Hardware backdoor

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Hardware backdoors are backdoors in hardware, such as code inside hardware or firmware of computer chips. [1] The backdoors may be directly implemented as hardware Trojans in the integrated circuit.

Contents

Hardware backdoors are intended to undermine security in smartcards and other cryptoprocessors unless investment is made in anti-backdoor design methods. [2] They have also been considered for car hacking. [3]

Severity

Hardware backdoors are considered to be highly problematic for several reasons. [1] For instance, they cannot be removed by conventional means such as antivirus software. They can also circumvent other types of security, such as disk encryption. Lastly, they can also be injected during production where the user has no control.

Examples

Countermeasures

Skorobogatov has developed a technique capable of detecting malicious insertions into chips. [9]

New York University Tandon School of Engineering researchers have developed a way to corroborate a chip's operation using verifiable computing whereby "manufactured for sale" chips contain an embedded verification module that proves the chip's calculations are correct and an associated external module validates the embedded verification module. [8] Another technique developed by researchers at University College London (UCL) relies on distributing trust between multiple identical chips from disjoint supply chains. Assuming that at least one of those chips remains honest the security of the device is preserved. [20]

Researchers at the University of Southern California Ming Hsieh Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering and the Photonic Science Division at the Paul Scherrer Institute have developed a new technique called Ptychographic X-ray laminography. [21] This technique is the only current method that allows for verification of the chips blueprint and design without destroying or cutting the chip. It also does so in significantly less time than other current methods. Anthony F. J. Levi Professor of electrical and computer engineering at University of Southern California explains “It’s the only approach to non-destructive reverse engineering of electronic chips—[and] not just reverse engineering but assurance that chips are manufactured according to design. You can identify the foundry, aspects of the design, who did the design. It’s like a fingerprint.” [21] This method currently is able to scan chips in 3D and zoom in on sections and can accommodate chips up to 12 millimeters by 12 millimeters easily accommodating an Apple A12 chip but not yet able to scan a full Nvidia Volta GPU. [21] "Future versions of the laminography technique could reach a resolution of just 2 nanometers or reduce the time for a low-resolution inspection of that 300-by-300-micrometer segment to less than an hour, the researchers say." [21]

See also

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References

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  2. Waksman, Adam (2010), "Tamper Evident Microprocessors" (PDF), Proceedings of the IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, Oakland, California, archived from the original (PDF) on 2013-09-21, retrieved 2019-08-27
  3. Smith, Craig (2016-03-24). The Car Hacker's Handbook: A Guide for the Penetration Tester. No Starch Press. ISBN   9781593277031 . Retrieved 22 January 2017.
  4. Wagner, David (2008-07-30). Advances in Cryptology - CRYPTO 2008: 28th Annual International Cryptology Conference, Santa Barbara, CA, USA, August 17-21, 2008, Proceedings. Springer Science & Business Media. ISBN   9783540851738 . Retrieved 22 January 2017.
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  8. 1 2 "Self-checking chips could eliminate hardware security issues - TechRepublic". Tech Republic. 31 August 2016. Retrieved 22 January 2017.
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  10. Lee, Michael. "Researchers find backdoor on ZTE Android phones | ZDNet". ZDNet. Retrieved 22 January 2017.
  11. Schoen, Douglas E.; Kaylan, Melik (9 September 2014). The Russia-China Axis: The New Cold War and America's Crisis of Leadership. Encounter Books (published 2014). ISBN   9781594037573 . Retrieved 2020-05-16. Hardware-encoded backdoors are more threatening than software-encoded ones [...] In October 2012, the U.S. House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence recommended that U.S. companies avoid hardware made by Chinese telecom giants Huawei and ZTE, saying that its use constitutes a risk to national security. Huawei and ZTE manufacture network hardware for telecommunications systems.
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  18. "Hardware hack defeats iPhone passcode security". BBC News. 19 September 2016. Retrieved 22 January 2017.
  19. Robertson, Jordan; Riley, Michael (4 October 2018). "The Big Hack: How China Used a Tiny Chip to Infiltrate U.S. Companies". Bloomberg. Retrieved 2022-03-06.
  20. Vasilios Mavroudis; et al. "A Touch of Evil: High-Assurance Cryptographic Hardware from Untrusted Components" (PDF). backdoortolerance.org. Proceedings of the 2017 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security.
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Further reading