| Enver Pasha's campaign in Bukhara | |||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Part of the Basmachi movement and Enver Pasha's Rebellion | |||||||||
| Enver Pasha's influence in Central Asia (shaded areas on map) | |||||||||
| |||||||||
| Belligerents | |||||||||
| Military support: | |||||||||
| Commanders and leaders | |||||||||
| | | ||||||||
| Strength | |||||||||
| 7,000–26,000 | 100,000–200,000 (reserves); over 20,000 in combat | ||||||||
| Casualties and losses | |||||||||
| See § Casualties | See § Casualties | ||||||||
In January 1922, the Basmachi movement under the command of Turkish general Enver Pasha launched a military campaign to wrest control of Bukhara and Khorezm from Soviet forces led by Mikhail Frunze, Semyon Budyonny and Kamenev. [2] The Basmachis seized most of the Bukharan and Khorezm People's Soviet Republics, challenging Soviet authority in the region by May, but Soviet counter-offensives in June forced the Basmachis to end their operation. The campaign formed part of the broader Basmachi Movement against Soviet rule in Central Asia following the Russian Civil War.
Turkish general Enver Pasha was sent to Bukhara by Moscow in the autumn of 1921 and arrived on 8 November 1921. [3] [4] Instead of focusing solely on Soviet objectives, he became involved with the Emir of Afghanistan, Amanullah. With ambitions to lead a Central Asian confederation, Amanullah stationed his most capable commanders along the northern frontier and, without formally committing, began corresponding with Enver. [5]
By 1922, Soviet forces combined military, political, and economic measures, cutting off towns from the countryside. While food continued to reach urban centers, the Basmachis and rural populations suffered from famine, weakening the movement's local support. [6]
During Enver Pasha's insurgency in Turkestan, Soviet forces deployed approximately 100,000 troops under Mikhail Frunze to confront his forces. [7] Some estimates place the force between 100,000 and 160,000, [8] or even 200,000. [9] The units were primarily cavalry, but the force was also well-equipped with artillery, armored cars, and aircraft. [10]
At the end of January 1922, Enver Pasha led about 200 Basmachi fighters in a successful siege of Dushanbe. During the battles of 20–22 January, Enver inflicted heavy casualties on the Russian forces. [11] [12]
The town was besieged on 28 January or 8 February. The Russians sent wireless messages requesting reinforcements from the garrisons in Tashkent, Bukhara, and Samarkand. [13] [14] Meanwhile, a Russian cavalry detachment dispatched from Denov to relieve the Bolsheviks trapped in Dushanbe was ambushed; its soldiers were neutralized, and machine guns, rifles, and ammunition were captured. [15]
On 31 January, Soviet troops attempted to raid the village of Kampçı but ultimately failed. The Basmachis captured one horse, inflicted heavy losses on the Russians, and pursued them all the way to Dushanbe. [16]
On 7 February, the Soviets suffered over 100 casualties. The Basmachis captured a machine gun, along with numerous rifles and ammunition. Seventy-two Russian troops defected and joined the Basmachis [12]
According to Cemal Kutay, the Russian commander in Dushanbe, Mazarof, reported that Enver Pasha had organized a strong resistance movement with growing local support, inflicting heavy losses on Russian forces and compelling them to contemplate abandoning the city. [11] [12]
By 14 February, during a smoky and snowy noon, the town was completely captured, and Enver pursued the retreating Russian forces toward Mirtyube. His troops seized 120 rifles and two machine guns, inflicting around 100 casualties on the Russian garrison, while 88 soldiers defected to his side. [17] [18] [19] At Mirtyube, Enver's forces clashed with the Bolsheviks once again, resulting in a decisive victory for Enver's troops. [20] [21] The remaining elements of the 7th Soviet Regiment retreated to Boysun. [22]
Between 28 January and 22 February, Enver Pasha's forces, numbering around 1,500 men, captured Sariosiyo, Qubodiyon, Yurchi, and Denov against a Soviet force estimated at 7,000–8,000 troops. During these engagements, the Russians suffered around seventy deaths, abandoning their supplies, ammunition, five machine guns, two cannons, and hundreds of rifles. Enver was wounded during the operations, and several Russian soldiers defected to join the Basmachi forces. [23] [24] [25]
These victories increased Enver's reputation across Central Asia and enhanced his prestige in the Islamic world. [26] [27] In February, Enver was warned of an impending Russian counterattack and withdrew to Kofarnihon. [18]
Enver's successful gains in Bukhara began to spread to Dagestan and Chechnya, where signs of unrest had already emerged. [28] [29] [30] In response to the armed detachments of N. Gotsinsky, the Soviet authorities established the Republican Military Council for Combating Banditry in Dagestan on January 30, 1922. By August 1922, the situation had escalated to the point that Dagestan was placed under martial law. [31] [32]
In early 1922, Soviet authorities warned that the situation in Dagestan was critical. A telegram from March 1922 described a surge in "banditism," growing anti-Soviet agitation led by mullahs and "Turkish emissaries," and feared that the uprising was spreading into Dagestan. [33]
In the same year, Gotsinsky's associates sought international recognition from the League of Nations for a future independent Caucasian state, citing solidarity with broader Muslim resistance movements. [32]
According to the ninth page of a report by Galib Pasha, the cities of Bukhara, Qarshi, Karmana, and Chardzhou were under Soviet control, while the remaining territories of the Emirate were held by Enver Pasha's forces in spring. The other provinces of Bukhara were listed as Shahrisabz, Sherobod, and, in Eastern Bukhara, the cities of Termez, Dushanbe, Hisar, and Gharm. [34]
In early spring or January, the Basmachis occupied the Karshi, Shahrisabz, and G'uzor regions, opening the roads to Western Bukhara. Around the same time, Abdulkhai Arifov, the military commissioner of the Bukhara Republic, who commanded a full Bukhara cavalry squadron of 300 men, defected to the Basmachi side. [35] [36]
According to the Commander-in-Chief of the British forces in India, reporting to the War Office on 10 May 1922, unrest broke out in Askabad region in March, in which the Zaloni bazaar was looted. Troops were dispatched but later withdrawn once order was restored. [36] Meanwhile, Termez remained under rebel siege, and the Bolsheviks sent reinforcements from Kerki. [36]
Koyenikov, the official Soviet Russian representative in Bukhara, reported to the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs that "the Basmachis were growing stronger and becoming organized in Eastern Bukhara, were also active in Western Bukhara, and that even the capital, Bukhara itself, was in danger." [37]
On 25 March, fighting erupted at Qarsang, where Enver Pasha's forces killed roughly 245 Russian troops and seized three machine guns. The next day, Enver reported that his men were facing around 5,000 Russian soldiers while having only about 500 rifles at their disposal. In the village of Tal, east of Boysun, Russian units—about 400 men backed by two artillery pieces and four machine guns—launched repeated attacks on Enver's outposts over three days. They were repelled each time, leaving roughly 80 dead before retreating. These victories secured Enver Pasha full control over Kulob, Darvaz, Karategin, Baljuvon, and Qurghonteppa. [38]
In a 26 March 1922 letter from Mazar-i-Sharif, Ali Nazif Bey reported to Enver Pasha that Bukhara's diplomatic envoys were seeking Afghan support while Russian troop numbers in the region were being under- and over-reported; he warned that local anti-Soviet forces under leaders such as Danyal and Jabbar were growing, that Turkmen detachments were preparing to move, and that efforts were underway to sabotage the railway lines through Merv and Chardzhou. The letter indicates Nazif's expectation of imminent operations and his reliance on orders from Kabul. [39]
Due to these successes, on 28 March 1922, Enver Pasha was declared commander of all forces in Eastern Bukhara by a decree from Amir Alim Khan. [40] [41]
A. Nagornov, the Consul General in Bukhara, sent a report on 2 April 1922 describing the loss of Soviet control in Eastern Bukhara, and the negative effect and will probably have an even greater impact on the country's food resources in the near future. [42] At that time, around 3,000 Basmachi cavalry laid siege to Kerki and eventually captured the town, inflicting heavy casualties on the Soviet forces. [43] [44]
On 13 April 1922, Ruz Muhammed Bek and a unit of Basmachis arrived at Enver Pasha's headquarters, bringing him a horse, a bird, a chest, and a letter from Korşirmat. [45]
On 20 April 1922, Joseph Stalin, then serving as Secretary of the Central Committee, sent a classified telegram to Sergo Ordzhonikidze instructing him to travel from Tiflis to Tashkent to assess the situation on the Turkestan Front. Stalin ordered an immediate investigation into the Basmachi uprising in Fergana and Bukhara, directing Ordzhonikidze to determine whether native units were supplying insurgents with arms, whether local authorities were obstructing military operations, and whether the composition of the Turkfront, Turkburo, or Turkestan Commission required reorganization. The telegram also mandated the introduction of martial law in Bukhara and Turkestan and requested detailed recommendations on measures to suppress the revolt and restore control. [46] Ordzhonikidze was also given the task of ascertaining "how great is the danger of [losing] Bukhara and Ferghana." [47]
The Soviet forces suffered heavy casualties and severe attrition from disease, exhaustion, and the harsh climate while combating the Basmachi insurgents. Shortages of food, water, and medical supplies, compounded by continuous attacks from the Basmachi, left the troops in a critical condition. In a report to the Turkestan Front headquarters, the commander Vladimir Martynovsky stated: [48]
"Diseases and exhaustion disabled 80% of personnel. Dozens of Red Army soldiers were killed or wounded. Breaking out from the dense encirclement is practically impossible."
In mid-March, Basmachis besieged and on the same day, captured Margilan, while heavy fighting occurred in the Kokand region, damaging nearby oil wells. Approximately 2,500 Bolshevik soldiers deserted—taking four machine guns with them—and joined the insurgents. In Tashkent, the 14th Uzbek Regiment also defected en masse, bringing weapons and ammunition. [49] The railway north of Tashkent was repeatedly cut as the Basmachi movement spread further across the region. Bolshevik reinforcements were dispatched to Kerki, while a growing number of deserters fled into Persia. [50] [36]
According to military commissar Urastemov, Basmachi forces took Uchqoʻrgʻon and eventually Namangan in March. They killed 51 communists during the operation and captured another 75 as prisoners. [51]
In spring 1922, Leon Trotsky personally took charge of operations against the Basmachis and traveled to Fergana.The Basmachis then engaged in brutal combat; after liberating villages, they executed all Soviet officials, especially commissars. [52] [53]
In mid-1922, a Revolutionary Committee report from Fergana warned that the city was forced to organize civil defense measures in response to unexpectedly strong Basmachi attacks in the area. [54]
In May 1922, after receiving military aid from Afghanistan—including 800 soldiers, 100 British rifles, and 80 camel-loads of ammunition. [55] [56] [57] [58] Enver Pasha mobilized from his headquarters in the Kafirun region with approximately 3,000 to 20,000 Basmachi fighters under his command. [note 1]
On 11 May, the Basmachis attacked the city of Karmana. After heavy fighting, however, they were forced to withdraw. [59] The following day, G. K. Ordzhonikidze arrived in Bukhara from Tashkent and sharply criticized the hesitant policies of the Bukharan satellite government. [60] Soviet envoy Shalva Eliava reported to Joseph Stalin that Eastern Bukhara was effectively in open revolt under Enver Pasha's leadership and urged that Enver's elimination was essential to restoring control. [61]
On 13 May, Enver launched a broad offensive, taking Saraykemer and most of the city of Boysun under his possession. [62] [25] In 1922, multiple reports described Enver's growing power in Bukhara. A detailed report submitted to Galip Pasha, appointed as the Ottoman representative to Bukhara, confirmed that more than half of the territory of the Emirate of Bukhara was under Enver's military control, rather than Soviet authority. [63]
At 23:00 on 14 May, Stalin warned Ordzhonikidze in Tashkent about Enver's operatives and leftist elements in a coded telegram. Along with criticizing Eliava's assessment of Bukhara, Stalin stressed the need for combining military occupation with political concessions, particularly regarding the return of waqf lands, and urged measures against disruptive factions. [64]
During this period, the Basmachi movement also became more centralized; regular meetings were held among the leaders of Khiva, Bukhara, and Fergana. [65] [66] He established a unified army in Bukhara, implemented a Western-style chain of command, and incorporated Turkish officers into his ranks. [67] [66] [68] He also set up cartridge and ammunition factories and maintained regular contact with Afghanistan. [66] [69]
Enver also decided to unify his forces under a single uniform. He informed Hacı Sami in Afghanistan, and through Amanullah Khan's foster brother Ahmet Khan, he received khaki uniforms and lambskin hats made from Karagöl pelts. Because boots were scarce, local craftsmen produced light, upturned shoes modeled after Anatolian footwear. [70] [71]
On 29 May, Colonel Humphrys—the British diplomatic representative in Kabul—reported to Lord Curzon that Enver Pasha had recently inflicted a heavy defeat on General Budyonny, who commanded about 50,000 men. Newspapers in Istanbul were circulating the same claim around the same time. [72] [73]
According to The New York Herald report of July 29, by the end of May Enver Pasha had launched offensives from Bukhara toward Tashkent, Kokand, Khujand, and Naryn. As a result, he held a line extending from Tashkent to Khujand and eastward through Kokand to Naryn, threatening both Tashkent and the Krasnovodsk railway. [74] [75]
A report published by The New York Times on 31 July 1922 stated that Enver Pasha had occupied a region roughly comparable in size to the state of Texas. [76]
According to Current History journal and New York Herald, Enver Pasha also captured Yarkand and Kashgar alongside Bukhara and Samarkand. [74] [75]
During this campaign, sown areas in Bukhara were reduced by 72 percent, and livestock numbers fell by two-thirds. [77] By early 1922, Enver had already seized much of the Bukharan People's Soviet Republic and attracted several Jadid reformers, former collaborators of the Soviet regime, to his cause. [78]
Later that month, Basmachi strength around Samarkand was such that when Eliava and Ordzhonikidze could visit Ulug Bek's Observatory only under heavy guard. [79] When Enver's forces controlled the entire eastern part of Bukhara, the Soviet officials viewed the situation as politically more dangerous than the military successes achieved by Enver. [80] [81]
The Bukharan Army could no longer contain the movement, and fearing the collapse of their government, the Chairman of the Council of People's Nazirs of the Bukharan PSR, Fayzulla Xo'jayev, approved a further increase in Soviet troop deployment in the area. [82]
In response to Fayzulla Xoʻjayev's request, the Bukhara Group of Troops was formed, drawing units from the Moscow Military District and Belarus, and totaling 4,500 rifles, 3,030 sabers, and 20 artillery pieces [83] [84]
On 20 April, 20,000 troops from Samarkand and Chardzhou were directed toward Kogon, on the Kizilsu–Tashkent railway, 8,000 of whom were sent to Qarshi. [59]
For the direct command of military operations in the region, RKKA commander S.S. Kamenev and Chekist Ya.Kh. Peters were sent to purge the Bukharan party, military, and militia of Pan-Turkist and Pan-Islamist elements. [85]
Under the Turkestan Front, commanded by N. Kakurin and P. Pavlov, Soviet authorities organized two Cavalry Brigades, two cavalry squadrons, and one rifle division, comprising roughly 7,500–8,000 soldiers with 20 machine guns. [85] Peters, a veteran Russian revolutionary and one of the first commanders of the Communist Party, along with Kamenev, oversaw operations against Enver in Bukhara. [60] [85] A squadron of four aircraft—two Nieuport fighters and two 1½-Strutters—was deployed to southern Bukhara to provide air support against Basmachis. [86] The Soviets also purchased about 24 LVG VI reconnaissance planes from Germany, the majority of which were sent to the Central Asian front. [87]
As a last resort, the Soviet government summoned Fayzulla Xoʻjayev, the highly trusted head of the Bukharan Government, to Moscow, and through him, they offered a truce to Enver Pasha. [79] [88] [89] The Soviets, through an eleven-member delegation sent from Kazan, proposed granting Enver Pasha broad concessions in nearly all matters and urged him to reach an agreement. In response, Enver convened the National Pact Congress. [90] However, Enver's reply was uncompromising: [79]
"Peace is only acceptable after the withdrawal of Russian troops from Turkestan soil."
As a result of the negotiations, the Soviet offer was rejected, even though Togan urged Enver to accept the peace as he had received news from Moscow that the Soviet government intended to send 100,000 additional troops to Turkestan if they refused. [79] The National Pact of Congress consequently issued a decision for full independence. [91] Enver himself remained optimistic; hoping for better days, the headquarters was later moved from Pulluhakiyan to Kafirun.
Around the same time, through Nariman Narimanov, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Azerbaijan Republic, Enver Pasha sent an ultimatum to Moscow, demanding the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Turkestan. On 30 March 1922, the Soviet administration established a new front in Bukhara against the Basmachi, along with a special operations staff. Special brigades were organized in Samarkand and sent to Bukhara. [92]
Meanwhile, Enver continued to pursue his objectives. On 18 May 1922, the Central Committee discussed the "Turkestan–Bukhara issue" and issued a decree initiating a broad political campaign against him, while also dispatching military reinforcements to the Bukharan People's Soviet Republic. [84] [93]
On 19 May 1922, Enver sent a ultimatum to the Soviet government, again demanding that the Red Army withdraw from Turkestan,Bukhara, and Khiva within 14-15 days. The demand was rejected by the Soviet authorities. [94]
As a response to the ultimatum, the Soviet government issued a brief declaration: "Enver Pasha is an agent of British imperialism." [95] [96] [97]
Following this, the Soviet government reinforced its forces in the region and established an extensive espionage network, which was placed under the direct leadership of Georges Agabekov. [95]
In Western Bukhara, the Basmachi movement was also gaining strength, and by late 1921, all the provinces of the region were administered by Abdulkahhar and Faizul Makhdum. [98] [99] Their growing influence increased local recruitment and drew more volunteers into joining the Basmachis. During this period, Abdulkahhar established communication with Amir Alim Khan in Afghanistan, Lakay Ibrahim, and Enver Pasha in Bukhara. According to Amir Alim Khan, Abdulkahhar's army was reinforced by 6,000 men around Bukhara, 2,000 from Vabkent, 2,000 from Qiziltepa, 2,000 from Shofirkon, 2,500 from Romitan and Peshku, and 2,000 from Kogon district. [100] [101] Bolshevik strength in Bukhara was estimated at 20,000 troops. [102]
Following his operations toward Bukhara, [26] [103] Abdulkahhar captured the districts of Gijduvon, Shofirkon, Vabkent, Romitan, and Nurata. In March 1922, he launched a major offensive against Bukhara, seizing most of the city and advancing toward Kogon, a key railway junction about 12.8 km (12 versts) from old Bukhara. [104] [105] [101] Abdulkahhar also seized the Baha' al-Din Naqshband shrine, the resting place of the founder of the Naqshbandi Sufi Order. [106] The Red Army suffered defeat near the Mehta Qasim Bridge over the Zarafshan River. [107] To protect their supply lines to Bukhara, the Soviet command dispatched cavalry from Samarkand, Budyonny's forces from the Trans-Caspian front, and additional troops from Tashkent, the Fergana Valley, and Central Turkestan. [108] In total, the Soviets sent about 12,000 additional troops and several armored trains to Bukhara. [109] [110] Overall, the campaign inflicted heavy casualties on the Bolsheviks and resulted in the Basmachis seizing Bukhara. [111] [112]
In November 1921, Junaid Khan signed a peace agreement with the Khorezm Republic, while waiting for an opportune moment to seize control of Khorezm. [113] He commanded about 15,000 men in 1922, [114] [115] although this figure might have been exaggerated, as estimates vary. [116] In early months of 1922 during the height of the Basmachi movement, Enver Pasha sent convoys and letters to Junaid Khan who was offering strong resistance to the Bolsheviks in the Karakum desert. [117] [118] Several Turkmen tribes also joined Junaid khan, who also held the title of "Commander of the Army of Islam" alongside Enver Pasha. [114] [119] As a result, the territory under Khivan Basmachi control expanded significantly. [117]
In April 1922, Junaid Khan captured the Boldumsaz District. [120] On April 12, he attacked the Chovdur tribes, who were allied with Soviets, inflicting heavy casualties. [121]
In 1922, Basmachi uprisings broke out against the Soviet government in Khiva, where the Soviets suffered a heavy defeat against Junaid Khan and Abdulkahhar in Khiva. [122] [29] [123] This enabled Junaid Khan to seize control of Khorezm. [124] However, due to increase of Soviet dispatch in the area, a portion of his troops began negotiations with the Red Army, and about 150 Basmachis eventually surrendered. [125]
On 9 April, Enver circulated a nine-point directive to Basmachi units calling for internal unity, strict discipline, and coordinated operations: he asked fighters to settle local disputes, unite under a single banner, cut Soviet supply lines through raids, build effective intelligence networks, and send delegations to the congress planned after 10 April. [126]
While touring the southern front of Boysun, Enver and his men passed through the village of Kafirun, located about 2 km away. [127] On 15 April 1922, an enormous crowd gathered under the command of their headquarters. For the council scheduled that day, nearly one hundred Basmachis from across Turkestan assembled, accompanied by approximately 3,000 armed fighters united under the Enver Pasha's banner for a common ideal. [128]
Precisely at eight o'clock, Enver Pasha—accompanied by Chief of Staff Hasan Bey, Afghan Captain Afzaleddin, and Afghan volunteers under the command of Ahmet Khan—stood before the assembled commanders to address them in Ottoman Turkish: [129]
"«ای ترکستانِ مُجاهدلَرِنین قهرمانلاری! سیزلَر بو گؤزل و مُثِلْسِز وطنِیْنینیزی، یِت(?) ییل دیر آنونُ مُردَر چِیزمَهلَری ایله قَدیْمَلییان روسلاردان آزاد ائتمک اُچون بورادا توپلانمیش سیز. قدَرین چِلْوَسی ایله بیز، باشقا بیر مملکتده دوغولوب بِیوُمُوش افغان گؤنُلُلوَر ایله تقدیرینیزده شریک اولوروز.
بِن و ضابطانیم حُضورونوزدا واعده ائدیریم کی، بو مقدّراتا شریک اولماغدان پِشیمانلیق حسِی اِتمِیرم. سون نفَسیمَغَه قَدَر بو دَوا اوچون چالیشاجام. اینجا وردیغیم یَمینی شَرَفْینِیز ایله تَصْدِیق ائدِمَنِیزی طلب ائدیرم.»"
English Translation:
"O heroes of Turkestan's mujahideen, you have gathered here to liberate your beautiful and unparalleled homeland from the Russians, who for seventy years have trampled it under their filthy boots. By the twists of fate, we, born in another land, and the Afghan volunteers share in your destiny. On behalf of myself and my fellow officers, I promise before you that I do not regret sharing in your fate. I will work for this cause until my last breath. I ask that you, in turn, endorse the pledge I make here with your honor."
In response, all the Basmachis affirmed the Kafirun decisions, declaring: "We pledge on our honor!" [130]
Following the congress, the Turkestan Provisional Government was established, outlining a comprehensive military and administrative framework for territories of Eastern Bukhara cleared of Soviet control. The resolutions called for the formation of regular forces under provincial commanders (leshkerbashis), the mobilization of new uprisings in remaining regions, and the creation of local governments in liberated areas. Funding was to be secured through zakat , tributes, or additional taxes based on wealth, managed by appointed collectors. The decrees regulated logistics, reporting, and inter-provincial coordination, ordering daily communication with central command and mutual military assistance during emergencies. They also instructed forces to sabotage Soviet infrastructure, suppress espionage, and treat prisoners humanely. Ultimate authority over all political and military operations was vested in Enver Pasha. [131] [132]
In accordance with the decisions made at the Congress of Kafirun on 15 April 1922, Enver Pasha established local and civil administrations in the liberated areas and stationed a portion of his troops in the mentioned locations to maintain control and security. [133] [134] [135] The same congress also proclaimed Turkestan Provisional Government ), headquartered in Samarkand. [136] They declared a constitution consisting of 7 sections and 36 articles. [137] [138] Osman hoca was appointed President of Bukhara, while Shir Muhammad Bek, commander-in-chief of the Islamic Armies, was elected as the president. [66] [89] [139] Abdul hamid as named minister of War, and Ali Riza served as Deputy Minister of War. [140] [141] The new state was founded on the principles of private property and governance under Shari'a law . [66]
The government established by Shir Muhammad Bek relocated its center five times within three months, moving successively between Samarkand, Namangan, Osh, Margilan, and Naryn. [142] [143] The Kafirun Congress, attended by representatives including Cora Hoca from Kabul, resolved to organize regular military units in liberated areas of Eastern Bukhara, prepare local populations for combat, appoint commanders to lead revolutionary actions in each region, and levy taxes if resources were insufficient. [122]
The congress consisted of sixteen resolutions, the last of which granted Enver Pasha full authority over all military and political affairs. He was formally presented with a seal inscribed: [122] "Damad-ı Halifet'ül Müslimin, Emir-i Leşker-i İslâm Seyyid Enver" ("Son-in-law of the Caliph of the Muslims, Commander of the Islamic Army, Seyyid Enver") symbolizing his authority and consolidating the support of the national movement's command. [144] [132]
Soviet losses in the Basmachi conflict varied widely according to different sources. Total Soviet casualties were reported at around 17,000 in Termez and Kerki alone, [44] some sources estimate as many as 259,000 between 1921 and 1922; these figures are likely exaggerated. [145] [146] Vladimir Martynovsky reported that losses have reached up to 80% of Soviet forces in the region. [147] According to Grigori F. Krivosheev, from January 1921 to July 1922 Soviet casualties totaled 1,793. [148]
According to a Revolutionary Committee report covering January–July 1922, the Basmachi in the Namangan region killed 17 militia and likely a large number of civilians, though exact figures were unknown due to disrupted communications. Since March, fifteen militia deserted to join the Basmachi, bringing 21 rifles and several hundred rounds of ammunition, while the authorities noted they could not measure how much of the population was suffering from Basmachi activity, only that it was “great.” The Basmachi also captured civilians, robbed villages, and seized weapons during skirmishes. [149]
Total Basmachi casualties were reported at approximately 4,000 according to the Krugosvet encyclopedia. [150] A Soviet report indicated that only 100–150 fighters remained under the main Western Bukhara emirs by autumn 1922, down from roughly 1,000 following heavy fighting. [151] Another Soviet report estimated that Basmachi strength declined from 26,000 fighters in May 1922 to 6,700 by October 1922. [152]
A report from the chairman of the commission, dated August 7, Sokolnikov, acknowledged that after four years of struggle, the Bolsheviks had failed to eliminate the Basmachi. Instead, the insurgency had expanded across Samarkand, parts of Syr-Darya, and Turkmen oblasts—becoming a widespread regional revolt and a major embarrassment for Soviet authority in Turkestan. [153] [154]
As a result of Basmachi successes, they regained control over all of Eastern Bukhara, most of Western Bukhara, and the entire Fergana Valley. [155] [156] [157]
By early June, insurgents under Enver Pasha advanced from Boysun, capturing Bolshevik positions at Chashma and Hazifan. By 6 June, Soviet forces in the region were estimated at 70,000, including 4,500 in Tashkent, 10,000 in Fergana, 5,000 in Semirechye, 7,000 in Khiva, 1,000 between Kizilsu and Ashkabad, 4,000 in Ashkabad, 3,000 between Ashkabad and Merv, 10,000 between Merv and Kushk, 3,500 in Chardzhou, 7,000 in the Kerki–Termez sector, and 15,000 along the Kogon–Karshi–Samarkand line. [158] [159]
The Basmachis entered Termez again on 8 June but were pushed back after Soviet reinforcements arrived. Fighting continued in the surrounding area for twelve days, with heavy losses on both sides, including the death of Russian military commissar M. Marosin. [160] Enver's forces also captured Sherobod, inflicting heavy casualties on the Bolsheviks and prompting additional Soviet reinforcements to be sent. [59] Meanwhile, the Soviets transferred large numbers of troops to Turkestan via Kizilsu from the Caucasus and through the Orenburg railway, concentrating them around Kushk and partly in Bukhara, aiming to deter Afghanistan from supporting Enver Pasha. [59]
On 10 June 1922, the Soviets launched a new campaign against Enver, describing him as "the most evil enemy of Soviet power and defender of the interests of the manaps." [161] At that day, Enver Pasha successfully defended Kurganteppa and won the battle in Argamchi. [162]
Due to the deteriorating situation in Turkestan, Yakov Melkumov, commander of the 2nd Turkestan Cavalry Brigade, was dispatched to lead operations against the Basmachi movement.
On 21 June, Enver Pasha engaged with the Bolshevik forces to the west of Samarkand. His troops achieved a decisive victory, reportedly destroying two Red Army divisions. [163] [164] [165]
At the end of June, Enver Pasha attacked a bridgehead on the Surxondaryo River, defended by a battalion of the 5th Rifle Regiment. Several assaults led by Enver were repelled, and by 29 June, the entire regiment, supported by artillery, crossed the river and outflanked his forces. After an intense battle in which the Basmachis lost 165 men, Enver retreated. [166] [167] The Red Army pursued Enver in two columns—one to seal the Afghan frontier and the other to envelop him from the north and expel him from the Hisar Valley. [168]
In July 1922, the forces of Faizal Maksum, supporters of Enver Pasha, were disarmed by the Basmachi in Karategin under the leadership of Ishan Sultan. [169] On 7 July, a Basmachi assassination attempt on the life of Fayzulla Xoʻjayev failed. [60] [170]
During the same year and into the following one, the government of the Bukharan People's Soviet Republic dismissed all Ottoman prisoners of war working in Bukhara as teachers, officially accusing them of provoking factionalism in the country and supporting Enver's actions. [171] [172] [173] [174]
Some Soviet writers even claimed that Mikhail Frunze faced **40,000** in Bukhara (Tsentralnaya Aziya i Zakavkaz'ye: Istoriya i Sovremennost', p. 64), but this figure is considered exaggerated and logistically impossible by Robert F. Baumann (p.121).
His first major victory is when he attacks Dushanbe on January 28, 1922, with 1500 soldiers against some 7 or 8000. After two weeks of fighting the occupying troops evacuate the town
{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: numeric names: authors list (link)Начальник Душанбинского гарнизона Владимир Мартыновский в донесении штабу Туркестанского фронта сообщал о критическом положении, в котором оказались красноармейцы, и просил скорейшей помощи: "Болезни и истощение вывели из строя 80% личного состава. Десятки красноармейцев убиты и ранены. Осуществить прорыв из плотного кольца окружения практически невозможно".
...by the end of May [he] started a double offensive northeast from Bokhara, which he had captured by a brilliant coup de main, toward Tashkent and northeast from Hisar to Khokand ... and now holds loosely the line from Tashkent down to Khojent and eastward through Kokand to Naryn, whence he is sending out flying columns that threaten the Tashkent and Krasnovodsk Railway ... The entire country south of Tash-kent has been wrested from the Reds, including the Important towns of Yar-kand, Kashgar, Samarkand and Bokhara
A recent report from Tashkend says that he now oc-cupies a region about the size of Texas.
советские войска провели операцию по окружению и уничтожению отрядов Энвер-паши, сам он был убит в бою. Численность басмачей, по оценке советской разведки, сократилась с 26 тыс. человек в мае до 6,7 тыс. человек в октябре 1922 г.
At their height in 1920–1922, some sources claim that the rebels had twenty to thirty thousand men under arms, controlled the Ferghana valley and most of Tajikistan, and enjoyed widespread popularity among the indigenous non-Russian population.