A publicly accessible viewpoint is located immediately west of the City of Fort St. John, on the south side of Highway 97.[5]
The project has drawn considerable opposition from several quarters due to its planned flooding of agricultural land, damage to the local environment, high construction cost, possible alternatives, and the uncertainty of future electricity prices and demand in the province. Two Treaty 8First Nations, and local landowners have made legal challenges to the dam, though these were dismissed by the federal Court of Appeal.[6][7] In addition, over 200 scholars, as well as the Royal Society of Canada, have expressed concerns to the federal Liberal government, citing weakness in the regulatory review process and the environmental assessment for the project.[8][9] In May 2016 the federal government stated it is "not revisiting projects that have been reviewed and approved".[10] On 11 December 2017, John Horgan, the Premier of British Columbia, announced: "We've come to a conclusion that, although Site C is not the project we would have favoured or would have started, it must be completed,"[11] thus guaranteeing the completion of the project.
History
When completed, Site C will be the third of four major dams on the Peace River that were initially proposed in the mid-twentieth century. The first project was the flagship W. A. C. Bennett Dam 19 kilometres west of Hudson's Hope. The Bennett Dam began operation in 1968 and formed Williston Reservoir, which is 95% larger than the Site C reservoir will become.[12] Construction of the Peace Canyon Dam was completed in 1980 at a point 23km downstream of the W. A. C. Bennett dam. The third dam,"Site C," was also proposed at the time for a site 83km downriver of the Peace Canyon dam, or approximately 7km southwest of Fort St. John. Site C would flood an 83km length of the Peace River valley, widening the river by up to three times, as well as a 10km length of the Moberly River valley and 14km of the Halfway River valley. The fourth proposed dam on the British Columbia segment of the Peace River, Site E, near the BC–Alberta border, was removed from the planning process during hearings in 1982.
Portion of 80 kilometre stretch of valley planned for flooding
After hearings between 1981 and 1983, the British Columbia Utilities Commission turned down the Site C project.[13] The commission was critical of BC Hydro's forecasting methods, declaring that it neither explicitly took energy prices into account nor relied on statistically significant past patterns of behaviour.[13] BC Hydro then chose to purchase electricity under long-term contracts from independent power producers, and it continues to do so today. As of 2017 these annual purchases are about four times the capacity of Site C. Once the initial contracts with BC Hydro expire, these independent producers may be free to export their electricity.[14]
In April 2010, passage of the Clean Energy Act exempted the project from further BC Utilities Commission review.[15] Site C was being reconsidered by BC Hydro for two years prior as the utility reconsidered expansion of its dam capacity on the Peace.[3] Also in April 2010, the provincial government announced it would move forward on planning for the project, moving it to the regulatory review phase.[3] The review was mandated under the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, 2012 (CEAA 2012) and the British Columbia Environmental Assessment Act (BCEAA). To avoid duplication, the governments of Canada and British Columbia set up a cooperative federal-provincial environmental assessment, including a joint review panel (JRP) process.[16]
In October 2014, Site C received environmental assessment approvals from the federal and provincial governments after a three-year environmental review, including a federal/provincial Joint Review Panel process.[17] In December 2014, the provincial government announced a final investment decision, approving the construction of the hydroelectric project at a cost of $8.335 billion, as well as a project reserve of $440 million. A notice of Site C construction commencing in 2015 was issued in July 2015.[18] By March 2016, site clearing, attempts at bank stabilization and the search for bedrock took the majority of BC Hydro's focus - there were no "works" in the ground; the diversion tunnels had not yet been started. BC Premier Christy Clark's stated intention was to get dam construction "to the point of no return" by the time of a scheduled general election in May 2017.[17] The provincial election resulted in the previous Liberal government being defeated and a New Democratic government taking office. The newly elected government requested the BC Utilities Commission 2017 review.
Local residents and landowners do not know when the filling of the dam will begin though BC Hydro has said it will not start filling until 2024 and aims to have the dam operational by 2025.[19][20]
The project has sparked controversy for a number of reasons: First Nations treaty rights are at issue,[21] the dam is thought by many to be economically unviable, and there are concerns about the loss of agriculturally productive land and the overall environmental impact.[22] The federal/provincial Joint Review Panel found that the need for the electricity had not been clearly demonstrated, nor were alternatives to the project evaluated.[16]
Cost
Site C Dam construction site near Fort St. John. Clearing on far side of river is part of the construction zone.
A cost estimate produced during the 2007 feasibility study placed the financial cost at a maximum of C$6.6 billion based on the 1981 design, safety, and engineering standards.[23][24] An updated cost projection was released in May 2011 placing the estimated cost at $7.9 billion,[25] which was revised to $8.3 billion in 2014.[24] This does not include the cost of a transmission line to major population centres, estimated to be in the range of $743 million additional, bringing the total estimated cost to approximately $9 billion.[26] At the invitation of the British Columbia Utilities Commission, Deloitte published a report on the project, and noted that it's likely to miss a crucial river diversion deadline; this will bring the cost to just under $10 billion.[27] In 2015, some experts stated that the costs could reach as high as $11 to 12 billion.[28] In February 2021, the estimated price tag rose once again, reaching $16 billion.[29]
Economic estimates in 2016 by Harry Swain, former chair of the Joint Review Panel and former BC deputy minister of Industry, projected that if all the power were sold to the US spot market, as little as $1.8 billion would be returned, and the rest ($7 billion) of the cost would be covered by taxpayers. Power consumption has not been increasing despite increasing population.[30] Swain also stated that power roughly equivalent to that produced by Site C could be reclaimed from American producers under the Columbia River Treaty at no capital cost to the province; the power is currently sold to American utilities at about half the projected cost of Site C power.[17] British Columbia Utilities Commission has stated that the Canadian entitlement under the treaty, however, is not a suitable source of dependable capacity.[31]
BC Hydro failed to disclose $128 million worth of no bid contracts it awarded, largely to SNC Lavalin until this information was revealed by The Narwhal following a Freedom of Information request.[32] An independent review has found that the same amount of energy could be produced for around half the cost using a combination of other, largely renewable energy sources.[32][17][33][34]
Legality
Members of the Treaty 8 First Nations boycotted the official Site C announcement ceremony at the Bennett Dam in April 2010,[21] and the West Moberly First Nation publicly stated that it was considering legal action to oppose the dam.[21] In April 2016, a group of landowners and farmers from BC's Peace River Valley launched a legal challenge to the project. The landowners' case states that the Provincial government ignored concerns about the project raised by the Joint Review Panel, including its cost, failure to demonstrate the need for the project, and lack of evaluation of alternatives.[6] Also in April 2016, BC Treaty 8 First Nations filed a legal challenge in the Supreme Court of BC. The Peace Valley Landowners’ Association, BC Treaty 8 First Nations, Alberta Treaty 8 First Nations, and Blueberry River First Nation were pursuing actions in federal court.[6]
As of December 2016, five judicial reviews of Site C's environmental approvals have been dismissed. These include two challenges from the Peace Valley Landowner Association in the B.C. Supreme Court and the Federal Court of Appeal, as well as a pair of challenges against the project's federal and provincial environmental approvals from the West Moberly and Prophet River First Nations. On 23 January 2017, the sixth legal challenge was dismissed, involving Treaty 8 First Nations, which was in the federal court.[35]
Scholars' concerns
In May 2016 a group of over 200 Canadian scholars signed a letter raising serious concerns about the process used to approve the Site C dam. The Royal Society of Canada took the "unusual step" of writing a separate supporting letter to Prime Minister Justin Trudeau.[36] The letter from those "concerned scholars" summarized their concerns: "Our assessment is that this process did not accord with the commitments of both the provincial and federal governments to reconciliation with and legal obligations to First Nations, protection of the environment, and evidence-based decision-making with scientific integrity."[8] Scientists argue that the environment impacts of the dam and the lack of First Nations consent make the dam a "'bellwether' of the Trudeau government's commitment to develop resources in a more science-based, sustainable and socially responsible way."[9] The federal government rejected the scholars' call to halt construction. Environment and Climate Change Minister Catherine McKenna's office indicated that the government had no intention to revisit the Site C environmental assessment.[10]
Utilities Commission 2017 review
BC's opposition New Democratic Party promised a review of the project by the BC Utilities Commission (BCUC) should they win the 2017 general election. Hydro critic Adrian Dix called the B.C. Liberal government "reckless" for not having already done the review, as was recommended by the federal-provincial Joint Review Panel led by Harry Swain.[17] On 2 August 2017, following a Provincial election, the NDP government requested that the BCUC evaluate the cost to BC Hydro ratepayers of continuing, suspending or terminating construction of the Site C dam. In its Final Report published on 1 November 2019, the BCUC reached two overarching conclusions:
The cost to ratepayers of suspending construction would be significantly higher than either continuing or terminating the project, to the tune of $3.6 billion. In addition, there are significant risks that it would not be possible to restart the project due to permitting and other issues.
The cost to ratepayers of continuing or terminating construction is similar, given the assumptions that the BCUC finds to be most reasonable. Both alternatives also have risks which may cause one or the other to be more costly to ratepayers either in the short-term or over a longer period.[37]
To assist the government in its decision-making, the BCUC included in the Final Report some sensitivity analyses to show how the cost estimates would change if different assumptions were applied.[38]
Following the release of the Final Report the BCUC responded to additional questions from the BC government which clarified that:
Site C sunk and termination costs were correctly treated in the rate impact analysis (sunk costs were excluded; Site C termination costs were added to the cost of the alternative portfolio);[39]
The same financing cost assumption was used for Site C and wind/geothermal investments in order to ensure the review was agnostic regarding ownership structure;
Demand-side management costs were included in the alternative portfolio at their cost to the utility, as these would be the costs incurred by BC Hydro;
The period used to recover Site C sunk costs from customers if the project was terminated would be subject to BCUC approval. While no determination as to the appropriate period was made, a 30-year period was assumed for the rate impact analysis with sensitivity analysis on 10- and 70-year amortization periods; and
The BCUC considered electrification in arriving at its assessment that it would be more appropriate to use BC Hydro’s low load forecast in its economic analysis. The BCUC also considered recent developments in the industrial sectors, accuracy of historical load forecasts, GDP and other forecast drivers, price elasticity assumptions, future rate increases, potential disrupting trends and historical flattening electricity demand.[40]
Agricultural land impacts
Annual flooding has deposited rich sediments along the low bank portions of the Peace River. The creation of the Williston Lake reservoir has improved agricultural use on the former floodplain. Since 1967, the annual spring flood measured at Hudson's Hope has been reduced by two-thirds, along with a reduction in ice jams and ice scouring above the riverbank.[41] The Site C project will result in the largest exclusion of land in the 40-year history of BC's Agricultural Land Reserve (ALR). Of the land to be flooded, there are 2,601 hectares (6,430 acres) of Class 2 ALR land within the project activity zone. Permanent losses are estimated at 541ha (1,340 acres) of currently cultivated land and 1,183ha (2,920 acres) of land under grazing licence or lease areas. In all, 2,775ha (6,860 acres) of land will be removed from the ALR for the project. The Joint Review Panel accepted BC Hydro's assessment that "production from the Peace River bottom lands is small and is certainly not important in the context of B.C." The Panel's assessment of earning potential in the next several decades led them to conclude: "The highest and best use of the Peace River valley would appear to be as a reservoir."[16]
Professional agrologist Wendy Holm, past president of the B.C. Institute of Agrologists, noted that flooding agricultural land in the Peace River valley is a bad idea, because it is "the only large tract of land for future horticultural expansion in the province." She notes that much of B.C.'s produce is imported from California, and growing food locally would increase food security for the province.[42]
According to David Suzuki, flooding valuable farmland to build the dam will undermine Canada's international commitments under the Paris Agreement. Suzuki considers the farmland essential to reduce B.C.'s dependence on imported foods and minimize the carbon fuels needed to transport those foods: "It seems to me crazy to put farmland in the north underwater," Suzuki said. "We live in a food chain now in which food grows on average 3,000 kilometres from where it's consumed. The transport of all that food is dependent on fossil fuels. Food has got to be grown much closer to where it's going to be consumed."[43]
Proposed benefits
In April 2015, the federal and provincial governments named a Joint Review Panel to hold a public hearing on Site C.[44]
In addition to a long list of recommended changes, their assessment stated: "Despite high initial costs, and some uncertainty about when the power would be needed, the Project would provide a large and long-term increment of firm energy and capacity at a price that would benefit future generations. It would do this in a way that would produce a vastly smaller burden of greenhouse gases than any alternative save nuclear power, which B.C. has prohibited."[33] At the time the report was released, the panel added, "Site C would be the least expensive of the alternatives, and its cost advantages would increase with the passing decades as inflation makes alternatives more costly."[45]
In reference to the Paris climate accord, Site C is predicted to prevent approximately 30 to 70 million tonnes of carbon dioxide from being generated in the atmosphere.[46]
Ottawa has discussed a new electricity inter-tie to move Site C power between BC and Alberta. Justin Trudeau commented "I think anything we can work together inter-provincially or nationally [to get] emissions down, emphasizing hydroelectricity, creating opportunities to get off coal, to get off natural gas, where possible, is good for the country. It’s good for our emissions profile; it’s good for the economy we need to build," [47]
This section may be unbalanced towards certain viewpoints. Please improve the article by adding information on neglected viewpoints, or discuss the issue on the talk page.(August 2020)
Northeastern BC Indigenous peoples have previously been negatively impacted by other resource development projects, such as the W.A.C. Bennett Dam which is on the same river as Site C.[48] It is feared that the construction of the Site C Dam would result in similar impacts, such as the alteration of Indigenous ways of life, although consultation with Indigenous groups is taking place and measures to mitigate some of the dam's impacts on Indigenous peoples are being taken.[49] The risk of serious harm to the rights of Indigenous peoples requires that large-scale resource development proceed only with their free, prior and informed consent.
First Nations have identified hundreds of sacred sites or areas with cultural or historic significance in the planned Site C flood zone.[50] The Indigenous peoples of the area use the valley to hunt, fish trap, and gather berries as well as conduct ceremonies and harvest wild foods. The valley is a prime habitat for animals that they rely on as a food source, such as moose, bears, and eagles.
Resource extraction has led to rapid population growth in the region. As a result of road construction and logging, non-Indigenous fisherman and hunters now have access to dwindling harvests. Just over 110 square km is recognized as reserve lands and this is not enough to sustain First Nations cultures and traditions.[51] Indigenous peoples have ongoing rights to harvest foods and practice their customs throughout their broader territory but because of intensive resource development there is a decreasing amount of places left where this is possible. The Peace River Valley falls within the bounds of Treaty 8, which recognizes First Nations rights to hunt, trap, and fish throughout the region. According to Indigenous activist Helen Knott, if the valley is flooded, then the promise of that treaty will be violated.
Impacts to wildlife
Bear relocation
The proposed flood zone will flood the Peace River Valley, a biodiverse area where four ecosystem zones meet that is home to a significant number of bears.[20] In order to mitigate impacts on wildlife, BC Hydro has proposed trapping, tranquilizing, and relocating the bears prior to the dam being filled.[20] A permit to relocate the bears was filed on October 16, 2023, requesting permission to move the bears starting November 1, 2023.[20] The permit application seeks to relocate the bears to artificially constructed bear dens made of straw bales while the bears are hibernating.[20] The proposed relocation strategy has been criticised as being dangerous for the bears and people moving them and for being untested.[52][20]
Endangered and threatened species
The dam could also harm an already threatened fish species, the bull trout. The flooding of the valley may poison the fish with methylmercury for 20–30 years.[53]
Alternatives
BC Hydro achieved savings at $20/MWh, while the estimated savings were at $30/MWh. Columbia Treaty and non-treaty power now sold to the US, is available at approximately $30/MWh, equivalent to Site C quantities. BC Hydro determined in the 2013 Integrated Resource Plan, DSM 5, that more than double the amount of power from Site C could be obtained from conservation at up to $45/MWh.[citation needed]
In 2017, Alberta received quotations for 600 MW of wind power at $37/MWh.[citation needed]
When BC Hydro buys power from independent power producers they set a price as low as $76.20 per megawatt hour for intermittent power from wind farms, and as high as $133.80 for firm hydro power. The average price paid, as of 2010, was $100 per megawatt hour.[54] Site C is expected to cost $83 per megawatt hour for firm hydro power.[55]
British Columbia has committed to reducing greenhouse gases to 33 per cent below 2007 levels by 2020; however, the province is far short of that goal, only achieving a 6.5% reduction as of 2015.[56] Although the Site C dam is expected to have a large initial electricity surplus, the province has proposed to sell this power rather than choosing to reduce fossil fuel consumption in the province.[57][47]
In 1983 the B.C. Utilities Commission recommended the province to explore geothermal as a potential alternative to Site C. As the Site C Joint Review Panel noted in its final report on the project, the province put virtually no effort into exploring alternatives.[58]
The W. A. C. Bennett Dam is a large hydroelectric dam on the Peace River in northern British Columbia, Canada. At 186 metres (610 ft) high, it is one of the world's highest earth fill dams. Construction of the dam began in 1961 and culminated in 1968. At the dam, the Finlay, the Parsnip and the Peace rivers feed into Williston Lake, also referred to as Williston Reservoir. It is the third largest artificial lake in North America as well as the largest body of fresh water in British Columbia. Williston Lake runs 250 kilometres north–south and 150 kilometres east–west.
The British Columbia Hydro and Power Authority, operating as BC Hydro, is a Canadian electric utility in the province of British Columbia. It is the main electricity distributor, serving more than 4 million customers in most areas, with the exception of the City of New Westminster, where the city runs its own electrical department and portions of the West Kootenay, Okanagan, the Boundary Country and Similkameen regions, where FortisBC, a subsidiary of Fortis Inc. directly provides electric service to 213,000 customers and supplies municipally owned utilities in the same area. As a provincial Crown corporation, BC Hydro reports to the BC Ministry of Energy, Mines and Low Carbon Innovation, and is regulated by the British Columbia Utilities Commission (BCUC). Its mandate is to generate, purchase, distribute and sell electricity.
Hugh Keenleyside Dam is a flood control dam spanning the Columbia River, 12 km upstream of the city of Castlegar, British Columbia, Canada.
The Peace River is a 1,923-kilometre-long (1,195 mi) river in Canada that originates in the Rocky Mountains of northern British Columbia and flows to the northeast through northern Alberta. The Peace River joins the Athabasca River in the Peace-Athabasca Delta to form the Slave River, a tributary of the Mackenzie River. The Finlay River, the main headwater of the Peace River, is regarded as the ultimate source of the Mackenzie River. The combined Finlay–Peace–Slave–Mackenzie river system is the 13th longest river system in the world.
The Manitoba Hydro-Electric Board, operating as Manitoba Hydro, is the electric power and natural gas utility in the province of Manitoba, Canada. Founded in 1961, it is a provincial Crown Corporation, governed by the Manitoba Hydro-Electric Board and the Manitoba Hydro Act. Today the company operates 16 interconnected generating stations. It has more than 527,000 electric power customers and more than 263,000 natural gas customers. Since most of the electrical energy is provided by hydroelectric power, the utility has low electricity rates. Stations in Northern Manitoba are connected by a HVDC system, the Nelson River Bipole, to customers in the south. The internal staff are members of the Canadian Union of Public Employees Local 998 while the outside workers are members of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Local 2034.
The Columbia River Treaty is a 1961 agreement between Canada and the United States on the development and operation of dams in the upper Columbia River basin for power and flood control benefits in both countries. Four dams were constructed under this treaty: three in the Canadian province of British Columbia and one in the U.S. state of Montana.
The Mactaquac Dam is an embankment dam used to generate hydroelectricity in Mactaquac, New Brunswick. It dams the waters of the Saint John River and is operated by NB Power with a capacity to generate 670 megawatts of electricity from 6 turbines; this represents 20 percent of New Brunswick's power demand.
The electricity sector in Canada has played a significant role in the economic and political life of the country since the late 19th century. The sector is organized along provincial and territorial lines. In a majority of provinces, large government-owned integrated public utilities play a leading role in the generation, transmission, and distribution of electricity. Ontario and Alberta have created electricity markets in the last decade to increase investment and competition in this sector of the economy.
The British Columbia Transmission Corporation (BCTC) was a Crown corporation in the province of British Columbia, Canada. Its mandate was to plan, build, operate and maintain B.C.'s electricity transmission system.
Canada has access to all main sources of energy including oil and gas, coal, hydropower, biomass, solar, geothermal, wind, marine and nuclear. It is the world's second largest producer of uranium, third largest producer of hydro-electricity, fourth largest natural gas producer, and the fifth largest producer of crude oil. In 2006, only Russia, the People's Republic of China, the United States and Saudi Arabia produce more total energy than Canada.
FortisBC is a Canadian owned, British Columbia based regulated utility providing natural gas, and electricity. FortisBC has approximately 2,600 employees serving more than 1.2 million customers in 135 B.C. communities and 58 First Nations communities across 150 Traditional Territories.
The Kenney Dam is a rock-fill embankment dam on the Nechako River in northwestern British Columbia, built in the early 1950s. The impoundment of water behind the dam forms the Nechako Reservoir, which is also commonly known as the Ootsa Lake Reservoir. The dam was constructed to power an aluminum smelter in Kitimat, British Columbia by Alcan, although in the late 1980s the company increased their economic activity by selling excess electricity across North America. The development of the dam caused various environmental problems along with the displacement of the Cheslatta T'En First Nation, whose traditional land was flooded.
The Nechako Reservoir, sometimes called the Ootsa Lake Reservoir, is a hydroelectric reservoir in British Columbia, Canada that was formed by the Kenney Dam making a diversion of the Nechako River through a 16-km intake tunnel in the Kitimat Ranges of the Coast Mountains to the 890 MW Kemano Generating Station at sea level at Kemano to service the then-new Alcan aluminum smelter at Kitimat. When it was constructed on the Nechako River in 1952, it resulted in the relocation of over 75 families. It was one of the biggest reservoirs built in Canada until the completion of the Columbia Treaty Dams and the W.A.C. Bennett Dam that created Lake Williston. The water level may swing 10 feet between 2790 and 2800 feet.
According to the International Hydropower Association, Canada is the fourth largest producer of hydroelectricity in the world in 2021 after the United States, Brazil, and China. In 2019, Canada produced 632.2 TWh of electricity with 60% of energy coming from Hydroelectric and Tidal Energy Sources).
The Blueberry River First Nations is an Indian band based in the Peace country in northeast British Columbia. The band is headquartered on Blueberry River 205 Indian reserve located 80 kilometres (50 mi) northwest of Fort St. John. The band is party to Treaty 8.
The Muskrat Falls Generating Station is a hydroelectric generating station in the Labrador region of Newfoundland and Labrador, Canada. It comprises part of the remaining 35 per cent of the Churchill River that was not developed by the Churchill Falls Generating Station. The station at Muskrat Falls has a capacity of over 824 MW and provides 4.5 TWh of electricity per year.
The history of electricity sector in Canada has played a significant role in the economic and political life of the country since wide-scale industrial and commercial power services spread across the country in the 1880s. The development of hydropower in the early 20th century has profoundly affected the economy and the political life in Canada and has come to symbolize the transition from "old " industrialism of the 19th century to a "new", modern and diversified, Canadian economy.
Independent Power Producer (IPP) projects have had a significant presence in British Columbia since the 1980s. Their relationship with BC Hydro grew from the province's need to supply growing energy demands and implementation of the 2002 Energy Strategy, which mandated that BC Hydro would purchase its energy supply from IPPs rather than generating the supply itself. There are a variety of power projects in BC, with the most popular being hydroelectricity and biomass projects. In recent years, more attention has been placed on the environmental effects of IPP projects and the social implications it has to residents living around the project development sites. Despite the decline in demand for new IPP projects, in 2016 they supplied 20,000 GWh, one-third of BC Hydro's total.
LNG Canada Development Inc. is an industrial joint venture established to construct a liquefied natural gas (LNG) export terminal in Kitimat, British Columbia, Canada. The consortium is led by Shell and also includes Petronas, PetroChina, Mitsubishi, and Korea Gas. The Kitimat terminal will export LNG produced in the Montney Formation near Dawson Creek, B.C by the project's partners.
1 2 3 Swain, Harry; Beaudet, Jocelyne; Mattison, James (May 2014), Site C Clean Energy Project(PDF), Minister of the Environment, Government of Canada and Minister of Environment, Government of British Columbia, retrieved 11 July 2016
↑ BCUC letter to the Deputy Minister of Energy, Mines and Petroleum Resources Respecting the Site C Inquiry, 23 November 2017, page 1. Report Errata was issued on 16 November 2017 to correct two math related errors, however the changes to the final analysis was not material and did not affect the BCUC’s overall findings.
↑ BCUC letter to the Deputy Minister of Energy, Mines and Petroleum Resources Respecting the Site C Inquiry, 23 November 2017, page 2; Site C Inquiry Report, Executive Summary, page 10
↑ BCUC letter to the Deputy Minister of Energy, Mines and Petroleum Resources Respecting the Site C Inquiry, 23 November 2017, pp. 4, 5
↑ BCUC letter to the Deputy Minister of Energy, Mines and Petroleum Resources Respecting the Site C Inquiry, 23 November 2017, pp. 18-25
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