The campaign resulted in the Basmachis temporarily gaining control over Eastern and most of Western Bukhara and Khorezm People's Soviet Republic, challenging Soviet authority in the region. Despite these significant successes, Soviet counter-offensives in June, forced the Basmachis to halt their campaign. The campaign formed part of the broader Basmachi Movement against Soviet rule in Central Asia following the Russian Civil War.
By 1922, Soviet forces combined military action with political and economic control, began cutting off towns from the countryside. Food reached towns, but Basmachis and rural population suffered from famine, which weakened the Basmachis’ local support.[5]
In a 26 March 1922 letter from Mazar-i-Sharif, Ali Nazif Bey reported to Enver Pasha that Bukhara’s diplomatic envoys were seeking Afghan support while Russian troop numbers in the region were being under- and over-reported; he warned that local anti-Soviet forces under leaders such as Danyal and Jabbar were growing, that Turkmen detachments were preparing to move, and that efforts were underway to sabotage the railway lines through Merv and Çardjuy. The letter indicates Nazif’s expectation of imminent operations and his reliance on orders from Kabul.[6]
Koyenikov, the official Soviet Russian representative in Bukhara, reported to the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs that "the Basmachis were growing stronger and becoming organized in Eastern Bukhara, were also active in Western Bukhara, and that even the capital, Bukhara itself, was in danger."[7]
In April 1922, Soviet authorities published a report summarizing the year’s military research in Central Asia, covering topics such as the Hisar expedition, the organization of military convoys, mountain warfare, and the tactics of the Basmachi. Additional studies examined the experiences of Civil War veterans and the impact of the regional climate on operations. A second list released that September again included “The Tactics of the Basmachi,” reflecting continued Red Army focus on counterinsurgency in Turkestan. Around the same time, the Council of People’s Commissars established a scientific commission to study the social and environmental conditions of the region’s indigenous population.[8]
Bukharan Army could no longer contain the movement and, fearing the collapse of their own government, the Bukharan Council of Nazir, Fayzulla Xo'jayev approved yet another increase in Soviet troop commitment in the area.[9]
During Enver Pasha's insurgency in Turkestan, Soviet forces deployed approximately 100,000 troops to the region to combat his forces.[10][11][12][13](Other estimates range from 100,000-160,000[14][15][16][17] to 200,000[18]), mostly cavalry but well-equipped with artillery, armored cars and aircraft.[19]
Enver Pasha's campaign
January-February offensives
In early January, the Basmachis occupied the Karshi, Shahrisabz, and Guzar regions, opening the roads to Western Bukhara. Around the same time, Abdulkhai Arifov, the military commissioner of the Bukhara Republic, who commanded a full Bukhara cavalry squadron of 300 men, defected to the Basmachi side.[20][21]
According to the ninth page of a report by Galib Pasha, the cities of Bukhara, Qarshi, Karmana, and Chardzhou were under Soviet control, while the remaining territories of the Emirate were held by Enver Pasha’s forces in spring. The other provinces of Bukhara were listed as Shahrisabz, Sherobod, and, in Eastern Bukhara, the cities of Termez, Dushanbe, Hisar, and Gharm.[22]
At the end of January 1922, Enver Pasha led about 200 Basmachi fighters in a successful siege on Dushanbe. During the battles of 20–22 January, Enver Pasha inflicted heavy casualties on the Russian forces.[23][24]
The town was besieged on 28 January or 8 February. The Russians sent wireless messages requesting reinforcements from the garrisons in Tashkent, Bukhara, and Samarkand.[25] Meanwhile, a Russian cavalry detachment dispatched from Denov to relieve the Bolsheviks trapped in Dushanbe was ambushed; its soldiers were neutralized, and machine guns, rifles, and ammunition were captured.[26]
On 7 February, the Soviets suffered over 100 casualties. The Basmachis captured a machine gun, along with numerous rifles and ammunition. Seventy-two Russian troops defected and joined the Basmachis.[24]
By 14 February, during a smoky and snowy night, the town was completely captured, and Enver pursued the retreating Russian forces toward Mirtyube. His troops seized 120 rifles, two machine guns, and inflicted around 100 casualties on the Russian garrison, while 88 soldiers defected to his side.[27][28] According to Cemal Kutay, the Russian commander in Dushanbe, Mazarof reported that Enver Pasha had organized a strong resistance movement with increasing local support, inflicting heavy losses on Russian forces and compelling them to contemplate abandoning the city. However, Kutay regards this account as unreliable.[23][24] Between 28 January and 22 February, Enver Pasha’s forces, numbering around 1,500 men, captured Sariosiyo, Qubodiyon, Yurchi, and Denov against a Soviet force estimated at 7,000 to 8,000 troops. During the engagement, the Russians suffered significant losses, leaving behind their supplies, ammunition, five machine guns, two cannons, and hundreds of rifles. A number of Russian soldiers defected and joined the Basmachi forces.[29][30][31][32][33][34] While fighting near Sariosiyo on 19 February, Enver Pasha was wounded.[35][36]
These victory increased Enver’s reputation across Central Asia and enhanced his prestige in the Islamic world.[37][38] In February, Enver was warned of an impending Russian attack and withdrew to Kofarnihon.[27]
Unrest in Dagestan
Enver’s successful gains in Bukhara began to spread to Dagestan, where signs of unrest had already emerged. In response to the armed detachments of N. Gotsinsky, the Soviet authorities established the Republican Military Council for Combating Banditry in Dagestan on January 30, 1922. By August 1922, the situation had escalated to the point that Dagestan was placed under martial law.[39][40][41][42]
In early 1922, Soviet authorities warned that the situation in Dagestan was critical. A telegram from March 1922 described a surge in “banditism,” growing anti-Soviet agitation led by mullahs and “Turkish emissaries,” and feared that the uprising was spreading into Dagestan.[43]
In the same year, Gotsinsky’s associates sought international recognition from the League of Nations for a future independent Caucasian state, citing solidarity with broader Muslim resistance movements.[42]
March-April offensives
Due to these successes, on 28 March 1922, Enver Pasha was declared commander of all forces in Eastern Bukhara by a decree from Amir Alim Khan.[44][45]
According to the Commander-in-Chief of the British forces in India, reporting to the War Office on 10 May 1922, unrest broke out in Askabad region in March, in which the Zaloni bazaar was looted. Troops were dispatched but later withdrawn once order was restored.[21] Meanwhile, Termez remained under rebel siege, and the Bolsheviks sent reinforcements from Kerki.[21]
In mid-March, Basmachis besieged Termez and on the same day, they captured Margilan, while heavy fighting occurred in the Kokand region, damaging nearby oil wells. Approximately 2,500 Bolshevik soldiers deserted—taking four machine guns with them—and joined the insurgents. In Tashkent, the 14th Uzbek Regiment also defected en masse, bringing weapons and ammunition.[21] The railway north of Tashkent was repeatedly cut as the Basmachi movement spread further across the region. Bolshevik reinforcements were dispatched to Kerki, while a growing number of deserters fled into Persia.[46][21]
On 25 March, a battle broke out at Qarsang, during which 245 Russian troops were killed and three machine guns were captured by Enver Pasha’s forces. In the Tal village inside Boysun, over the course of 3 days, approximately 400 Russian troops—supported by two artillery pieces and four machine guns—attacked the outposts but were eventually repelled, leaving around 80 dead before withdrawing. As a result, Kulob, Darvaz, Karategin, Baljuvon, and Qurghonteppa came completely under Enver Pasha’s control.[47][48]
A. Nagornov, the Consul General in Bukhara, sent a report on 2 April 1922 describing the loss of Soviet control in Eastern Bukhara, and the negative effect and will probably have an even greater impact on the country’s food resources in the near future.[49]
In spring 1922, Leon Trotsky personally took charge of operations against the Basmachis and traveled to Fergana. The Basmachis then engaged in brutal combat; after liberating villages, they executed all Soviet officials, especially commissars.[50] At that time, Basmachis laid a siege on Kerki.[51][52]
On 13 April 1922, Ruz Muhammed Bek and a unit of Basmachis arrived at Enver Pasha’s headquarters, bringing him a horse, a bird, a chest, and a letter from Korşirmat.[53]
On 20 April 1922, Joseph Stalin, then serving as Secretary of the Central Committee, sent a classified telegram to Sergo Ordzhonikidze instructing him to travel from Tiflis to Tashkent to assess the situation on the Turkestan Front. Stalin ordered an immediate investigation into the Basmachi uprising in Fergana and Bukhara, directing Ordzhonikidze to determine whether native units were supplying insurgents with arms, whether local authorities were obstructing military operations, and whether the composition of the Turkfront, Turkburo, or Turkestan Commission required reorganization. The telegram also mandated the introduction of martial law in Bukhara and Turkestan and requested detailed recommendations on measures to suppress the revolt and restore control.[54] Ordzhonikidze was also given the task of ascertaining “how great is the danger of [losing] Bukhara and Ferghana.”[55]
The Soviet forces suffered heavy casualties and severe attrition from disease, exhaustion, and the harsh climate while combating the Basmachi insurgents. Shortages of food, water, and medical supplies, compounded by continuous attacks from the Basmachi, left the troops in a critical condition. In a report to the Turkestan Front headquarters, the commander Vladimir Martynovsky stated:[56]
“Diseases and exhaustion disabled 80% of personnel. Dozens of Red Army soldiers were killed or wounded. Breaking out from the dense encirclement is practically impossible.”
May offensives
In May 1922, after receiving military aid from Afghanistan—including 800 soldiers, 100 British rifles, and 80 camel-loads of ammunition.[57][58][59][60][61][62]Enver Pasha mobilized from his headquarters in the Kafirun region with approximately 3,000 to 20,000 Basmachi fighters under his command.[note 1]
On 11 May, the Basmachis attacked the city of Karmana. After heavy fighting, however, they were forced to withdraw.[63] The following day, G. K. Ordzhonikidze arrived in Bukhara from Tashkent and sharply criticized the hesitant policies of the Bukharan satellite government.[64] Soviet envoy Shalva Eliava reported to Joseph Stalin that Eastern Bukhara was effectively in open revolt under Enver Pasha’s leadership and urged that Enver’s elimination was essential to restoring control.[65]
On 13 May, Enver launched a broad offensive, taking Saraykemer, Samarkand, Bukhara, Yarkand, Kashgar and most of the city of Boysun under his possession.[66][67][68][14][69][70][71] In 1922, multiple reports described Enver’s growing power in Bukhara. A detailed report submitted to Galip Pasha, appointed as the Ottoman representative to Bukhara, confirmed that more than half of the territory of the Emirate of Bukhara was under Enver’s military control, rather than Soviet authority.[72]
At 23:00 on 14 May, Stalin warned Ordzhonikidze in Tashkent about Enver's operatives and leftist elements in a coded telegram. Along with criticizing Eliava's assessment of Bukhara, Stalin stressed the need for combining military occupation with political concessions, particularly regarding the return of waqf lands, and urged measures against disruptive factions.[73]
According to The New York Herald report of July 29, by the end of May Enver Pasha had launched offensives from Bukhara toward Tashkent, Kokand, Khujand, and Naryn. As a result, he held a line extending from Tashkent to Khujand and eastward through Kokand to Naryn, threatening both Tashkent and the Krasnovodsk railway.[67][68]
Aftermath
During this campaign, sown areas in Bukhara were reduced by 72 percent, and livestock numbers fell by two-thirds.[79] By early 1922, Enver had already seized much of the Bukharan People’s Soviet Republic and attracted several Jadid reformers, former collaborators of the Soviet regime, to his cause.[80]
Later that month, Basmachi strength around Samarkand was such that when Eliava and Ordzhonikidze could visit Ulug Bek's Observatory only under heavy guard.[81] When Enver's forces controlled the entire eastern part of Bukhara, the Soviet officials viewed the situation as politically more dangerous than the military successes achieved by Enver.[82][83]
Soviet attempts to pacify the Basmachis failed. (RGASPI, f. 17, op. 84, d. 356, l. 70)
Bolshevik response
In response to Enver's victories, the Bukhara Group of Troops was formed from units drawn from the Moscow Military District and Belarus, totaling 4,500 rifles, 3,030 sabers, and 20 artillery pieces.[84][85]
On 20 April, 20,000 troops from Samarkand and Chardzhou were directed toward Kogon, on the Kizilsu–Tashkent railway, 8,000 of whom were sent to Qarshi.[63]
Under the Turkestan Front, commanded by N. Kakurin and P. Pavlov, Soviet authorities organized two Cavalry Brigades, two cavalry squadrons, and one rifle division, comprising roughly 7,500–8,000 soldiers with 20 machine guns.[86]Peters, a veteran Russian revolutionary and one of the first commanders of the Communist Party, along with Kamenev, oversaw operations against Enver in Bukhara.[64][86] A squadron of four aircraft—two Nieuport fighters and two 1½-Strutters—was deployed to southern Bukhara to provide air support against Basmachis.[87] The Soviets also purchased about 24 LVG VI reconnaissance planes from Germany, the majority of which were sent to the Central Asian front.[88]
Enver's reforms
During this period, the Basmachi movement also became more centralized; regular meetings were held among the leaders of Khiva, Bukhara, and Fergana.[89][90] He established a unified army in Bukhara, implemented a Western-style chain of command, and incorporated Turkish officers into his ranks.[91][90][92] He also regularized contact with the Afghans.[90]
Enver also decided to unify his forces under a single uniform. He informed Hacı Sami in Afghanistan, and through Amanullah Khan’s foster brother Ahmet Khan, he received khaki uniforms and lambskin hats made from Karagöl pelts. Because boots were scarce, local craftsmen produced light, upturned shoes modeled after Anatolian footwear.[93][94]
Peace attempts
As a last resort, the Soviet government summoned Fayzulla Xoʻjayev, the highly trusted head of the Bukharan Government, to Moscow, and through him, they offered a truce to Enver Pasha.[81][95][96][97]The Soviets, through an eleven-member delegation sent from Kazan, proposed granting Enver Pasha broad concessions in nearly all matters and urged him to reach an agreement. In response, Enver convened the National Pact Congress.[98] However, Enver's reply was uncompromising:[81]
"Peace is only acceptable after the withdrawal of Russian troops from Turkestan soil."
As a result of the negotiations, the Soviet offer was rejected, even though Togan urged Enver to accept the peace as he had received news from Moscow that the Soviet government intended to send 100,000 additional troops to Turkestan if they refused.[81] The National Pact of Congress consequently issued a decision for full independence.[99] Enver himself remained optimistic; hoping for better days, the headquarters was later moved from Pulluhakiyan to Kafirun.
Casualties
According to the Central Asia Information Bureau, Soviet losses in Termez and Kerki totaled 17,000 men(Turlybek, 2013, p. 366)
Total Soviet casualties were reported at around 17,000 in Termez and Kerki alone,[100] though some sources claim figures as high as 259,000—an exaggerated number.[101][102] Other estimates suggest losses reached up to 80% of the forces in the region.[103] Total Basmachi casualties were reported as approximately 4,000 by Krugosvet encyclopedia.[104] According to Soviet intelligence, Basmachi strength declined from 26,000 fighters in May to 6,700 fighters in October 1922.[105]
Result
A report from the chairman of the commission, dated August 7, Sokolnikov, acknowledged that after four years of struggle, the Bolsheviks had failed to eliminate the Basmachi. Instead, the insurgency had expanded across Samarkand, parts of Syr-Darya, and Turkmen oblasts—becoming a widespread regional revolt and a major embarrassment for Soviet authority in Turkestan.[106][107]
In November 1921, Junaid Khan signed a peace agreement with the Khorezm Republic, while waiting for an opportune moment to seize control of Khorezm.[127] He commanded about 15,000 men in 1922,[128][129] although this figure might have been exaggerated, as estimates vary.[130] In early months of 1922 during the height of the Basmachi movement, Enver Pasha sent convoys and letters to Junaid Khan who was offering strong resistance to the Bolsheviks in the Karakum desert.[131][132] Several Turkmen tribes also joined Junaid khan, who also held the title of "Commander of the Army of Islam" alongside Enver Pasha.[128][133] As a result, the territory under Khivan Basmachi control expanded significantly.[131]
Khiva offensive
In April 1922, Junaid Khan captured the Boldumsaz District.[134] On April 12, he attacked the Chovdur tribes, who were allied with Soviets, inflicting heavy casualties.[135]
In 1922, Basmachi uprisings broke out against the Soviet government in Khiva, where the Soviets suffered a heavy defeat against Junaid Khan and Abdulkahhar in Khiva.[136][39][137] This enabled Junaid Khan to seize control of Khorezm.[52][114][138][139] However, due to increase of Soviet dispatch in the area, a portion of his troops began negotiations with the Red Army, and about 150 Basmachis eventually surrendered.[140]
Congress of Kafirun
On 9 April, Enver circulated a nine-point directive to Basmachi units calling for internal unity, strict discipline, and coordinated operations: he asked fighters to settle local disputes, unite under a single banner, cut Soviet supply lines through raids, build effective intelligence networks, and send delegations to the congress planned after 10 April. [141]
While touring the southern front of Boysun, Enver and his men passed through the village of Kafirun, located about 2 km away.[142] On 15 April 1922, an enormous crowd gathered under the command of their headquarters. For the council scheduled that day, nearly one hundred Basmachis from across Turkestan assembled, accompanied by approximately 3,000 armed fighters united under the Enver Pasha's banner for a common ideal.[143]
Precisely at eight o’clock, Enver Pasha—accompanied by Chief of Staff Hasan Bey, Afghan Captain Afzaleddin, and Afghan volunteers under the command of Ahmet Khan—stood before the assembled commanders to address them in Ottoman Turkish:[144]
"«ای ترکستانِ مُجاهدلَرِنین قهرمانلاری! سیزلَر بو گؤزل و مُثِلْسِز وطنِیْنینیزی، یِت(?) ییل دیر آنونُ مُردَر چِیزمَهلَری ایله قَدیْمَلییان روسلاردان آزاد ائتمک اُچون بورادا توپلانمیش سیز. قدَرین چِلْوَسی ایله بیز، باشقا بیر مملکتده دوغولوب بِیوُمُوش افغان گؤنُلُلوَر ایله تقدیرینیزده شریک اولوروز.
بِن و ضابطانیم حُضورونوزدا واعده ائدیریم کی، بو مقدّراتا شریک اولماغدان پِشیمانلیق حسِی اِتمِیرم. سون نفَسیمَغَه قَدَر بو دَوا اوچون چالیشاجام. اینجا وردیغیم یَمینی شَرَفْینِیز ایله تَصْدِیق ائدِمَنِیزی طلب ائدیرم.»"
English Translation:
"O heroes of Turkestan’s mujahideen, you have gathered here to liberate your beautiful and unparalleled homeland from the Russians, who for seventy years have trampled it under their filthy boots. By the twists of fate, we, born in another land, and the Afghan volunteers share in your destiny. On behalf of myself and my fellow officers, I promise before you that I do not regret sharing in your fate. I will work for this cause until my last breath. I ask that you, in turn, endorse the pledge I make here with your honor."
In response, all the Basmachis affirmed the Kafirun decisions, declaring: "We pledge on our honor!"[145]
Territories of The Turkestan Provisional Government
Decisions of the Congress and creation of The Turkestan Provisional Government
Following the congress, the Turkestan Provisional Government was established, outlining a comprehensive military and administrative framework for territories of Eastern Bukhara cleared of Soviet control. The resolutions called for the formation of regular forces under provincial commanders (leshkerbashis), the mobilization of new uprisings in remaining regions, and the creation of local governments in liberated areas. Funding was to be secured through zakat, tributes, or additional taxes based on wealth, managed by appointed collectors. The decrees regulated logistics, reporting, and inter-provincial coordination, ordering daily communication with central command and mutual military assistance during emergencies. They also instructed forces to sabotage Soviet infrastructure, suppress espionage, and treat prisoners humanely. Ultimate authority over all political and military operations was vested in Enver Pasha. [146][147]
The government established by Shir Muhammad Bek relocated its center five times within three months, moving successively between Samarkand, Namangan, Osh, Margilan, and Naryn.[156][157] The Kafirun Congress, attended by representatives including Cora Hoca from Kabul, resolved to organize regular military units in liberated areas of Eastern Bukhara, prepare local populations for combat, appoint commanders to lead revolutionary actions in each region, and levy taxes if resources were insufficient.[136]
The congress consisted of sixteen resolutions, the last of which granted Enver Pasha full authority over all military and political affairs. He was formally presented with a seal inscribed:[136]"Damad-ı Halifet’ül Müslimin, Emir-i Leşker-i İslâm Seyyid Enver" (“Son-in-law of the Caliph of the Muslims, Commander of the Islamic Army, Seyyid Enver")
symbolizing his authority and consolidating the support of the national movement's command.[158][147]
enver's hand-drawn map of Turkestan published in “şarkı buhara vekazı’i” liva-el-Islam 2 no 11-12 1 August 1922 49
Meanwhile, Enver continued to pursue his objectives. On 18 May 1922, the Central Committee discussed the “Turkestan–Bukhara issue” and issued a decree initiating a broad political campaign against him, while also dispatching military reinforcements to the Bukharan People's Soviet Republic.[85][160]
On 19 May 1922, Enver sent a ultimatum to the Soviet government, again demanding that the Red Army withdraw from Turkestan,Bukhara, and Khiva within 14-15 days. The demand was rejected by the Soviet authorities.[160][161][162][163][164]
As a response to the ultimatum, the Soviet government issued a brief declaration: "“Enver Pasha is an agent of British imperialism."[165][166]
Following this, the Soviet government reinforced its forces in the region and established an extensive espionage network, which was placed under the direct leadership of Georges Agabekov.[165]
The Basmachis entered Termez on 8 June but were pushed back after Soviet reinforcements arrived. Fighting continued in the surrounding area for twelve days, with heavy losses on both sides, including the death of Russian military commissar M. Marosin.[169] Enver's forces also captured Sherobod, inflicting heavy casualties on the Bolsheviks and prompting additional Soviet reinforcements to be sent.[63] Meanwhile, the Soviets transferred large numbers of troops to Turkestan via Kizilsu from the Caucasus and through the Orenburg railway, concentrating them around Kushk and partly in Bukhara, aiming to deter Afghanistan from supporting Enver Pasha.[63]
On 10 June 1922, the Soviets launched a new campaign against Enver, describing him as "the most evil enemy of Soviet power and defender of the interests of the manaps."[170] At that day, Enver Pasha successfully defended Qoʻrgʻontepa and won a battle in Argamchi.[171]
Due to the deteriorating situation in Turkestan, Yakov Melkumov, commander of the 2nd Turkestan Cavalry Brigade, was dispatched to lead operations against the Basmachi movement.
On 21 June, Enver Pasha engaged with the Bolshevik forces to the west of Samarkand. His troops achieved a decisive victory, reportedly destroying two Red Army divisions.[172][173][70]
At the end of June, Enver Pasha attacked a bridgehead on the Surxondaryo River, defended by a battalion of the 5th Rifle Regiment. Several assaults led by Enver were repelled, and by 29 June, the entire regiment, supported by artillery, crossed the river and outflanked his forces. After an intense battle in which the Basmachis lost 165 men, Enver retreated.[174][175]The Red Army pursued Enver in two columns—one to seal the Afghan frontier and the other to envelop him from the north and expel him from the Hisar Valley.[176]
In July 1922, the forces of Faizal Maksum, supporters of Enver Pasha, were disarmed by the Basmachi in Karategin under the leadership of Ishan Sultan.[177] On 7 July, a Basmachi assassination attempt on the life of Fayzulla Xoʻjayev failed.[64][178]
During the same year and into the following one, the government of the Bukharan People’s Soviet Republic dismissed all Ottoman prisoners of war working in Bukhara as teachers, officially accusing them of provoking factionalism in the country and supporting Enver’s actions.[179][180][181][182]
Ali Bademci gives **60,000** (Ali Bademci, Basmacı Arşiv Belgelerine Göre Türkistan’da Enver Paşa] (Istanbul: Kamer Yayınları, 2019), p. 306. (although this probably includes non-armed basmachis aswell since Bademci uses the word "mujahid" which means one who struggles on behalf of Islam.)
A Soviet archival source gives **26,000** (Central State Archive of the Soviet Army [CSASA], file 7, catalogue 2, dossier 466, p. 58).
Salahi R. Sonyel, “Enver Paşa ve Orta Asya'da Başgösteren ‘Basmacı’ Akımı,” Belleten 54, no. 211 (1990): 1179–1208, and Okan Yeşilot & Burcu Özdemir, “Sovyet Arşiv Belgeleri Işığında Basmacı Hareketi,” Belleten 85, no. 302 (2021): 279–310, both suggest **around 20,000** (though these often refer to total Basmachi numbers in Central Asia, not only Enver’s immediate forces).
Marie Broxup, “The Basmachi,” Central Asian Survey 2, no. 1 (1983): 57–81, gives **16,000** alongside Robert F. Baumann Russian-Soviet Unconventional Wars in the Caucasus, Central Asia, and Afghanistan (Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1993), Leavenworth Papers no. 20, p. 112
Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, Enver Paşa: Makedonya'dan Orta Asya'ya (Istanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1970), p. 664, suggests a range of **12,400–7,465**.
Glenda Fraser, "Basmachi I Central Asian Survey, 6:1" p.58 and H. B. Paksoy, “The Basmachi Movement From Within: An Account of Zeki Velidi Togan,” Nationalities Papers 23, no. 2 (1995): p.392 suggests up to **7,000** in May of 1922
Some Soviet writers even claimed that Mikhail Frunze faced **40,000** in Bukhara (Tsentralnaya Aziya i Zakavkaz'ye: Istoriya i Sovremennost’, p. 64), but this figure is considered exaggerated and logistically impossible by Robert F. Baumann (p.121).
↑ Bademci 2015d, p.131, Düşenbe'de sıkışan Bolşevikler'e imdat için Dihnev'den gön-derilen bir bölük Rus süvârisi pusuya düşürüldü. Askerleri tesirsiz hale getirilerek, mitralyöz, tüfek ve cephane ganimetleri elde edildi. Gün geçtikçe işler ciddileşiyordu..
↑ Kara 2011, p.128, Enver Paşa bu saldırıda 180 tüfek 2 mitralyöz ele geçirmiş 100 Rus askeri öldürülmüştür. Dahası Enver Paşa'ya 82 Basmacı daha katılacaktır.
↑ texte, France Ministère de la guerre (1791-1936) Auteur du; texte, France Ministère des affaires étrangères (1588-2007) Auteur du (1922-06-01). "Bulletin périodique de la presse russe". Gallica. Retrieved 2025-11-03.{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: numeric names: authors list (link)
↑ Yamauchi 1995a, pp.262, Düşen-be'den çıkan Rusları ta'kîben Mortebe, Şorab, Nevabad-Noda, Seşme, Sarıasıya, An-barsay-yarı, Mirşadi'de Rusları vurduk. Kendilerinde 50'dan ziyâde ölü vardır. Bir o ka-dar da yaralı. Araba ve at elimize düştü ... Ruslar yalnız Şehrisebz, Guzar, Karşi'de kalmıştır. Şehirlerden çıkmamaktadırlar..
↑ Kara 2011, p.128, Cenab-ı Allah'ın yardımıyla düşman-ı din olan Bolşevikle-ri Duşanbe, Yürci, Seriasyab, Dihnev, Kabadiyan şehirlerinden çıkardık. Duşanbe ve Kabadiyan müstesna bu şehirleri düşman harpsiz tahliye etmiştir. Bolşevik kuvvetlerinin kısm-ı külli'si Baysun garnizonunda bulunuyor. Buna mukabil Darvaz, Baba-dağ, Karadağ, Dihnev, Cilligöl askerlerinden müteşekkil kuv-vetlerimiz Baysun şehrini muhasara etmiş bulunmaktadır. Bu şehirde muharebe devam etmektedir.
↑ Kandemir 1955b, p.32, 19 Şubatta (Seriasya) civarında Ruslarla tekrar çarpışan Enver Paşa, bir nefer gibi ilk saflara atıldığından, yaralandı. Fakat yaraşma aldırmadan yine cenge devam etti..
↑ Wheeler, Geoffrey. "Central Asian Review". Central Asian Review. 4: 175 – via Pahar. preference of Indian Muslims the question arose as to who was in fact to command the Indian army once India had won her independence, the almost unanimous answer was heard: Of course, 'Enver Pasha!'.
↑ Исалабдулаев 2016e, p.62, Для борьбы с отрядами Н. Гоцинского 30 января 1922 г. в Дагестане было образовано Республиканское военное совещание по борьбе с бандитизмом. В августе 1922 г. Дагестан был объявлен на военном положении..
↑ "Тайная сделка советской власти с главным "басмачом" Средней Азии". BBC News Русская служба (in Russian). Retrieved 2025-10-31. Начальник Душанбинского гарнизона Владимир Мартыновский в донесении штабу Туркестанского фронта сообщал о критическом положении, в котором оказались красноармейцы, и просил скорейшей помощи: "Болезни и истощение вывели из строя 80% личного состава. Десятки красноармейцев убиты и ранены. Осуществить прорыв из плотного кольца окружения практически невозможно".
↑ Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History (RGASPI), f. 62, op. 2, d. 5, l. 231.
↑ KC MDA, Fund No. 2225, Record No. 2, File No. 45, pp. 115–120.
↑ These numbers are disputed. According to a report from Nabi Baksh, Enver received only 150 rifles and ten boxes of ammunition (British Library, India Office Records (IOR), Political and Secret Department, File 1919/57: Statement by Nabi Baksh, 13 December 1923). Another account claims that General Nadir Khan sent Enver 60,000 rupees and 300 armed men to serve as a guard, together with a limited supply of cartridges, but Enver refused the 300 men, frustrated that the two artillery pieces he had requested were not provided by the Amir (British Library, India Office Records (IOR), Political and Secret Department, File 1919/57: Statement by Sayyid Ibadulla, 27 February 1923).
↑ texte, France Ministère de la guerre (1791-1936) Auteur du; texte, France Ministère des affaires étrangères (1588-2007) Auteur du (1922-06-01). "Bulletin périodique de la presse russe". Gallica. Retrieved 2025-11-03.{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: numeric names: authors list (link)
1 2 "Islamism threatens to drive out reds"(PDF). 29 July 1922. ...by the end of May [he] started a double offensive northeast from Bokhara, which he had captured by a brilliant coup de main, toward Tashkent and northeast from Hisar to Khokand ... and now holds loosely the line from Tashkent down to Khojent and eastward through Kokand to Naryn, whence he is sending out flying columns that threaten the Tashkent and Krasnovodsk Railway ... The entire country south of Tash-kent has been wrested from the Reds, including the Important towns of Yar-kand, Kashgar, Samarkand and Bokhara
↑ "During February-October 1922, the Red Army destroyed 119 Basmachi detachments (4 thousand people) out of 200." Check Krugosvet, Vadim Damier Basmach Movement (source is unavailable for now)
↑ Плеханов, Александр Михайлович (15 March 2024). "Басмачество". Большая российская энциклопедия (in Russian). АНО «Национальный научно-образовательный центр «Большая Российская энциклопедия». Retrieved 15 October 2025. советские войска провели операцию по окружению и уничтожению отрядов Энвер-паши, сам он был убит в бою. Численность басмачей, по оценке советской разведки, сократилась с 26 тыс. человек в мае до 6,7 тыс. человек в октябре 1922 г.
↑ Malikov 2020b, p.173, Report of the chairman of the commission on the extermination of basmachis sokol'nikov to the central committee of the communist party: Basmachi movement is a reproach to all our work in Turkestan, and maybe even in the entire East. We have fought hard against the Basmachis for four years. However, we failed to suppress this movement. On the contrary, the Basmachi movement expanded to other raions, and now it covers entire Samarkand Oblast and some parts of Syr-Daria and Turkmen Oblast’s..
↑ Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Sotsial’no Politicheskoi Istorii (hereafter RGASPI) [Russian State Archive of the Social Political History], fond 122, op. 1, d. 228. ll. 1-1ob.
↑ Riordan 2012, p.15, At the current time the Basmachi are situated in Ashtak region in the mountains bordering the Tashkent region. They are near Naiman-Polvan, which is in Nanysk region, and in Kizil Pavate in the area close to the mountains..
↑ "Basmachi". Encyclopedia.com. Retrieved 2025-10-17. At their height in 1920–1922, some sources claim that the rebels had twenty to thirty thousand men under arms, controlled the Ferghana valley and most of Tajikistan, and enjoyed widespread popularity among the indigenous non-Russian population.
↑ Entsiklopedik Luğat, vol. 2 (Tashkent: Özbek Sovet Entsiklopediyasi, 1988), p. 117: "In the spring of 1922, the Basmachi occupied much of the Bukhara People's Soviet Republic; similar movements also occurred in Ferghana and Khorezm at that time."
↑ Schoeberlein-Engel 2009, "At its height (1920–1922), the Basmachi movement was in control of the entire Ferghana Valley, aside from Russian railroad and military installations, as well as most of what is now Tajikistan and some other areas.".
↑ "Mulla Abdulqahhor"(PDF). Oʻzbekiston Milliy Ensiklopediyasi (in Uzbek). Vol.M. Tashkent: Oʻzbekiston Milliy Ensiklopediyasi Davlat Ilmiy Nashriyoti. 2003. p.803.
↑ For example, Kydyralieva gives the number of troops under Junaid Khan as 1918 in the page 219, meanwhile "K. B. Muhammetberdiyew/Y. Orazgylyjow, Türkmenistanyn Taryhyndan Materiallar" book gives 4,000 and ÇELEBİ, Ercan Yaş Türkistan Dergisine Göre Türkistan Milli Mücadelesi even gives 80,000 in page 157 of his thesis.
↑ FO 371/8080/N 8484, India Office to Foreign Office, dispatch, enclosing Secret Meshed Intelligence Diary, No.22, for the period ending 17 July 1922. Kew, London: The National Archives (UK).
Bogdanov, V. N. (1997). Армия и Внутренние Войска в Противоповстанческой и Противопартизанской Борьбе. Мировой Опыт и Современность[The Army and Internal Troops in Counter-Rebellion and Anti-Partisan Warfare: Global Experience and the Present] (in Russian). Moscow: Main Command of Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia.
Donuk, Abdülkadir (1992c). "Basmacı Hareketi"(PDF). İslam Ansiklopedisi (in Turkish). Vol.5. Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı.
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Basmachi movement 
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Russian SFSR 
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