The term was coined in January 1896 by a Canadian politician, George Eulas Foster. He indicated his approval for Britain's minimal involvement in European affairs by saying "In these somewhat troublesome days when the great Mother Empire stands splendidly isolated in Europe."[1]
There is considerable historical debate over the extent to which this approach was intentional or accidental, its impact, or even if it ever existed, other than as a useful phrase.
Foreign Secretary George Canning (1770–1827), reputed originator of the policy
Nineteenth-century British foreign policy was characterised by a reluctance to enter into permanent alliances with other Great Powers. Often assumed to apply only to the latter part of the century, some historians argue it originated after the 1822 Congress of Verona, when Britain withdrew from the post-1815 Concert of Europe, guided by Foreign Secretary George Canning. His principles dominated British foreign policy for decades, and have been summarised as follows;
Non-intervention; no European police system; every nation for itself, and God for us all; balance of power; respect for facts, not for abstract theories; respect for treaty rights, but caution in extending them...England not Europe...Europe's domain extends to the shores of the Atlantic, England's begins there.[2]
For much of the 19th century, Britain sought to maintain the existing balance of power in Europe, while protecting trade routes to its colonies and dominions, especially those connecting to British India through the Suez Canal. In 1866, the Foreign Secretary Lord Derby explained this policy as follows:
It is the duty of the Government of this country, placed as it is with regard to geographical position, to keep itself upon terms of goodwill with all surrounding nations, but not to entangle itself with any single or monopolising alliance with any one of them; above all to endeavour not to interfere needlessly and vexatiously with the internal affairs of any foreign country.[3]
One exception was the 1839 Treaty of London, recognising the independence of Belgium, which led to Britain entering World War I in 1914. The ports of Ostend, Antwerp and Zeebrugge were so important to ensuring control of the English Channel, Britain guaranteed Belgian independence, by military means if required.[4]
Unlike his successors, Bismarck viewed a war on two fronts as potentially fatal for Germany; his key foreign policy aims were friendship with Russia, and the isolation of France. When the French attempted to negotiate a Russian alliance in 1881, he persuaded Austria and Russia to join a reconstituted Dreikaiserbund.[6] Even after the League finally dissolved in 1887, Bismarck replaced it with the Reinsurance Treaty, a secret agreement with Russia to observe 'benevolent neutrality', in the event of an attack by France on Germany, or Austria-Hungary on Russia.[7]
British Prime Minister Lord Salisbury once defined his foreign policy as "to float lazily downstream, putting out the occasional diplomatic boathook."[8] He defined this as avoiding war with another Great Power, or combination of Powers, and securing communications with the Empire. A recurring concern was Russian access to the Mediterranean, in this case by acquiring Constantinople and the Dardanelles.[lower-alpha 1] A factor in the 1853–1856 Crimean War, it resurfaced during the 1875–1878 Great Eastern Crisis, when jingoism demonstrated a growing sense of insecurity among British media and politicians.[10]
The British Empire in 1898
After occupying Egypt in the 1882 Anglo-Egyptian War, Britain negotiated the 1887 Mediterranean Agreements with Italy and Austria-Hungary. These were not considered treaties, simply an undertaking to discuss problems should they arise, and thus did not require approval by Parliament. Since Britain shared Austrian concern over Russian expansion in South-East Europe, and Austria generally followed Germany, it allowed Salisbury and Bismarck to align without a formal alliance.[11]
In the 1885 Panjdeh incident, Russian troops occupied an oasis near the disputed border between Afghanistan and Russian-occupied Turkmenistan. Always sensitive to potential threats in this area, Britain threatened a military response, before both sides backed down, and agreed a negotiated solution.[12] However, the Ottomans refused a British request to allow warships access to the Black Sea, a position strongly supported by all the European powers. Taylor suggests it was "the most formidable display of Continental hostility to Britain between Napoleon's day and Hitler's".[13]
Although concerned by increasing German industrial and military strength post-1871, British politicians were reassured by Bismarck's efforts to maintain the status quo, one example being the 1890 Heligoland–Zanzibar Treaty.[14] His dismissal by Wilhelm II in 1890 introduced greater uncertainty into international politics, at a time when Britain faced numerous foreign policy challenges.
The most pressing issue was Germany, caused by Wilhelm's determination to challenge the Royal Navy, which led to the naval arms race. A tendency to make aggressive statements was as much of a problem as his erratic foreign policy. It included securing 'compensation' for Germany in Africa, China and the Pacific, provision of military support for the Boers, and growing economic and military influence in the Ottoman Empire.[17] Wilhelm's aim was to end "Britain's free ride on the coat-tails of the Triple Alliance."[18]
Abandonment
In 1898, the Colonial SecretaryJoseph Chamberlain tried to negotiate an alliance with Germany. He spoke publicly of Britain's diplomatic predicament, saying "We have had no allies. I am afraid we have had no friends... We stand alone."[19] While unsuccessful, it reflected a growing realisation that Britain's diplomatic isolation during the 1899–1902 Second Boer War left it dangerously exposed.[20]
According to G.W. Monger's summary of the Cabinet debates in 1900 to 1902:
Chamberlain advocated ending Britain's isolation by concluding an alliance with Germany; Salisbury resisted change. With the new crisis in China caused by the Boxer rising and Lansdowne's appointment to the Foreign Office in 1900, those who advocated a change won the upper hand. Lansdowne in turn attempted to reach an agreement with Germany and a settlement with Russia but failed. In the end Britain concluded an alliance with Japan. The decision of 1901 was momentous; British policy had been guided by events, but Lansdowne had no real understanding of these events. The change of policy had been forced on him and was a confession of Britain's weakness.[21]
In 1902, Britain and Japan signed the Anglo-Japanese Alliance; if either were attacked by a third party, the other would remain neutral and if attacked by two or more opponents, the other would come to its aid. This meant Japan could rely on British support in a war with Russia, if either France or Germany, which also had interests in China, decided to join them.[22] With Britain still engaged in the Boer War, this was arguably a defensive move rather than an end to isolation, a view supported by T. G. Otte, who sees it as reinforcing Britain's aloofness from the Continent and the European alliance systems.[23]
The peaceful resolution of the Venezuela issue in 1897 led to the 1901 Hay–Pauncefote Treaty, but it dealt with the Panama Canal, Britain tacitly accepted US supremacy and responsibility for the Americas. Just as the Anglo-Japanese Alliance allowed the Royal Navy to reduce its presence in the Far East, that in the Caribbean was also significantly reduced as a result.[24]
Primarily for domestic British consumption, the 1904 Entente Cordiale with France and the 1907 Anglo-Russian Convention were not formal alliances, and both focused on colonial boundaries in Asia and Africa. However, they cleared the way for co-operation in other areas, making British entry into any future conflict involving France or Russia a strong possibility; these interlocking bilateral agreements became known as the Triple Entente.[25]
In the 1911 Agadir Crisis, Britain backed France against Germany. By 1914, the British army and navy were committed to support France in the event of war with Germany, but even in the government, few were aware of the true extent of these undertakings.[26]
Appraisal by historians
Diplomatic historian Margaret MacMillan argues that by 1897, Britain was indeed isolated, but far from being "splendid" this was a bad thing. Britain had no real friends, and was engaged in disputes with the United States, France, Germany, and Russia.[27]
Historians have debated whether British isolation was intentional, or dictated by contemporary events. A.J.P. Taylor claimed it existed only in a limited sense: "The British certainly ceased to concern themselves with the Balance of Power in Europe; they supposed that it was self-adjusting. But they maintained close connection with the continental Powers for the sake of affairs outside of Europe, particularly in the Near East."[28] For John Charmley, splendid isolation was a fiction for the period prior to the Franco-Russian Alliance of 1894, and reluctantly pursued thereafter.[29]
E. David Steele argues that although Salisbury once referred to splendid isolation, he "was being ironical at the expense of those who believed in the possibility."[30] Another biographer claims the term "unfairly affixed itself to (his) foreign policy" and that Salisbury discouraged its use, considering it dangerous to be completely uninvolved with European affairs.[1]
↑ This was, and remains, a long-standing Russian objective; in 1914, 50 per cent of total Russian exports, and 90 per cent of agricultural, went through the Straits. The Russian naval facility in Tartus is a key element driving their involvement in the Syrian civil war.[9]
Related Research Articles
The Entente Cordiale comprised a series of agreements signed on 8 April 1904 between the United Kingdom and the French Republic which saw a significant improvement in Anglo-French relations. On the surface, the agreement dealt with minor issues related to fishing and colonial boundaries. Egypt was recognized as part of Britain's sphere of influence, and Morocco as part of France's. The Entente was not a formal alliance and did not involve close collaboration, nor was it intended to be directed against Germany. However, it paved the way for a stronger relationship between France and Britain in the face of German aggression. It should not be mistaken for the official Anglo-French military alliance, which was only established after the outbreak of World War I in 1914.
Henry Charles Keith Petty-Fitzmaurice, 5th Marquess of Lansdowne,, was a British statesman who served successively as Governor General of Canada, Viceroy of India, Secretary of State for War and Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
The Triple Entente describes the informal understanding among the Russian Empire, the French Third Republic, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland. It was built upon the Franco-Russian Alliance of 1894, the Entente Cordiale of 1904 between France and Britain, and the Anglo-Russian Entente of 1907. It formed a powerful counterweight to the Triple Alliance of the German Empire, the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and the Kingdom of Italy. The Triple Entente, unlike the Triple Alliance or the Franco-Russian Alliance itself, was not an alliance of mutual defence.
The Congress of Berlin was a diplomatic conference to reorganise the states in the Balkan Peninsula after the Russo-Turkish War (1877–1878), which had been won by Russia against the Ottoman Empire. Represented at the meeting were Europe's then six great powers: Russia, Great Britain, France, Austria-Hungary, Italy, and Germany; the Ottomans; and four Balkan states: Greece, Serbia, Romania and Montenegro. The congress concluded with the signing of the Treaty of Berlin, replacing the preliminary Treaty of San Stefano that had been signed three months earlier.
The Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, or Convention between the United Kingdom and Russia relating to Persia, Afghanistan, and Tibet, was signed on August 31, 1907, in Saint Petersburg. It ended the longstanding rivalry in Central Asia and enabled the two countries to outflank the Germans, who were threatening to connect Berlin to Baghdad with a new railroad that could potentially align the Ottoman Empire with Imperial Germany.
The first Anglo-Japanese Alliance was an alliance between Britain and Japan. It was in operation from 1902 to 1922. The original British goal was to prevent Russia from expanding in Manchuria while also preserving the territorial integrity of China and Korea. For the British, it marked the end of a period of "splendid isolation" while allowing for greater focus on protecting India and competing in the Anglo-German naval arms race. The alliance was part of a larger British strategy to reduce imperial overcommitment and recall the Royal Navy to defend Britain. The Japanese, on the other hand, gained international prestige from the alliance and used it as a foundation for their diplomacy for two decades. In 1905, the treaty was redefined in favor of Japan concerning Korea. It was renewed in 1911 for another ten years and replaced by the Four-Power Treaty in 1922.
The Reinsurance Treaty was a diplomatic agreement between the German Empire and the Russian Empire that was in effect from 1887 to 1890. The existence of the agreement was not known to the general public, and as such, was only known to a handful of officials in Berlin and St. Petersburg. The treaty played a critical role in German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck's network of alliances and agreements, which aimed to keep the peace in Europe as well as maintaining Germany's economic, diplomatic and political dominance. It helped calm tensions between both Russia and Germany.
The identification of the causes of World War I remains a debated issue. World War I began in the Balkans on July 28, 1914, and hostilities ended on November 11, 1918, leaving 17 million dead and 25 million wounded. Moreover, the Russian Civil War can in many ways be considered a continuation of World War I, as can various other conflicts in the direct aftermath of 1918.
The Entente, or the Allies, were an international military coalition of countries led by France, the United Kingdom, Russia, the United States, Italy, and Japan against the Central Powers of Germany, Austria-Hungary, the Ottoman Empire, and Bulgaria in World War I (1914–1918).
The bilateral relations between Germany and the United Kingdom span hundreds of years, and the countries have been aligned since the end of World War II.
France–Russia relations, also known as Franco-Russian relations or Russo-French relations, have seldom been friendly.
This timeline covers the main points of British foreign policy from 1485 to the early 21st century.
This article covers worldwide diplomacy and, more generally, the international relations of the great powers from 1814 to 1919. This era covers the period from the end of the Napoleonic Wars and the Congress of Vienna (1814–1815), to the end of the First World War and the Paris Peace Conference (1919–1920).
The Struggle for Mastery in Europe 1848–1918 is a scholarly history book by the English historian A. J. P. Taylor and was part of "The Oxford History of Modern Europe", published by the Clarendon Press in Oxford in October 1954.
The history of French foreign relations covers French diplomacy and foreign relations down to 1981. For the more recent developments, see foreign relations of France.
The foreign policy of the Russian Empire covers Russian foreign relations from their origins in the policies of the Tsardom of Russia down to the end of the Russian Empire in 1917. Under the system tsarist autocracy, the Emperors/Empresses made all the main decisions in the Russian Empire, so a uniformity of policy and a forcefulness resulted during the long regimes of powerful leaders such as Peter the Great and Catherine the Great. However, several weak tsars also reigned—such as children with a regent in control—and numerous plots and assassinations occurred. With weak rulers or rapid turnovers on the throne, unpredictability and even chaos could result.
The history of German foreign policy covers diplomatic developments and international history since 1871.
Germany entered into World War I on August 1, 1914, when it declared war on Russia. In accordance with its war plan, it ignored Russia and moved first against France–declaring war on August 3 and sending its main armies through Belgium to capture Paris from the north. The German invasion of Belgium caused Britain to declare war on Germany on August 4. Most of the main parties were now at war. In October 1914, Turkey joined the war on Germany's side, becoming part of the Central Powers. Italy, which was allied with Germany and Austria-Hungary before World War I, was neutral in 1914 before switching to the Allied side in May 1915.
The United Kingdom entered World War I on 4 August 1914, when King George V declared war after the expiry of an ultimatum to the German Empire. The official explanation focused on protecting Belgium as a neutral country; the main reason, however, was to prevent a French defeat that would have left Germany in control of Western Europe. The Liberal Party was in power with prime minister H. H. Asquith and foreign minister Edward Grey leading the way. The Liberal cabinet made the decision, although the party had been strongly anti-war until the last minute. The Conservative Party was pro-war. The Liberals knew that if they split on the war issue, they would lose control of the government to the Conservatives.
The Egyptian Lever was an aspect of colonial Anglo-German relations in the late 19th century in which Germany would receive consent for her African colonial ventures from the United Kingdom in exchange for German support of the British occupation of Egypt.
↑ G. W. Monger, "The End of Isolation: Britain, Germany and Japan, 1900-1902" Transactions of the Royal Historical Society vol. 13, 1963, pp. 103–21 online
Asquith, Margot (2014). Brock, Michael; Brock, Eleanor (eds.). Margot Asquith's Great War Diary, 1914–1916: The View from Downing Street. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ISBN978-0-19-873772-8.
Morgan, Roger; Silvestri, Stefano, eds. (1982). Moderates and Conservatives in Western Europe. London: Heinemann Educational Books. ISBN978-0-435-83615-3.
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——— (1974). Britain and the Casus Belli, 1822–1902: A Study of Britain's International Position from Canning to Salisbury. Burns & Oates.
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