Abbreviation | NSG |
---|---|
Formation | 1974 |
Type | International organization |
Purpose | Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons; Controlling transfer of nuclear energy |
Membership | See list |
Official languages | English, French, German, Spanish |
Chair | Claudia Santos (Brazil) |
Affiliations | International Atomic Energy Agency |
Website | nuclearsuppliersgroup |
The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) is a multilateral export control regime and a group of nuclear supplier countries that seek to contribute to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons through the implementation of two sets of Guidelines for nuclear exports and nuclear-related exports. [1]
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The NSG was founded in response to the Indian nuclear test in May 1974 [2] and first met in November 1975. The test demonstrated that certain non-weapons specific nuclear technology could be readily turned to weapons development. Nations already signatories of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) saw the need to further limit the export of nuclear equipment, materials or technology. Another benefit was that non-NPT and non-Zangger Committee nations, then specifically France, could be brought in.
A series of meetings in London from 1975 to 1978 resulted in agreements on the guidelines for export; these were published as INFCIRC/254 (essentially the Zangger "Trigger List") by the International Atomic Energy Agency. Listed items could only be exported to non-nuclear states if certain International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards were agreed to or if exceptional circumstances relating to safety existed.
The name of the "London Club" was due to the series of meetings in London. It has also been referred to as the London Group, or the London Suppliers Group.
The NSG did not meet again until 1991. The "Trigger List" remained unchanged until 1991, although the Zangger list was regularly updated. The revelations about the Iraqi weapons program following the first Gulf War led to a tightening of the export of so-called dual-use equipment. At the first meeting since 1978, held at the Hague in March 1991, the twenty-six participating governments agreed to the changes, which were published as the "Dual-use List" in 1992, and also to the extension of the original list to more closely match the up-to-date Zangger list.
Initially the NSG had seven participating governments: Canada, West Germany, France, Japan, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States. In 1976-77, participation was expanded to fifteen with the admittance of Belgium, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Sweden, and Switzerland. Germany was reunited in 1990 while Czechoslovakia broke up into the Czech Republic and Slovakia in 1993. Twelve more nations joined up to 1990. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union a number of former republics were given observer status as a stage towards future membership. China became a participating government in 2004. The European Commission and the Zangger Committee Chair participate as observers. The NSG Chair for 2024 - 2025 is South Africa. [3]
As of 2022 [update] , the NSG has 48 participating governments, and their accession date: [4]
During a state visit to India in November 2010, U.S. President Barack Obama announced U.S. support for India's participation in the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Wassenaar Arrangement, the Australia Group and the Missile Technology Control Regime, "in a phased manner," and to encourage the evolution of regime participation criteria to that end, "consistent with maintaining the core principles of these regimes." [6] [7] [8]
During a visit to India in December 2010, French President Sarkozy also expressed his country's backing for India's inclusion in Nuclear Suppliers Group. [9] The United Kingdom has for a long time been a supporter of India's inclusion in the Nuclear Suppliers Group. [10] During Republic Day visit of India in January 2015, Obama said that India was ready for NSG membership. [11] Russian president Vladimir Putin has also offered unconditional support to India's entry into NSG. [12]
Switzerland also announced its backing on India's participation in 48 member group on 6 June 2016 during PM Modi's visit to Geneva, [13] President Obama reiterated U.S. support for India's NSG membership on 8 June 2016 during PM Modi's visit to Washington DC. [14] Japan has expressed support for India's bid for accession to the NSG. [15]
However, China is opposing India's accession citing Pakistan's non-admission in the exclusive group. [16] Other countries opposing Indian membership of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) on the basis of NPT non-signatory status of India included New Zealand, Ireland and Austria. [16]
In June 2016, India got crucial support from Mexico in its bid to become a participant of the NSG ahead of a plenary meeting of the 48-nation bloc whose members are allowed to trade in and export nuclear technology. [17] On 17 June, British Prime Minister David Cameron had assured Prime Minister Narendra Modi of the UK's "firm support" for India's NSG membership bid. [18] In an interview on 18 June, Russian President Vladimir Putin said that he was 'positive' about India's entry into NSG. [19] On 20 June, Canada stated that NSG will be strengthened with India's presence. [20] On 22 June France reiterated its support to India, and urged all the other 48 members of the NSG to allow entry for India into the atomic control body. [21] China remains opposed to Indian membership. [22]
In July 2016, South Africa agreed to back India's entry into the NSG. [23] In August 2016, Turkey confirmed support for India's NSG membership bid. [24] On 4 September 2016, Australia reiterated its commitment to India's bid for membership of the Nuclear Suppliers Group just ahead of the G20 summit in Hangzhou, China. [25] On 5 September 2016, Prime Minister Narendra Modi thanked Argentina for backing India's bid. [26]
On 17 October 2016, following the BRICS summit in Benaulim, Goa, Brazil officially backed India's bid for NSG membership. [27] [28] [29] On 26 October 2016, Prime Minister Key of New Zealand stated that "New Zealand would continue to contribute constructively to the process currently underway in the NSG to consider India’s membership." [30] Poland and Cyprus backed India's NSG bid in April 2017. Germany reaffirmed India's NSG membership bid in May 2017. [31] Switzerland also showed support for India's NSG bid. The Swiss Foreign Ministry spokesperson Pierre-Alain Eltschinger said that “We support India’s application for participation in the NSG and acknowledge India’s support to global non-proliferation efforts.” [32] During the 15th RIC (Russia, India, China) foreign ministerial meeting Russia has said it continues to support India’s entry into the exclusive Nuclear Suppliers’ Group. [33] Describing India as a leading power in the Indo-Pacific region, Washington's envoy to New Delhi, Kenneth Juster reaffirmed support for India’s NSG bid in January 2018. [34] In the joint press statement of India-Nordic countries summit, The Nordic countries welcomed India’s application for membership of the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group and reaffirmed their commitment to work constructively within the Group with the aim of reaching a positive outcome at the earliest opportunity in April 2018. [35] On 16 April 2018 Germany supported India's bid for NSG membership saying that India's inclusion into the NSG will boost the global export control system. [36] Reaffirming their commitment to global non-proliferation efforts, PM Conte reiterated Italy's support to India's intensified engagement for admission into the Nuclear Suppliers' Group (NSG) in Oct 2018 during the 24th edition of the India-Italy Technology Summit. [37]
As of 2019, China has thwarted every attempt of India's inclusion into NSG and has made it clear that status quo will remain citing "lack of consensus" among NSG members. [38]
Pakistan applied for participation on 19 May 2016. [39] Pakistan has stressed the need for NSG to adopt a non-discriminatory criteria-based approach for NSG membership of the countries, which have never been party to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). [40]
Pakistan is supported by Turkey and China. [41] Pakistan has launched a major lobbying campaign to get additional support on its NSG membership. [42] [43] The US has not publicly opposed Pakistan, the US State Department's Spokesperson Mark Toner commented in May 2016: “They have made public their interest, and certainly any country can submit its application for membership. And we’ll consider [it] based on a consensus decision.” [44] Subsequently, NSG initiated discussions on the ‘Technical, Legal, and Political aspects of participation of non-NPT states in the NSG’ in the Seoul Plenary in June 2017. [45] China has also tied Indian bid to Pakistani bid, blocking the former's entry repeatedly based on the argument that If India can be let in without signing NPT, then Pakistan should be granted membership as well. [46]
In 2004, the illicit procurement network run by Pakistani scientist AQ Khan, who led Pakistan's uranium enrichment program, was exposed. This network trafficked in nuclear and dual-use goods and supported nuclear weapons programs in Iran, Libya and North Korea as well as Pakistan itself, and included individuals and entities from over 30 countries. [47] In 2004, Pakistan also promulgated an Export Control Act on Goods, Technologies, Materials and Equipment related to Nuclear and Biological Weapons and their Delivery Systems and published Export Control Lists in 2005, which have been frequently updated. [48] The United States on 26 March 2018 sanctioned seven Pakistani firms for nuclear proliferation, potentially hurting its ambitions of NSG membership. [49]
Chile has been candidate for the Nuclear Suppliers Group since 2015 as part of its national commitments with the UNSC resolution 1540 of 2004. In its 2017 report to UN about prevention of arms proliferation has presented a National Plan of Action (2017-2021) that includes as targets membership to the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Wassenaar Arrangement. [53]
In July 2006, the United States Congress amended U.S. law to accommodate civilian nuclear trade with India. A meeting of NSG participating governments on 21–22 August 2008 on an India-specific exemption to the Guidelines [54] was inconclusive. Several participating governments, including Austria, Switzerland, Norway, Ireland, and New Zealand, expressed reservations about the lack of conditions in the proposed exemption. [55] In another meeting on 6 September 2008, the NSG participating governments agreed to grant India a "clean waiver" from its existing rules, which forbid nuclear trade with a country which has not signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The NSG's decision came after three days of intense U.S. diplomacy. [56] The approval was based on a formal pledge by India stating that it would not share sensitive nuclear technology or material with others and would uphold its voluntary moratorium on testing nuclear weapons. The pledge was contained in a crucial statement issued during the NSG meeting by India outlining the country's disarmament and nonproliferation policies. [1]
The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, commonly known as the Non-Proliferation Treaty or NPT, is an international treaty whose objective is to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons technology, to promote cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and to further the goal of achieving nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament. Between 1965 and 1968, the treaty was negotiated by the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament, a United Nations-sponsored organization based in Geneva, Switzerland.
Nuclear proliferation is the spread of nuclear weapons, fissionable material, and weapons-applicable nuclear technology and information to nations not recognized as "Nuclear Weapon States" by the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, commonly known as the Non-Proliferation Treaty or NPT. Proliferation has been opposed by many nations with and without nuclear weapons, as governments fear that more countries with nuclear weapons will increase the possibility of nuclear warfare, de-stabilize international or regional relations, or infringe upon the national sovereignty of nation states.
Smiling Buddha was the code name of India's first successful nuclear weapon test on 18 May 1974. The nuclear fission type bomb was detonated in the Pokhran Test Range of the Indian Army in Rajasthan. As per the United States military intelligence, the operation was named as Happy Krishna. The Indian Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) described the test as a peaceful nuclear explosion.
The Zangger Committee, also known as the Nuclear Exporters Committee, sprang from Article III.2 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) which entered into force on March 5, 1970. Under the terms of Article III.2 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards must be applied to nuclear exports.
India possesses nuclear weapons and previously developed chemical weapons. Although India has not released any official statements about the size of its nuclear arsenal, recent estimates suggest that India has 172 nuclear weapons and has produced enough weapons-grade plutonium for up to 200 nuclear weapons. In 1999, India was estimated to have 800 kilograms (1,800 lb) of separated reactor-grade plutonium, with a total amount of 8,300 kilograms (18,300 lb) of civilian plutonium, enough for approximately 1,000 nuclear weapons. India has conducted nuclear weapons tests in a pair of series namely Pokhran I and Pokhran II.
The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) is a multilateral export control regime. It is an informal political understanding among 35 member states that seek to limit the proliferation of missiles and missile technology. The regime was formed in 1987 by the G-7 industrialized countries. The MTCR seeks to limit the risks of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) by controlling exports of goods and technologies that could make a contribution to delivery systems for such weapons. In this context, the MTCR places particular focus on rockets and unmanned aerial vehicles capable of delivering a payload of at least 500 kilograms (1,100 lb) to a range of at least 300 kilometres (190 mi) and on equipment, software, and technology for such systems.
Nuclear sharing is a concept in NATO's policy of nuclear deterrence, which allows member countries without nuclear weapons of their own to participate in the planning for the use of nuclear weapons by NATO. In particular, it provides for involvement of the armed forces of those countries in delivering nuclear weapons in the event of their use.
Pokhran-II was a series of five nuclear weapon tests conducted by India in May 1998. The bombs were detonated at the Indian Army's Pokhran Test Range in Rajasthan. It was the second instance of nuclear testing conducted by India, after the first test, code-named Smiling Buddha, was conducted in May 1974.
The 123 Agreement signed between the United States of America and India is known as the U.S.–India Civil Nuclear Agreement or Indo-US nuclear deal. The framework for this agreement was a July 18, 2005, joint statement by then Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and then U.S. President George W. Bush, under which India agreed to separate its civil and military nuclear facilities and to place all its civil nuclear facilities under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards and, in exchange, the United States agreed to work toward full civil nuclear cooperation with India. This U.S.-India deal took more than three years to come to fruition as it had to go through several complex stages, including amendment of U.S. domestic law, especially the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, a civil-military nuclear Separation Plan in India, an India-IAEA safeguards (inspections) agreement and the grant of an exemption for India by the Nuclear Suppliers Group, an export-control cartel that had been formed mainly in response to India's first nuclear test in 1974. In its final shape, the deal places under permanent safeguards those nuclear facilities that India has identified as "civil" and permits broad civil nuclear cooperation, while excluding the transfer of "sensitive" equipment and technologies, including civil enrichment and reprocessing items even under IAEA safeguards. On August 18, 2008, the IAEA Board of Governors approved, and on February 2, 2009, India signed an India-specific safeguards agreement with the IAEA. After India brought this agreement into force, inspections began in a phased manner on the 35 civilian nuclear installations India has identified in its Separation Plan. The deal is seen as a watershed in U.S.-India relations and introduces a new aspect to international nonproliferation efforts. On August 1, 2008, the IAEA approved the safeguards agreement with India, after which the United States approached the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) to grant a waiver to India to commence civilian nuclear trade. The 48-nation NSG granted the waiver to India on September 6, 2008, allowing it to access civilian nuclear technology and fuel from other countries. The implementation of this waiver made India the only known country with nuclear weapons which is not a party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) but is still allowed to carry out nuclear commerce with the rest of the world.
In Pakistan, nuclear power is provided by six commercial nuclear power plants with a net capacity of 3,262 megawatts (3.262 GW) from pressurized water reactors. In 2020, Pakistan's nuclear power plants produced a total of 133 terawatt-hours of electricity, which accounted for roughly 10% of the nation's total electric energy generation.
Relations between India and the United States date back to India's independence movement and have continued well after independence from the United Kingdom in 1947. Currently, India and the United States enjoy close relations and have deepened collaboration on issues such as counterterrorism and countering Chinese influence in the Indo-Pacific.
Trigger list in its most general meaning refers to a list whose items are used to initiate ("trigger") certain actions.
A multilateral export control regime is an informal group of like-minded supplier countries that seek to contribute to the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, delivery systems, and advanced conventional weapons through national implementation of guidelines and control lists for exports. For a chart of national membership in different regimes, see the SIPRI Yearbook chapter on "Transfer controls".
United Nations Security Council resolution 1172, adopted unanimously on 6 June 1998, after hearing of nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan in May 1998, the Council condemned the tests and demanded that both countries refrain from engaging in further tests.
India was among the charter members of the United Nations that signed the Declaration by United Nations at Washington, D.C., on 1 January 1942 and also participated in the United Nations Conference on International Organization at San Francisco from 25 April to 26 June 1945. As a founding member of the United Nations, India strongly supports the purposes and principles of the UN and has made significant contributions in implementing the goals of the Charter, and the evolution of the UN's specialised programmes and agencies.
The 2010 Review Conference for the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) was held at United Nations Headquarters in New York City from 3 to 28 May 2010. The President of the Review Conference is Ambassador Libran N. Cabactulan of the Philippines. UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon used the opening of the conference to note that "sixty five years later, the world still lives under the nuclear shadow".
The 2016 BRICS summit was the eighth annual BRICS summit, an international relations conference attended by the heads of country or heads of government of the five member countries Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. The summit was held from 15 to 16 October 2016 at the Taj Exotica hotel in Benaulim, Goa, India. India holds the chair of the BRICS from February 2016 to December 2016.
India–Switzerland relations or the Indo–Swiss relations are the bilateral relations between the Republic of India and the Swiss Confederation.
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