During the Gulf War of 1991 United States Naval Forces Central Command (NAVCENT) reported to United States Central Command. After discussions between General H. Norman Schwarzkopf (CINCCENT) and Admiral Huntington Hardisty (CINCPAC), Vice Admiral Henry H. Mauz Jr. ("Hank" Mauz), Commander Seventh Fleet, was appointed as Commander U.S. Naval Forces Central Command (COMUSNAVCENT).
After arrival in-theatre in late 1990, Vice Admiral Mauz "retained the Middle East Force, Commander Task Group 150.1 (CTG 150.1), for most warfighting functions inside the Persian Gulf. Under the CTG 150.1 designation, Rear Admiral William M. "Bill" Fogarty would control only the half-dozen ships or so of the Middle East Force, augmented by the battleship USS Wisconsin (BB-64) when it arrived. Under a second hat, CTG 150.2, Fogarty would be the commander of the U.S. Maritime Interception Force. For this job, his authority would extend outside the Persian Gulf to ships operating in the North Arabian Sea and Red Sea, but only for interception operations." [1] The CVBGs in the North Arabian Sea and Red Sea were designated Task Groups 150.4 and 150.5 respectively; the Amphibious and Landing Forces were CTG 150.6 and CTG 150.8 (Major General Jenkins). Rear Admiral Stephen S. Clarey was Commander U.S. Maritime Prepositioning Force, Task Group 150.7, which was disestablished on 12 September 1990. [2] [3]
USS Dwight D. Eisenhower (CVN-69) transited from the Mediterranean/Suez Canal into the Red Sea on 8 August 1990 with USS Ticonderoga, USS John L. Hall, USS Suribachi (AE-21) and USNS Neosho (T-AO-143), the last two underway replenishment ships (CH-90, pp13–14). [4] On 23–24 August, the Red Sea Battle Group was turned over to the USS Saratoga group, and 'Eisenhower' and 'Ticonderoga' left Sixth Fleet on 3 September.
From 1 January 1991, the six carriers deployed were divided into Battle Force Yankee (two carriers, including Saratoga, in the Red Sea under Rear Admiral Riley Mixson, Commander, Carrier Group Two/Task Force 155) and Task Force 154, Battle Force Zulu (four carriers in the Arabian Sea/Persian Gulf under Rear Admiral Daniel P. March, Commander, Carrier Group Five). TF 150 was Vice Admiral Henry H. Mauz, Jr. himself, TF 151 the Middle East Force, now including USS Bunker Hill, TG 150.3 Naval Logistics Support Force (Rear Admiral Bob Sutton), and TF 156 the amphibious force. [5] Conduct of the Persian Gulf War Fig VII-3, lists the PG, Red Sea, and Middle East Forces; the Amphibious Force, the Logistics Support Force, at some points, the Mediterranean Strike Group, and NAVCENT Rep Riyadh.
Rear Admiral "Mixson also commanded CTG 150.9, the Mediterranean Strike Group, which included ships and a submarine launching TLAMs (eight) into Iraq several days after" the beginning of the Coalition assault on 17 January 1991. [6]
On 15 February, France placed one frigate, Jean de Vienne (D-643), [7] under U.S. operational control to escort Coalition combat logistics ships, but it was not authorised to take part in offensive operations. [8]
Battle Force Yankee included two carriers, including Saratoga, in the Red Sea under Rear Admiral Riley Mixson, Commander, Carrier Group Two/Task Force 155). [21]
During the Gulf Conflict, the Royal Navy "had a pivotal role in joint operations". Westland Lynx helicopters were tasked with finding and destroying Iraqi Navy vessels. A large element of the Royal Navy undertook the coalition's mine hunting in the northern Gulf. In clearing the Gulf of mines, the Royal Navy minehunters enabled the battleships USS Missouri and USS Wisconsin to sail into Kuwaiti waters, from where they would fire their 16-inch guns on Iraqi positions ashore. The Type 42 destroyers provided air defence for these vessels, notably when HMS Gloucester was able to intercept a missile fired at Missouri. [38] In total, the Fleet Air Arm destroy some 15 Iraqi patrol vessels, achieving a 93% hit rate, and accounting for 1/4 of all ships destroyed in the war. [39]
Preliminary command arrangements for the BAe Nimrod detachment to be sent to the Gulf were made on 10 August 1990:
"The Joint Commander of British forces in the Gulf (the AOC-in-C Strike Command) assumed operational command of the Nimrod detachment, while operational control was vested in the Air Commander British Forces Arabian Peninsular. Tactical command of the Nimrod detachment was exercised by the Detachment Commander, who reported to the Air Commander, but it was accepted that tactical control (TACON) might be delegated to the Royal Navy Task Group already deployed in the Gulf, Task Group 321.1 (under the Commander Task Group (CTG 321.1), the Senior Naval Officer Middle East." [40]
It appears that command of Task Force 321 was retained by the Commander-in-Chief Fleet at Northwood Headquarters in the northwest of London. On 29 November 1990 Commodore Chris Craig relieved Commodore Paul Haddocks as Senior Naval Officer Middle East. [41]
Ashore supporting the 1st (UK) Armoured Division was the Support Helicopter Force Middle East, which included a composite Royal Marine Westland Sea King HC.4 made up of six aircraft each from 845 Naval Air Squadron and 848 Naval Air Squadron, totalling 12. [54]
In September 1990, at one of the early coordinating meetings for the maritime interception operation, French and Italian representatives asked for a separate role for the naval units of the Western European Union (WEU) states. The WEU states were therefore assigned a separate operating area off the United Arab Emirates. [55] The WEU decided to place their ships under the operational command of the French Amiral Ocean Indien (ALINDIEN). [56]
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