Badan Pengelola Investasi Daya Anagata Nusantara | |
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![]() Wisma Danantara (formerly Plaza Mandiri), the headquarters of Danantara, taken in 2025 | |
Agency overview | |
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Formed | 24 February 2025 |
Preceding Agency |
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Jurisdiction | Government of Indonesia |
Headquarters | Wisma Danantara Jl. Jend. Gatot Subroto No. 36–38 Central Jakarta, Indonesia |
Agency executives | |
Child agencies |
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Website | danantaraindonesia |
Daya Anagata Nusantara Investment Management Agency (Indonesian : Badan Pengelola Investasi Daya Anagata Nusantara), commonly known as Danantara Indonesia or simply Danantara, is the second sovereign wealth fund of Indonesia, after the Indonesian Investment Authority. [1] [2] The agency is led by a chairman, currently Rosan Roeslani.
The agency is the fusion of certain functions between the Indonesia Investment Authority and the country's Ministry of State-Owned Enterprises. [3] [4]
Daya is an Indonesian word meaning "strength", "ability", or "effort", with origin traced from Sanskrit and Old Javanese. Anagata was taken either from Sanskrit or Pali, anāgata , meaning "not yet to come" or "future". Nusantara is the Indonesian name for the region spanning the Indonesian archipelago. The word nūsa meaning "island" in Old Javanese was derived from the Proto-Malayo-Polynesian word *nusa with the same meaning, and the word antara is a Javanese loanword from Sanskrit, antarā, meaning "between" or "in the middle", thus creating a compound word of nūsa + antara. Together, it means "the outer islands" (from Java's perspective) as mentioned in the 14th century Old Javanese manuscript Pararaton and Nagarakretagama .
Danantara was launched on 24 February 2025. [5] For the initial stage, it is projected to have funding of IDR 320 trillion or US$20 billion. [6] Danantara is projected to be a global investment firm like Malaysia's Khazanah or Singapore's Temasek. [7]
In mid-June 2025, representatives from Danantara and the Russian Direct Investment Fund signed an agreement at the 2025 St Petersburg International Economic Forum to create an investment fund worth 2 billion Euros (US$2.9 billion). [8] [9]
As a result of the formation of Danantara, seven state-owned enterprises have been moved out of the Ministry of State-Owned Enterprises' direct management and placed under Danantara, which are: [1]
When fully operated, Danantara is expected to manage approximately IDR 14.72 quadrillion funds (US$900 billion), combined total assets of the seven state-owned enterprises. [10] [11]
The following is the structure of Danantara: [12] [13] [14]
Danantara Managing Committee organized into the following: [15]
Managing Directors:
Risk Management Committee: John Prasetio
Investment and Portfolio Committee: Yup Kim
Operational Holding under COO
Investment Holding under CIO
On 24 February 2025, Eddy Junarsin, an economist from Gadjah Mada University (UGM), optimistically stated that Danantara would accountably and transparently strengthen the state-owned asset governance from state-owned enterprises. By using concepts of holding company, it would improve the governance of the SOEs, which were previously fragmented. Danantara is expected to maintain the stability of national finances in the long term. Junarsin wants Danantara to merge and acquire inefficient companies and establish a less layered management structure so that SOEs will be more agile in innovation. [16] However, on the other hand, Junarsin is also viewed that Danantara was established during escalating socio-political issues, such as the 2025 budget efficiency, free nutritious meals, the revision of the Mineral and Coal act, etc. [17]
Concerns about the management and transparency of the entity were raised due to the inability of national auditors namely the Financial Audit Board (BPK), the Agency for Financial and Development Supervision (BPKP), as well as the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) to monitor the managed assets. [18] However, audits may be made upon request from the House of Representatives. [19] [20] [21] Indonesian public spheres and mass media concerned about the future fate of Danantara may look to 1Malaysia Development Bhd. (1MDB) for a relevant example. [22] [23]
Deni Friawan, a researcher from the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), argued that the success of Danantara may depend on factors such as independence, transparency, professionalism in its management and support for clear business orientation. He compared it to Singapore's Temasek Holdings, whose officials have close connections to the government, but still maintain their independence and professionalism. [23]
On 24 March 2025, former Thai prime minister (2001–2006) Thaksin Shinawatra was appointed as a Danantara advisory board member. However, he and his family were involved in several scandals and corruptions in Thailand. [24] [25] [26]
The concurrent position issues among state-owned enterprise commissioners has been under discussion, even before Danantara was established. Since the end of 2008, Minister of Finance Sri Mulyani has prohibited any civil servants within the Ministry of Finance, particularly those of echelon I rank, from holding concurrent positions as a commissioner of state- or private-owned enterprises, based on a joint decree between the Minister of Finance, the Minister of Administrative and Bureaucratic Reform, and the Minister of State-Owned Enterprises. [27] However, this attempt does not completely successful in suppresing conflict of interest in government. In 2023, Indonesia Corruption Watch (ICW) reported that between 2016 and 2019, 397 SOE commissioners and 167 SOE subsidiary commissioners were suspected of holding concurrent positions, which violates 2003 State-Owned Enterprises Act. According to ICW, these cases of concurrent positions leave commissioners trapped in conflicts of interest and threaten good corporate governances. ICW highlighted that incompetent oversighting can lead SOEs into corruption. [28]
On 16 July 2025, Transparency International (TI) Indonesia continues to find cases of deputy ministers holding concurrent positions as commissioners of SOEs. TI Indonesia Secretary General Danang Widoyoko acknowledged that SOEs are inextricably linked to political interferences, particularly in the appointment of top management, including commissioners. He even suggested this trend would extend to the board of directors, creating a burden for SOEs and weakening GCGs. At the time, TI Indonesia noted that in addition to Danantara's leadership, which is largely filled by political elites, several SOEs had appointed deputy ministers as SOEs commissioners (as of 16 July 2025): [29]
The House Speaker of the House of Representatives Sufmi Dasco Ahmad views that Indonesian president Prabowo Subianto placed the deputy ministers as commissioners of SOEs as "government representatives". He stated that the deputy ministers appointed as commissioners of SOEs would not receive any benefits or bonuses. According to ICW, even though they would not receive a bonus, holding concurrent position as both deputy minister and commissioner of an SOE violates Article 27B of the SOEs Act and Article 23 of the Government Ministry Act, as well as the Constitutional Court decision No. 80/PUU-XVII/2019 on prohibition of concurrent positions for deputy ministers, as well as Art. 73(2) Minister of SOEs' Regulation No. PER-3/MBU/03/2023. [30]
In July 2025, Danantara issued letter No. S-063/DI-BP/VII/2025, which prohibits all members of the Board of Commissioners of SOEs and their subsidiaries from receiving any bonuses, incentives, or other income linked to company performance. Meanwhile, incentives for directors remain permitted, provided they are based on genuine and sustainable performance and do not stem from short-term gains, such as revaluations or asset sales. [31]