Ius or Jus (Latin, plural iura) [2] in ancient Rome was a right to which a citizen (civis) was entitled by virtue of his citizenship ( civitas ). The iura were specified by laws, so ius sometimes meant law. As one went to the law courts to sue for one's rights, ius also meant justice and the place where justice was sought. [3]
On the whole, the Romans valued their rights as the greatest good of Roman citizenship (civitas romana), as opposed to citizenship in other city-states under the jurisdiction of Rome but without Roman rights. Outsiders (peregrini) and freedmen (libertini) perforce used Roman lawyers to represent them in actions undertaken under the jurisdiction of Roman law. Representation was one of the civic obligations ( munera ) owed to the state by citizens. These munera (on which account the citizens were municipes) included military service as well as paying taxes, but specialized obligations might also be associated with functions of elected offices or assigned by the government, such as paying the cost of road or aqueduct maintenance. Some of these functions were highly lucrative, such as tax collecting, since the collector collected much more than he owed the government, but for the most part functionaries were appointed for their wealth and were expected to assume the costs as their munus. If they did not, they were tried and sometimes executed. Violation of the iura of other citizens, whether in office or out, was a serious matter, for which the punishment might be death.
Ius in ancient Roman law had two principal meanings, which are still reflected in French droit, German Recht, English right and Castilian derecho. [4] Ferdinand Mackeldy, 19th-century jurist, analyzed them into two principles: ius is the law, a set of compulsory rules (Jus est norma agendi, "law is a rule of conduct"), which he called objective or positive law, and a set of possibilities to act (Jus est facultas agendi, "law is a license to act"), which he called subjective law, or duties. [5]
Ius was defined by the jurists Publius Juventius Celsus and Julius Paulus as the aequum et bonum, "the just and the fair", or justice. [6] Jurisprudence was the art of bringing it about through application of the laws; thus ius was law in the abstract, as in the English usage of the term "the law". Iura were "the whole of laws" (iura populi Romani), not a list of all the laws, but the very principle of legality, which might be applied through this law or by the magistrates and lawyers of Rome through disputation in the law courts. Ius might be something less than the whole body of law when special fields were designated by an adjective, such as ius publicum, "public law," as opposed to private law.
The actual laws (leges), or written statutes, were only the specific tools through which ius was applied. Ius was the law in its broadest sense or its ideal state, above and unaffected by the contingent decrees that the state happened to enact—hence the distinction between the English terms justice and legislation.
Ius as the law was generally the domain of Roman aristocrats, from whose ranks the magistrates were chosen and who often defended clients in court. On a more practical basis, the populace of Rome daily encountered the primary meaning of ius. They understood that they had rights. Furthermore, these rights could be named and enumerated in formulae beginning with the word ius followed by a descriptive phrase, most often in the genitive case: "the right of ...."
Black defines ius in the sense of a right as "a power, privilege, faculty, or demand inherent in one person and incident upon another." [4] This power, or potestas, was a license governing behavior between persons granted by the constitution. It determined what one citizen or group of citizens could or could not do regarding another; i.e., potestas is to be translated as authority, which the possession of iura gave to individuals. One might act socially sui iuris, on one's own authority, asserting one's own right, or on behalf of another, alieni iuris, in response to a demand to serve his right by being under his authority.
This was the principle binding soldiers in the army: the consul, or a commander of some other rank, had a right to demand public service of citizens in the army, who were then under his authority. The magistrates thus had the right and power to draft men into the army at any time, but this demand was never a private affair; the males were lawfully assembled and selections were made by the commanders of the units. Typically, the right to raise a legion from a given populace for a specified purpose under the Roman Republic had to be granted by a senatus consultum, a decree of the Senate.
Similarly, under the Roman Empire the imperator ("commander") was from a legal point of view the chief magistrate whose major ius was the ordering of all public affairs, for which he could demand assistance from anyone at any time. The cynical demands of the bad emperors and the beneficial ones of the good emperors are described at great length by the historians of the empire, such as Tacitus.
The list below contains iura from different branches of Roman civilization. A ius of ancient Rome, marked by the imperial eagle, typically begins in the Roman Republic and continues through the Roman Empire. A ius of the Holy Roman Empire is marked with the double-headed eagle. The term is used in this article in the general sense to mean also the Carolingian Empire, named after Charlemagne, who had the title Holy Roman Emperor. His domain also included what is now France. Its iura reflect early Germanic laws. They are more likely to be found as legal principles in modern European countries. Iura that originated and remained primarily as canon law are marked with the coat of arms of the Holy See.
Name | Literal Translation | Provenience, Jurisdiction | Description |
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ius abstinendi with potestas abstinendi supplemented by the beneficium abstinendi | Right of refusal with the power of refusal supplemented by the privilege of refusal | Roman Republic on its claim based on the Twelve Tables, supplemented by the Praetorian Edict, Roman Empire | In keeping with the high value placed by the Romans on family, they developed a complex system of transmitting family rights and property. That any family should disappear through lack of heirs was abhorrent. An inheritance (haereditas) began with the rights (iura) and goods (bona) possessed by a citizen, regardless of whether there were any heirs to tenant it in the future. For the time being the citizen tenanted it. His civic duty was to find heirs (haeres). The preferred way to do this was to have children and designate them as heirs in a will (testamentum). These were voluntarii (or extranei or sui) because they had the ius abstinendi, carrying the power (potestas) of refusal. They might do that if the estate were hopelessly encumbered by debt. If the owner of the property died intestate, the law designated heirs, preferably other relatives, who were called necessarii, because they had no right of refusal. [7] A haereditas was not automatically conferred on its heres as it is today. On the death of the testator the estate entered a pending period (delatio) during which the heirs must apply and either prove that they were qualified to be heirs or be disqualified. Voluntarii would state their intentions to accept or refuse at this time. If no qualified heirs were found, the haereditas reverted to the state, ending the family line, not considered a desirable outcome. The Praetorian Edict assigned the problem of finding heirs to the praetor, a Roman magistrate, who could appoint a manager (possessor bonorum). Before he did, the will of a pending inheritance was considered to continue the testator. A possessor assumed title as though the will were his own. He was a necessarius, but the praetor could grant him on application the beneficium abstinendi, the privilege of refusing. After the heirs were approved the estate entered the adquisitio phase. The testamentum was now of no effect. Roman wills never extended the testator. He and any possessor were vacated at this time. Joint heirs had to be all voluntarii or all necessarii; mixed inheritance was not allowed. If no heirs had been found, the possessor kept the estate, as he had already vacated the testator. |
ius abutendi | right to consume | Roman Catholic Church, 14th century on | Devised by Cardinal Bertrand de la Tour in support of Pope John XXII's stance in his bull, Ad Conditorem Canonum , issued 8 December 1322. The ius, also known as ius consumendi, builds on the Roman ius utendi, asserting that not only does a possessor have the right to use his property as he sees fit, but also to consume it. This ius establishes that Christ and the apostles "had the right to use, use up, sell, donate or acquire" property. [8] |
ius accrescendi | right of increase, accrual, accrescence or accretion | Roman Republic, Roman Empire | In ancient Rome the right of accrual belonged to the joint heirs (haeres), male or female, of an expected inheritance (haereditas), whether to be transmitted by will (testamentum) or by law in the case of intestate inheritance. If any of the heirs should die or become ineligible to inherit for any reason before the death of the testator, the share of the other heirs increased by a percentage of the vacated share. This rule took precedence over any testament left by the deceased heir. Alternatives could be designated under some circumstances. There were exceptions and conditions, which required adjudication. Vacated shares for which heirs could not be found were forfeited to the government. [9] In 9 AD the lex Pappia et Poppaea modified the Lex Julia of 18 BC (early empire), being called informally on that account the Lex Julia et Pappia Poppaea. It excluded a caelebs, an unmarried person, male or female from inheriting unless he or she married within 100 days of the death of the testator. Also excluded were orbi, or childless couples between 25 and 60 years of age for the male and 20 and 50 for the female. The intent of the law was to discourage childlessness. The emperor Justinian removed these conditions, restoring the republican form in favor of Christians who had decided to live celibate. The ius is sometimes called the right of survivorship, the modern term for the disposition of joint property to the survivors, dating from the Middle Ages. Accrescendi, however, does not mean survivorship; moreover, the Roman use only covered the survival of joint heirs. Although general survivorship rules undoubtedly did develop from the ius accrescendi, they are not the same as the Roman. |
ius ad rem , ius in personam, ius personale | right to a thing, right against a person | First known in the Brachylogus, a 12th-century work purporting to give ancient Roman iura but in fact containing the iura of mediaeval kingdoms and other institutions, whose official language was Latin. There is no trace of it in antiquity. The source is believed to have been canon law. Subsequently, it became a staple of civil law in the many nations descending from the Roman Empire. | The right to undertake an action against a person to compel performance of an obligated service or delivery of an owed thing. [10] The Romans would have accomplished the same result with other iura, typically under criminal law, as in a punitive action brought against a magistrate for non-performance of obligations. |
ius Aelianum | the jurisprudence of Aelius | Not a ius, body of iura, or any type of law or any other public enactment, this phrase is the title of a missing and otherwise unknown book written under the Roman Republic. | Nothing more is known of the book than that Sextus Aelius Paetus Catus, consul in 198 BC, wrote it in three parts: the laws of the Twelve Tables, an interpretation, and some cases (actiones), on which account the book was also called the Tripertita. Which if either name was original remains unknown. Whether the cases concerned the tables or were new in form or content, or just what the significance of the book in Roman jurisprudence was, are purely speculation, as no other evidence exists. [11] |
ius aesneciae | principle of the first born | Primogeniture was unknown to the Romans of the classical and imperial periods. It was not a right, law or legal principle associated with Rome in any way. [12] It was a principle applied to the inheritance of some fiefs among Germanic tribes in the Middle Ages and assigned the legal Latin term ius in modern times. | Late Latin aesnecia or aesnetia, anglicised to aesnecy or esnecy was the condition of being the eldest born of either sex, from Old French aisne < ainznez, the condition of being ainz, first (born), as opposed to secunz. [13] Although Bede remarked that the Saxons before the conquest of Britain recognized the eldest son as the head of the family and gave him preference in inheritance, primogeniture was not made a principle of legislation until the Holy Roman Empire, when it was necessary to classify estates as divisible and non-divisible. The latter were maintained intact to support the army. They must therefore be inherited by one person (the knight), the elder by custom. [14] |
ius albanagii or ius albinatus | right of alien inheritance | Although this right originated in the Holy Roman Empire and existed in other reflex states, such as Bremen, it was used primarily in early France, where it became the droit d'aubaigne, droit d'aubaine or droit d'aubenage. | Late Latin albinatus, "alien" and albanagium, "state of being an alien," derived from the word for alien, a person from outside the kingdom residing within it (such as a merchant). [15] In the Frankish Period they were known as Albani, Albini, Alibini, Albanici and Aubani. |
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As the Roman jurist Ulpian said, “that which nature has taught all animals”. For most writings of classical Roman law, synonymous with ius naturae. From the writings of Paul, however, the term ius naturale acquired the sense of an ideal of law, quod semper est bonum et aequum—those actions that are always fair and just. This sense is followed in the Thomist conceptions of natural law, or lex naturalis.
Roman law is the legal system of ancient Rome, including the legal developments spanning over a thousand years of jurisprudence, from the Twelve Tables, to the Corpus Juris Civilis ordered by Eastern Roman emperor Justinian I. Roman law forms the basic framework for civil law, the most widely used legal system today, and the terms are sometimes used synonymously. The historical importance of Roman law is reflected by the continued use of Latin legal terminology in many legal systems influenced by it, including common law.
A brocard is a legal maxim in Latin that is, in a strict sense, derived from traditional legal authorities, even from ancient Rome.
Praetor, also pretor, was the title granted by the government of ancient Rome to a man acting in one of two official capacities: (i) the commander of an army, and (ii) as an elected magistratus (magistrate), assigned to discharge various duties. The functions of the magistracy, the praetura (praetorship), are described by the adjective itself: the praetoria potestas, the praetorium imperium, and the praetorium ius, the legal precedents established by the praetores (praetors). Praetorium, as a substantive, denoted the location from which the praetor exercised his authority, either the headquarters of his castra, the courthouse (tribunal) of his judiciary, or the city hall of his provincial governorship. The minimum age for holding the praetorship was 39 during the Roman Republic, but it was later changed to 30 in the early Empire.
Private law is that part of a civil law legal system which is part of the jus commune that involves relationships between individuals, such as the law of contracts and torts, and the law of obligations. It is to be distinguished from public law, which deals with relationships between both natural and artificial persons and the state, including regulatory statutes, penal law and other law that affects the public order. In general terms, private law involves interactions between private individuals, whereas public law involves interrelations between the state and the general population.
Public law is the part of law that governs relations and affairs between legal persons and a government, between different institutions within a state, between different branches of governments, as well as relationships between persons that are of direct concern to society. Public law comprises constitutional law, administrative law, tax law and criminal law, as well as all procedural law. Laws concerning relationships between individuals belong to private law.
Citizenship in ancient Rome was a privileged political and legal status afforded to free individuals with respect to laws, property, and governance. Citizenship in ancient Rome was complex and based upon many different laws, traditions, and cultural practices. There existed several different types of citizenship, determined by one's gender, class, and political affiliations, and the exact duties or expectations of a citizen varied throughout the history of the Roman Empire.
The ius gentium or jus gentium is a concept of international law within the ancient Roman legal system and Western law traditions based on or influenced by it. The ius gentium is not a body of statute law nor a legal code, but rather customary law thought to be held in common by all gentes in "reasoned compliance with standards of international conduct".
In Roman law, status describes a person's legal status. The individual could be a Roman citizen, unlike foreigners; or he could be free, unlike slaves; or he could have a certain position in a Roman family either as head of the family, or as a lower member.
The history of international law examines the evolution and development of public international law in both state practice and conceptual understanding. Modern international law developed out of Renaissance Europe and is strongly entwined with the development of western political organisation at that time. The development of European notions of sovereignty and nation states would necessitate the development of methods for interstate relations and standards of behaviour, and these would lay the foundations of what would become international law. However, while the origins of the modern system of international law can be traced back 400 years, the development of the concepts and practises that would underpin that system can be traced back to ancient historical politics and relationships thousands of years old. Important concepts are derived from the practice between Greek city-states and the Roman law concept of ius gentium. These principles were not universal however. In East Asia, political theory was based not on the equality of states, but rather the cosmological supremacy of the Emperor of China.
The right of patronage in Roman Catholic canon law is a set of rights and obligations of someone, known as the patron in connection with a gift of land (benefice). It is a grant made by the church out of gratitude towards a benefactor.
In the early Roman Empire, from 30 BC to AD 212, a peregrinus was a free provincial subject of the Empire who was not a Roman citizen. Peregrini constituted the vast majority of the Empire's inhabitants in the 1st and 2nd centuries AD. In AD 212, all free inhabitants of the Empire were granted citizenship by the Constitutio Antoniniana, with the exception of the dediticii, people who had become subject to Rome through surrender in war, and freed slaves.
Ius naturale is Latin for natural right, the laws common to all beings. Roman jurists wondered why the ius gentium was in general accepted by all people living in the Empire. Their conclusion was that these laws made sense to a reasonable person and thus were followed. All laws which would make sense to a normal person were called ius naturale.
Ius publicum is Latin for public law. Public law regulated the relationships of the government to its citizens, including taxation, while ius privatum, based upon property and contract, concerned relations between individuals. The public/private law dichotomy is a structural core of Roman law and all modern western legal systems. Public law will only include some areas of private law close to the end of the Roman state.
Ius privatum is Latin for private law. Contrasted with ius publicum, ius privatum regulated the relations between individuals. In Roman law this included personal, property and civil law. Judicial proceeding was a private process. Criminal law was also considered private matters, except where the crimes were particularly severe.
Consensu or obligatio consensu or obligatio consensu contracta or obligations ex consensu or contractus ex consensu or contracts consensu or consensual contracts or obligations by consent are, in Roman law, those contracts which do not require formalities.
Jus ad rem is a Latin term of the civil law, meaning "a right to a thing:" that is, a right exercisable by one person over a particular article of property in virtue of a contract or obligation incurred by another person in respect to it and which is enforceable only against or through such other person. It is thus distinguished from jus in re which is a complete and absolute dominion over a thing available against all persons.
Jurisdictional dualism in France is the separation of the French court system into two separate divisions, or "ordres", as they are called in French: the ordinary courts, and the administrative courts. The ordinary courts, also known as the judiciary order, handle criminal and civil cases, while the administrative courts handle disputes between individuals and the government. This dual system allows for a clear separation of powers and specialized handling of cases related to the actions of the government. The administrative courts are headed by the Council of State, and the ordinary courts by the Court of Cassation for judiciary law.
Ius civile vigilantibus scriptum est is a Latin legal phrase that translates to "civil law is written for the vigilant". It can be traced back to the Roman jurist Quintus Cervidius Scaevola and is to this day referred to in different legal systems and contexts. Many variations of the brocard are known all connoting similar but slightly different concepts.
The French code of criminal procedure is the codification of French criminal procedure, "the set of legal rules in France that govern the State's response to offenses and offenders". It guides the behavior of police, prosecutors, and judges in how to deal with a possible crime. The current code was established in 1958, and replaced the code of 1808, created under Napoleon.