Additional Union troops were recalled from a campaign against the Cheyenne, and the Kansas State Militia was mobilized, forming the Union Army of the Border under Major General Samuel R. Curtis. The call-up of the militia became a political issue in Kansas, which hampered Curtis's use of the militamen. Curtis's Army of the Border was located west of Price's column, which was moving west along the Missouri River. Following Price from the east was a Union Department of the Missouri cavalry force commanded by Major General Alfred Pleasanton and a veteran infantry force under Major General A. J. Smith. One of the two divisions of Curtis's army was commanded by Major General James G. Blunt. Blunt moved east to the town of Lexington, Missouri, reaching the town on October 18. Blunt was hoping for reinforcement from Curtis, but this was not feasible due to most of the Kansas militia's refusal to move that far into Missouri.
On October 19, Price's army attacked Blunt at Lexington, led by Brigadier GeneralJoseph O. Shelby's command. Blunt's outnumbered command was gradually pushed back, with Price deploying more of his army, and the Union troops fell back from the town, with ColonelThomas Moonlight commanding the rear guard. The Confederates attempted to maneuver a brigade into a position where it could block the Union retreat, but were unsuccessful. Blunt fought another delaying action at the Battle of Little Blue River on October 21, and after the Battle of Byram's Ford and the Second Battle of Independence on October 22, Price was defeated at the Battle of Westport. Several other battles followed during Price's withdrawal, including a decisive defeat at the Battle of Mine Creek on October 25. The campaign wrecked Price's army as an effective fighting force and the Confederates did not make another offensive campaign in the Trans-Missisippi theater of the war.
By the beginning of September 1864, events in the eastern United States, especially the Confederate defeat in the Atlanta campaign, gave Abraham Lincoln, who supported continuing the war, an edge in the 1864 United States presidential election over George B. McClellan, who favored ending the war. At this point, the Confederacy had very little chance of winning the war.[6] Meanwhile, in the Trans-Mississippi Theater, the Confederates had defeated Union attackers during the Red River campaign in Louisiana, which took place from March through May. As events east of the Mississippi River turned against the Confederates, GeneralEdmund Kirby Smith, Confederate commander of the Trans-Mississippi Department, was ordered to transfer the infantry under his command to the fighting in the Eastern and Western Theaters. However, this proved to be impossible, as the Union Navy controlled the Mississippi River, preventing a large scale crossing. Despite having limited resources for an offensive, Smith decided that an attack designed to divert Union troops from the principal theaters of combat would have an equivalent effect as the proposed transfer of troops, through decreasing the Confederates' numerical disparity east of the Mississippi. Price and the Confederate Governor of Missouri, Thomas Caute Reynolds, suggested that an invasion of Missouri would be an effective offensive; Smith approved the plan and appointed Price to command the offensive. Price expected that the offensive would create a popular uprising against Union control of Missouri, divert Union troops away from principal theaters of combat (many of the Union troops previously defending Missouri had been transferred out of the state, leaving the Missouri State Militia to be the state's primary defensive force), and aid McClellan's chance of defeating Lincoln in the election.[7] On September 19, Price's column, named the Army of Missouri, entered the state[8]
When it entered the state, Price's force was composed of about 13,000 cavalrymen. However, several thousand of these men were poorly armed, and all fourteen of the army's cannons were small-caliber, which limited their effectiveness against fortifications.[9] This Confederate army was divided into three divisions, which were commanded by Major Generals James F. Fagan and John S. Marmaduke and Brigadier General Joseph O. Shelby. Fagan's division was subdivided into four brigades, Marmaduke's two, and Shelby's three. Shelby and Marmaduke's divisions were mostly Missouri troops, while most of Fagan's soldiers were from Arkansas. Fagan's division had a battery and a section of artillery, Marmaduke's division had two batteries, and Shelby's division had a single battery. Price's best combat unit, Shelby's Iron Brigade, was part of its former commander's division. Most of Price's units were understrength, some of the men were unarmed, and others lacked cavalry mounts.[10] Countering Price was the Union Department of the Missouri, under the command of Major General William S. Rosecrans, who had fewer than 10,000 men on hand, many of whom were militiamen.[11]
In late September, the Confederates encountered a small Union force holding Fort Davidson near the town of Pilot Knob. Attacks against the post in the Battle of Pilot Knob on September 27 failed, and the Union garrison abandoned the fort that night. Price had suffered hundreds of casualties in the battle, and decided to divert the aim of his advance from St. Louis to Jefferson City.[12] Price's army was accompanied by a sizable wagon train, which significantly slowed its movement.[13] The delays caused by this slow progress enabled Union forces to reinforce Jefferson City, whose garrison was increased from 1,000 men to 7,000 between October 1 and October 6.[14] In turn, Price determined that Jefferson City was too strong to attack, and began moving westwards along the course of the Missouri River. The Confederates gathered recruits and supplies during the movement; a side raid against the town of Glasgow on October 15 was successful,[15] as was another raid against Sedalia.[16] As Price's army moved west from Jefferson City, it was harassed by Union troops. On October 6, Major General Alfred Pleasonton had arrived at St. Louis after Rosecrans recalled him from leave; Pleasonton reached Jefferson City two days later and then organized a cavalry division which consisted of four brigades, which were commanded by Brigadier Generals Egbert B. Brown, John McNeil, John B. Sanborn, and Colonel Edward F. Winslow. Pleasonton sent Sanborn and his brigade after the Confederates with instructions to "harass and delay [Price] as much as possible until other troops could be brought forward".[17] An infantry division commanded by Major General A. J. Smith was diverted to St. Louis;[18] Rosecrans sent these 4,500 veteran infantrymen in purusit of Price, but they never saw action during the campaign.[19]
To the west, the Department of Kansas was commanded by Major General Samuel R. Curtis. Curtis had roughly 7,000 men in his department, but they were spread over a wide area in operations against Native American tribes.[20] Major General James G. Blunt and some of the department's troops were withdrawn from their role in fights against the Cheyenne.[21] Along with some troops already stationed along the Missouri-Kansas border, this amounted to about 4,000 men, which made it necessary to also call up the Kansas State Militia to provide additional manpower. Curtis informed Governor of KansasThomas Carney on September 17 that the situation might warrant the mobilization of the militia[22] The call-up of the militia was delayed by Kansas politics. Carney and his followers were opposed by United States SenatorJames H. Lane's faction of the Kansas Republican Party. Carney suspected that the militia call-up was a ploy by Curtis to influence the outcome of the 1864 Kansas gubernatorial election by preventing voters who supported Carney's faction from being present at the polls on election day. Carney had resisted an October 5 call from Curtis to mobilize the militia, and did not order the mobilization until he telegraphed Rosecrans on October 9, who confirmed that Price's force did indeed pose a threat to Kansas.[23] The Kansas militiamen were placed under the command of Major General George Deitzler, who had previous combat experience at the Battle of Wilson's Creek and in the Vicksburg campaign;[24] these militiamen made up the bulk of Curtis's command.[25]
To Lexington
On October 14, Curtis named his command the Army of the Border and organized into two divisions: the First Division under Blunt and the Second Division under Deitzler. Blunt's division was a mixed force of militia and army soldiers, while Deitzler's force was composed of militiamen. Of Curtis's roughly 16,000 to 18,000 men, all but 4,000 were militia.[26] Blunt had his troops at Hickman Mills, Missouri, that same day. He organized his division into three brigades there.[a] Blunt's first brigade, under the command of Colonel Charles R. Jennison, was composed of one regiment of Kansas cavalry and part of a Wisconsin cavalry regiment. The second brigade was commanded by Colonel Thomas Moonlight and consisted of one regiment of Kansas cavalry and parts of two others. Moonlight was a political partisan for Lane, while Jennison was a former Lane backer who had since switched to the Carney fold, while Blunt himself was a Lane support. The third brigade's commander, Colonel Charles W. Blair, was less politically involved than the other two, and contained part of one Kansas cavalry regiment and three milita units.[28] Each brigade was assigned an artillery battery, with Blair's brigade getting an extra artillery section.[29] Having some of militia under Blunt's command caused further political issues in the form of militia Brigadier General Charles W. Fishback,[30] who resented being subordinate to a non-militia colonel. Fishback under his own initiative ordered one of the militia regiment assigned to Blair back to Kansas, an order which was countermanded by Blunt, who had Fishback arrested.[31] Even after the militia had been called out, political issues between Carney and Blunt continued. Sanborn and Pleasanton had not kept in continuous contact with Price, and the telegraph link between Curtis and the Union troops on the other side of Price's force had been broken. Lacking good reports of Price's location, doubts grew in the mind of Carney and other influential Kansans that Price's force was a threat to Kansas; fears that Curtis was interfering with the upcoming election or that northeastern Kansas had been left exposed to pro-Confederate Missouri guerrillas remained.[32]
At Independence, Missouri, 9 miles (14km) east of Kansas City, the 2nd Colorado Cavalry Regiment garrisoned the town, under the command of Major James Nelson Smith. Sending troops on a scout east of the Little Blue River, Smith received various reports regarding Price's movements. At Lexington, 35 miles (56km) to the east, the small Missouri State Militia garrison abandoned the town; by October 14 it had been occupied by pro-Confederate guerrillas.[33] Late on October 16, Curtis decided to send Blunt's division less Blair's brigade in the direction of Warrensburg to scout for Confederate troops; if the area was clear of opposing forces he had the option to move north to Lexington.[34] Blunt to probed south and east from Hickman Mills to Pleasant Hill late that day, having sent Blair's brigade to Kansas City to be equipped. This detachment left Blunt with roughly 2,000 men and eight 12-pounder mountain howitzers.[35] Finding no enemy troops at Pleasant Hill, Blunt decided to advance, moving his troops to Holden. By 5:00 p.m. on October 17, Blunt had received information that Price and Shelby were at Waverly,[36] which was 20 miles (32km) east of Lexington.[37] Sanborn was report to be at Dunksburg, with A. J. Smith's troops further behind.[36] Blunt requested that Curtis send the 2nd Colorado Cavalry and the portion of the 16th Kansas Cavalry Regiment that were at Independence east to Lexington.[38]
Requesting support from Curtis and Sanborn, Blunt moved his troops after dark on October 17 to Lexington.[36] Blunt hoped to catch Price's army between his force, Smith's and Pleasanton's, and the Missouri River.[39] Also on October 17, Major Smith of the 2nd Colorado and Major James Kentner of the 16th Kansas Cavalry scouted with roughly 300 troops from Independence to Lexington, but with insufficient supplies, returned to Independence, although these troops were sent back towards Lexington soon after having returned to Independence.[40] Moonlight's troops reached Lexington the next morning and drove out some pro-Confederate guerrillas; the rest of Blunt's force reached the town later that day.[36] Lexington was not a readily defensible position. What little high ground there was at the town was along the Missouri River, near the Masonic College site, where Price had defeated a Union force in the 1861 Siege of Lexington. The terrain was open and did not contain any natural bottlenecks and roads ran into Lexington from multiple directions. Blunt positioned Moonlight's brigade at the Masonic College, while Jennison's troops were deployed at a fairgrounds several miles south. Blunt was suffering from sleep deprivation and made few preparations for a defense before the late evening of October 18. After dark, Blunt sent two companies commanded by Captain Louis Green south of Lexington to picket the Warrensburg road, while a force of roughly battalion size commanded by Captain H. E. Palmer which was drawn from the 2nd Colorado and the 11th Kansas Cavalry Regiment was deployed three miles east of Lexington, guarding the approach from Dover.[41]
The Confederate troops which had raided Glasgow and Sedalia and returned to Price's main body at Waverly,[42] and Price had mostly regathered his army by late on October 17. The Confederate army had been recruiting as it passed through the Boonslick. On October 18, Price was informed by a spy that sizable Union forces from Jefferson City and St. Louis were pursuing from the east, and that at least 3,000 Union troops had occupied Lexington. Concerned that he could not supply or protect any further soldiers, Price ceased recruiting and moved his roughly 17,000 troops west to Lexington early on October 19, with a plan of advance designed to capture Blunt's whole force at Lexington. Shelby's troops were ordered to swing around Lexington and strike the road to Independence west of the town.[43]
With Shelby's troops in the lead, Price's army approached Lexington in three prongs.[44] In Lexington, Blunt placed the town under martial law and called out all able-bodied male civilians, regardless of race, who were between the ages of 15 and 60 to assemble at 2:00 p.m. to build fortifications, but the fighting opened before the time for the civilians to assemble.[45] Scouting parties were sent out from the Union line,[42] and at around 11:00 a.m., Shelby's troops encountered Union forces at the Burns House, which was roughly 4 miles (6.4km) or 5 miles (8.0km) from Lexington, on the Salt Pond Road.[46] At around the same time, scouts returned to Blunt, bringing news of the contact with Confederates troops on the Salt Pond Road, as well as evidence of Confederate troops coming from the east on the road from Dover. A message from Curtis also arrived, informing Blunt that he could not send reinforcements to Lexington;[47] the majority of the Kansas militia were not willing to advance into Missouri. Blunt would need to fall back to the Big Blue River, which was west of the Little Blue River. Unbeknownst to Blunt, there was not chance of reinforcement from Sanborn either, as Sanborn did not receive Blunt's request for aid until the morning of October 19, by which time it was too late to save the Lexington position.[48]
Shelby's advance was led by the Iron Brigade, which was under the command of Brigadier General M. Jeff Thompson.[b] Thompson spent the next three hours deploying his force, with his troops aligned on either side of the Salt Pond Road. Meanwhile, Shelby moved to the road from Warrensburg with Colonel Sidney D. Jackman's brigade.[50] Blunt positioned Jennison on the Union right, and Moonlight on the left; this positioned covered the road to Independence, which was Blunt's line of retreat. Jennison threw out a skirmish line with troops from the 3rd Wisconsin Cavalry Regiment and the 15th Kansas Cavalry Regiment to confront Thompson, who began his attack at 2:00 p.m.[51] The Confederates drove back the outlying Union lines, except on the road from Dover, while Palmer's line held.[52] Moonlight's troops came under Confederate pressure, and fell back from a cornfield to a position at a ravine near the fairgrounds beyond Jennison's line.[53] While Blunt's troops put up a stiff fight, Thompson's troops continued to drive the Union troops back towards the north and west.[54] Confederate rifled artillery made a significant impact on the fight:[55] while only two guns from Collins's Missouri Battery were in action for the Confederates compared to Blunt's eight cannons, Collins's two pieces outranged the Union mountain howitzers.[56] During the fight, many of the Union scouting parties were at least temporarily cut off from Blunt's main body.[55] Palmer's position east of Lexington had been reinforced by some Missouri militia, and was assailed by Confederate troops multiple times. By 3:00 p.m., Palmer's men could hear Blunt's fight. Two hours later the sound of the fighting had largely ceased; Palmer determined that he was isolated from the main Union body.[54] Palmer and his men did not rejoin Blunt's main force until late on October 20.[57]
Price added the forces of Fagan and Marmaduke to the fight,[37] although the advance of these troops west towards Lexington was slow.[56] At around 3:00 p.m., Blunt began to withdraw,[58] with Jennison's brigade pulling out first; Shelby had failed to get Jackman's brigade in a position where it could block the Union retreat. Moonlight made a covering stand southwest of the fairgrounds on a hill about 1 mile (1.6km) from Lexington; for this defense Moonlight had roughly 500 men and four of Blunt's cannons.[56] While Jennison withdrew his forces after dark, the limber of one of his mountain howitzers was broken in an accident, although it was repaired enough for the gun to be removed from the field.[55] Moonlight's force retreated, making a stand in one position with the 11th Kansas Cavalry and the cannons until the position was flanked, after which the Union troops fell back to a new position,[59] with the artillery withdrawing first to cover the retreat of the cavalrymen.[60] The Confederate pursuit became weaker after dark; the fighting ended at roughly midnight as the Union troops crossed Sni-A-Bar Creek, which was 7 miles (11km) from Lexington. The 11th Kansas Cavalry's commander, Lieutenant ColonelPreston B. Plumb ordered the bridge over Sni-a-Bar Creek burned, but Confederate troops were able to put out the fire.[60] Blunt had gained definite evidence about Price's strengths and exact movements,[37] which the Union high command had been lacking since the time that Price was still in Arkansas,[44] although the historian Mark A. Lause questions "how many times the [Union] needed to learn such lessons about a force that had been rampaging through Missouri for a month".[61]
Aftermath
Lause estimates that the Confederates actually had about 6,000 to 8,000 engaged at Lexington, although Blunt and Moonlight thought that they had faced 20,000 Confederates. Price reported that he had faced "between 3,000 and 4,000" Union troops, compared to the actual 2,000 men that Blunt had for the battle.[61] The historian Kyle S. Sinisi notes that Union casualties were estimated to be about forty; Price gave no official total, but stated that his losses were "very light".[62] Lause believes that "casaulty estimates merit severe skepticism" given that neither commander had an accurate idea of the strength of the opposing force. Curtis estimated Union losses at roughly 50, while contemporary Kansas newspaper reporting referenced figures of twenty and "about forty". Lause states that "the actual reports offer the numbers of killed and wounded in the single digits". Lause refers to the estimates of Union casaulties as "minimal", and estimates that Price lost about twice as many men as Curtis.[63]
The Confederates spent the night near Fire Prairie Creek,[15] while Blunt retreated to the Little Blue River, reaching that position at about 9:00 am that day after the battle.[58] Blunt wanted to make a stand at the Little Blue River, but Curtis ordered him back to the Big Blue River due to the Kansas militia's reluctance to operate that far into Missouri. Moonlight was placed in command of a small force to fight a delaying action at the Little Blue.[64] The Battle of Little Blue River began on the morning of October 21.[65] That morning, Curtis changed his mind and allowed Blunt to take the rest of his force back to the Little Blue River,[66] but Blunt was forced to withdraw through Independence to the Big Blue River.[67] Curtis deployed his Army of the Border behind prepared postions on the west side of the Big Blue River.[68] Price's troops were caught between Curtis to the west and Pleasanton's troops advancing from the east, and had to protect the sizable wagon train as well.[69]
Shelby breached the Big Blue River line on October 22 in the Battle of Byram's Ford, while Pleasanton drove Price's rear guard through Independence in the Second Battle of Independence.[70] The following day, Price's troops fought Curtis's men at the Battle of Westport, but Pleasanton broke through Marmaduke's line at Byram's Ford, which allowed the Confederates fighting near Westport to be struck on the flank. Defeated, Price's troops withdrew southward into Kansas. On October 25, the retreating Confederates were defeated at the Battle of Marais des Cygnes and then more decivisely at the Battle of Mine Creek.[71] Moving back into Missouri, Price was defeated a third time on October 25 at the Battle of Marmaton River.[72] Another battle in Missouri occurred on October 28 in the Second Battle of Newtonia; the Union pursuit of Price ended at the Arkansas River in the Indian Territory in November.[73] On November 23, the Confederate survivors reached Bonham, Texas, before moving to Laynesport, Arkansas on December 2.[74] Price's army had been destroyed as an effective combat force, and the Confederates made no more offensive operations in the Trans-Mississippi.[75]
Forsyth, Michael J. (2015). The Great Missouri Raid: Sterling Price and the Last Major Confederate Campaign in Northern Territory. Jefferson, North Carolina: McFarland & Co.ISBN978-1-4766-1923-1.
Geise, William Royston (2022). Forsyth, Michael J. (ed.). The Confederate Military Forces in the Trans-Mississippi West, 1861–1865. El Dorado Hills, California: Savas Beatie. ISBN978-1-61121-621-9.
Hatcher, Richard (1998). "Wilson's Creek, Missouri". In Kennedy, Frances H. (ed.). The Civil War Battlefield Guide (2nded.). Boston/New York: Houghton Mifflin. ISBN978-0-395-74012-5.
McPherson, James M. (1998). "Pro-Confederate Activity in Missouri". In Kennedy, Frances H. (ed.). The Civil War Battlefield Guide (2nded.). Boston/New York: Houghton Mifflin. pp.377–379. ISBN978-0-395-74012-5.
Shea, William L. (2023). Union General: Samuel Ryan Curtis and Victory in the West. Lincoln, Nebraska: Potomac Books. ISBN978-1-64012-518-6.
Shea, William L.; Hess, Earl J. (1998). "Pea Ridge, Arkansas". In Kennedy, Frances H. (ed.). The Civil War Battlefield Guide (2nded.). Boston/New York: Houghton Mifflin. pp.34–37. ISBN978-0-395-74012-5.
Welcher, Frank J. (1993). The Union Army 1861–1865: Organization and Operations. Vol.II: The Western Theater. Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press. ISBN0-253-36454-X.
This page is based on this Wikipedia article Text is available under the CC BY-SA 4.0 license; additional terms may apply. Images, videos and audio are available under their respective licenses.
Confederate States 
United States 
