Wassenaar Arrangement

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Participating states of the Wassenaar Arrangement Wassenaar Arrangement members map.svg
Participating states of the Wassenaar Arrangement

The Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies is a multilateral export control regime established on 12 July 1996, in Wassenaar, near The Hague, Netherlands. According to the Wassenaar Arrangement document, it was "established to contribute to regional and international security and stability by promoting transparency and greater responsibility in transfers of conventional arms and dual-use goods and technologies, thus preventing destabilizing accumulations. Participating states seek, through their national policies, to ensure that transfers of these items do not contribute to the development or enhancement of military capabilities which undermine these goals, and are not diverted to support such capabilities". [1]

Contents

It is the successor to the Cold War–era Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (CoCom). The Wassenaar Arrangement is considerably less strict than CoCom, focusing primarily on the transparency of national export control regimes and not granting veto power to individual members over organizational decisions. A Secretariat for administering the agreement is located in Vienna, Austria. Like CoCom, however, it is not a treaty, and therefore is not legally binding. [2]

Every six months member countries exchange information on deliveries of conventional arms to non-Wassenaar members that fall under eight broad weapons categories: battle tanks, armoured fighting vehicles, large-calibre artillery, military aircraft, military helicopters, warships, missiles or missile systems, and small arms and light weapons.

There are 42 participating states including many former Comecon (Warsaw Pact) countries, including Russia. [3]

Control lists

The outline of the arrangement is set out in a document entitled "Guidelines & Procedures, including the Initial Elements". [4] The list of restricted technologies is broken into two parts, the "List of Dual-Use Goods and Technologies" (also known as the Basic List) and the "Munitions List". The Basic List is composed of ten categories based on increasing levels of sophistication:

Basic List has two nested subsections—Sensitive and Very Sensitive. Items of the Very Sensitive List include materials for stealth technologyi.e., equipment that could be used for submarine detection, advanced radar, and jet engine technologies.

Within each of the categories, there are 5 types of controlled item. These are approximately as follows:

The types of item B, C, D and E typically refer to the type A items, but there are many exceptions, e.g. some materials may be controlled, even though there is no specific good referred to.

The Wassenaar Arrangement List's categories are typically processed, and merged with other sources, e.g. Category 5.A.2 maps on to US ECCN 5A002, and EU control classification 5A002.

The Munitions List has 22 categories, which are not labeled.

In order for an item to be placed on the lists, member states must take into account the following criteria:

Admission requirements

Admission requires states to:

The Arrangement is open on a global and non-discriminatory basis to prospective adherents that comply with the agreed criteria. Admission of new members requires the consensus of all members.

India joined as the 42nd participating state on 7 December 2017. "Wassenaar Arrangement participating states reviewed the progress of a number of current membership applications and agreed at the plenary meeting to admit India which will become the Arrangement's 42nd participating state as soon as the necessary procedural arrangements for joining the WA are completed", the grouping said in a statement. [5] [6] India's application was supported by Russia, the United States, France and Germany. [7]

2013 amendments

In December 2013, the list of export restricted technologies was amended to include Internet-based surveillance systems. New technologies placed under the export control regime include "intrusion software"—software designed to defeat a computer or network's protective measures so as to extract data or information—as well as IP network surveillance systems.

The purpose of the amendments was to prevent Western technology companies from selling surveillance technology to governments known to abuse human rights. However, some technology companies have expressed concerns that the scope of the controls may be too broad, limiting security researchers' ability to identify and correct security vulnerabilities. Google and Facebook criticised the agreement for the restrictions it will place on activities like penetration testing, sharing information about threats, and bug bounty programs. [8] [9] They argue that the restrictions will weaken the security of participating nations and do little to curb threats from non-participant nations. [10] [11]

"Wassenaar minus one"

During 2022 and 2023, a variety of proposals for modification to the listed items were proposed within Wassenaar, but were not accepted. [12] Several states made unilateral legislation, rather than obtaining harmonisation through the Arrangement, including: [13]

The corresponding proposals within WA were not accepted, due to objection from the Russian delegation. [14] Only minor and editorial changes were universally accepted. At the time, Russia faced international sanctions over its invasion of Ukraine.

Consequently in mid 2024 and later, many Wassenaar nations have implemented export controls corresponding to the unliateral legislation above. These include UK [15] and Canada. [16] These are classified as 'country specific', although there appears to he harmonisation of these 2024 controls across many advanced economies. The introduction of these controls caused surprise in some circles. [17] [18] Other nations largely harmonised their export controls over the course of 2024 and early 2025.

Membership

The 42 states that have been participating since December 2017 are: [19]

Flag of Europe.svgEuropean Union member state. Flag of NATO.svgNATO member.


Candidates

Chile

Chile has been candidate for Nuclear Suppliers Group and Wassenaar Arrangement since 2015 as part of its national commitments with the UNSC resolution 1540 of 2004. In its 2017 report to UN about prevention of arms proliferation has presented a National Plan of Action (2017-2021) that includes as targets membership to the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Wassenaar Arrangement by 2021. [20]

See also

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References

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  2. "The Wassenaar Arrangement at a Glance | Arms Control Association".
  3. "Wassenaar Arrangement | Nuclear Threat Initiative".
  4. "Guidelines & Procedures, including the Initial Elements" (PDF). Public Documents. Vol. 1: Founding Documents. Wassenaar Arrangement. December 2016. Retrieved 6 April 2023.
  5. Falconi, Jean-Louis (7 December 2017). "Statement Issued by the Plenary Chair on 2017 Outcomes of the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies" (PDF). Wassenaar Arrangement. Archived (PDF) from the original on 6 March 2019. Retrieved 7 December 2017.
  6. "Wassenaar Arrangement decides to make India its member". The Hindu. Press Trust of India. 8 December 2017. Retrieved 6 April 2023.
  7. "India becomes member of key export control regime". Business Standard. Indo-Asian News Service. 8 December 2017. Retrieved 6 April 2023.
  8. Brandom, Russell (20 July 2015). "Google says controversial export proposal would make the world 'less secure'". The Verge. Retrieved 30 July 2015.
  9. "Wassenaar rules are not the right direction". Facebook Public Affairs. 28 July 2015. Retrieved 30 July 2015 via Facebook.
  10. Bennett, Cory (21 July 2015). "Cyber industry assails anti-hacking regulations". The Hill. Retrieved 30 July 2015.
  11. Brandom, Russell (22 May 2015). "The international rules that have the security world on alert". The Verge. Retrieved 30 July 2015.
  12. Shivakumar, Sujai; Wessner, Charles; Tomoshige, Hideki (10 January 2023). "Toward a New Multilateral Export Control Regime" . Retrieved 9 December 2024.
  13. "International Unilateral Export Controls—An Increased Focus on Advanced Technologies". Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP - International Unilateral Export Controls—An Increased Focus on Advanced Technologies. Retrieved 9 December 2024.
  14. "US, allies explore Russia's exclusion from Wassenaar export control regime". WorldECR. Retrieved 9 December 2024.
  15. "NTE 2024/06: updates to UK strategic export list". GOV.UK.
  16. Government of Canada, Public Works and Government Services Canada (19 June 2024). "Canada Gazette, Part 2, Volume 158, Number 13: Order Amending the Export Control List". gazette.gc.ca. Retrieved 7 July 2024.
  17. Sparkes, Matthew (3 July 2024). "Multiple nations enact mysterious export controls on quantum computers". New Scientist. Retrieved 7 July 2024.
  18. Grimm, Dallin (6 July 2024). "Mysterious quantum computing restrictions spread across multiple nations — UK cites national security risks and refuses to elaborate". Tom's Hardware. Retrieved 7 July 2024.
  19. "Participating States". Wassenaar Arrangement. Archived from the original on 27 May 2012. Retrieved 6 April 2023.
  20. https://www.un.org/en/sc/1540/documents/chile_action_plan.pdf