China–Democratic Republic of the Congo relations

People's Republic of China-Democratic Republic of the Congo relations

China	DR Congo

The People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) have maintained diplomatic relations since 1961 and contacts between the two regions stretch back to 1887 when representatives of the Congo Free State established contacts with the court of the Qing dynasty. The first treaty between the two powers was signed in 1898.

The Free State became a Belgian colony in 1908, but when it gained its independence in 1960 it established formal relations with the Republic of China (ROC), which had replaced the Qing in 1912 but was relegated to the island of Taiwan, a former Japanese colony, after 1949. Over the next decade, Congolese recognition was switched several times between the ROC and the PRC before it settled finally on the latter in 1971.

At the time, the Congo was known as Zaire. In the 21st century, Chinese investment in the DRC and Congolese exports to China have grown rapidly. The DRC joined the Belt and Road Initiative in 2021.

The DRC upholds the One-China policy, recognizing the PRC as the sole legitimate government of China (rather than the ROC) and regarding Taiwan as part of China. ^[1]

Qing relations with the Congo Free State

In 1887, King Leopold II of Belgium sent emissaries to the Qing court in China to request the right to recruit labourers for the Congo Free State. Since the Qing had already signed a treaty with Belgium, the Belgians were permitted to recruit labour on behalf of their own colonies, but not for the Congo Free State, which was not a Belgian colony. In 1892, the agents of the Congo Free State contracted out their recruiting in China to Macau-based Portuguese firms. A total of 536 men and six boys were recruited in Guangzhou under three-year contracts. The Congo paid their round-trip fares, provided room and board and paid wages of 45 francs a month. Workers wishing to remain in the Congo after three years would then receive a 400-franc cash allowance. These men left for the Congo on 18 September 1892 aboard the German steamer Walstein from Macau. Both the China Custom Annual Trading and Commerce Records and the Business Report of the British Consulate in China reported more workers recruited by Macanese and Hong Kong agents in Qiongzhou and Shantou for work in the Congo in 1892. In the Congo, these recruits were put to work on the Congo railway, logging trees and hauling rocks. Most of these recruits died in the harsh conditions of the Congo. Contemporary newspapers in Hong Kong published information about the bad conditions and mistreatment suffered by the Chinese in the Congo. ^[2] During this first period of recruitment, around 1,000 Chinese went to the Congo. ^[3]

On 10 July 1898, China and the Congo Free State signed a "special chapter" in Peking that stated, in part: "It was agreed upon that Chinese citizens can at will move to and live in the Congo Free State. All properties, movable or unmovable, can be purchased or traded. Whether for shipping, business, crafts or arts, Chinese citizens will receive the same treatment as citizens of the most favorable countries." This agreement granted China "most favoured nation" status in the Congo. It also had the effect of legalising the recruitment of Chinese for work in the Congo. Although Congolese authorities found the performance of the workers of 1892 unsatisfactory, recruitment drives were undertaken in China in 1901, 1902, 1904, and 1906. ^[2] During this second period of recruitment, about 2,000 Chinese went to the Congo. In 1906, Hong Kong alone produced 500 recruits. ^[4]

Establishing relations with the ROC and PRC

A mass rally in Tiananmen Square of Beijing in 1965 against U.S. intervention in Congo-Léopoldville.

In October 1960, the newly independent DRC, then called the Republic of the Congo, established diplomatic relations with the Republic of China (ROC). ^[5] On February 20, 1961, China recognized the government headed by Antoine Gizenga. ^{[6] : 346} In September 1961, Gizenga joined the Cyrille Adoula government, which recognized the ROC, and the PRC suspended relations in response. ^{[6] : 346}

Relations were again established between the DRC, then known as the Republic of Zaire, and the People's Republic of China in November 1972 and have remained intact since. ^{[7] : 43}

During the time that the DRC/Zaire recognised Taiwan, between 1961 and 1971, the PRC supported and provided material support to anti-Zairian rebels. After Zaire's president, Joseph-Désiré Mobutu, reverted recognition back to the PRC, eight Chinese leaders visited Zaire between 1978 and 1995. Mobutu himself visited the PRC five times, despite the fact that their relationship was not very close at the time. ^[8]

Present economic relations

The DRC is a major destination for Chinese investment, especially in mining, with the South China Morning Post describing the country as "the epicentre of Chinese investments in Africa". Major companies involved include Chengtun Mining, China Molybdenum Company, China Nonferrous Metal Mining Group, and Huayou Cobalt. ^[9]

In June 2000, a Sino-Congolese telecommunications company (China-Congo Telecom) was set up between ZTE and the Congolese government in a deal worth RMB80 million in concessional finance from China EXIM Bank. In April 2009, South African telecommunications group MTN Group offered to buy ZTE's 51 percent stake in the company for US$200 million. ^{[7] : 43} As of January 2010, the DRC has not yet been given Approved Destination Status (ADS) by China due to ongoing civil conflict in the country. ^{[7] : 44}

Exports of copper ore and hard woods to China increased greatly in 2007. ^{[10] : 43}

China and the DRC have significant trade in cobalt, a metal for which China is the world's largest consumer due to its importance in batteries for electric vehicles. ^{[11] : 127} As of at least 2024, the DRC produces more than 70% of the world's cobalt, and most of this production goes to China. ^{[11] : 127} Chinese companies also account for the majority of cobalt mining in the DRC. ^{[11] : 127}

Sicomines

See also: Dikuluwe Mine

A deal was struck between Sicomines, a consortium of Chinese companies (Sinohydro and China Railway Engineering Corporation), and the Congolese government in April 2008 to grant mineral concessions in Katanga province in exchange for infrastructure investments. In a deal originally worth US$9 billion and funded by China EXIM Bank, US$6 billion would go to infrastructure development and US$3 billion being invested in mining operations in Katanga. 68% of the project would be owned by Sicomines and the remaining 32% would be owned by Congo's mining parastatal Gécamines.

The US$6 billion was originally to have been invested in a total of 6,600 km of road would be either built or rehabilitated, two hospitals and two universities being built. The mining concessions in Dima (Dikuluwe) and Mashamba West would have given Sicomines access to 10.6 million tons of copper and over 600,000 tons of cobalt, with 6.8 million tons of copper and 427,000 tons of cobalt being confirmed deposits. The mine will come online at the earliest in 2013.

The Congolese and Chinese side have argued that the financing provided to Sicomines by China EXIM Bank is not to be seen as regular government debt since, as stated in article 10.1 of the contract, it is taken on by the joint venture and is backed by the mineral concessions. The articles 10.3, 13.2 and 13.3.3 of the contract are however the stumbling blocks in the context, stating that the Congolese state guarantees the repayment of the loan. ^{[10] : 34}

Critics of the project have alleged that the deal undervalues the mineral deposits in Katanga. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has raised concerns about this deal negatively affecting the DRC's ability to sustain its debt. This is because the deal would disqualify the country from the IMF's foreign debt relief program run under the auspices of the World Bank Group’s Highly Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) program, as the DRC would be getting its debt canceled only to be taking on even more new debts. The IMF has argued that in order for the DRC to remain eligible and the deal to go through the value of the Sicomines deal would have to be greatly reduced. In May 2009, the Congolese government agreed to put on hold US$3 billion of the deal while a feasibility study for the mineral concessions is finalized. ^{[10] : 33–34}

As of October 2017, "Sinohydro Corp. and China Railway Construction...own 68 percent of Sicomines," with the government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo originally telling the Chinese companies to "stop exporting unprocessed copper and cobalt and refine all its metals within the country" and later reversing their decision. ^{[12] [13] [14] [15]}

A 2017 report by the Carter Center estimated that $685 million in loans for Sicomines' infrastructure projects had gone missing, with no evidence that the money was used for its intended purpose, raising concerns about using Chinese money for corruption. ^{[16] [17]}

Benefaction

Former governor of Katanga province Moïse Katumbi estimated that over 60 of the province's 75 processing plants are owned by Chinese nationals. He said that 90% of the region's minerals went to China. ^[18] They are known to have poor environmental and labour relations records and have been accused, directly or indirectly, of using child labour. ^{[18] [19] : 12–15} In 2007, about 600 Chinese nationals were expelled from Katanga for violating labour and environmental laws. ^[18]

Building projects in the DRC

Since 1972, the PRC has given a number of donations to the DRC. Including a farm on the outskirts of Kinshasa, a sugar refinery in Kisangani, and the National Assembly building (at the time costing US$42 million or US$186 million in 2011 dollars ^[20] ) were all built and given to the DRC/Zaire in the 1970s. The Chinese government also built an 80,000-seat stadium in 1994. ^{[7] : 43} In 2004, the PRC built and donated the N'Djili Sino-Congolese Friendship Hospital, handing it over to the DRC government in 2006. ^{[7] : 44} According to AidData, from 2000 to 2011, there are approximately 21 Chinese official development finance projects identified in DRC through various media reports. ^[21]

In January 2021, the Chinese government agreed to cancel Congolese debt worth US$28 million and pledged US$17 million in aid, mainly for development projects. At the same time, the Democratic Republic of the Congo joined the Belt and Road Initiative. ^[22]

Military cooperation

China has also been committed to providing assistance for reforming the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDC). Besides providing military equipment, Chinese firms helped construct the FARDC headquarters and a naval base at the sea port of Banana. The Chinese have also provided maintenance and repair for the Congolese navy's "Shanghai" Type 062 gunboats, since eight boats were purchased under the Mobutu regime, but only two being currently operational due to poor maintenance. A Chinese military mission is based at Kamina since 2008, where in August 2017 they completed training of the Congolese 32nd Rapid Reaction Brigade by Chinese instructors. ^[23] 4th President Joseph Kabila of the DRC has received training at the PLA National Defense University. ^{[24] [25]}

Official visits

Throughout 2015 and 2016, high-ranking officials of the DRC, including President Kabila, Prime Minister Augustin Matata Ponyo, and Foreign Minister Raymond Tshibanda, met with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi. They discussed the increase in economic cooperation, as well as in other fields, between the two states. ^[26]

References

1. "African Union, China upbeat over upcoming FOCAC". Archived from the original on 2022-08-03. Retrieved 2022-08-03.
2. Li Anshan, A History of Overseas Chinese in Africa to 1911 (Diasporic Africa Press, 2012), 76–77.
3. Anshan (2012), 89.
4. Anshan (2012), 91.
5. http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/focac/183553.htm Archived 2012-05-27 at the Wayback Machine China.Org.Cn website where it says "In October [1960], the Congolese Kasavubu government "established diplomatic relations" with the Taiwan Authority."
6. Shinn, David H.; Eisenman, Joshua (2023). China's Relations with Africa: a New Era of Strategic Engagement. New York: Columbia University Press. ISBN   978-0-231-21001-0.
7. Hon, Tracy; Jansson, Johanna; Shelton, Garth; Liu, Haifang; Burke, Christopher; Kiala, Carine (January 2010). "Evaluating China's FOCAC commitments to Africa and mapping the way ahead" (PDF). Centre for Chinese Studies, Stellenbosch University. Archived from the original (PDF) on 2016-08-24. Retrieved 24 January 2011.
8. Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2006-10-10). "Congo (DRC)" . Retrieved 24 January 2011.^{[ permanent dead link ‍]}
9. "Why China is making a big play for Congo's cobalt – and other critical minerals". South China Morning Post. 15 August 2021. Archived from the original on 16 May 2023. Retrieved 15 August 2021.
10. Burke, Christopher; Jansson, Johanna; Jiang, Wenran (August 2009). "Chinese Companies in the Extractive Industries of Gabon & the DRC: Perceptions of Transparency" (PDF). Centre for Chinese Studies, Stellenbosch University. Archived from the original (PDF) on 26 July 2011. Retrieved 24 January 2011.
11. Garlick, Jeremy (2024). Advantage China: Agent of Change in an Era of Global Disruption. Bloomsbury Academic. ISBN   978-1-350-25231-8.
12. William Clowes, "Congo Halts Sicomines Copper Exports, Orders Local Processing Archived 2018-11-20 at the Wayback Machine ,"American Journal of Transportation, Oct 2017.
13. Tom Wilson, "Kinshasa, Chinese partners near deal for $660 million power plant: DR Congo rising? Archived 2017-10-26 at the Wayback Machine ," Mail and Guardian, Oct 15, 2015.
14. Aaron Ross, "Congo orders China joint venture to stop exporting raw metals Archived 2020-11-12 at the Wayback Machine ,"Reuters, Oct 9, 2017.
15. Reuters Staff, "Congo lifts ban on raw metal exports by Chinese joint venture Archived 2020-09-22 at the Wayback Machine ," Reuters, Oct 11, 2017.
16. Solomon, Salem; Frechette, Casey (September 13, 2018). "Corruption Is Wasting Chinese Money in Africa". Foreign Policy. Archived from the original on November 1, 2020. Retrieved January 7, 2021.
17. "A State Affair: Privatizing Congo's Copper Sector" (PDF). Carter Center. November 2017. Archived (PDF) from the original on 21 October 2020. Retrieved 7 January 2021.
18. Clark, Simon (22 July 2008). "China Lets Child Workers Die Digging in Congo Mines for Copper". Bloomberg. Archived from the original on 8 April 2011. Retrieved 16 March 2011.
19. Marks, Stephen (2010). "Strengthening the Civil Society Perspective: China's African Impact" (PDF). Fahamu. Archived from the original (PDF) on 4 January 2011. Retrieved 16 March 2011.
20. Measuring Worth Archived 2017-06-10 at the Wayback Machine , Relative Value of a U.S. Dollar Amount – Consumer Price Index, retrieved on the 24/01/2011
21. Austin Strange, Bradley C. Parks, Michael J. Tierney, Andreas Fuchs, Axel Dreher, and Vijaya Ramachandran. 2013. China’s Development Finance to Africa: A Media-Based Approach to Data Collection. CGD Working Paper 323. Washington DC: Center for Global Development.
22. "China cancels Democratic Republic of Congo loans as it joins belt and road". South China Morning Post. 7 January 2021. Archived from the original on 7 January 2021. Retrieved 7 January 2021.
23. Wondo, Jean-Jacques (23 May 2018). Joseph Kabila continues to over-equip his regime militarily for the upcoming political deadlines – JJ Wondo Archived 2018-09-25 at the Wayback Machine . Desc-wondo.
24. "非洲总统回中国母校（名人特写）". 人民網. 2002-04-04. Archived from the original on 2018-08-24. Retrieved 2019-12-30.
25. "Joseph Kabila Kabange". GlobalSecurity.org. Archived from the original on 2021-01-07. Retrieved 2019-12-30.
26. Activities Archived 2017-03-19 at the Wayback Machine . Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China. Retrieved 18 March 2016.

Further reading

• Sun, Jodie Yuzhou (2022). "Supplied Cash and Arms but Losing Anyway: Chinese Support of the Lumumbist Insurgencies in the Congo Crisis (1959–65)". Cold War History. 22 (4): 459–478. doi:10.1080/14682745.2022.2050699.
• Cardenal, Juan Pablo; Araújo, Heriberto (2011). La silenciosa conquista china (in Spanish). Barcelona: Crítica. pp. 84–88, 114–121. ISBN   9788498922578.