Battle of Dul Madoba

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Battle of Dul Madoba
Part of the Dervish War
Engelse kameelruiters - English camel troopers.jpg
British camel troopers in 1913, between Berbera and Odweyne in British Somaliland.
Date9 August 1913;113 years ago (9 August 1913)
Location
Dul Madoba, British Somaliland
Result Dervish victory
Belligerents
Flag of British Somaliland (1903-1950).svg British Somaliland Flag of the Taleh-based Dervish State 2.png Dervish State
Commanders and leaders
Flag of British Somaliland (1903-1950).svg Richard Corfield   †
Flag of British Somaliland (1903-1950).svg Gerald Henry Summers  (DOW)		Flag of the Taleh-based Dervish State 2.png Ismail Mire [1]
Strength
110 Somaliland Camel Constabulary
Accompanying forces:
2,000 riflemen
600 spearmen
150 horsemen		 2,000 fighters
Casualties and losses
35 killed
10 died en route
21 wounded
24 deserted
Pro-British forces flee
Livestock losses:
5,000-6,000 camels
20,000-30,000 sheep		 200-395 killed

The Battle of Dul Madoba was an engagement between British forces and the Dervish State on 9 August 1913. The British suffered repeated attacks losing nearly half their force including the commander Richard Corfield. [2] Although the Dervishes eventually withdrew from the battlefield, they retained the livestock they had seized from British-protected tribes, preventing the British expedition from recovering it. The defeat forced the British withdrawal from Burao, which was subsequently sacked by the Dervishes, and dealt a significant blow to British prestige in Somaliland.

Contents

Background

During the early twentieth century, British attempts to defeat the Dervishes, led by Sayyid Mohammed Hassan, had failed to establish lasting control over the Somali interior. Following several unsuccessful military expeditions, the British government adopted a policy in 1910 of concentrating its administration and military forces along the coastal ports of Zeila, Berbera and Bulhar, withdrawing from all inland positions. [3] This reduced the British military presence in the interior, where the Dervishes continued to conduct raids and expand their influence. [4] [5]

In 1911, the Dervishes conducted raids against the Majeerteen in Italian Somaliland, who counterattacked with the assistance of the Warsangeli. By the end of the year, the Dervishes had been driven into British Somaliland, where they launched further operations against the Dhulbahante, who had renewed their allegiance to the British. The Dervishes seized Dhulbahante livestock and moved into the pastures of the Nugaal Valley, while reports reaching the British authorities indicated that previously neutral tribes were increasingly coming under the Sayyid's influence. [6] In November 1911, the Dervishes successfully attacked the Dhulbahante holding the former British outpost at Bohotle. Although the Dhulbahante repelled another Dervish attack at Eil Dab in January 1912, the Dervishes inflicted a severe defeat on them the following month, capturing their livestock and leaving the affected communities facing starvation. [7] [8]

In response to continued Dervish activity in the interior, the British established the Somaliland Camel Constabulary in 1912 under Richard Corfield. The force was tasked with protecting the British-allied tribes, maintaining security along important routes and countering Dervish raids. Its operations were initially restricted to an area around Berbera, but were later extended towards Burao and Ber. Corfield was nevertheless instructed to avoid engagements with large Dervish forces. [9]

Battle

Dul Madoba is a ridge some 25 miles (40 km) southeast of Burao, in what was then British Somaliland. On 8 August 1913, following reports of Dervish raids against British-allied tribes and the seizure of large numbers of livestock, Richard Corfield set out from Burao with the Somaliland Camel Constabulary to intercept the raiders. Although Governor Geoffrey Archer had authorized a reconnaissance, Corfield had been instructed not to engage the Dervishes. The Governor had asked Gerald Henry Summers to accompany him, likely to restrain Corfield from engaging the Dervishes. [10] The expedition was joined along its route by 600 spearmen, 150 horsemen and 2,000 riflemen from pro-British tribes. [11] [12] Approximately 300 Dhulbahante tribesmen also accompanied the force in an attempt to recover their captured livestock. [13] [14]

Summers, who was severely wounded. Gerald Henry Summers.png
Summers, who was severely wounded.

On the evening of 8 August, the Constabulary camped near Oodweyne, where Dervish campfires could be seen in the distance. Summers advised withdrawal, but Corfield decided to continue the operation. The following morning, the British-led force encountered approximately 2,000 Dervish fighters, among whose commanders was Ismail Mire. [15] [16] The Dervishes advanced rapidly towards Dul Madoba, catching the Constabulary in dense bush before it could form a defensive square. When fighting began at approximately 6:50 a.m., the 300 Dhulbahante tribesmen positioned on the British left flank fled, exposing the Constabulary's position and depriving it of ammunition supplies. [17] [18] [19]

The Dervishes launched successive attacks against the Constabulary, overwhelming its defensive positions. The Maxim gun was disabled during the fighting, and Corfield was shot in the head and killed. Although seriously wounded, Summers, together with Cecil de Sivrac Dunn, organized the surviving Constabulary behind the bodies of dead camels. The Dervishes repeatedly attacked their position, with some fighters penetrating the defences and attempting to capture the Maxim gun. After five hours of pitched fighting, the Dervishes finally withdrew, as their ammunition ran out while also leaving the Constabulary severely depleted. [20] British losses consisted of 35 men killed, including 10 who perished on the way, approximately 20 wounded, and some 20 others who deserted, [21] [22] while estimates of Dervish fatalities range from below 200 to around 395. [23] [24] Despite their losses, the Dervishes retained the captured livestock estimated at 5,000-6,000 camels and 20,000-30,000 sheep, defeating the British expedition and crushing its objective of recovering the herds. [25] [26]

A firsthand descriptive account of the battle is found in the poem Annagoo Taleex naal by Ismail Mire, the commander of the battle. [27] [28]

Aftermath

The defeat at Dul Madoba marked a major setback for British authority in Somaliland. The expedition failed to achieve either of its objectives: preventing the Dervishes from escaping with the captured livestock and restoring British prestige. The Dervishes escaped with the captured livestock, although estimates of its size vary. Douglas Jardine estimated that the Dervishes carried away 5,000–6,000 camels and 20,000–30,000 sheep, [29] while Raymond Beachey recorded a herd containing approximately 25,000 camels. [30] Douglas Jardine later acknowledged that "In both these objects we failed lamentably", describing the withdrawal as another damaging blow to British prestige. [31]

The British withdrawal left Burao, which had served as the Somaliland Camel Constabulary's base, exposed to further Dervish operations. [32] On 5 September 1913, a force of Dervish horsemen sacked Burao and razed the British station to the ground. It was the first time the Dervishes had penetrated as far as Burao since 1900. [33] [34] Douglas Jardine regarded possession of Burao as the key to controlling Somaliland, emphasizing its strategic importance in the interior. [35] The Dervishes subsequently operated from Mount Shimbiris, where they established a fortified position. The loss of Burao further undermined British authority and alarmed tribes allied with the administration. [36]

The scale of the defeat also drew criticism from the British government. In a statement presented to the House of Commons in February 1914, the Acting Commissioner described the engagement as a "severe set-back" that had resulted in a "politically disastrous withdrawal from Burao". [37] Colonial Secretary Lewis Harcourt likewise characterized the battle as an "ill-advised and disastrous action", attributing responsibility to Corfield's disregard of orders not to engage the Dervishes. [38] The victory strengthened the prestige of Sayyid Mohammed Hassan and the Dervish movement, while exposing the limitations of British attempts to maintain control over the Somali interior.

See also

References

  1. ↑ Samatar, Said (1982). Oral Poetry and Somali Nationalism. London: Cambridge University Press. p. 175. ISBN   9780521238335. Dervish raiding party at Dulmadooba near Oodweyne on 9 August 1913. Although the constabulary fought courageously, they were overwhelmed and savagely cut up, Corfield being killed in action. The Dervishes sustained considerable losses but proudly carried off the looted stock and Corfield's severed arm as a war trophy. On arrival at the harun, Ismaa'iil Mire, one of the commanders of the raid, composed a gabay, the second in the series, 'Residing in Taleeh', celebrating the success which attended his operation
  2. ↑ Xasan, Sayid Maxamad Cabdille; Ciise, Jaamac Cumar (2005). Taariikhdii daraawiishta iyo (in Somali). p. 275.
  3. ↑ Vitturini, Elia (2023). The Gaboye of Somaliland: The Historical Process of Emancipation and Marginalisation. Milano: Ledizioni. ISBN   9788855269810. The British withdrawal to the coastal towns of Zeyla, Berbera and Bullhar occurred, finally, between 1910 and 1913. According to the historian Brock Millman (2013, p. 17), "protected tribes were armed and advised to defend themselves".
  4. ↑ Labahn, Thomas (1984). Proceedings of the Second International Congress of Somali Studies. Vol. II: Archaeology and History. University of Hamburg: Helmut Buske Verlag. pp. 204–205. ISBN   3871186929.
  5. ↑ Olmstead, Justin Quinn (2019). Britain in the Islamic World: Imperial and Post-Imperial Connections. University of Central Oklahoma: Springer Nature. p. 133. ISBN   9783030245092. Eventually, this scheme was as adopted after Churchill had left the Colonial Office, though it was not until March 1910 that the orders came to withdrawal from the interior of the country and hold the coast, as Churchill had advocated. However, the plan proved to be a total failure and was characterized by historian Ronald Hyam as 'melancholy and even catastrophic.
  6. ↑ Laurence, Margaret (2003). Heart of a Stranger. Edmonton: University of Alberta Press. p. 43. ISBN   0888644078. In 1910, in the British House of Commons, the government soothingly stated that the power of the Mad Mullah was now completely broken. But in 1911, Mahammed 'Abdille Hasan attacked the Dolbahanta, took their stock, and moved again into the pasture lands of the Nogal Valley. Tales reached the British in Berbera that the Sayyid was becoming more ruthless with the dissenting tribes, that he was mutilating prisoners, and that the few remaining neutral tribes of the interior, whether out of belief in his goals or fear of his strength, were fast coming under his control.
  7. ↑ Hess, Robert L. (1966). Italian Colonialism, In Somalia. United States: The Univesity Of Chicago Press. p. 142. In the first half of 1911, the dervishes maintained a steady series of raids against the Mijjertein Somali, who were able to launch a counterattack with the aid of their Warsangeli allies in June. By the end of the year Muhammad Abdullah and his followers were cut off from arms and ammunition ordinarily smuggled in from the coast and were driven out of Italian Somalia into British Somaliland; with great cruelty, they occupied Bohotleh and oppressed the Dolbahanta, who had shifted their allegiance back to the British.
  8. ↑ Jardine, Douglas (1923). The Mad Mullah of Somaliland. London: Herbert Jenkins Limited. p. 199. But it was not until November, 1911, that a further move was made and a successful attack launched against the Dolbahanta who held the old Government outpost at Bohotle. In the following January, the Dolbahanta strongly repulsed a Dervish force which attacked them at Eil Dab. But in February retribution followed, and the Dolbahanta sections concerned suffered a disastrous defeat in which they lost all their stock and were reduced to a state of starvation.
  9. ↑ Colonial Office, Great Britain (1956). Somaliland Protectorate: Report. London: H.M. Stationery Office. p. 52. In 1913, a Camel Constabulary of 150 men with a British Commander (Mr. Richard Corfield) was formed to protect caravan routes into Berbera and to attempt to restore order among the friendly tribes. This force was not intended to engage the dervishes, or to infringe the principle of coastal concentration;
  10. ↑ Labahn, Thomas (1984). Proceedings of the Second International Congress of Somali Studies. Vol. II: Archaeology and History. University of Hamburg: Helmut Buske Verlag. p. 210. ISBN   3871186929. On June 12, Corfield, then in Burao, received a report to the effect that a large Dervish force was harassing people in the Ain Valley, beyond the prescribed operational zone. In utter disregard of the official policy Corfield set out in pursuit of the Dervishes with the in-tention of attacking them. The governor was forced to warn Corfield [...]. Archer's reminder to Corfield to stick to the official policy apparently made no impact on the latter. Only two months later he led the camel corps to its destruction at Dul Madoba. On August 8, Corfield received reports that a big Dervish force was raiding to the south of Burao, as far as Idoweyna.
  11. ↑ Beachey, Raymond Wendell (1990). The Warrior Mullah: The Horn Aflame, 1892-1920. London: Bellew Publishing. p. 96. ISBN   0947792430. The Camel Corps made an impressive sight when it moved out of Burao on the afternoon of 8 August 1913, with Corfield and assistant officers in the lead, and followed by a contingent of 110 mounted camelry and pony men, all armed with single-loading M. H. carbines and a full number of rounds in each man's belt and a goodly reserve in their saddle bags. They carried also a precious Maxim With 4,000 rounds of ammunition packed in cork-lined tin boxes. In addition the 150 followers could muster between them a dozen or so rifles and 10,000 rounds of ammunition. This compact force was joined en route by 600 spearmen and 2,000 riflemen from pro-British tribes. The overall impression was one of vigour and purpose.
  12. ↑ Labahn, Thomas (1984). Proceedings of the Second International Congress of Somali Studies. Vol. II: Archaeology and History. University of Hamburg: Helmut Buske Verlag. p. 211. ISBN   3871186929. Archer asked Gerald Summers, commanding officer of the 6th Battalion K.A.R., to accompany the camel corps, the idea being, presumably, that he would restrain Corfield from taking any rash action. [...] They were armed with 140 rifles, 8200 rounds of ammunition and 1 maxim gun. They were joined en route by 600 spearmen, 150 horsemen and 2000 riflemen.
  13. ↑ Beachey, Raymond Wendell (1990). The Warrior Mullah: The Horn Aflame, 1892-1920. London: Bellew Publishing. p. 97. ISBN   0947792430. A sudden whispered warning from the sentries set the whole camp alert. Muttered assurance soon came, however. It was only a force of some 300 Dolbahanta wishing to join them, intent on recovering their looted stock.
  14. ↑ Jardine, Douglas James (1923). The Mad Mullah of Somaliland. London: Herbert Jenkins Limited. p. 222. The Constabulary were joined by some 300 Dolbahanta who were anxious to recover their lost stock from the Dervishes; and some ammunition from the precious reserve was distributed to them.
  15. ↑ Labahn, Thomas (1984). Proceedings of the Second International Congress of Somali Studies. Vol. II: Archaeology and History. University of Hamburg: Helmut Buske Verlag. pp. 211–212. ISBN   3871186929. On the evening of August 8, the camel corps camped near Idoweyna and from here they could see Dervish camp fires a few miles away. Summers proposed withdrawal but Corfield brushed aside the idea. On the following morning the Dervishes started to move towards the Dul Madoba Hill, with the stock they had seized. Corfield decided to cut the Dervish line of retreat and a fierce exchange of fire erupted between the camel corps and the 2000 or so Dervishes.
  16. ↑ Samatar, Said (1982). Oral Poetry and Somali Nationalism. London: Cambridge University Press. p. 175. ISBN   9780521238335. Dervish raiding party at Dulmadooba near Oodweyne on 9 August 1913. Although the constabulary fought courageously, they were overwhelmed and savagely cut up, Corfield being killed in action. The Dervishes sustained considerable losses but proudly carried off the looted stock and Corfield's severed arm as a war trophy. On arrival at the harun, Ismaa'iil Mire, one of the commanders of the raid, composed a gabay, the second in the series, 'Residing in Taleeh', celebrating the success which attended his operation
  17. ↑ Beachey, Raymond Wendell (1990). The Warrior Mullah: The Horn Aflame, 1892-1920. London: Bellew Publishing. p. 98. ISBN   0947792430. At the first shot the mercurial Dolbahanta fled incontinently, carrying with them the precious supplies of ammunition. No surprise ambush could have been more disastrous. It was still early morning 7.00 am and light was obscure in the thick bush and amid raised clouds of dust.
  18. ↑ Jardine, Douglas James (1923). The Mad Mullah of Somaliland. London: Herbert Jenkins Limited. p. 224. The action commenced at 6.50 a.m. The Dervish attacks may be said to have been delivered in spasms. At the first shot the 300 Dolbahanta tribesmen on the extreme left flank broke and fled, seeking safety in the dense bush to the rear, and were seen no more until the fight was over.
  19. ↑ Labahn, Thomas (1984). Proceedings of the Second International Congress of Somali Studies. Vol. II: Archaeology and History. University of Hamburg: Helmut Buske Verlag. p. 212. ISBN   3871186929. The pro-British tribes who had volunteered support for the camel corps took to their heels on hearing of the first shoots; shortly afterwards the maxim gun was silenced by rifle fire, and Corfield was shot dead through the head.
  20. ↑ Jardine, Douglas (1923). The Mad Mullah of Somaliland. London: Herbert Jenkins Limited. p. 226. The action lasted a little over five hours. Soon after midday, the Dervishes withdrew for the last time, their ammunition being exhausted, and the defenders were left in the possession of their zariba— and of their dead. The 2,000 Dervish riflemen engaged left no less than 395 dead
  21. ↑ Beachey, Raymond Wendell (1990). The Warrior Mullah: The Horn Aflame, 1892-1920. London: Bellew Publishing. p. 99. ISBN   0947792430. Among the survivors were Mr Dunn, looking almost comically surprised that he had come through it all, Captain Summers, in sore need of medical care, and some 40 fighting men, scarcely any of whom went unscathed, and were slightly or seriously wounded. Of seven personal servants 'followers' only one was living: Corfield's two attendants (including the loyal Dualeh who had followed his master from Somaliland to Nigeria and back) lay dead at his side. Out of 110 Constabulary who had so blithely left Burao the evening before, 10 had fallen out on the road, 35 had been killed in action, 17 were seriously wounded and 24 had deserted.
  22. ↑ Labahn, Thomas (1984). Proceedings of the Second International Congress of Somali Studies. Vol. II: Archaeology and History. University of Hamburg: Helmut Buske Verlag. p. 212. ISBN   3871186929. After five hours of pitched battle the Dervishes withdrew leaving 35 of the camel corps dead, 21 wounded and 3 missing. The Dervishes too lost nearly 200 men.
  23. ↑ Labahn, Thomas (1984). Proceedings of the Second International Congress of Somali Studies. Vol. II: Archaeology and History. University of Hamburg: Helmut Buske Verlag. p. 212. ISBN   3871186929. After five hours of pitched battle the Dervishes withdrew leaving 35 of the camel corps dead, 21 wounded and 3 missing. The Dervishes too lost nearly 200 men.
  24. ↑ Jardine, Douglas (1923). The Mad Mullah of Somaliland. London: Herbert Jenkins Limited. p. 226. The action lasted a little over five hours. Soon after midday, the Dervishes withdrew for the last time, their ammunition being exhausted, and the defenders were left in the possession of their zariba— and of their dead. The 2,000 Dervish riflemen engaged left no less than 395 dead
  25. ↑ Jardine, Douglas (1923). The Mad Mullah of Somaliland. London: Herbert Jenkins Limited. p. 229. Estimated at 5,000-6,000 camels and 20,000-30,000 sheep. The numbers were so large that the Dervishes had to send to the haroun for assistance to drive in their loot.
  26. ↑ Jardine, Douglas (1923). The Mad Mullah of Somaliland. London: Herbert Jenkins Limited. p. 229. It may be said that Corfield's objects in giving battle were twofold. The immediate object was to prevent the Dervishes from driving off the stock they had looted from the Dolbahanta, and the ultimate object was to restore our damaged prestige. In both these objects we failed lamentably. For the Dervishes got away with the stock*, and the withdrawal of the decimated Constabulary from Burao to Sheikh discouraged and alarmed the friendlies as much as it must have rejoiced the heart of the Mullah. So far from being restored, our prestige in Somaliland had received yet another damaging blow.
  27. ↑ Samatar, Said S. (1980). "Gabay-Ḥayir: A Somali Mock Heroic Song". Research in African Literatures . 11 (4): 462. JSTOR   3818223.
  28. ↑ "Buuraha Dulmadoobe (Dulmadoobe Buuraha) Map, Weather and Photos - Somalia: hills - Lat:9.1 and Long:45.8667". www.getamap.net. Retrieved 23 January 2022.
  29. ↑ Jardine, Douglas (1923). The Mad Mullah of Somaliland. London: Herbert Jenkins Limited. p. 229. Estimated at 5,000-6,000 camels and 20,000-30,000 sheep. The numbers were so large that the Dervishes had to send to the haroun for assistance to drive in their loot.
  30. ↑ Beachey, Raymond Wendell (1990). The Warrior Mullah: The Horn Aflame, 1892-1920. London: Bellew Publishing. p. 100. ISBN   0947792430. Having destroyed the badly injured camels and ponies, and having confirmed that the Dervishes had moved southwards with a vast herd of stock including 25,000 camels, the remnant of the Camel Corps, exhausted and half-crazed for water, set out on the endurance trek of 6 miles to Idoweina, which was reached at 4 pm the same day. Bitter welcome did they find. The few pools of water in the sandy river bed were fouled and browned by the droppings of Dervish camels and goats.
  31. ↑ Jardine, Douglas (1923). The Mad Mullah of Somaliland. London: Herbert Jenkins Limited. p. 229. It may be said that Corfield's objects in giving battle were twofold. The immediate object was to prevent the Dervishes from driving off the stock they had looted from the Dolbahanta, and the ultimate object was to restore our damaged prestige. In both these objects we failed lamentably. For the Dervishes got away with the stock*, and the withdrawal of the decimated Constabulary from Burao to Sheikh discouraged and alarmed the friendlies as much as it must have rejoiced the heart of the Mullah. So far from being restored, our prestige in Somaliland had received yet another damaging blow.
  32. ↑ Hazlehurst, Cameron; Woodland, Christine (2023). A Liberal Chronicle in Peace and War: Journals and Papers of J. A. Pease, 1st Lord Gainford, 1911-1915. Oxford University Press. ISBN   9780192887078. British policy was to administer the coast and leave the interior to the 'friendlies', but this defeat had forced the abandonment of Burao (not 'Burrow'), the Camel Corps' base.
  33. ↑ Beachey, Raymond Wendell (1990). The Warrior Mullah: The Horn Aflame, 1892-1920. London: Bellew Publishing. p. 102. ISBN   0947792430. They had razed Burao, so recently evacuated by the Camel Corps, their farthest penetration towards Berbera since 1900, and with thousands of head of looted stock had rejoined the Mullah at Shimber Berris, at the head of the Ain Valley and dominating its rich pastures, and with the pro-British tribes there at its mercy.
  34. ↑ Bartlett, H. Moyse- (2012). The King's African Rifles - Volume 1. Andrews UK Limited. p. 194. ISBN   9781781506615. The blow to British prestige was severe, as the dervishes soon followed up their advantage and in September sacked Burao for the first time since 1900.
  35. ↑ Jardine, Douglas James (1923). The Mad Mullah of Somaliland. London: Herbert Jenkins Limited. p. 223. Nor were they ill advised. For on the 5th September a party of sixty Dervish horse sacked the bazaar and razed the station to the ground. The Dervishes had not penetrated to Burao since 1900, and the event was viewed by all with consternation. The possession of Burao is the key to control in Somaliland, and from this point of vantage the Dervishes were in a position to ravage the whole country.
  36. ↑ Jardine, Douglas (1923). The Mad Mullah of Somaliland. London: Herbert Jenkins Limited. p. 229. For the Dervishes got away with the stock*, and the withdrawal of the decimated Constabulary from Burao to Sheikh discouraged and alarmed the friendlies as much as it must have rejoiced the heart of the Mullah. So far from being restored, our prestige in Somaliland had received yet another damaging blow.
  37. ↑ Great Britain. Parliament. House of Commons (1914). The Parliamentary Debates (Official Report). pp. 1636–1637. In that dispatch the Acting Commissioner says:- "It is with the most profound regret that I should have had to lay to the charge of a dead man and a gallant officer that he acted in a hazardous manner, without a full sense of his responsibilities. I have considered it my duty, however, to place before you a perfectly candid and frank statement of the whole occurrence. A rash act has involved the Government of the Protectorate in a severe set-back, and, under the circumstances, in a politically disastrous withdrawal from Burao. For this Mr. Corfield, who had previously done such excellent work, has paid the penalty with his life. It can only be said that he allowed his attribute of great personal bravery and the complete confidence he had in the men under his command to outweigh his better judgment. The action of Dul Madoba should never have been fought."
  38. ↑ Great Britain. Parliament. House of Commons (1914). The Parliamentary Debates (Official Report). p. 1637. I accepted the Acting-Commissioner's statement of the case, and in my dispatch of the 5th of September I used almost his precise words I said:-"It is evident that the whole responsibility for this ill-advised and disastrous action must rest with the late Mr. Corfield. He has paid the penalty with his life, and I have no desire to dwell on this aspect of the matter. But I am compelled, if only in justice to the other officers concerned, to record my opinion that the disaster is due to his complete disregard of the instructions issued by His Majesty's Government, by Mr. Byatt, and by yourself."

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