Guangzhou Uprising

For the Guangzhou Uprisings that occurred during the late Qing Dynasty, see First Guangzhou Uprising and Second Guangzhou Uprising.

Guangzhou Uprising
Part of Chinese Civil War and the Northern Expedition
Communist casualties
Date 11–13 December 1927 [1] Location Canton, Republic of China Result Nationalist victory
Belligerents
Canton Soviet of Workers, Soldiers, and Peasant Deputies Supported by: Soviet Union Comintern	Nationalist government
Commanders and leaders
Zhang Tailei   † Ye Ting Ye Jianying Xu Xiangqian Heinz Neumann	Zhang Fakui
Units involved
Red Guard Communist cadet regiment	National Revolutionary Army (NRA)
Strength
20,000 armed workers and soldiers [2]	15,000 soldiers; later reinforced by 5 divisions [2]
Casualties and losses
5,700 [2] [3]	Heavy [2]

Guangzhou Uprising
Traditional Chinese	廣州 起義
Simplified Chinese	广州 起义
Cantonese Yale	Gwóngjàu Héiyih
Transcriptions Standard Mandarin Hanyu Pinyin Gǔangzhōu Qǐyì Yue: Cantonese Yale Romanization Gwóngjàu Héiyih

v t e Campaigns of the Chinese Civil War

Outline of the Chinese Civil War First Phase (1927–1937) Autumn Harvest Uprising Li Lisan line Encirclement campaigns Japanese invasion of Manchuria Long March Southern Guerilla War Resumption of hostilities (1945–1949) Operation Beleaguer Northeast China Liaoshen Huaihai Pingjin Yangtze River Shanghai Hainan Guningtou Wanshan Aftermath Xinjiang Kuomintang Islamic insurgency China–Burma border Cross-strait conflict

The Guangzhou Uprising, also known as the Canton Uprising ^[2] or Canton Riots of 1927, was a short-lived communist uprising in the city of Guangzhou (Canton) in southern China. Communist forces briefly seized much of the city and proclaimed a Soviet of Workers, Soldiers, and Peasant Deputies before being defeated by Kuomintang (Nationalist) troops. ^{[4] [5]}

Background

Northern Expedition and fractured authority

The Guangzhou Uprising occurred during the later phase of the Northern Expedition, a military campaign launched by the Kuomintang to defeat regional warlords and reunify China. Although the expedition nominally aimed to overthrow the Beiyang government in Beijing, political authority during this period remained deeply fragmented. In 1927, China was divided among the declining Beiyang government, the left-leaning Nationalist government in Wuhan, and the right-wing Nationalist government in Nanjing under Chiang Kai-shek, while powerful regional militarists retained substantial autonomy. ^{[6] [7]}

Canton, long a revolutionary base for Sun Yat-sen, functioned during the Northern Expedition as a critical rear area and logistical hub rather than as the seat of a unified national government. Local KMT authorities exercised control in cooperation with military commanders whose loyalty was often personal rather than institutional, reflecting the continuing warlord character of Chinese politics at the time. ^[8]

Collapse of the First United Front

The Chinese Communists and Nationalists had cooperated since 1923 under the First United Front, an alliance initiated by Sun Yat-sen and strongly promoted by the Soviet Union and the Communist International (Comintern). Under the terms of the alliance, communist party members were permitted to join the KMT as individuals, operating within it as an organized faction.

The alliance disintegrated violently in 1927 when Chiang Kai-shek and allied KMT leaders purged communists and leftists from the party and the National Revolutionary Army during the Northern Expedition. Mass arrests and executions followed in Shanghai, Wuhan, Guangzhou, and other major cities, inaugurating a period commonly described as a nationwide White Terror. ^{[9] [10]}

In Canton, communist-led trade unions and militias clashed increasingly with KMT-aligned right-wing unions and security forces. By mid-1927, the city had become a site of sustained political violence within the broader breakdown of the United Front. ^[11]

Immediate causes and Comintern influence

The major defeats suffered by the communists in 1927, including the Nanchang Uprising and the Autumn Harvest Uprising, forced the party leadership to reassess its strategy. Under strong ideological and organizational pressure from the Comintern, the communist leadership reaffirmed armed struggle and pursued a series of urban uprisings intended to reassert proletarian leadership and revolutionary momentum. Soviet advisers encouraged attempts to seize major cities, even as the military balance increasingly favored the KMT. ^{[12] [13]}

The Communist Party’s Canton Provincial Committee had been preparing for an uprising since September 1927. Initial plans relied on communist-leaning troops retreating from the failed Nanchang Uprising, with local workers and peasants expected to play a supporting role. However, these forces were defeated at Shantou in early October, preventing their participation. ^[14]

Following this setback, communist central committee leader Qu Qiubai advocated persuading National Revolutionary Army units stationed in Canton to defect. Internal rivalries among local KMT militarists were seen as creating a temporary opportunity, and communist organizers believed that divisions within the local command structure, combined with lingering labor militancy, could be exploited. A provincial Revolutionary Military Council was established, and armed workers’ detachments—often referred to as Red Guards—were formed alongside sympathetic soldiers within local units. ^[15]

Although elements of the leadership from several communist-aligned military commanders, including Ye Ting, Ye Jianying, and Xu Xiangqian initially opposed the operation and warned that conditions were unfavorable and that the uprising was unlikely to succeed; they ultimately acquiesced to Comintern pressure. Preparations continued through November and early December 1927. ^{[16] [17]}

After receiving directives from Joseph Stalin to proceed with the uprising, ^[17] final operational plans were drawn up by the communist central leadership and cantonese party secretary Zhang Tailei in Shanghai. ^[18] The communist leadership anticipated that armed conflict between KMT-aligned Zhang Fakui and Li Jishen would destabilize Canton, creating conditions favorable to multiple coordinated uprisings. ^[18]

When fighting between Zhang Fakui and Li Jishen erupted earlier than expected on 27 November 1927, resulting in Zhang’s seizure of Canton, the Canton Provincial Committee revised its plans and concluded that conditions favored an immediate uprising in the city. ^[19] Responsibility for the subsequent decisions remains disputed, with later accounts variously attributing blame to the local Cantonese leadership, the communist central leadership, or the Comintern. ^{[19] [20]}

Regardless of who was responsible for the decision, the Canton Committee began to prepare its uprising in earnest from 27 November. A Revolutionary Military Council was appointed with Ye Ting as commander-in-chief and Zhang Tailei as chairman. The core fighting force of the rebellion consisted of an ad-hoc "Red Guard" formed by 2,000 armed workers, and a cadet regiment of 1,200 soldiers. ^{[21] [19]} Sometime in early December, Comintern agent Heinz Neumann arrived in Canton, joining the local communists. According to communist leader Zhang Guotao, Neumann came to wield great influence on the committee and took a leading role in the rebellion; others believe that he was just a messenger for Stalin. ^[20]

Course of the uprising

In the early hours of 11 December 1927, communist-aligned soldiers and armed workers launched coordinated attacks on key installations in Cantonu including government offices and communication centers. Taking advantage of surprise and confused local command structures, the insurgents seized much of the urban area within hours. ^[22] A "Soviet of Workers, Soldiers, and Peasant Deputies" was proclaimed as the new governing authority. Revolutionary decrees were issued, including plans for land redistribution and labor protections. Local workers and students were encouraged to take up arms in defending the newly proclaimed Soviet. ^[23]

The uprising, however, lacked sufficient arms, manpower, and external support. Nationalist forces loyal to the Canton authorities regrouped quickly, and reinforcements numbering 5 divisions from nearby units entered the city to supress the uprising. ^[2] By 13 December, communist positions were overwhelmed after intense street fighting, and the uprising was suppressed. Zhang Tailei was killed in an ambush, ending the proclaimed soviet in the early morning of December 13, 1927. ^[24]

Aftermath and repression

Following the defeat, KMT authorities carried out severe reprisals. Captured insurgents were executed, and extensive efforts were made to dismantle remaining communist networks in Canton and surrounding areas. In early 1928, additional arrests and public executions eliminated most visible communist organizational presence in the city. ^[25] In January 1928, the Kuomintang captured Communist Party members Zhou Wenyong and Chen Tiejun, who had taken part in preparations for the uprising and had returned to the city to attempt to rebuild the party's underground organs. They were executed on February 6, 1928. ^{[26] [27]} In the resulting purges, many communists were executed and the Guangzhou Soviet became known as the "Canton Commune","Guangzhou Commune" or "Paris Commune of the East", drawing comparisons to the similarly short-lived Paris Commune. ^[28]

On 13 December, the Soviet consulate in Guangzhou was surrounded by KMT authorities and all its personnel were arrested. In the accident the consulate diplomats Ukolov, Ivanov and others were killed. ^[3]

Ye Ting, one of the military commanders involved in the uprising, was subsequently criticized within communist circles and held partly responsible for the failure of the operation. Later historical studies have argued that such assessments understated the significant structural disadvantages faced by the insurgent forces, including numerical inferiority, inadequate armaments, and the absence of sustained military support—concerns that Ye Ting and other commanders had reportedly expressed prior to the uprising. Following the suppression of the uprising, Ye Ting was removed from active command and left China, living in exile in Europe until the late 1930s after the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War to command communist forces as a senior officer of the New Fourth Army. He did not formally join the communist party during this period.

The failure of the uprising intensified internal debates within the chinese communists regarding strategy, leadership, and the extent of Comintern influence over decision-making. Some contemporary and later accounts criticized Comintern representatives, particularly Heinz Neumann, for encouraging the communists to hold Canton despite deteriorating military conditions. ^[20]

Together with earlier failures such as the Nanchang Uprising and the Autumn Harvest Uprisings, the Guangzhou Uprising contributed to a strategic shift within the chinese communists away from urban insurrection and toward the establishment of rural revolutionary bases and protracted guerrilla warfare. ^{[29] [30] [28]}

Legacy and historical significance

In later chinese communist historiography, the Guangzhou Uprising was commemorated as a heroic but doomed effort to establish proletarian power in a major city. In the People’s Republic of China, it has been portrayed as an example of revolutionary sacrifice despite its brief duration and military failure. ^[31]

Among historians, the uprising is widely interpreted as the culmination of the chinese communists’ 1927 urban uprising strategy and a demonstration of its limitations. The episode illustrates the extreme violence of the early Chinese Civil War, the fragmented political authority of the Northern Expedition era, and the complex interaction between Chinese revolutionary politics and Soviet revolutionary doctrine. ^{[32] [33]}

See also

• Chinese Civil War
• Shanghai Massacre
• Northern Expedition
• First United Front
• Nanchang Uprising
• Autumn Harvest Uprising

References

1. Hsiao 1967, p. 65.
2. Jowett 2014, p. 27.
3. "广州起义失败后苏联外交官为何惨遭处决并暴尸示众？_手机凤凰网". ihistory.ifeng.com. Retrieved 2018-08-27.
4. Dirlik, Arif. The Origins of Chinese Communism. Oxford University Press, 1989.
5. Wilbur, C. Martin. The Communist Movement in China: An Essay in Historical Perspective. University of California Press, 1969.
6. Eastman, Lloyd. The Abortive Revolution: China under Nationalist Rule, 1927–1937. Harvard University Press, 1974.
7. Spence, Jonathan D. The Search for Modern China. W. W. Norton, 2013.
8. Chesneaux, Jean. The Chinese Labor Movement, 1919–1927. Stanford University Press, 1968.
9. Bianco, Lucien. Origins of the Chinese Revolution, 1915–1949. Stanford University Press, 1971.
10. Wilbur, C. Martin, and Julie Lien-ying How. Missionaries of Revolution: Soviet Advisers and Nationalist China, 1920–1927. Harvard University Press, 1989.
11. Chesneaux, Jean. The Chinese Labor Movement, 1919–1927. Stanford University Press, 1968.
12. McDermott, Kevin, and Jeremy Agnew. The Comintern: A History of International Communism from Lenin to Stalin. Palgrave Macmillan, 1996.
13. Dirlik, Arif. The Origins of Chinese Communism. Oxford University Press, 1989.
14. Hsiao 1967, pp. 65–66.
15. Wilbur, C. Martin. The Communist Movement in China. University of California Press, 1969.
16. Saich, Tony. The Origins of the First United Front in China. Brill, 1991.
17. Brandt 1958, p. 162.
18. Hsiao 1967, p. 66.
19. Hsiao 1967, p. 67.
20. Tsin 2002, p. 234 (note 153).
21. Hsiao 1967, pp. 67–68.
22. Chesneaux, Jean. The Chinese Labor Movement, 1919–1927. Stanford University Press, 1968.
23. Bianco, Lucien. Origins of the Chinese Revolution. Stanford University Press, 1971.
24. Eastman, Lloyd. The Abortive Revolution. Harvard University Press, 1974.
25. Wilbur, C. Martin. The Communist Movement in China. University of California Press, 1969.
26. Dirlik 1997, p. 370.
27. Wu and Zhao 2021, p. 3. sfn error: no target: CITEREFWu_and_Zhao2021 (help)
28. Jowett 2013, p. 167.
29. Spence, Jonathan D. The Search for Modern China. W. W. Norton, 2013.
30. Dirlik, Arif. The Origins of Chinese Communism. Oxford University Press, 1989.
31. Bianco, Lucien. Origins of the Chinese Revolution. Stanford University Press, 1971.
32. Dirlik, Arif. The Origins of Chinese Communism. Oxford University Press, 1989.
33. McDermott, Kevin. Comintern: A History of International Communism. Palgrave Macmillan, 1996.

Bibliography

• Wu, Bishan; Zhao, Tong (2021). "Analysis of Gardening Theory and Method of Small and Micro Space -- Taking the "Blood Sacrifice to Xuanyuan Pavilion" in Guangzhou Uprising Martyr Cemetery Park as an Example" (PDF). Academic Journal of Architecture and Geotechnical Engineering. 3 (1). ISSN   2663-1563.
• Brandt, Conrad (1958). Stalin's Failure in China: 1924–1927 . Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
• Dirlik, Arif (1 October 1997), "Narrativizing Revolution: The Guangzhou Uprising (11–13 December 1927) in Workers' Perspective", Modern China
• Hsiao, Tso-Liang (April–June 1967). "Chinese Communism and the Canton Soviet of 1927". The China Quarterly (30): 49–78. JSTOR   651862.
• Jowett, Philip S. (2013). China's Wars. Rousing the Dragon 1894–1949. Atglen, Pennsylvania: Schiffer Publishing. ISBN   978-1782004073.
• Jowett, Philip S. (2014). The Armies of Warlord China 1911–1928. Atglen, Pennsylvania: Schiffer Publishing. ISBN   978-0764343452.
• Tsin, Michael T. W. (2002). Nation, Governance, and Modernity in China: Canton, 1900–1927 . Stanford, California: Stanford University Press.