USTA v. FCC | |
---|---|
Court | United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit |
Full case name | United States Telecom Association v. Federal Communications Commission and United States of America |
Decided | March 2, 2004 |
Citation | 359 F.3d 554, 561-62 |
Court membership | |
Judges sitting | Harry T. Edwards, A. Raymond Randolph, Senior Circuit Judge Stephen F. Williams |
Keywords | |
United States Telecom Association (USTA) FCC Regional Bell Operating Company ILEC CLEC |
United States Telecom Association v. FCC, 359 F.3d 554 (D.C. Cir., 2004), is the court case in which the Washington, D.C., Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the Federal Communications Commission's Triennial Review Order (TRO). The court's decision is based on the Telecommunications Act of 1996 section 251 which defines unbundled network elements (UNEs) for incumbent local exchange carriers and competitive local exchange carriers. [1]
Following the Court of Appeals' decision the FCC requested that the case be appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States. In June 2004 the solicitor general announced that a request for the Supreme Court to review the case would not be made. As a result of the solicitor general's decision the FCC would issue its Triennial Review Remand Order (TRRO) creating new rules and regulations for unbundled network elements. [2]
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 required local incumbent exchange carriers(ILECs) to maintain the availability of physical network components, or Unbundled Network Element (UNEs), for use by other telecommunication carriers, or Competitive local exchange carriers (CLECs). [3]
The Act gave the FCC the responsibility to decide which network components would maintain availability, measuring with the standard of if "the failure to provide access to such network elements would impair the ability of the telecommunications carrier seeking access to provide the services that it seeks to offer." [4]
In August of that year, the FCC's Report and Order identified seven Unbundled Network Elements and resulted in two unbundling models. The UNEs included:
The UNE-P model consisted of local loop and switching and transportation, and allowed CLECs to enter the market without investing in supporting equipment and facilities. The further Unbundled Network Element -inclusive enhanced extended loop (EEL) model allowed CLECs to serve customers more easily by using their own local and tandem switching equipment. While CLECs and new market entrants said UNE-P helped open the local telecommunications market, ILECs claimed Unbundled Network Element practices served as a heavily discounted resale of their own network elements. [6]
Controversy that lead to the first USTA v. FCC case occurred in FCC's third Report and Order. [7] The order required telecommunications carriers to allow law enforcement agencies access to carriers' individual phone calls and caller information, as outlined the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act of 1994. [8] In court, The FCC stated that it had "exceeded its statutory authority," and agreed to remove certain aspects of the order. [9] The removed portions included the information accessible to law enforcement of custom calling features and dialed telephone numbers during connected phone calls. [9]
The Triennial Remand Order or TRRO was a response to the decision in USTA v. FCC in which the D.C. Circuit Court vacated many of the provisions set forth in the original Triennial Review Order created in 2003. [2] In a 3–2 vote along party lines, FCC Commissioners approved the Triennial Remand Order, which was officially adopted and enacted on February 4, 2005. The Triennial Remand Order among other things discussed high capacity loops, interoffice transport, mass market local circuit switching Unbundled Network Element-P, and unbundled network elements all issues that had been discussed three times prior when trying to fulfill the sharing portion (Section 251) of the 1996 Telecommunications Act. [10] Though it was requested that the TRRO address and grant element access to wireless carriers, the FCC found that no wireless carrier could or would be impaired by not having access to landline network elements or Unbundled Network Elements. [11]
One of the key factors in including high capacity loops in the Triennial Remand Order is the fact that it was one of the few elements that the D.C. Circuit did not vacate in their order in USTA v. FCC. In the TRRO high capacity loops were readdressed and refined by the FCC to the point of saying that CLECs would be impaired without access to DS3 and DS1-capacity loops except in buildings and service areas with more than 60,000 lines. The FCC did make one new exception to the high capacity loop portion and that was that it found CLECs are not at a disadvantage without access to dark fiber loops in any instance and therefore removed that element from the list of things Incumbent local exchange carriers have to share. [12]
Similar to high-capacity loops the FCC in the TRRO reevaluated how interoffice competition could be made possible between CLECs and ILECs. In the revised order the FCC determined that CLECs would only be impaired, a measure in determining access, in cases of DS3 and DS1 capacity loops in businesses that had at least 24,000 business lines. [2] The numbers mentioned in the TRRO were important because the D.C. Circuit vacated many previous provisions by the FCC for lack of clear definitions and specific standards. [13]
When dealing with mass market local circuit switching the Triennial Remand Order and the FCC found that ILECs would no longer have an obligation to provide CLECs unbundled access to these network elements. [2] Mass market local circuit switching, which was considered part of the unbundled network elements platform included the unbundled loop, unbundled local circuit switching, and shared transport. The order to remove Unbundled Network Element platforms from the TRRO either forced many CLECs out of the long-distance market or forced CLECs to design and create their own platforms. [12]
For the first time the FCC used the Triennial Review Order to address the issue of broadband access loops and sharing for CLECs [14] This portion of the order upset many Incumbent local exchange carriers companies as it forced them in certain situations to provide broadband access loop elements [CLECs. Compared to previous FCC rulings that left a lot of decisions to individual state public utility commissions the FCC made a clear framework for the type of cases CLECs would need to present in order to access ILEC broadband access loops and prove that they would be severely impaired without it. [15] These elements today are different as many cable companies that provide broadband access are excluded from having to share their broadband elements and access points; a result of being considered an information service rather than a telecommunications service.
The Triennial Remand Order was the fourth time that the FCC had to rewrite its own rules to fulfill Section 251 of the 1996 Telecommunications Act. [16] In 2006 the D.C. Circuit rejected claims in Covad Communications Company et al. v. FCC, affirming the unbundling and sharing rules made by the FCC in the Triennial Remand Order . [17] The D.C. Circuit and many other courts have since reaffirmed the decision that CLECs have to provide and demonstrate that they would be competitively impaired in order to gain access to any of the remaining unbundled network elements. [18] [ not specific enough to verify ]
On March 2, 2004, the U.S. appeals court ruled that the FCC lacks the authority to delegate responsibility for setting those rates to the states. It ruled that the FCC had failed to prove that competitors in the local phone market are impaired without government regulated access to critical parts of the phone network controlled by the regional giants. [19] Along with upholding the Triennial Review Order's exemption provided to incumbent carriers from unbundling for certain fiber-fed loops and for line sharing. The ruling was unanimous amongst the three judges and stated that the FCC erred by not providing unified federal guidelines, but rather pushing FCC decisions onto the states. [20]
With this ruling in place regional companies believed that the rates set by the government were too low and gave the competition an unfair advantage. A representative of SBC stated that without the regulation they would have still given competitors access to their networks, but at rates set by the market not by the government. Whereas competitors like AT&T Corp and MCI stated that without the regulated rates, they would have to get out of the local phone business in many markets because the regional companies' rates would be too high. [19] In an article by ISP Planet, they described that the courts decision had completely changed the economics of monopolies in these markets. By forcing a regulated price on the companies the monopolistic companies are now unable to make profits because they cannot set their own rates. However this also skews the capitalist market because the rates may not be what the customer is willing to pay or lower. [21]
Local loop unbundling is the regulatory process of allowing multiple telecommunications operators to use connections from a telephone exchange to the customer's location. The physical wire connection between the local exchange and the customer is known as a "local loop" and is owned by the incumbent local exchange carrier. To increase competition, other providers are granted unbundled access.
Digital subscriber line is a family of technologies that are used to transmit digital data over telephone lines. In telecommunications marketing, the term DSL is widely understood to mean asymmetric digital subscriber line (ADSL), the most commonly installed DSL technology, for Internet access.
Enhanced 911 is a system used in North America to automatically provide the caller's location to 911 dispatchers. 911 is the universal emergency telephone number in the region. In the European Union, a similar system exists known as E112 and known as eCall when called by a vehicle.
The telecommunications policy of the United States is a framework of law directed by government and the regulatory commissions, most notably the Federal Communications Commission (FCC). Two landmark acts prevail today, the Communications Act of 1934 and the Telecommunications Act of 1996. The latter was intended to revise the first act and specifically to foster competition in the telecommunications industry.
A competitive local exchange carrier (CLEC), in the United States and Canada, is a telecommunications provider company competing with other, already established carriers, generally the incumbent local exchange carrier (ILEC).
The Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA), also known as the "Digital Telephony Act," is a United States wiretapping law passed in 1994, during the presidency of Bill Clinton.
An incumbent local exchange carrier (ILEC) is a local telephone company which held the regional monopoly on landline service before the market was opened to competitive local exchange carriers, or the corporate successor of such a firm.
Local number portability (LNP) for fixed lines, and full mobile number portability (FMNP) for mobile phone lines, refers to the ability of a "customer of record" of an existing fixed-line or mobile telephone number assigned by a local exchange carrier (LEC) to reassign the number to another carrier, move it to another location, or change the type of service. In most cases, there are limitations to transferability with regards to geography, service area coverage, and technology. Location Portability and Service Portability are not consistently defined or deployed in the telecommunication industry.
A naked DSL, also known as standalone or dry loop DSL, is a digital subscriber line (DSL) without a PSTN service — or the associated dial tone. In other words, only a standalone DSL Internet service is provided on the local loop.
Unbundled network elements (UNEs) are a requirement mandated by the United States Telecommunications Act of 1996. They are the parts of the telecommunications network that the incumbent local exchange carriers (ILECs) are required to offer on an unbundled basis. Together, these parts make up a local loop that connects to a digital subscriber line access multiplexer (DSLAM), a voice switch or both. The loop allows non-facilities-based telecommunications providers to deliver service without having to lay network infrastructure such as copper wire, optical fiber, and coaxial cable.
Unbundled access is an often practiced form of regulation during liberalization, where new entrants of the market (challengers) are offered access to facilities of the incumbent that are hard to duplicate. Its applications are mostly found in network-oriented industries and often concerns the last mile.
In local telephone networks, a loop management system (LMS) is a kind or a part of network management system intended to maximize local loop control. Sometimes it is referred to as local loop management (LLM) or copper loop management (CLM).
Satellite Broadcasting and Communications Association v. FCC, 275 F.3d 337 was a case decided by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. Congress required satellite television carriers to carry all requesting local broadcast stations in the market where the carrier voluntarily decides to carry one local station in order to, in part, preserve a multiplicity of local broadcast outlets for over-the-air-viewers who do not subscribe either to satellite or cable service.
Verizon Communications Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission, 535 U.S. 467 (2002), is a United States Supreme Court case in which Verizon Communications argued that the FCC had an unreasonable way for setting rates for leasing network elements. It held that the FCC can require state commissions to set the rates charged by incumbents for leased elements on a forward-looking basis untied to the incumbents' investment and that the FCC can require incumbents to combine elements of their networks at the request of entrants.
Total element long-run incremental cost (TELRIC) is a calculation method that the United States Federal Communications Commission (FCC) requires incumbent local exchange carriers (ILECs) to use to charge competitive local exchange carriers (CLECs) for interconnection and colocation, effectively imposing a price ceiling. A variant of long-run incremental cost (LRIC), it "measures the forward-looking incremental cost of adding or subtracting a network element" from a hypothetical system. This allows the incumbent to recover a share of the fair value of their inputs in the long run.
The Federal Communications Commission Open Internet Order of 2010 is a set of regulations that move towards the establishment of the internet neutrality concept. Some opponents of net neutrality believe such internet regulation would inhibit innovation by preventing providers from capitalizing on their broadband investments and reinvesting that money into higher quality services for consumers. Supporters of net neutrality argue that the presence of content restrictions by network providers represents a threat to individual expression and the rights of the First Amendment. Open Internet strikes a balance between these two camps by creating a compromised set of regulations that treats all internet traffic in "roughly the same way". In Verizon v. FCC, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit vacated portions of the order that the court determined could only be applied to common carriers.
In the United States, the Federal Communications Commission Computer Inquiries were a trio of interrelated FCC Inquiries focused on problems posed by the convergence of regulated telephony with unregulated computing services. These Computer Inquiries created rules and requirements designed to prevent cross subsidization, discrimination, and anti-competitive behavior from companies such as Bell Operating Companies (BOCs) to enter the enhanced services market.
Verizon Communications Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission, 740 F.3d 623, was a case at the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit vacating portions of the FCC Open Internet Order of 2010, which the court determined could only be applied to common carriers and not to Internet service providers. The case was initiated by Verizon, which would have been subjected to the proposed FCC rules, though they had not yet gone into effect. The case has been regarded as an important precedent on whether the FCC can regulate network neutrality.
United States Telecom Association v. FCC, 825 F. 3d 674, was a case at the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit upholding an action by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) the previous year in which broadband Internet was reclassified as a "telecommunications service" under the Communications Act of 1934, after which Internet service providers (ISPs) were required to follow common carrier regulations.
AT&T Corp. v. City of Portland, 216 F.3d 871, was a court ruling at the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The ruling was an important early precedent on the regulation of local cable broadband networks, with the court finding that Federal Communications Commission regulations supersede those of local authorities.The ruling has also been cited as a precedent in network neutrality disputes.
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