Relations between the Commonwealth of Australia and the Republic of China, formerly the Qing dynasty, date back to 1909. The two countries had official diplomatic relations from 1941 to 1972. Since 1972, Australia no longer has formal diplomatic relations with Republic of China (Taiwan). Australia and Taiwan share partnership in the inter-governmental Global Cooperation and Training Framework (GCTF) activities.[1]
Australia's current position towards Taiwan is largely based on the Joint Communiqué with the People's Republic of China signed by the Whitlam Labor government in 1972 on the outcome of UN Resolution 2758 as international situation turned against ROC, even though Australia voted supporting Republic of China's seat in the UN instead of Communist China.[2] Under this agreement, the Australian government diplomatically recognises the People's Republic of China (PRC) as the 'sole legitimate government of China'.[3][4]
The Joint Communiqué establishes ‘(diplomatic) guidelines for official Australian contact with Taiwan,’ explicitly stating that Australia 'does not (diplomatically) consider Taiwan (ROC) to have the status of national government.'[5] Despite the Australian government not having an official diplomatic relationship with Taiwan, an official Bilateral Economic Consultation is held annually by high-ranking Ministry of Economy officials of both sides[6] and there is a substantial unofficial relationship has developed through cultural and trade links, however, other than conventional industry, Australian firms rely on a mature international financial market to capitalise from the strong scientific/growing technical research due to high tax rate in Australia, and Taiwan does not have this attribute,[7] but Taiwan's highly Americanized specialist workforce may assist Australia's firms to internationalise the vision, especially with the competency on analytical research.[8] Therefore, it is likely Taiwan may benefit from the relations with Australia on University spin-off rather than research spin-off.[9] On international trade, Australia and Taiwan are complementary.[10]
Trade
Monthly value of Taiwanese merchandise exports to Australia (A$ millions) since 1988Monthly value of Australian merchandise exports to Taiwan (A$ millions) since 1988
Taiwan and Australia have developed strong economic and trade links, with Taiwan currently being Australia's ninth largest customer for exports.[11] The value of exports between both Australia and Taiwan equates to more than A$12 billion.[11] The Australia-Taiwan Business Council is based in Sydney,[12] and Taiwan has an official, government-sponsored branch office of the Taiwan External Trade Development Council in Sydney.[13]
As Taiwan was under Japanese control, prior to 1941, relations between the Republic of China and Australia were described as 'episodic.' One reason for this was Australia's reliance on Britain, as it was only in 1923 that Britain had granted its dominions permission to conclude treaties with foreign countries.[14] Subsequently, Australia sent its first Minister Plenipotentiary to China, Sir Frederic Eggleston on 20 October 1941.[15] The embassy based in Chungking was the third such post when Australia gained its on external affairs and already had diplomatic missions to London and Washington.[15]
Australia's relations with the ROC between 1949 and 1971 operated in a political environment which has been coined the 'China question', a term used to encompass the 'contest between two rival authorities, each claiming to represent the one China.'[16] Since 1949, China has insisted that Taiwan is part of the PRC, while the ROC on Taiwan contends that it is an independent state which was subjected to controversy after Japan surrendered at World War II. From 1949 to 1971, Taiwan and its affiliated organisations and conventions were represented in the UN by officials of the 'Republic of China in Taipei.'[16] Under this title, Taiwan entered into and became a party to a number of multilateral treaties and conventions sponsored by the UN and other bodies,[16] despite certain countries, predominantly in the Eastern bloc, opposing Taiwan's legal ability to enter into such arrangements.
The Australian policy towards Taiwan before 1972 has been described as one of ambivalence.[17] During the 1950s Australia's relationship with Taiwan was not particularly close. There were 'official diplomatic relations' as Australia did not believe in the One-China policy at this time,[18] and some Australian officials visited Taiwan during this period.[19] These included Sir Arthur Tange, Secretary for External Affairs in October 1957 and then-Senator John Gorton in November 1960. Nevertheless, Taiwan refused to appoint an ambassador between 1951 and 1959 in protest over Australia's indifference towards Taiwan.[17]
On June 11, 1966, the Australian government, under the direction of the Holt Liberal government, established an embassy in Taipei.[20] This was an unusual decision given the socio-political climate at the time. During this period the Soviet Bloc, India, Pakistan, Burma and France officially recognised the PRC.[21] Australia's decision to go against the international diplomatic current was due to a combination of anti-communist sentiment, Australia's participation in the Vietnam war, and Australia's close relationship with the US.[21]
Despite these tensions, Australia's economic relationship with the PRC grew substantially. Strong trade relations were established during the 1950s–1960s, with wool, iron and later wheat the predominant Australian exports.[22] In 1956 an Australian Trade commissioner was sent to Taipei to consider the development of trade between Taiwan and Australia.[23] In November 1958 and March 1959 a commercial counsellor from Manila was sent to Taipei on 'instructions from Canberra to strengthen relations between the two countries.'[23]
1972–1990
International affairs in 1971 contributed to Australia's decision to officially recognise the PRC. During this period there were a series of Pacific Islands Independence Movements, and the UN decided to reject the claim by the Republic of China (Taiwan) to independent statehood.[24] Following this announcement, a policy of non-interference in Taiwan issues along with deliberate ambiguity was adopted by the UN.[24] Australia followed the general political atmosphere of the time in recognising Beijing, culminating in the December 21 Joint Communiqué with the PRC. The technical language and terms agreed upon in this document were also utilised by declarations between the PRC and Canada, Italy and other states.[16]
Following the Joint Communiqué with the PRC, official diplomatic links with Taiwan were discontinued, with officials and diplomatic passport holders being prohibited by the Whitlam government from visiting each other's countries.[25] An unofficial organisation known as the "Australia-Free China Society", headed by New South WalesMPDouglas Darby, established an office in 1974 to provide services for Australians visiting Taiwan.[26]
Later, relations resumed on an unofficial basis. In 1981, the Australian Commerce and Industry office (ACIO) was established in Taiwan, which acted as an unofficial Australian organisation for trade representatives, as well as tourist promotion and visa application. It was based in Canberra to provide an active connection between the business sector and government departments and ACIO.[27] In October 1988, the Taiwan Marketing Service (TMS) was established as a Taiwanese equivalent in Australia to the ACIO in Taiwan.[27]
In March 1990, an Australian education centre was created in Taipei to promote mutual student and cultural exchange.[27] In addition, since 1989 Taiwan began focusing on a policy of 'flexible diplomacy,' which included an emphasis on creating informal relations or 'substantial relations' rather than formal diplomatic relations.[28] This policy was embodied in the creation of Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Offices in various countries, with more than 50 such offices currently located around the world.[28]
Australia and Taiwan used other documents that were not technically legally binding to develop their unofficial relationship. These included Memorandums of Understanding, which under Australia law are not documents to which the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties applies.[29] Instead, such agreements encourage relations between states on a 'moral and political basis.'[29] Arrangements were made on a variety of topics such as access by Taiwanese fishing vessels to Australia's Exclusive economic zone, which were established in 1979 and 1986.[29]
1990 to present
A review on Australia's policy towards Taiwan was undertaken and on 26 November 1990, the Minister for Technology and Commerce, Senator John Button, declared government support for closer Australia economic relations with Taiwan.[30] The 1989 Tiananmen Square protests and massacre led to increased tensions between the PRC and Australia, thus contributing to a closer relationship with Taiwan. The incident reportedly shocked Australia and Prime Minister Bob Hawke publicly cried at the memorial service for the victims who were killed.[21] Another factor that contributed to closer unofficial relations was the 'democratisation' of Taiwan.[21] Legislation was passed to protect Taiwanese investment products in Australia, as the Taiwanese government feared that the PRC may claim them.[31]
Australia's trade with Taiwan in 1993 amounted to $5.1 billion, while trade with the PRC was slightly greater at $5.2 billion.[32] In 1992, Taiwan was Australia's fourth-largest Asian trading partner and seventh most important overall.[32] Despite Taiwan's inability to conclude multilateral treaties, Australia has concluded various bilateral agreements with Taiwan. This includes establishing direct air links with Taiwan in 1991, which saw an increase in tourism resulting in Taiwan becoming Australia's third largest market in Asia.[32] The period to receive an Australian visa in Taiwan was reduced to 48 hours,[30] and a memorandum of understanding was agreed relating to 'the promotion of investment and technology transfer and to the protection of intellectual property'.[32]
Political and cultural links also improved. The Taipei Economic and Cultural Office was formally opened by Senator Gareth Evans in March 1991.[33] Ministerial visits increased in the early 1990s, beginning with the visit of Tourism and Resources Minister Alan Griffiths in October 1992.[21]
The 1996 Taiwan Straits Crisis affected Australia's relationship with both Taiwan and the PRC. The PRC fired missiles close to Taiwan in an attempt to influence Taiwanese political elections.[21] Australia's response to the crisis was that Beijing should exercise 'constraint'.[34] This was expressed by Alexander Downer, who had recently been appointed Foreign Minister in the Howard government. Australia supported the US reaction of deploying two aircraft carriers to the east of Taiwan.[34] These events caused tension with the PRC, as they perceived that the US was executing a 'new containment strategy in which Australia and Japan were anchors.'[35] Consequently, Australia-China relations suffered during this period, demonstrating the sensitivity of the Taiwan issue.
Following the crisis, the Howard government attempted to strengthen relations with the PRC, resulting in reaffirming its One-China policy stance. This was achieved through a series of ministerial and official visits by Australian diplomats, politicians and other government representatives. In September 1996, the chief of the Australian Defence Force (ADF), General John Baker, visited China to seek an 'upgrade in Sino-Australian exchanges on defence and strategic issues as a 'confidence-building' measure.'[36] This culminated in an agreement in 1997 to start a range of annual PRC-Australia talks focused on security within the Asia Pacific region. In addition, there were agreements for the exchange of military professionals and officials to attend each other's strategic studies Institutes.[37] When Howard visited the PRC, he not only stressed Australia's stand on the One-China policy, but also emphasised that Australia's national interests would be decided independently of US policy direction.
In the late 1990s and early 2000s Taiwan's checkbook diplomacy and competing policy goals in the Pacific lead to clashes with Australia over Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands, and Vanuatu.[38]
In the later 1990s, Australia's relations with Taiwan were largely influenced by what has been called the 'Armitage Scenario'.[39] In 1999, Richard Armitage, former US Assistant Secretary of Defence, visited Australia and expressed that should a conflict arise, the United States would 'demand Australian support, including military support if demanded.'[39] If Australia did not agree to this arrangement, ANZUS would be concluded. This placed Australia in a precarious position with the PRC, which was encompassed in a statement released by an aide of Jiang Zemin, saying that Australia faced 'very serious consequences' if it sided with the US in a future Taiwan conflict.[39] Following those events, Jiang made a state visit to Australia, during which Howard reassured him Australia still followed the One-China policy.[40]
This placed Australia in a complicated political situation, as Australia was still trying to retain its economic and cultural relationship with Taiwan. This led to Howard implementing a 'dual policy' towards the China-Taiwan issue, in which it encouraged the PRC to 'exercise restraint in issuing threats of using military force against Taiwan.' This was emphasised by Australian government officials, particularly from DFAT, when they met with the PRC's Ambassador to Australia to express their concern over a white paper intimating the PRC would employ force against Taiwan if it failed to negotiate unification expeditiously.
Australians tend to be very pro-Taiwan due to the widespread belief that China poses a threat to national security. In 2022, a poll conducted by the Lowy Institute showed that 51% of Australians would support sending military support to Taiwan if China were to invade, up from 43% in 2021. The same survey showed only 12% trusted China on foreign affairs, down from 16% in 2021 and 52% in 2018. Two thirds supported Taiwanese independence in 2021.[43][44]
Foreign relations of the Republic of China (ROC), more commonly known as Taiwan, are accomplished by efforts of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China, a cabinet-level ministry of the Government of the Republic of China. As of January 2024, the ROC has formal diplomatic relations with 11 of the 193 United Nations member states and with the Holy See, which governs the Vatican City State. In addition to these relations, the ROC also maintains unofficial relations with 59 UN member states, one self-declared state (Somaliland), three territories (Guam, Hong Kong, and Macau), and the European Union via its representative offices and consulates. In 2021, the Government of the Republic of China had the 33rd largest diplomatic network in the world with 110 offices.
One China is a phrase describing the relationship between the People's Republic of China (PRC) based on Mainland China, and the Republic of China (ROC) based on the Taiwan Area. "One China" asserts that there is only one de jure Chinese nation despite the de facto division between the two rival governments in the aftermath of the Chinese Civil War. The term may refer, in alphabetical order, to one of the following:
The Joint Communique of the Government of Japan and the Government of the People's Republic of China was signed on September 29, 1972, in Beijing. The communique established and normalized diplomatic relations between Japan and the People's Republic of China (PRC), resulted in the severing of official relations between Japan and the Republic of China (ROC) in Taiwan. The document produced nine articles in a joint statement, showing compromises on previously ambiguous principles enunciated by both sides. Of these, four points are particularly worthy of attention:
the desire for a peace treaty between Japan and China;
the statement that Japan "understands and respects [China's] stance" that Taiwan is part of the PRC;
an Asia-Pacific anti-hegemony clause;
Japan's reversal of relations with China and Taiwan.
The Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office (TECRO), also known as Taipei Economic and Cultural Office (TECO), Taipei Representative Office (TRO) or Taipei Mission, is an alternative diplomatic institution serving as a de facto embassy or a consulate of the Republic of China to exercise the foreign affairs and consular services in specific countries which have established formal diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China. The PRC denies the legitimacy of the ROC as a sovereign state and claims the ROC-controlled territories as an integral part of its territory. An exclusive mandate, namely One-China policy, requires that any country wishing to establish a diplomatic relationship with the PRC must first sever any formal relationship with the ROC. According to The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, "non-recognition of the Taiwanese government is a prerequisite for conducting formal diplomatic relations with the PRC—in effect forcing other governments to choose between Beijing and Taipei." As a result, these countries only allow the ROC to establish representative offices instead of a fully-fledged embassy or consulate for the purpose of conducting practical bilateral relations without granting full diplomatic recognition.
The Canadian Trade Office in Taipei is Canada's representative office in Taiwan, which functions as a de facto embassy in the absence of official diplomatic relations in which Canada recognized the People's Republic of China in October 1970 in accordance with the "one-China policy".
The 1972 Australian federal election was held in Australia on 2 December 1972. All 125 seats in the House of Representatives were up for election, as well as a single Senate seat in Queensland. The incumbent Liberal–Country coalition government, led by Prime Minister William McMahon, was defeated by the opposition Labor Party led by Gough Whitlam. Labor's victory ended 23 years of successive Coalition governments that began in 1949 and started the three-year Whitlam Labor Government.
China–Japan relations or Sino-Japanese relations are the bilateral relations between China and Japan. The countries are geographically separated by the East China Sea. Japan has been strongly influenced throughout its history by China, especially by the East and Southeast through the gradual process of Sinicization with its language, architecture, culture, cuisine, religion, philosophy, and law. When Japan was forced to open trade relations with the West after the Perry Expedition in the mid-19th century, Japan plunged itself through an active process of Westernization during the Meiji Restoration in 1868 and began viewing China under the Qing dynasty as an antiquated civilization unable to defend itself against foreign forces—in part due to the First and Second Opium Wars along with the Eight-Nation Alliance's involvement in suppressing the Boxer Rebellion. Japan eventually took advantage of such weaknesses by invading China, including the First Sino-Japanese War and the Second Sino-Japanese War.
South Korean–Taiwan relations
Oceania is, to the People's Republic of China and the Republic of China, a stage for continuous diplomatic competition. The PRC dictates that no state can have diplomatic relations with both the PRC and the ROC. As of 2024, eleven states in Oceania have diplomatic relations with the PRC, and three have diplomatic relations with the ROC. These numbers fluctuate as Pacific Island nations re-evaluate their foreign policies, and occasionally shift diplomatic recognition between Beijing and Taipei. The issue of which "Chinese" government to recognize has become a central theme in the elections of numerous Pacific island nations, and has led to several votes of no-confidence.
Numerous states have ceased their diplomatic recognition of the Republic of China during the last 70 years, since the founding of the People's Republic of China. Under the One China policy, the ROC is recognized by 11 UN member states and Holy See with 59 UN member states and Somaliland maintaining unofficial cultural and economic relations.
After the United States established diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1979 and recognized Beijing as the only legal government of China, Taiwan–United States relations became unofficial and informal following terms of the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), which allows the United States to have relations with the Taiwanese people and their government, whose name is not specified. U.S.–Taiwan relations were further informally grounded in the Six Assurances in response to the third communiqué on the establishment of US–PRC relations. The Taiwan Travel Act, passed by the U.S. Congress on March 16, 2018, allows high-level U.S. officials to visit Taiwan and vice versa. Both sides have since signed a consular agreement formalizing their existent consular relations on September 13, 2019. The US government removed self-imposed restrictions on executive branch contacts with Taiwan on January 9, 2021.
Paraguay–Taiwan relations are the bilateral relations between the Republic of Paraguay and the Republic of China (Taiwan). Both governments established diplomatic relations on 8 July 1957.
India and Republic of China (ROC) had formal diplomatic relations from 1942 to 1949. After severing diplomatic relations, the bilateral relations have improved since the 1990s, despite both countries not maintaining official diplomatic relations. India only recognises the People's Republic of China (PRC) since 1949. However, India's economic and commercial links as well as people-to-people contacts with Taiwan have expanded in recent years.
The Republic of the Fiji Islands was the first Pacific Island country to establish diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China, in 1975. China established an embassy in Fiji in 1976, and Fiji opened its embassy in China in 2001.
The Republic of Kiribati and the People's Republic of China (PRC) established diplomatic relations on June 25, 1980, and resumed on September 27, 2019. Between 2003 and 2019, The government of Kiribati recognized the Republic of China, and, in accordance with the "One China" policy, the People's Republic of China did not have diplomatic relations to the country.
The Independent State of Papua New Guinea and China (PRC) established official diplomatic relations in 1976, soon after Papua New Guinea became independent. The two countries currently maintain diplomatic, economic and, to a lesser degree, military relations. Relations are cordial; China is a significant provider of both investments and development aid to Papua New Guinea.
Tonga and China (PRC) established official diplomatic relations in 1998. The two countries maintain cordial diplomatic, economic, and military relations.
The Republic of Vanuatu and the People's Republic of China (PRC) established official diplomatic relations on March 26, 1982. China established an embassy in Vanuatu in 1989, while Vanuatu established an honorary consulate in China in 1999; it officially became an embassy in 2005. The current Ambassador of China in Vanuatu is Liu Quan. The current Ambassador of Vanuatu in China is former Minister of Finance Willie Jimmy.
Canada and Taiwan have maintained unofficial bilateral relations since 1970. First contacts between Canada and Taiwan began in 1871 with the arrival of George Leslie Mackay.
The Australian Office in Taipei represents Australian interests in Taiwan in the absence of formal diplomatic relations, functioning as a de facto embassy. The Office is headed by a Representative.
↑ Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Australia Taiwan Bilateral Relations (Report of a visit to Taiwan of Australian Parliament: July 1994), p. 11.
↑ Nicholas Thomas, Re-Orientating Australia-Taiwan Relations 1972 to present (England: Ashgate Publishing, 2004)
1 2 Griffiths, Billy (2012). The China Breakthrough, Whitlam in the Middle Kingdom, 1971. Melbourne: Monash University Publishing. pp.4–5. ISBN9781921867644.
1 2 3 4 Ivan Shearer, 'International Legal relations between Australia and Taiwan: Behind the Façade.' Australia Year Book of International Law 28.113 (2000)
1 2 Nicholas Thomas, Re-Orientating Australia-Taiwan Relations 1972 to present (England: Ashgate Publishing, 2004), p. 35.
↑ Nicholas Thomas, Re-Orientating Australia-Taiwan Relations 1972 to present (England: Ashgate Publishing, 2004), p. 38.
↑ Nicholas Thomas, Re-Orientating Australia-Taiwan Relations 1972 to present (England: Ashgate Publishing, 2004), p. 40.
↑ Nicholas Thomas, Re-Orientating Australia-Taiwan Relations 1972 to present (England: Ashgate Publishing, 2004), p. 50.
1 2 Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Australia Taiwan Bilateral Relations (Report of a visit to Taiwan of Australian Parliament: July 1994), p. 21.
1 2 Van Fossen, Anthony (2007). "The struggle for recognition: Diplomatic Competition between Taiwan and China in Oceania". Journal of Chinese Political Science. 12 (2): 125–146. doi:10.1007/s11366-007-9008-0. hdl:10072/18133.
1 2 3 Gary Klintwood, Modern Taiwan in the 1990s, Canberra papers on Strategy and Defence N0 75 (Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, 1991), p.189.
1 2 Jurgen Domes, 'Taiwan in 1991: Searching for Political Consensus,’ Asian Survey 32.1 (1991)
1 2 3 Ivan Shearer, 'International Legal relations between Australia and Taiwan: Behind the Façade.' Australia Year Book of International Law 28.113 (2000), p. 124.
1 2 Gary Klintwood, Australia's Taiwan Policy 1942 to 1992 (Australia: Australian National University, 1993), p. 108.
↑ Gary Klintwood, Australia's Taiwan Policy 1942 to 1992 (Australia: Australian National University, 1993), p. 106.
1 2 3 4 Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Australia Taiwan Bilateral Relations (Report of a visit to Taiwan of Australian Parliament: July 1994)
↑ Gary Klintwood, Australia's Taiwan Policy 1942 to 1992 (Australia: Australian National University, 1993), p. 108
1 2 Austin, G., ed., 1997. Missile Diplomacy and Taiwan's Future: Innovations in Politics and Military Power. Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence No.122. Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre.
↑ Richardson, M. 1996. ‘'Neighbours strike neutral pose for fear of aggravating Beijing.' Australian, 13 March.
↑ McGregor, R. 1996. 'ADF Chief seeks to reassure Beijing'. The Australian, 27 September
↑ Greenlees, D. and McGregor, R. 1996. 'Downer Warns China Over War Games.' Australian, 13 March
1 2 3 William T. Tow, "Australia, the United States and a 'China Growing Strong':Managing Conflict Avoidance", Department of Government, The University of Queensland (Paper for: The annual Australasian Political Science Association Conference Canberra ACT, 4–6 October 2000)
Tow, William T., and Chen-shen Yen. "Australia–Taiwan relations: the evolving geopolitical setting." Australian Journal of International Affairs 61.3 (2007): 330–350.
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