Comparison of anti-ballistic missile systems

This is a table of the most widespread or notable anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems, intended in whole or part, to counter ballistic missiles. Since many systems have developed in stages or have many iterations or upgrades, only the most notable versions are described. Such systems are typically highly integrated with radar and guidance systems, so the emphasis is chiefly on system capability rather than the specific missile employed. For example, David's Sling is a system that employs the Stunner missile.

Legend for ABM system status in below table:  Operational  In development  Inactive  Unknown status

System name	Country of origin	Period of use	Intercept	Role against	Weight	Warhead types	Range (max)	Ceiling (max)	Speed	Launcher	Cost/round (2024)
A-35M/A-350 (5V61R) [1] [nb 1]	Soviet Union	1978–1995	Exo-atmospheric [1]	ICBM	32,700 kg	Nuclear 2-3 MT	320–350 km [1]	120 km	Mach 4	Fixed launcher
A-135 ABM (51T6 Gorgon) [1]	Russia	1995–present	Exo-atmospheric	MRBM, ICBM [3]	33,000–45,000 kg	Nuclear 10 KT	350–900 km		Mach 7	Silo
A-135 ABM (53T6 Gazelle) [1]	Russia	1995–present	Re-entry	MRBM, ICBM [1] [3]	10,000 kg	Nuclear 10 KT	80–100 km	80–100 km	Mach 17	Silo
A-235 Nudol [4] [5]	Russia	In development	Re-entry, terminal	ICBM, [4] ASAT [5]		Conventional [4] [5]	150 km [4]	5–80 km [4] (ASAT 700 km) [5]		Mobile, silo
S-300 (V/SA-12B/9M82M) [6] [7] [nb 2]	Russia	1983–present [7]	Terminal	MRBM, IRBM	5800 kg [6]	Blast [6] [7]	40 km [6] [7]	30 km [6]	Mach 7.8+ [6]	Mobile [6]	$1,000,000 (48N6) [8]
S-400 (48N6DM Triumf, 40N6, 9M96E/E2) [4] [9] [10] [11]	Russia	2007–present [10]	Terminal	SRBM, IRBM [9]	1800–1900 kg [9]	Blast [10]	80–250 km (48N6DM) [4] [9] 400 km (40N6), 120 km (9M96E/E2) [11]	30 km [4] [9]	Mach 5.9	Mobile
S-500 [4] [12] [13]	Russia	2021–present		IRBM, MRBM, ICBM, [4] ASAT [13]			600 km [13]	200 km	Mach 12	Mobile
HQ-9/HQ-19 [14] [15]	China	2018–present [16]	Terminal	SRBM, MRBM, [16] IRBM [15]	1300 kg		250 km [14]	50 km [14]		Mobile
Aster (30 1N, SAMP/T) [17] [18]	France   Italy	2011–present [18]	Terminal	SRBM, MRBM	450 kg [17] [18]	Blast [17]	150 km [17]	25 km [17]	Mach 4.5 [17]	Ship silo, mobile [17]	$2,000,000 [8]
Prithvi ADV Phase I [19] [20]	India	Awaiting deployment?	Exo-atmospheric [21]	MRBM, IRBM, ICBM, ASAT [22]		Blast	300–>1000 km	50–180 km [17]	Mach 5
AAD/Ashwin Phase I [19] [20]	India	Awaiting deloyment?	Terminal [21]	MRBM, IRBM	1200 kg	Kill vehicle	200 km	15–50 km [17]
AD-1 Phase II [19] [20] [23]	India	In development	Endo-exo-atmospheric	MRBM, IRBM	18,000 kg
AD-2 Phase II [19] [20] [23]	India	In development	Terminal	IRBM
David's Sling/Stunner [24] [25]	Israel	2018–present [26]	Terminal	SRBM, MRBM [24]		Kill vehicle [24] [25]	250 km [27]	15 km [25]	Mach 7.5	Mobile	$1,000,000 [28]
Arrow 2 (Block 4) [24] [29] [nb 3]	Israel	2012–present	Re-entry [29]	MRBM, IRBM	2800 kg	Blast [29]	90 km +	Exo-atmospheric [30]	Mach 9	Mobile	$3,500,000 [28]
Arrow 3 [24] [31] [32]	Israel	2017–present [31]	Exo-atmospheric, [24] ASAT	MRBM, IRBM	less than 1400 kg [31]	Kill vehicle [32]	2400 km [31]	100 km [31]	Mach 9+	Silo [31]	$2,000,000 [33]
KM-SAM (Block II)	Republic of Korea	(Block II with ABM capabilities) 2017-present	Terminal	SRBM	400kg	Kill Vehicle	50 km	20 km	Mach 4.5+	Mobile
L-SAM (Block I) [34]	Republic of Korea	In development	Exo-atmospheric	SRBM		Kill vehicle [34]	150 km	40–60 km [35]	Mach 5+	Mobile [34]
Sky Bow III/Tien-Kung III [36]	Republic of China	2014-present	Terminal	SRBM [37]			200 km [38]	45 km	Mach 7	Mobile
Strong Bow I [39]	Republic of China	In development	Exo-atmospheric	SRBM				70 km [40]		Mobile
Violet Friend/Bloodhound Mk. III	United Kingdom	Canceled 1965	Terminal			Nuclear low KT [41]	120 km [42]	9 km+		Mobile
Patriot (PAC-3) [43] [44] [45] [nb 4]	United States	2009–present	Terminal [44]	SRBM, MRBM [44]	312 kg [45]	Kill vehicle [44]	160 km	24 km +		Mobile	$3,729,769 [8]
THAAD [43] [46] [47]	United States	2008–present	Re-entry	SRBM, MRBM, IRBM [43] [46]	900 kg [48]	Kill vehicle [46] [48]	200 km + [48] [47]	150 km [48]	Mach 8.2	Mobile [46]	$12,600,000 (2017) [49]
Aegis SM-6 ERAM [50] [51] [52] [nb 5]	United States	2009–present	Terminal [50]	MRBM, IRBM	1500 kg [53]	Blast [53]	240–370 km [51] [53]	33 km [53]	Mach 3.5	Ship silo	$3,901,818 (IA) [8]
Aegis SM-3 (IIA) [51] [54] [55] [56] [nb 6]	United States	2014–present	Boost (naval), mid-course	MRBM, IRBM, [54] ICBM, [56] [57] ASAT [55] [56]	1500 kg [58]	Kill vehicle [58]	1200 km [51]	900 – 1,050 km (depending on the type of target)  [58]	Mach 13.2 (IIA)	Ship and land silo	$27,915,625 (IIA), $9,698,617 (IB) [8]
Nike Zeus (B) [59] [nb 7]	United States	Canceled 1963, ASAT role to 1964 [60]	Re-entry	ICBM, [59] ASAT [60]	10,300 kg [59]	Nuclear 400 KT [59]	400 km [59]	280 km [59]	Mach 4+	Silo
Safeguard/Spartan [nb 8]	United States	1975–76 [63] [59]	Exo atmospheric [64]	ICBM [59]	13,100 kg [59]	Nuclear 5 MT [59]	740 km [59]	560 km [59]	Mach 3–4	Silo
Safeguard/Sprint [nb 9]	United States	1975–76	Terminal	ICBM [6]	3,500 kg [6]	Nuclear low KT [6]	40 km [6]	30 km [6]	Mach 10+ [6]	Silo
Sentry/Overlay [65] [66]	United States	1977–83 (study)	Exo-atmospheric	ICBM				Exo-atmospheric [65] [66]		Silo
Sentry/LoAD [67] [66] [nb 10]	United States	1977–83 (study)	Terminal	ICBM		Conventional [67] or nuclear [68]		15 km [67] [66]		Silo
Ground-Based Midcourse Defense/GBI [69] [70] [nb 11]	United States	2010–present	Mid-course	ICBM [69]	21,600 kg	Kill vehicle [69]				Silo	$70,000,000 [8]
Next Generation Interceptor [71] [72]	United States	In development	Mid-course	ICBM		Kill vehicle				Silo	$111,000,000 [8]

Notes

• System name: Many systems have numerous iterations or block upgrades, or have had multiple names. The primary or current system in use is described and noted, with the specific weapon iteration noted as appropriate.
• Period of use: ABM systems have protracted development periods. The time the system is or was in operational use is described.
• Intercept: Most systems can be used in different phases of ballistic missile flight, i.e., boost ^[73] (where surface or air-launched anti-aircraft missiles might also be effective because the ballistic missile is moving relatively slowly at low altitude), requiring proximity to the launch site and immediate response, mid-course/exo-atmospheric, ^[74] and re-entry/terminal. ^[75] The principal intended phase of ballistic missile interception is noted. Other phases may be tried, with less effect. The earlier in flight that a missile is intercepted, the greater area a system may defend. Mid-course interception requires an ABM launch position between the ballistic missile launch site and the area defended. Terminal defense usually protects a relatively small area (i.e., Moscow, Minot Air Force Base missile fields) from projectiles in the re-entry phase. ^{[71] [76]}
• Role: Ballistic missile speed roughly corresponds to range. MRBMs move faster than SRBMs, IRBMs faster than MRBMs, and ICBMs faster than IRBMs. ^{[71] [77]} Each iteration demands greater speed, range, and targeting capability (either in accuracy or warhead power).
• Weight: Weight roughly correlates to one or more of range/ceiling, speed/acceleration, or warhead size.
• Warhead type: Lacking precision guidance systems, early systems relied on nuclear blast to destroy ballistic missiles. ^[78] Systems intended for dual-role anti-aircraft/anti-SRBM and MRBM systems typically use blast/fragmentation warheads. Newer systems intended for IRBMs and ICBMs with high-altitude interception typically use hit-to-kill kinetic intercept profiles. ^[79]
• Range and ceiling: Maximum range does not necessarily coincide with maximum ceiling.
• Speed: Speed, along with ceiling, correlates to intercept capability, with ICBMs demanding the greatest speed and acceleration. ^[80] The terminal defense role of the Sprint system demanded extraordinary acceleration over a very brief period to intercept ICBMs that leaked through higher-altitude defense systems, or which were revealed when decoys disappeared at lower altitudes. ^[81] A high speed at low altitude (as with Sprint) is much more challenging that a high speed at high altitude. ^[82]
• Cost: Selected approximate costs are indicated for specific versions/blocks. These may vary significantly depending on the years procured and which upgrades they may incorporate. For instance, the cost of an SM-6 may vary by more than 100% depending on which version is examined, from about $4.25 million for Block I/IA to about $8.5 million in 2024 costs for Block IB. Costs in general appear to decline over time for United States weapons of the same version. ^[83]
• Hypersonic weapons: Nearly all ballistic missiles reach hypersonic speeds during re-entry, leading to assertions that they are "hypersonic weapons." Strictly speaking. hypersonic weapons are not purely ballistic in their action, and use aerodynamic maneuvering to complicate or defeat interception by anti-ballistic missiles, rather than minor maneuvering to refine targeting accuracy, as advanced ballistic missiles may do. ^[84]

The Israeli Iron Dome system is not specifically an anti-ballistic missile system, as it is intended primarily to counter unguided rockets and artillery projectiles, rather than guided missiles on trajectories that take them above Earth's atmosphere, re-entering at extreme velocities. ^[85] Iron Dome uses principles that are similar to a true anti-ballistic missile system to intercept slower-moving short-range rockets and artillery projectiles, employing the Tamir missile at ranges of up to 70km and altitudes to 10km, at a cost of about $50,000 per missile. Iron Dome also has an anti-aircraft capability. ^[86]

The U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) investigated a variety of missile defense strategies, many involving exotic technologies such as the X-ray lasers ^[87] envisioned by Project Excalibur, or the Brilliant Pebbles kinetic-kill satellite system. ^[88] None of the more exotic systems were pursued to prototyping.

Footnotes

1. The original A-35 was introduced in 1972 with the A-350Zh missile. It was replaced by the A-350R in 1974, and then by A-350M in 1978. ^[2]
2. The S-300 requires specific missile models to be used in the ABM role. Most missiles are optimized for anti-aircraft use.
3. The Arrow 1 (Hetz) never went into service, as it was quickly overtaken by the smaller Arrow 2.
4. Patriot initially was solely an anti-aircraft missile. with no capability against ballistic missiles. The PAC-1 upgrade introduced this capability as a software upgrade. PAC-2 improved this capability, and the GEM+ upgrade introduced separate versions optimized for cruise missiles or ballistic missiles. PAC-3 is a new design, intended primarily for ABM use.
5. SM-6 is a general-purpose weapon that can be used against ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, aircraft, and surface targets.
6. SM-3 is a specialty weapon intended solely for ABM use .
7. The U.S. ABM concepts proposed in the 1950s, 60s and 70s share a common genesis, with overlapping technologies and often confusingly similar names. Refer to the individual articles on these topics for fuller discussions of their histories and characteristics.
8. The precursor programs to Safeguard (or follow-on to Nike-Zeus) were Nike-X and then the Sentinel programs. These projects incorporated most of the same systems and concepts, differing chiefly in scope of coverage and defensive philosophy. Nike-X emphasized close-range interception using small, fast missiles with low-yield neutron-enhanced weapons for the terminal defense component. These became Sprint. Sentinel resurrected Nike-Zeus, now named Spartan, alongside Sprint, using large x-ray-enhanced nuclear warheads for the Spartan exo-atmospheric component, allowing the system to operate with significantly loosened accuracy requirements due to the much greater kill radius of an x-ray-enhanced nuclear explosive outside the atmosphere compared to pure blast or neutron effects. ^{[61] [62]} After China demonstrated a nuclear capability in 1967, Nike-X became the Sentinel program, using both Spartan and Sprint, but in a scaled-back scope.
9. Sprint was the principal component of Nike-X, and was combined with Spartan for Sentinel.
10. LoAD used a Sprint-like missile.
11. The GBI uses a three-stage booster based on the Minotaur-C launch vehicle, itself a derivative of the Peacekeeper/MX ICBM.

See also

• Missile defense systems by country
• Anti-ballistic missile defense countermeasure

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