The Wagner Group, also known as PMC Wagner, [1] a Russian paramilitary organization [1] also described as a private military company (PMC), a network of mercenaries, [1] [2] and a de facto unit of the Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD) or Russia's military intelligence agency, the GRU, [3] has conducted operations in Libya since late 2018. [4]
In October 2018, the British tabloid The Sun cited British intelligence officials that two Russian military bases had been set up in Benghazi and Tobruk, in eastern Libya, in support of Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar who leads the Libyan National Army (LNA) in that country's civil war. It was said the bases were set up under the cover of the Wagner Group and that 'dozens' of GRU agents and special forces members were acting as trainers and liaisons in the area. Russian Kalibr missiles and S-300 SAM systems were also thought to be set up in Libya. [4] [5]
The Head of the Russian contact group on intra-Libyan settlement, Lev Dengov, stated that The Sun report did not "correspond to reality", although RBK TV also confirmed the Russian military deployment to Libya. [6] [7] By early March 2019, according to a British government source, around 300 Wagner PMCs were in Benghazi supporting Haftar. [8] At this time, the LNA was making large advances in the country's lawless south, capturing a number of towns in quick succession, [9] including the city of Sabha [10] and Libya's largest oil field. [11] By 3 March, most of the south, including the border areas, was under LNA control. [12] [13] [14]
Following the southern campaign, the LNA launched an offensive against the GNA-held capital of Tripoli, but the offensive stalled within two weeks on the outskirts of the city due to stiff resistance. [15] At the end of September, following reports of GNA airstrikes killing Russian mercenaries during the month south of Tripoli, [16] [17] [18] [19] including one that reportedly left dozens dead [20] and Wagner commander Alexander Kuznetsov injured, [21] [22] Western and Libyan officials stated that during the first week of September more than 100 Wagner PMCs arrived on the frontline to provide artillery support for Haftar's forces. [23] Following the GNA's recapture of a village south of Tripoli from the LNA, the GNA found the abandoned belongings of one of the PMCs. [24] [25]
Subsequently, at the sites of various clashes along the frontline, GNA militiamen were recovering Russian material being left behind. By early November, the number of PMCs had grown to 200 or 300 and Wagner snipers were causing a number of casualties among GNA frontline fighters, with 30 percent of the deaths in one unit being due to the Russian snipers. On one day, nine GNA fighters were killed by sniper fire. In another incident at the frontline town of 'Aziziya, three GNA fighters were killed by snipers while assaulting a Russian-occupied school. The PMCs eventually blew a hole in the wall of a classroom and escaped as the GNA attacked the school with Turkish armored vehicles. The PMCs' snipers killed a number of competent GNA mid-level commanders along the frontline. The presence of the PMCs also lead to more precise mortar fire being directed at the GNA. The PMCs were also equipped with laser-guided howitzer shells and thus artillery fire had become more precise through laser designation from ground spotters. They were also reportedly using hollow point ammunition in contravention of rules of war. With the ground fighting in the war among the local factions being considered amateurish, it was thought that the arrival of the PMCs could have an outsized impact. [26] [27] [28] [29] [30] Additionally, the PMCs introduced land mines and improvised explosive devices into the conflict, planting a number of booby traps and minefields on the outskirts of Tripoli, as well as at least in one residential neighborhood of the capital. [31] According to Jalel Harchaoui, a Libya expert at The Netherlands Institute of International Relations, the PMCs' toughness, lethal techniques and coordination discipline instilled fear in the GNAs' forces [32] [29] as their morale suffered. [33]
A Wagner headquarters was set up at a hospital in the town of Esbia, 50 kilometers south of Tripoli, where the PMCs were stated to have detained and shot the family of a man who had stumbled upon the contractors by mistake. Three people were killed, while the man and another family member managed to survive the execution. [34]
At the end of October 2019, Facebook suspended accounts it said were part of a Russian disinformation campaign linked to Yevgeny Prigozhin. The campaign targeted eight African countries. At least some of the Facebook accounts came from the Wagner Group [35] and the one operation that was attributed to Wagner was supporting two potential future political competitors in Libya. It had Egyptian page managers and the pages included Muammar Gaddafi nostalgia content. They also bolstered Saif al-Islam Gaddafi. [36] The next month, the GNA stated that two Russians who were arrested by their forces in early July were employed by the Wagner Group. [37] The two were arrested on suspicion of seeking to influence elections and were said to be involved in "securing a meeting" with Saif al-Islam Gaddafi. [38] Later, it was reported that the two Russians had three meetings with Gaddafi by April 2019. [39]
In mid-November, the United States Congress was preparing bipartisan sanctions against the PMCs in Libya, [40] whose number had risen to 1,400, according to several Western officials. [41] The GNA, for its part, stated it documented between 600 and 800 PMCs in the country. [42] These included 25 pilots, trainers and support crew, with the pilots flying missions in refurbished LNA Su-22 fighter-bombers. [41]
On 20 November, an Italian military drone crashed near Tripoli, [43] with the LNA claiming it had shot it down. [44] The next day, a US military drone was also shot down over Tripoli, [45] although the LNA stated it had been brought down by mistake. [46] According to the US, the drone was shot down by Russian air defenses which were operated either by Russian PMCs or the LNA. A GNA official also stated that Russian PMCs appeared to be responsible. [47] An estimated 25 Wagner military technicians were thought to had established transmission towers and platforms atop buildings south of Tripoli, which lead to the bringing down of the drones by jamming of control signals for the aircraft. [29]
On 12 December, a new assault by the LNA was launched towards Tripoli, [48] [49] with the LNA making several advances. [50] [51] It was said the Russian PMCs were leading the LNA assault. [32] [33] Over a two-day period, the PMCs, who were equipped with sophisticated drone-jamming technology and artillery, launched 2,500 mortar or artillery projectiles [33] and brought down a Turkish drone which was deployed by the GNA in an attempt to deter the LNA push. The drone was the sixth of seven deployed by Turkey in June that had been brought down by this point. [29] In early January 2020, The Libya Observer reported the Russian Air Force had transported fighters belonging to two other Russian private military companies, Moran and Shield, from Syria to Libya to further support the LNA. [52] Meanwhile, according to Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the number of Wagner PMCs in Libya had reached 2,500. [53] Later, he also accused the United Arab Emirates of providing some financing for the PMCs, [54] while the Le Monde newspaper reported Saudi Arabia was also financing the group. [55]
Following Turkey's and Russia's call for a ceasefire in Libya on 8 January 2020, [56] the GNA claimed a significant number of Wagner fighters had withdrawn from the frontline via helicopters to the Al Jufra Airbase. [57] Towards the end of February, a Wagner PMC stated for the Russian information agency InterRight that all of the PMCs had been withdrawn from Libya due to the ceasefire. [58]
However, at the end of March, the GNA claimed to have targeted a building in the Qasr Bin Ghashir area south of Tripoli which had been occupied by Russian PMCs that had been responsible for several recent attacks on Tripoli neighborhoods. [59] On 2 April, GNA airstrikes in two areas south of Bani Walid targeted an ammunition convoy, as well as a fuel convoy, reportedly destroying six trucks. Wagner PMCs were claimed to be in the vehicles, with one of them being killed and another wounded. [60] On 22 April, the GNA's Interior Minister accused the Wagner Group of carrying out a chemical attack against its forces in the Salah al-Din area of southern Tripoli. [61] According to the Minister, Wagner snipers shot dead GNA fighters who had succumbed to nerve agents. [62]
In early May, according to a UN report, between 800 and 1,200 Wagner PMCs were deployed in Libya in support of the LNA. [63] They were operating in specialized military tasks, including sniper teams. [64] The UN also confirmed the presence of Syrian fighters [65] who were transported to Libya since the start of the year via at least 33 flights operated by the Cham Wings airline. The Syrians numbered less than 2,000 [65] and were made up of former rebels recruited by the Wagner Group, under Russian military supervision, to fight alongside them. [66] [67] Mid-May, GNA artillery reportedly shelled a Wagner base [68] that was used for observation, intelligence and organizing operations. [69]
In late May, the GNA captured the strategic Al-Watiya Air Base [70] and advanced into several districts of southern Tripoli, [71] during which they captured three military camps. [72] During the fighting, the GNA reported three Wagner PMCs were killed, with the body of one of them being seized. [73] The first Syrian fighter from the force recruited to support the Wagner Group also died. [74] Following these advances, Wagner's PMCs started to evacuate via Bani Walid's airport to Jufra, [75] with hundreds being evacuated on 25 May. According to the GNA, between 1,500 and 1,600 "mercenaries" withdrew from Tripoli's frontlines in the previous days. [76] The PMCs also pulled back their artillery and other heavy weapons during the withdrawal from southern Tripoli. [77] On 26 May, according to the United States Africa Command (AFRICOM), Russia deployed fighter jets to the Al Jufra Airbase [78] to support Wagner's PMCs. The jets arrived from an airbase in Russia via Syria, where they were repainted to conceal their Russian markings. [79] [80] The LNA denied it received new fighter jets. [81]
Following the collapse of the LNA's offensive on Tripoli, [82] the GNA launched an assault on the LNA-held city of Sirte in early June, [83] managing initially to capture parts of the city, [84] before a LNA counter-attack pushed the GNA's forces back. [85] Subsequently, while the GNA was preparing a second assault, [86] Russian PMCs were planting landmines in and around Sirte to "obstruct the advance" of the GNA. [31] [87] [88] Mid-June, AFRICOM reported one of the newly arrived Russian aircraft was spotted taking off from the Al Jufra Airbase, while a MiG-29 fighter jet was seen operating near Sirte. There was concern the aircraft were being operated by the PMCs. [89] At the end of the month, the GNA claimed a Wagner rocket attack west of Sirte left one civilian dead. [90]
Towards the end of June, the Al Jufra airbase was reportedly turned into a Wagner Group command center for operations to take control of the country's southern oil fields [91] and the PMCs at the base were said to include Ukrainians and Serbians, besides the Russian contractors. [92] Subsequently, Wagner PMCs and pro-LNA Sudanese mercenaries, in coordination with a pro-LNA militia known as the Petroleum Facilities Guard, entered and secured Libya's largest oil field, the El Sharara oil field. [93] [94] [95] The PMCs also secured the oil port of Sidra on the Mediterranean coast. [96] [97] Towards the end of July, "foreign mercenaries" were also reported to be at the Ras Lanuf petrochemical complex, Zuwetina oil port and Zallah field. [98]
In July, the United States imposed sanctions on Wagner individuals and entities for the planting of landmines in and around Tripoli. [99] Meanwhile, according to AFRICOM, Russia continued to supply the LNA through the Wagner Group with SA-22 missile launch vehicles, GAZ Tigr IMVs, Typhoon MRAPs and land mines. A total of 14 Mig-29 and Su-24 fighter jets had also been delivered. [100] [101] According to a UN report, 338 Russian military flights from Syria to Libya were conducted between November 2019, and July 2020, in support of the Wagner Group. [102] In early August, a 21-vehicle Wagner convoy moved from Jufra to Sirte. Concurrently, the LNA, supported by the PMCs, were reinforcing the Jarif valley south of Sirte with ditches and barriers. [103]
Mid-September, it was confirmed the Wagner Group was conducting air-strikes in support of the LNA, with two Mig-29s piloted by the PMCs crashing, [104] one at the end of June, and the other in early September. A video of the second jets' pilot circulated online, showing him being rescued by an LNA combat helicopter after he parachuted and landed in the desert. [105] [106] Towards the end of September, a helicopter transporting ammunition crashed in Sokna, near Al Jufra, while en route to an oil field. Four PMCs were killed in the crash. [107]
On 23 October 2020, a new cease-fire agreement was reached in Libya, [108] with peace talks to subsequently begin. [109] The talks started on 12 November. However, the same day, the GNA's army stated it would not accept further talks with the presence of the PMCs and their anti-aircraft systems in Sirte, after the LNA conducted live-fire exercises and the PMCs blocked their delegation from landing in Sirte, according to the GNA. [110]
In December 2020, the United States Pentagon revealed that the United Arab Emirates was funding the Russian PMCs in Libya and was the main financial supporter of the Wagner Group. [111] [112] By late January 2021, the PMCs built a large trench, or a series of trenches, extending about 70 kilometers from Sirte towards the Wagner stronghold of Jufra. The trench was bolstered by a series of elaborate fortifications designed to disrupt land attacks. More than 30 defensive positions were dug along the trench with key positions near the Jufra air base and at the Brak airfield further south, where radar defenses were installed and fortified. [113] [114]
On 31 May 2022, Human Rights Watch stated that information from Libyan agencies and demining groups linked the Wagner Group to the use of banned landmines and booby traps in Libya. These mines killed at least three Libyan deminers before the mines' locations were identified. [115]
The Libyan Air Force is the branch of the Libyan Armed Forces responsible for aerial warfare. In 2010, before the Libyan Civil War, the Libyan Air Force personnel strength was estimated at 18,000, with an inventory of 374 combat-capable aircraft operating from 13 military airbases in Libya. Since the 2011 civil war and the ongoing conflict, multiple factions fighting in Libya have been in possession of military aircraft. As of 2019, the Libyan Air Force is nominally under the control of the internationally recognised Government of National Accord in Tripoli, though the rival Libyan National Army of Marshal Khalifa Haftar also has a significant air force. In 2021, the air force was under command of the new President of Libya, Mohamed al-Menfi that replaced Fayez al-Sarraj.
The Libyan Army is the brand for a number of separate military forces in Libya, which were under the command of the internationally recognised Government of National Accord (GNA) and the Government of National Unity.
The Libyan National Army or the Libyan Arab Army is a component of Libya's military forces which were nominally a unified national force under the command of Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar when he was nominated to the role on 2 March 2015 by the House of Representatives, consisting at the time of a ground force, an air force and a navy.
The Libyan civil war (2014–2020), also more commonly known as the Second Libyan Civil War, was a multilateral civil war which was fought in Libya between a number of armed groups, but mainly the House of Representatives (HoR) and the Government of National Accord (GNA), for six years from 2014 to 2020.
The Shura Council of Benghazi Revolutionaries was a military coalition in Benghazi, Libya, composed of Islamist and jihadist militias, including Ansar al-Sharia, Libya Shield 1, and several other groups.
The Libyan crisis is the current humanitarian crisis and political-military instability occurring in Libya, beginning with the Arab Spring protests of 2011, which led to two civil wars, foreign military intervention, and the ousting and death of Muammar Gaddafi. The first civil war's aftermath and proliferation of armed groups led to violence and instability across the country, which erupted into renewed civil war in 2014. The second war lasted until October 23, 2020, when all parties agreed to a permanent ceasefire and negotiations.
al-Watiya Air Base also known as Okba Ibn Nafa Air Base is a military airport in the Nuqat al Khams district of western Libya. It was named after Uqba ibn Nafi, the Islamic general who conquered North Africa. It is 27 kilometres (17 mi) east of the Tunisian border and 125 kilometres (78 mi) from Tripoli.
The Government of National Accord was an interim government for Libya that was formed under the terms of the Libyan Political Agreement, a United Nations–led initiative, signed on 17 December 2015. The agreement was unanimously endorsed by the United Nations Security Council, which welcomed the formation of a Presidency Council for Libya and recognized the Government of National Accord as the sole legitimate executive authority in Libya. On 31 December 2015, Chairman of the Libyan House of Representatives, Aguila Saleh Issa declared his support for the Libyan Political Agreement. The General National Congress has criticized the GNA on multiple fronts as biased in favor of its rival parliament the House of Representatives.
This is a detailed timeline of the Libyan civil war (2014–2020) which lasted from 2014 to 2020.
The Western Libya campaign was a military campaign initiated on 4 April 2019 by the Operation Flood of Dignity of the Libyan National Army, which represents the Libyan House of Representatives, to capture the western region of Libya and eventually the capital Tripoli held by the United Nations Security Council-recognised Government of National Accord. The Government of National Accord regained control over all of Tripoli in June 2020 and the LNA forces withdrew from the capital, after fourteen months of fighting.
The Libyan peace process was a series of meetings, agreements and actions that aimed to resolve the Second Libyan Civil War. Among these were the Skhirat agreement of December 2015 and the plans for the Libyan National Conference in April 2019 that were delayed because of the 2019–20 Western Libya campaign.
In January 2020, Turkey militarily intervened in support of the United Nations-recognized Government of National Accord (GNA) of Libya in the 2014–2020 Libyan civil war. Military intervention was approved by the Grand National Assembly of Turkey on 2 January 2020, which passed a one-year mandate to deploy troops to Libya. Turkish military deployments to Libya began on 5 January.
This is the order of battle for the Western Libya campaign, codenamed "Operation Flood of Dignity" by forces under Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar. The forces supporting Haftar and the House of Representatives, mainly the Libyan National Army, are opposed by the armed forces of the forces loyal to the Government of National Accord, including the Libyan Army and the Tripoli Protection Force.
Events in Libya in 2020
The Central Libya offensive, officially known as Operation Paths to Victory, was a military offensive in Libya launched by the forces of the Government of National Accord, to take the city of Sirte and Al Jufra Airbase from the House of Representatives backed by the Libyan National Army. The city of Sirte is considered strategically important because of its close position to oil facilities, which give it control over Libya's oil and gas shipping ports. The Al Jufra Airbase is strategically important for the GNA, due to its central position to Fezzan and denying the Libyan National Army air superiority over Central Libya.
The Egyptian intervention in Libya has been substantial since the beginning of the Libyan civil war. The intervention started after the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) released a video of the beheading of 21 Egyptians on 12 February, 2015. In response, Egypt launched airstrikes on 16 February, that same year. After that incident, Egypt became increasingly involved with Libya's internal politics.
On 4 July 2020, forces of the Libyan National Army (LNA) launched airstrikes on Al-Watiya Air Base in the desert southwest of Tripoli, destroying Turkish military equipment, including anti-air defences, sent from Turkey to the Government of National Accord (GNA).
On January 4, 2020, the United Arab Emirates aiding the Libyan National Army launched an airstrike on a military school used by the UN-backed Government of National Accord in Tripoli, Libya. Twenty-six people were killed and thirty-three were wounded.
Operation Volcano of Anger, alternatively known as Operation Volcano of Rage, was a military resistance campaign launched by the Government of National Accord in Libya to counter the advances of the Libyan National Army led by General Khalifa Haftar. The conflict, which began in April 2019, had witnessed intense fighting around the capital city, Tripoli, and other strategic locations in the country.
"From a legal perspective, Wagner doesn't exist," says Sorcha MacLeod
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