "Buddy" McBroom (52), First Officer Roderick "Rod" Beebe (45), and Flight Engineer Forrest "Frosty" Mendenhall (41). McBroom had been with United Airlines for 27 years; he was one of the airline's most senior pilots with more than 27,600 hours of flight time, of which about 5,500 hours had been as a DC-8 captain. Beebe had been with the airline for 13 years and had logged more than 5,200 flight hours. Mendenhall had close to 3,900 flight hours and had been with the airline for 11 years. The first officer and flight engineer had over 2,500 hours of flying experience between them in the DC-8. [9]
Flight 173 departed from Denver's Stapleton International Airport at 15:47 MST with 189 people on board—eight crew and 181 passengers. The estimated flight time was 2 hours and 26 minutes, and the planned arrival time in Portland was 17:13 PST, about 40 minutes after sunset. According to the automatic flight plan and monitoring system, the total amount of fuel required for the flight to Portland was 31,900 lb (14,500 kg). About 46,700 lb (21,200 kg) of fuel were on board the aircraft when it departed the gate in Denver.
As the landing gear was being lowered on approach to Portland International Airport, the crew felt an abnormal vibration and yaw of the aircraft and a lack of an indicator light showing the gear was lowered successfully. The crew requested a holding pattern to diagnose the problem, and for about the next hour, the crew flew over southeast Portland and worked to identify the status of the landing gear and prepare for a potential emergency landing. During this time, none of the three cockpit flight crew effectively monitored the fuel levels, which was exacerbated by the fact that the gear was down with the flaps at 15° during the entire hour-long holding maneuver, significantly increasing fuel burn rate. As a result, the number 3 and 4 engines flamed out.
As the crew prepared for a final approach for an emergency landing on runway 28L, they lost the number one and number two engines to a flameout, at which point a mayday was declared. This was the last radio transmission from Flight 173 to air traffic control; it crashed into a wooded section of a populated area of suburban Portland, about six nautical miles (11 km; 7 mi) southeast of the airport. [9]
Of the crew members, two were killed, flight engineer Mendenhall and lead flight attendant Joan Wheeler; two sustained injuries classified by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) as "serious", and four sustained injuries classified as "minor/none". Eight passengers died, and 21 had serious injuries. [6] [9]
The 304th Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Squadron of the Air Force Reserve, based at Portland International Airport, was conducting routine training flights in the area that evening. Airborne aircraft from this unit (HH-1H Huey helicopters) were immediately diverted to the crash scene and proceeded to transport many of the survivors to local hospitals.
The NTSB investigation revealed that, when the landing gear was lowered, a loud thump was heard. That unusual sound was accompanied by abnormal vibration and yaw of the aircraft. The right main landing gear retract cylinder assembly had failed due to corrosion, and that allowed the right gear to free fall. [10] Although it was down and locked, the rapid and abnormal free fall of the gear damaged a microswitch so severely that it failed to complete the circuit to the cockpit green light that tells the pilots that gear is down and locked. Those unusual indications (loud noise, vibration, yaw, and no green light) led the captain to abort the landing, so they would have time to diagnose the problem and prepare the passengers for an emergency landing. While the decision to abort the landing was prudent, the accident occurred because the flight crew became so absorbed with diagnosing the problem that they failed to monitor their fuel state and calculate a time when they needed to return to land or risk fuel exhaustion. [10]
The Safety Board believes that this accident exemplifies a recurring problem—a breakdown in cockpit management and teamwork during a situation involving malfunctions of aircraft systems in flight… Therefore, the Safety Board can only conclude that the flight crew failed to relate the fuel remaining and the rate of fuel flow to the time and distance from the airport, because their attention was directed almost entirely toward diagnosing the landing gear problem. [9]
The NTSB determined the following probable cause: [9]
The failure of the captain to monitor properly the aircraft's fuel state and to properly respond to the low fuel state and the crewmember's advisories regarding fuel state. This resulted in fuel exhaustion to all engines. His inattention resulted from preoccupation with a landing gear malfunction and preparations for a possible landing emergency.
The NTSB also determined the following contributing factor: [9]
The failure of the other two flight crewmembers either to fully comprehend the criticality of the fuel state or to successfully communicate their concern to the captain
The fuel situation was known to be on the minds of the pilot and crew to some degree. Transcripts of cockpit recordings confirm this. [11] Media reports at the time suggested that a not widely known problem existed with fuel state gauges on that model aircraft.[ citation needed ] The problem was not widely known in part because commercial aircraft are expected to fly with no less than a 45-minute reserve of fuel at all times. The gauge problem is addressed, though obliquely, in one of the safety board's recommendations:
Issue an Operations Alert Bulletin to have FAA inspectors assure that crew training stresses differences in fuel-quantity measuring instruments and that crews flying with the new system are made aware of the possibility of misinterpretation of gauge readings. (Class II, Priority Action, A-79-32)
While the totalizer fuel gauge issue might have contributed to the crew's confusion toward the end of the flight, the NTSB report emphasized that the captain should never have allowed such a situation to develop in the first place. The NTSB made the following recommendation to specifically address that concern:
Issue an operations bulletin to all air carrier operations inspectors directing them to urge their assigned operators to ensure that their flightcrews are indoctrinated in principles of flight deck resource management, with particular emphasis on the merits of participative management for captains and assertiveness training for other cockpit crewmembers. (Class II, Priority Action, X-79-17)
This last NTSB recommendation following the incident, addressing flight deck resource management problems, was the genesis for major changes in the way airline crewmembers were trained. This new type of training addressed behavioral management challenges such as poor crew coordination, loss of situational awareness, and judgment errors frequently observed in aviation accidents. It is credited with launching the crew resource management [12] (CRM) revolution in airline training. Within weeks of the NTSB recommendation, NASA held a conference to bring government and industry experts together to examine the potential merits of this training. [13]
United Airlines instituted the industry's first CRM for pilots in 1981. This program is now used throughout the world, prompting some to call the United 173 accident one of the most important in aviation history. [14] The NTSB Air Safety Investigator who wrote the CRM recommendation was aviation psychologist Alan Diehl. [15] [16]
Assigned to investigate this accident, Diehl realized it was similar to several other major airline accidents including United Airlines Flight 2860, which occurred a little over a year before Flight 173 and under near identical circumstances; Eastern Air Lines Flight 401; and the Tenerife airport disaster. [17] Diehl was familiar with the research being conducted at NASA’s Ames Research Center and believed these training concepts could reduce the likelihood of human error. [12] [16] [ self-published source ]
Held responsible for the accident, Captain McBroom lost his pilot's license and retired from United Airlines shortly afterwards. He spent his remaining years battling health problems related to injuries sustained in the crash, as well as lung and prostate cancers. Family members and passengers who spoke to McBroom at a 1998 reunion of crash survivors reported he was "a broken man" plagued by guilt over his role in the accident. [18] He died on October 9, 2004, at age 77. [19]
One of the surviving passengers, who was three years old in 1978, [20] was awarded US$900,000 in damages in 1984 (equivalent to $2,639,462in 2023) from the airline by a Portland jury. She was injured and both her little sisters and her parents were killed. [20] [21]
Published in February 2018, Crash Course by Julie Whipple [22] focuses on the events of the night of the crash, the investigation, and aftermath of the crash.
The McDonnell Douglas DC-10 is an American trijet wide-body aircraft manufactured by McDonnell Douglas. The DC-10 was intended to succeed the DC-8 for long-range flights. It first flew on August 29, 1970; it was introduced on August 5, 1971, by American Airlines.
Delta Air Lines Flight 1141 was a scheduled domestic passenger flight between Dallas Fort Worth International Airport, Texas, and Salt Lake City International Airport, Utah. On August 31, 1988, the flight, using a Boeing 727-200 series aircraft, crashed during takeoff at Dallas Fort Worth International Airport, resulting in 14 deaths and 76 injuries among the 108 on board.
American Airlines Flight 1420 was a flight from Dallas/Fort Worth International Airport (DFW) to Little Rock National Airport in the United States. On June 1, 1999, the McDonnell Douglas MD-82 operating as Flight 1420 overran the runway upon landing in Little Rock and crashed. Nine of the 145 people aboard were immediately killed—the captain and eight passengers. Two more passengers died in the hospital in the following weeks.
United Airlines Flight 232 was a regularly scheduled United Airlines flight from Stapleton International Airport in Denver to O'Hare International Airport in Chicago, continuing to Philadelphia International Airport. On July 19, 1989, the DC-10 serving the flight crash-landed at Sioux Gateway Airport in Sioux City, Iowa, after suffering a catastrophic failure of its tail-mounted engine due to an unnoticed manufacturing defect in the engine's fan disk, which resulted in the loss of all flight controls. Of the 296 passengers and crew on board, 112 died during the accident, while 184 people survived. Thirteen of the passengers were uninjured. It was the deadliest single-aircraft accident in the history of United Airlines.
Eastern Air Lines Flight 401 was a scheduled flight from John F. Kennedy International Airport in Queens, New York, United States, to Miami International Airport in Miami, Florida, United States. Shortly before midnight on December 29, 1972, the Lockheed L-1011-1 TriStar crashed into the Florida Everglades, killing 101 people. All 4 cockpit crew members, two of the 10 flight attendants, and 96 of the 163 passengers had been killed in the disaster. 75 people survived, all injured, including 58 who were seriously injured and 15 who were minorly injured.
Air Canada Flight 797 was an international passenger flight operating from Dallas/Fort Worth International Airport to Montréal–Dorval International Airport, with an intermediate stop at Toronto Pearson International Airport.
Crew resource management or cockpit resource management (CRM) is a set of training procedures for use in environments where human error can have devastating effects. CRM is primarily used for improving aviation safety and focuses on interpersonal communication, leadership, and decision making in aircraft cockpits. Its founder is David Beaty, a former Royal Air Force and a BOAC pilot who wrote The Human Factor in Aircraft Accidents (1969). Despite the considerable development of electronic aids since then, many principles he developed continue to prove effective.
Troutdale Airport, also known as Troutdale-Portland Airport, is a corporate, general aviation, and flight-training airport serving the city of Troutdale, in Multnomah County, Oregon, United States. It is one of three airports in the Portland metropolitan area owned and operated by the Port of Portland. Troutdale Airport was established in 1920 as a private airfield, then purchased by the Port of Portland in 1942. It serves as a reliever airport for nearby Portland International Airport (PDX).
In aviation, pilot error generally refers to an action or decision made by a pilot that is a substantial contributing factor leading to an aviation accident. It also includes a pilot's failure to make a correct decision or take proper action. Errors are intentional actions that fail to achieve their intended outcomes. The Chicago Convention defines the term "accident" as "an occurrence associated with the operation of an aircraft [...] in which [...] a person is fatally or seriously injured [...] except when the injuries are [...] inflicted by other persons." Hence the definition of "pilot error" does not include deliberate crashing.
Eastern Air Lines Flight 212 was a controlled flight into terrain accident of a McDonnell Douglas DC-9 during approach to Charlotte Douglas International Airport in North Carolina. The accident occurred on September 11, 1974, killing 72 of the 82 people on board. The scheduled flight was from Charleston Municipal Airport to Chicago O'Hare, with an intermediate stop in Charlotte.
In aviation, the sterile flight deck rule or sterile cockpit rule is a procedural requirement that during critical phases of flight, only activities required for the safe operation of the aircraft may be carried out by the flight crew, and all non-essential activities in the cockpit are forbidden. In the United States, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) imposed the rule in 1981, after reviewing a series of accidents that were caused by flight crews who were distracted from their flying duties by engaging in non-essential conversations and activities during critical parts of the flight.
Southern Airways Flight 242 was a flight from Muscle Shoals, Alabama, to Atlanta, Georgia, with a stop in Huntsville, Alabama. On April 4, 1977, it executed a forced landing on Georgia State Route 381 in New Hope, Paulding County, Georgia, United States, after suffering hail damage and losing thrust on both engines in a severe thunderstorm.
In an internal combustion engine, fuel starvation is the failure of the fuel system to supply sufficient fuel to allow the engine to run properly, for example due to blockage, vapor lock, contamination by water, malfunction of the fuel pump or incorrect operation, leading to loss of power or engine stoppage. There is still fuel in the tank(s), but it is unable to get to the engine(s) in sufficient quantity. By contrast, fuel exhaustion is an occurrence in which the vehicle in question becomes completely devoid of usable fuel, with results similar to those of fuel starvation.
Scandinavian Airlines System Flight 933 was a scheduled international flight from Denmark to the United States that on January 13, 1969, crashed into Santa Monica Bay at 19:21, approximately 6 nautical miles (11 km) west of Los Angeles International Airport (LAX) in California, United States. The crash into the sea was caused by pilot error during approach to runway 07R; the pilots were so occupied with the nose gear light not turning green that they lost awareness of the situation and failed to keep track of their altitude. The Scandinavian Airlines System (SAS) aircraft had a crew of nine and 36 passengers, of whom 15 died in the accident. The flight originated at Copenhagen Airport, Denmark, and had a stopover at Seattle–Tacoma International Airport, where there was a change of crew. The crash was similar to Eastern Air Lines Flight 401. The crash site was in international waters, but the National Transportation Safety Board carried out an investigation, which was published on July 1, 1970. The report stated the probable cause as improper crew resource management and stated that the aircraft was fully capable of carrying out the approach and landing. The aircraft was conducting an instrument approach, but was following an unauthorized back course approach.
Atlantic Southeast Airlines Flight 2311 was a regularly scheduled commuter flight in Georgia in the southeastern United States, from Hartsfield–Jackson Atlanta International Airport to Glynco Jetport in Brunswick on April 5, 1991.
West Coast Airlines Flight 956 was a scheduled commercial flight in the western United States which crashed on October 1, 1966, approximately 5.5 miles (9 km) south of Wemme, Oregon, southeast of Portland. Thirteen passengers and five crew members were aboard, but none survived. In its first week of service, the aircraft was destroyed by the impact and subsequent fire.
On October 28, 2016, FedEx Express Flight 910, a McDonnell Douglas MD-10-10F flying from Memphis International Airport to Fort Lauderdale–Hollywood International Airport was involved in a runway skid after a landing gear collapse, which resulted in a fire completely destroying the left engine and wing. Two crew members, the only people on board, were unharmed.
Overseas National Airways (ONA) Flight 032 was a non-scheduled positioning flight operated by Overseas National Airways with a McDonnell Douglas DC-10-30CF. On November 12, 1975, the flight crew initiated a rejected takeoff after accelerating through a large flock of gulls at John F. Kennedy International Airport, resulting in a runway excursion. Of the 139 aircraft occupants, all survived, while the aircraft was destroyed by an intense post-crash fire. The National Transportation Safety Board concluded that the probable cause of the accident was bird ingestion into the right-hand engine, causing an uncontained engine failure that ruptured several landing gear tires and disabled the engine's hydraulic system, in turn partially disabling the spoilers and the landing gear brakes. Contributing to the accident was the resultant failure of the affected engine's thrust reverser and the wet runway. The accident aircraft is claimed to be the largest commercial airliner ever destroyed due to a bird strike.
Notes
{{cite web}}
: CS1 maint: unfit URL (link)Further reading