Next Slovak parliamentary election

Last updated

Next Slovak parliamentary election
Flag of Slovakia.svg
←  2023
By 2027
All 150 seats in the National Council
76 seats needed for a majority
PartyLeaderCurrent seats
Smer Robert Fico 41
PS Michal Šimečka 33
Hlas Matúš Šutaj Eštok 25
Slovakia Igor Matovič 12
KDH Milan Majerský 11
SaS Branislav Gröhling 12
SNS Andrej Danko 8
Independents 8
Incumbent Prime Minister
Robert Fico
Smer

Parliamentary elections are scheduled to be held in Slovakia by 2027 to elect members of the National Council, although they can be held sooner if a snap election is called.

Contents

The election is expected to be a pivotal contest shaping the country’s political direction amid evolving domestic and international challenges. It is likely to serve as a referendum on the governance of Robert Fico and his government, particularly regarding economic management, rule of law concerns, [1] [2] and Slovakia’s stance within the European Union (EU) and towards the war in Ukraine.

Opposition forces, including Progressive Slovakia and other centrist and conservative parties, are expected to frame the election as an opportunity to reorient the country’s foreign policy and restore institutional stability. [3] It is anticipated that the voter turnout and the performance of smaller parties will play a decisive role in determining whether Slovakia continues on its current political trajectory or undergoes a significant shift.

Background

2023 election

The last elections were held in 2023. The left-wing populist Direction – Social Democracy (Smer–SD) led by Robert Fico emerged as the winner with 22.95% of the vote and 42 seats, followed by the liberal Progressive Slovakia, the main opposition party, with 32 seats. A total of seven political parties managed to earn seats in the 150-seat National Council, reflecting a pluralized party system and the collapse of the previous governing coalition. International observers and media highlighted the election as marking a political comeback for Fico and raising questions about Slovakia’s future foreign policy orientation. [4] Concerns emerged particularly regarding military support for Ukraine, while also emphasizing that coalition negotiations would be decisive in creating a new government. [5] Smer–SD ultimately succeeded in doing so by forming a coalition government with Voice – Social Democracy (Hlas–SD) and the Slovak National Party. [6] [7]

Domestic policy

Judiciary and criminal code reforms

In December 2023, the government put forward changes to the Criminal Code and sought to have them processed under an accelerated legislative procedure, justifying the move by claiming that the existing legal framework violated human rights standards. Among the key elements of the proposal were the dissolution of the Special Prosecutor’s Office, which had been responsible for investigating high-level corruption, and a reduction in sentencing for selected financial crimes. The combination of the substantive reforms and the fast-track procedure was strongly criticized by the parliamentary opposition, President Zuzana Čaputová, the European Commission, and a range of non-governmental organizations, prompting extended parliamentary filibustering by opposition deputies and large-scale public protests lasting several weeks. [8]

Concerns had been raised about possible conflicts of interest within the governing coalition. Critics pointed to several individuals with perceived ties to the government, as well as accused members of coalition parties, including the bill's rapporteur, Tibor Gašpar, who ended up being directly impacted by the proposed reductions in criminal penalties. Many of these cases fell under the jurisdiction of the Special Prosecutor’s Office, which the amendment seeked to abolish. The government defended the reform by arguing that it is intended to modernize the criminal code, promote a more rehabilitative approach to justice, and bring Slovak legislation into alignment with European Union standards.

On 8 February 2024, the National Council approved an amendment to the Criminal Code. The reform introduced significant changes to criminal law, including reduced sentences and shortened statutes of limitations for a range of offenses such as bribery, tax fraud, embezzlement, and robbery. [9] The final version of the legislation also lowered the statute of limitations for rape cases from 20 to 10 years, a provision that drew strong criticism from political authorities and the general public, while the government argued that the change would encourage earlier reporting by victims and could later be revised in subsequent amendments.

Following its adoption, the reform had immediate legal consequences, effectively halting or discontinuing the prosecution of several corruption-related cases involving politicians and businessmen. This included investigations that had been ongoing for years, affecting individuals who were widely perceived as politically connected or close to Robert Fico. Among those affected were former finance minister Ján Počiatek, [10] oligarch Jozef Výboh, suspected of a €150,000 bribery linked to President Peter Pellegrini, [11] and Deputy speaker of the National Council Peter Žiga, who was suspected of attempting to bribe a Supreme Court judge with €100,000. [12]

Greater control of the media

Beginning in late 2023, the government initiated a broader campaign targeting critical media, publicly branding several leading independent outlets as "hostile" and signaling restrictions on their access to state institutions. [13] At the same time, journalists from outlets such as Sme, Denník N, Aktuality.sk, and TV Markíza were excluded from press conferences and denied responses to inquiries, while more sympathetic media received preferential treatment. [14] Pavol Szalai of Reporters Without Borders (RSF) described these developments as a "crash test" for Slovakia’s democracy. [15] Concurrently, the government reduced funding for the public broadcaster Radio and Television of Slovakia (RTVS) at the start of 2024 and proposed additional measures affecting its structure and financing, drawing criticism from press freedom advocates. [16] [17]

Further plans announced in March 2024 to replace RTVS triggered widespread condemnation and public protests, with critics arguing the move threatened media independence. Noel Curran of the European Broadcasting Union warned that the proposal resembled an attempt to convert the broadcaster into state-controlled media. [18] Concerns were echoed by figures including Zuzana Čaputová, opposition representatives, journalists, international media groups, and the European Commission. In an open letter, organizations such as the International Press Institute, the European Federation of Journalists, Free Press Unlimited, and the European Centre for Press and Media Freedom warned that the reforms could weaken media independence and endanger press freedom. RSF likewise condemned what it described as verbal attacks on journalists, restrictions on access to information, and challenges to the independence of RTVS. [19]

In April 2024, the government approved legislation proposed by Fico and Culture Minister Martina Šimkovičová to overhaul public broadcasting, citing alleged bias. [20] [21] [22] The law focused on dissolving RTVS and replacing it with Slovak Television and Radio (STVR), overseen by a government-appointed council and required to broadcast the national anthem daily, a provision widely seen as symbolic nationalism. [23] Parliament passed the reforms in June 2024, formally abolishing RTVS and establishing STVR. [24] [25] According to the International Press Institute, the restructuring enabled the ruling coalition to install loyal leadership and expand political influence over public media content. [26] The Democratic Erosion Consortium later noted in April 2025 that the changes had drawn international criticism and heightened concerns about democratic backsliding, [27] while an IPI report in June 2025 added that pressure on TV Markíza had led to staff changes and fears of growing editorial self-censorship. [28]

Doctors' strike

In late 2024, the government faced a major healthcare crisis as thousands of doctors went on strike to demand improved working conditions. More than 3,300 of them submitted their resignations, placing significant strain on the system. In response, authorities adopted legislation allowing penalties during a state of emergency. Medical professionals who refused to work could face up to one year in prison or a €1,500 fine, with sentences of up to five years if a patient suffered harm as a result. [29] The Health Minister Kamil Šaško indicated that emergency measures might be introduced in regions most affected by the wave of resignations.

Amid escalating tensions, the dispute raised concerns about both healthcare capacity and the government’s response to the strike, particularly following the adoption of emergency measures that would have compelled doctors to continue working under threat of legal penalties. The move was criticized by medical unions and opposition politicians, who argued that it risked undermining labor rights and further eroding trust between healthcare workers and the state. The crisis also highlighted long-standing structural weaknesses in Slovakia’s healthcare system, including chronic underfunding, which had contributed to mounting pressure on hospitals prior to the strike. [30] [31]

Negotiations between the government and healthcare workers intensified in late December 2024 and ultimately resulted in an agreement. [32] The deal preserved previously legislated salary increases for doctors and included commitments to address systemic issues such as hospital financing and workforce stabilization. In exchange, doctors agreed to withdraw mass resignation notices that had been submitted by several thousands of them, which had threatened to significantly disrupt hospital operations nationwide. This established a framework for continued dialogue in the future to prevent a repeat of mass resignations.

Constitutional amendments

On 27 January 2025, Fico announced a set of proposed amendments to the Constitution of Slovakia. According to the announcement, the amendments aimed to establish the primacy of the constitution over international treaties and agreements, thereby strengthening national legal sovereignty. Additional provisions included the formal recognition of only two genders (male and female) in law, the introduction of restrictions on gender transition, and a prohibition on child adoption by same-sex couples. [33] The proposals formed part of a broader legislative agenda presented by the government at the time.

The proposed amendments were subject to criticism from international bodies and legal experts prior to their consideration. Before the vote in September 2025, the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe issued a warning, expressing concern that provisions asserting the primacy of Slovak law in "cultural and ethical issues" could conflict with the country’s obligations under EU law and the European Convention on Human Rights. The Commission also recommended removing the strict binary definition of gender from the draft, citing the risk of potential discrimination and incompatibility with existing human rights standards. It further urged Slovak lawmakers to ensure that any constitutional changes remain consistent with established European human rights jurisprudence and avoid undermining protections for minority groups. [34]

The adoption of the amendment was accompanied by public demonstrations and criticism from opposition parties, civil society organizations, and international observers. Despite disagreements, the government passed the amendment 26 September 2025, introducing a range of socially conservative measures. [35] [36] [37] The amendment formally recognized only two genders, male and female, restricted adoption to married heterosexual couples, and established a nationwide ban on surrogacy. Additionally, the amendment asserted that Slovak laws on cultural and ethical matters would take precedence over conflicting European Union legislation. [38] Government representatives described the measure as a safeguard against progressive policies and as a means of preserving national traditions and spiritual heritage.

The adoption of the amendment led to further tensions between Slovakia and European Union institutions. Following its passage, the European Commission launched an infringement proceeding against Slovakia in November 2025, citing concerns that the constitutional changes were incompatible with EU law. The dispute formed part of a broader pattern of disagreements between the Slovak government and European bodies over rule of law and the interpretation of shared legal standards. Fico responded by stating that the government was prepared to face such a dispute, remarking that he's looking forward to the conflict. [39] [40]

Attempted assassination of Robert Fico

In the context of increasing polarization in Slovak politics and media, Robert Fico published a recorded message on 10 April 2024 aimed at easing tensions. He believed that hostility towards government representatives was growing, claiming that supporters of Progressive Slovakia were openly insulting politicians in public spaces. He further warned that this climate of frustration could escalate into political violence, while also accusing media outlets such as Sme, Denník N, and Aktuality.sk of promoting aggression and deepening the societal division. [41]

On 15 May 2024, shortly after attending a government session in Handlová, Fico was shot outside the city’s House of Culture. [42] [43] The attacker fired five rounds from a handgun, hitting him twice in the abdomen and once in the shoulder, which caused life-threatening injuries. [44] [45] [46] He was quickly evacuated by security forces to a local hospital and then airlifted to a medical facility in Banská Bystrica. [47] Although he remained conscious during transport, his condition was critical and required immediate, lengthy emergency surgery, with one bullet narrowly missing vital internal organs. Deputy Prime Minister Tomáš Taraba later indicated that Fico was expected to recover. [48] On 16 May, President Peter Pellegrini stated that he had spoken with Fico in the hospital and characterized his condition as "very serious." [49]

On 17 May, Minister of Defence Robert Kaliňák reported that Robert Fico had undergone a further operation to remove dead tissue, with his condition continuing to be assessed as very serious. [50] [51] By 19 May, Kaliňák and the attending medical staff indicated a "positive prognosis", noting that the most critical risks had subsided. [52] Fico’s chief adviser, Erik Kaliňák, later revealed that the prime minister’s small intestine had been struck in five separate places. [53] By the end of May 2024, Fico was discharged from hospital and airlifted by helicopter to his residence in Bratislava, [54] where he proceeded with his recovery.

On 5 June 2024, Fico released a 14-minute prerecorded video message, marking his first public statement since May. In the video, he said the attack had caused serious health complications and that he would need several weeks before fully resuming his duties, though he expressed hope of returning to work later in June or July. While stating that he forgave the attacker and did not seek revenge or legal action, he described him as an "Slovak opposition activist" who had become a "messenger of evil and political hatred" shaped by what he called a "frustrated and unsuccessful" opposition. He also urged "anti-government media", particularly those he linked to George Soros, as well as foreign-funded non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and opposition groups, not to downplay the causes of the attack, and hesitated whether the perpetrator had acted alone. [55]

Anti-government protests

Demonstrations against Fico began on 23 December 2024, shortly after his official visit to Moscow, where he held talks with Russian President Vladimir Putin. The meeting focused primarily on the continued supply of Russian natural gas to Slovakia amid ongoing energy concerns. [56] [57] Fico's visit drew criticism both domestically and internationally, as he became one of the few Western leaders to travel to Russia following the start of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, raising questions about Slovakia’s alignment with EU's Common Security and Defence Policy. [58] Opposition parties and civil society groups argued that the trip symbolized a departure from Slovakia’s pro-European orientation and undermined the country’s credibility among its Western allies. [59]

Following the meeting, Fico did not immediately return to Slovakia and remained absent from public appearances for more than two weeks, contributing to speculation and media scrutiny. The lack of official communication regarding his whereabouts during this period further intensified public debate and fueled media attention across Slovakia. [60] His location was later identified by journalists as Vietnam, after he posted videos on social media that were geolocated to a luxury apartment in Hanoi. [61] [62] The Moscow visit, along with his subsequent absence, became a catalyst for public dissatisfaction and was widely regarded as one of the immediate triggers for the wave of protests that followed.

On 17 January 2025, during an RTVS evening broadcast, Tibor Gašpar suggested that while Smer–SD currently does not prioritize or aim to leave the European Union or NATO, both organizations are evolving. He stated that, under specific circumstances, Slovakia might even consider withdrawal, although any such decision should be made via referendum, mirroring the process by which Slovakia originally joined these organizations. [63] President Peter Pellegrini responded swiftly, invoking a September 2024 memorandum signed by Slovakia's highest constitutional officials, reaffirming "indisputable membership" in both the EU and NATO, while Hlas–SD, one of the coalition partners, rejected any discussion of withdrawal, insisting that Slovakia's democratic and security interests remain tied to these alliances. The opposition parties strongly condemned the remarks as well. [64] In a video posted later, Gašpar defended his remarks by emphasizing that any choice to exit major European or transatlantic organizations should be democratic and based on citizen consent, and insisted his stance was consistent with national interests. [65]

Amid growing criticism of Fico’s foreign policy orientation, opposition parties announced plans to initiate a vote of no confidence against the government. During the parliamentary session in January 2025, proceedings were unexpectedly moved into a classified mode at the request of Fico, who cited a report from the Slovak Information Service (SIS). [66] Journalists and the public were excluded, and the debate continued behind closed doors, prompting criticism from opposition politicians, who accused the government of undermining transparency. Subsequent reports indicated that the intelligence cited by the government was based in part on an email discussing plans for a series of peaceful protests, which had been generated using artificial intelligence and circulated among civil society actors. [67] [68] Opposition representatives and protest organizers rejected the classification of the material as unjustified, arguing that it contained no evidence of violent or unconstitutional activity and that its use served political purposes.

Fico subsequently presented allegations of a potential coup attempt in connection with the same events. Citing a classified SIS report, he claimed that opposition actors were coordinating with foreign entities to destabilize the country through civil disobedience, including protests, blockades, and strikes. [69] [70] [71] Critics, however, questioned the credibility and independence of the intelligence service, noting its leadership's ties to figures associated with the governing coalition, and described the allegations as an attempt to discredit political opponents and deter public mobilization. Opposition leaders and protest organizers rejected the claims and characterized them as intimidation.

On 24 January 2025, large-scale protests took place across Slovakia, with the main demonstration concentrated in Bratislava, which drew an estimated 40,000 participants. Significant numbers were also reported in Košice, where approximately 15,000 people joined, alongside additional gatherings in many other Slovak cities and towns. [72] [73] [74] Across the country, protesters voiced strong opposition through chants, banners, and slogans that emphasized Slovakia's alignment with Europe and democratic values. A frequently repeated message was "Slovakia is Europe", reflecting concerns about the country's political direction. Many protesters also called for Fico's resignation, framing their demands around issues of governance, foreign policy orientation, and the preservation of Slovakia’s place within the EU. The demonstrations were characterized by a broad civic turnout and a unifying pro-European sentiment spanning across the country. [75]

On 8 February 2025, the organizers coordinated another large wave of demonstrations, calling for sustained public mobilization across Slovakia. Organizers estimated that around 110,000 people participated in evening rallies held in more than 40 cities and towns nationwide, alongside parallel gatherings in multiple cities across Europe, including Prague, Kraków, Vienna, Berlin and Copenhagen, where Slovak communities joined in solidarity. The largest single protest took place in the capital, Bratislava, with an estimated 45,000 attendees. [76] Observers described the events as the most extensive protests in Slovakia since 2018, noting not only their scale but also their unusually broad geographic reach, extending beyond major urban centers into smaller towns and regions that have traditionally been more supportive of Fico.

In response, government officials argued that the protests were being shaped by foreign influence, including the Czech Republic and Ukraine, and framed the demonstrations as part of a broader attempt to undermine political stability in the country. They also claimed that the Georgian Legion had been involved in the protests, although no publicly verified evidence was provided to support these claims. [77] [78] These claims were firmly rejected by protest organizers, who characterized the rallies as a domestic expression of civic concern rather than external interference. The dispute over the protests also contributed to a more polarized public debate, with supporters of the government emphasizing themes of sovereignty and stability, while critics highlighted issues of democratic accountability and Slovakia’s orientation within Europe. At the same time, the scale and spread of the demonstrations drew attention to growing political mobilization across different segments of society, including diaspora communities, underscoring the increasing visibility of civic activism both within Slovakia and abroad.

Composition of the National Council

Group/partyIdeologyLeaderDeputies
Smer [a]
Direction – Social Democracy		 Social democracy Robert Fico
41 / 150
PS [a]
Progressive Slovakia		 Liberalism Michal Šimečka
33 / 150
Hlas [a]
Voice – Social Democracy		 Social democracy Matúš Šutaj Eštok
25 / 150
OĽaNO and Friends [b] Slovakia Populism Igor Matovič
10 / 150
For the People Liberal conservatism Veronika Remišová
1 / 150
NOVA Conservatism Gábor Grendel
1 / 150
KDH [a]
Christian Democratic Movement		 Christian democracy Milan Majerský
11 / 150
Freedom and Solidarity [a] SaS
Freedom and Solidarity		 Classical liberalism Branislav Gröhling
11 / 150
OKS
Civic Conservative Party		 Liberal conservatism Ondrej Dostál
1 / 150
Slovak National Party [a]
Slovak National Party		Conservativism Andrej Danko
8 / 150

Opinion polls

A local regression graph of all polls conducted. Opinion polling for the next Slovak parliamentary election.svg
A local regression graph of all polls conducted.

Notes

  1. 1 2 3 4 5 6 Including several independents elected on the party's list.
  2. ↑ Including several independents elected on the coalition's list.

References

  1. ↑ "Slovakia government's actions affecting the rule of law, NGOs and media". Reuters. 9 December 2025. Retrieved 13 April 2026.
  2. ↑ Camut, Nicolas (20 March 2024). "Slovakia, the EU's next rule of law headache". Politico Europe. Retrieved 13 April 2026.
  3. ↑ Fornůsek, Martin (3 April 2026). "Slovak opposition vows break from Fico's Ukraine course". Kyiv Independent. Retrieved 13 April 2026.
  4. ↑ Hancock, Sam (11 October 2023). "Slovakia elections: Populist winner signs deal to form coalition government". BBC News. Retrieved 25 October 2023.
  5. ↑ "A populist, pro-Russia ex-premier looks headed for victory in Slovakia's parliamentary elections". Associated Press. 1 October 2023. Retrieved 13 April 2026.
  6. ↑ Nicholson, Tom; Hülsemann, Laura (11 October 2023). "New government emerges in Slovakia, with Robert Fico as prime minister". Politico Europe. Retrieved 11 October 2023.
  7. ↑ Hovet, Jason (16 October 2023). "Slovakia's populist ex-PM Fico seals coalition deal for new government". Reuters. Retrieved 25 October 2023.
  8. ↑ Henley, Jon (14 February 2024). "EU told Slovakia that its reforms risked 'irreparable damage' to rule of law". The Guardian. Retrieved 13 April 2026.
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  39. ↑ Onderčanin, Lukáš (21 November 2025). "Európska komisia koná voči Slovensku pre novelu. Ústavy sa nikto nedotkne, odpovedá Fico". Sme. Retrieved 15 April 2026.
  40. ↑ Weissová, Soňa (21 November 2025). "Európska komisia začala konanie voči Slovensku pre novelu ústavy. Prosím, neplašte, reaguje Fico". Denník N. Retrieved 15 April 2026.
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  42. ↑ "Slovakia's prime minister is expected to survive assassination attempt, deputy says". Associated Press. 15 May 2024. Retrieved 14 April 2026.
  43. ↑ Crisp, James (15 May 2024). "Pro-Russian Slovakia PM's assassination attempt 'politically motivated', government claims". The Daily Telegraph. Retrieved 14 April 2026.
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  46. ↑ "Slovakia prime minister shot - latest: Slovak PM 'escaped death by a hair' - as 'lone wolf' suspect charged over assassination attempt". Sky News. 16 May 2024. Retrieved 14 April 2026.
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  48. ↑ "Slovakia's Leader Survives Surgery After Shooting, Deputy Says". The New York Times. 15 May 2024. Retrieved 14 April 2026.
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  51. ↑ Josek, Petr David (17 May 2024). "Slovakia's prime minister underwent another operation. He remains in serious condition". Associated Press. Retrieved 17 May 2024.
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  53. ↑ Vilček, Ivan (29 May 2024). "Fico měl prostřelené tenké střevo na pěti místech". Novinky.cz. Retrieved 29 May 2024.
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  57. ↑ Higgins, Andrew (23 December 2024). "Slovak Leader Visits Putin, Breaking With EU's Policy of Isolation". The New York Times. Retrieved 15 April 2026.
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