Signals intelligence (SIGINT) is the act and field of intelligence-gathering by interception of signals, whether communications between people or from electronic signals not directly used in communication. As classified and sensitive information is usually encrypted, signals intelligence may necessarily involve cryptanalysis. Traffic analysis—the study of who is signaling to whom and in what quantity—is also used to integrate information, and it may complement cryptanalysis.
In military telecommunications, electronic support (ES) or electronic support measures (ESM) gather intelligence through passive "listening" to electromagnetic radiations of military interest. They are an aspect of electronic warfare involving actions taken under direct control of an operational commander to detect, intercept, identify, locate, record, and/or analyze sources of radiated electromagnetic energy for the purposes of immediate threat recognition or longer-term operational planning. Thus, electronic support provides a source of information required for decisions involving electronic protection (EP), electronic attack (EA), avoidance, targeting, and other tactical employment of forces. Electronic support data can be used to produce signals intelligence (SIGINT), communications intelligence (COMINT) and electronics intelligence (ELINT).
Surveillance is the monitoring of behavior, many activities, or information for the purpose of information gathering, influencing, managing, or directing. This can include observation from a distance by means of electronic equipment, such as closed-circuit television (CCTV), or interception of electronically transmitted information like Internet traffic. It can also include simple technical methods, such as human intelligence gathering and postal interception.
A covert listening device, more commonly known as a bug or a wire, is usually a combination of a miniature radio transmitter with a microphone. The use of bugs, called bugging, or wiretapping is a common technique in surveillance, espionage and police investigations.
Computer and network surveillance is the monitoring of computer activity and data stored locally on a computer or data being transferred over computer networks such as the Internet. This monitoring is often carried out covertly and may be completed by governments, corporations, criminal organizations, or individuals. It may or may not be legal and may or may not require authorization from a court or other independent government agencies. Computer and network surveillance programs are widespread today and almost all Internet traffic can be monitored.
TEMPEST is a U.S. National Security Agency specification and a NATO certification referring to spying on information systems through leaking emanations, including unintentional radio or electrical signals, sounds, and vibrations. TEMPEST covers both methods to spy upon others and how to shield equipment against such spying. The protection efforts are also known as emission security (EMSEC), which is a subset of communications security (COMSEC). The reception methods fall under the umbrella of radiofrequency MASINT.
Eavesdropping is the act of secretly or stealthily listening to the private conversation or communications of others without their consent in order to gather information.
Van Eck phreaking, also known as Van Eck radiation, is a form of network eavesdropping in which special equipment is used for a side-channel attack on the electromagnetic emissions of electronic devices. While electromagnetic emissions are present in keyboards, printers, and other electronic devices, the most notable use of Van Eck phreaking is in reproducing the contents of a cathode ray tube (CRT) display at a distance.
In computer security, a side-channel attack is any attack based on extra information that can be gathered because of the fundamental way a computer protocol or algorithm is implemented, rather than flaws in the design of the protocol or algorithm itself or minor, but potentially devastating, mistakes or oversights in the implementation. Timing information, power consumption, electromagnetic leaks, and sound are examples of extra information which could be exploited to facilitate side-channel attacks.
A radar detector is an electronic device used by motorists to detect if their speed is being monitored by police or law enforcement using a radar gun. Most radar detectors are used so the driver can reduce the car's speed before being ticketed for speeding. In general sense, only emitting technologies, like doppler RADAR, or LIDAR can be detected. Visual speed estimating techniques, like ANPR or VASCAR can not be detected in daytime, but technically vulnerable to detection at night, when IR spotlight is used. There are no reports that piezo sensors can be detected. LIDAR devices require an optical-band sensor, although many modern detectors include LIDAR sensors. Most of today's radar detectors detect signals across a variety of wavelength bands: usually X, K, and Ka. In Europe the Ku band is common as well. The past success of radar detectors was based on the fact that radio-wave beams can not be narrow-enough, so the detector usually senses stray and scattered radiation, giving the driver time to slow down. Based on a focused laser-beam, LIDAR technology does not suffer this shortcoming; however it requires precise aiming. Modern police radars incorporate formidable computing power, producing a minimum number of ultra-short pulses, reusing wide beams for multi-target measurement, which renders most detectors useless. But, mobile Internet allows GPS navigation devices to map police radar locations in real-time. These devices are also often called "radar detectors", while not necessary carrying an RF sensor.
The non-linear junction detector, or an NLJD, is a device that illuminates a small region of space with high-frequency RF energy. Any "non linear junction" in the vicinity—for example, and particularly, the p–n junction—will receive this energy, and because of the asymmetric response of the junction to an electric field, it will mangle it, re-emitting some of it on multiples of the illumination frequency. The detector has a sensitive receiver tuned to these harmonics, as well as appropriate processing and displays to make their presence known to the user of the device. Because the basis of almost all semiconductor electronics is the p-n junction, an NLJD is correspondingly capable of detecting almost any unshielded electronic device containing semiconductors, whether the electronics are actively powered or not.
The Special Collection Service (SCS), codenamed F6, is a highly classified joint U.S. Central Intelligence Agency–National Security Agency program charged with inserting eavesdropping equipment in difficult-to-reach places, such as foreign embassies, communications centers, and foreign government installations. Established in the late 1970s and headquartered in Beltsville, Maryland, the SCS has been involved in operations ranging from the Cold War to the Global War on Terrorism.
Radiofrequency MASINT is one of the six major disciplines generally accepted to make up the field of Measurement and Signature Intelligence (MASINT), with due regard that the MASINT subdisciplines may overlap, and MASINT, in turn, is complementary to more traditional intelligence collection and analysis disciplines such as SIGINT and IMINT. MASINT encompasses intelligence gathering activities that bring together disparate elements that do not fit within the definitions of Signals Intelligence (SIGINT), Imagery Intelligence (IMINT), or Human Intelligence (HUMINT).
The Thing, also known as the Great Seal bug, was one of the first covert listening devices to use passive techniques to transmit an audio signal. It was concealed inside a gift given by the Soviet Union to W. Averell Harriman, the United States Ambassador to the Soviet Union, on August 4, 1945. Because it was passive, needing electromagnetic energy from an outside source to become energized and active, it is considered a predecessor of radio-frequency identification (RFID) technology.
Radio frequency sweep or frequency sweep or RF sweep apply to scanning a radio frequency band for detecting signals being transmitted there. A radio receiver with an adjustable receiving frequency is used to do this. A display shows the strength of the signals received at each frequency as the receiver's frequency is modified to sweep (scan) the desired frequency band.
Computer security compromised by hardware failure is a branch of computer security applied to hardware. The objective of computer security includes protection of information and property from theft, corruption, or natural disaster, while allowing the information and property to remain accessible and productive to its intended users. Such secret information could be retrieved by different ways. This article focus on the retrieval of data thanks to misused hardware or hardware failure. Hardware could be misused or exploited to get secret data. This article collects main types of attack that can lead to data theft.
Counter-IED equipment are created primarily for military and law enforcement. They are used for standoff detection of explosives and explosive precursor components and defeating the Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) devices themselves as part of a broader counter-terrorism, counter-insurgency, or law enforcement effort.
Cellphone surveillance may involve tracking, bugging, monitoring, eavesdropping, and recording conversations and text messages on mobile phones. It also encompasses the monitoring of people's movements, which can be tracked using mobile phone signals when phones are turned on.
In cryptography, electromagnetic attacks are side-channel attacks performed by measuring the electromagnetic radiation emitted from a device and performing signal analysis on it. These attacks are a more specific type of what is sometimes referred to as Van Eck phreaking, with the intention to capture encryption keys. Electromagnetic attacks are typically non-invasive and passive, meaning that these attacks are able to be performed by observing the normal functioning of the target device without causing physical damage. However, an attacker may get a better signal with less noise by depackaging the chip and collecting the signal closer to the source. These attacks are successful against cryptographic implementations that perform different operations based on the data currently being processed, such as the square-and-multiply implementation of RSA. Different operations emit different amounts of radiation and an electromagnetic trace of encryption may show the exact operations being performed, allowing an attacker to retrieve full or partial private keys.
The GSOC bugging scandal in February 2014 involved revelations that the offices of the Garda Síochána Ombudsman Commission, Ireland's independent police watchdog, were under covert electronic surveillance by an unknown party. John Mooney, security correspondent for The Sunday Times, first published the story alleging that GSOC had been the subject of surveillance by an unidentified party using "government level technology" to hack into its emails, Wi-Fi and telephone systems. The espionage operation was uncovered by a private British counter-surveillance firm, Verrimus, whom GSOC hired after its suspicions became aroused of outside spying on the organisation and its activities.
