The Reconstruction and Development Alliance is an electoral and parliamentary coalition in Iraq, founded by Prime Minister Mohammed Shia' Al Sudani on 20 May 2025. The alliance was formed to contest the parliamentary elections scheduled for 11 November 2025 and to support Al-Sudani's bid for a second term as Prime Minister. It consists of multiple political parties and independent members of parliament.[1][2][3] The bloc has 54 members in parliament.[4]
The alliance includes Al-Sudani’s Furatayn Movement; the National Coalition, led by former Prime Minister Ayad Allawi; and the National Contract Alliance, headed by Popular Mobilisation Forces chief Falih Al-Fayyadh. It also brings together the Karbala Creativity Alliance, under Karbala Governor Nassif al-Khattabi; the Sumer Land Gathering, led by Labour Minister Ahmed Al-Asadi; the Generations Gathering, led by MP Mohammed al-Sahyoud; and the National Solutions Alliance, led by Prime Minister’s adviser Mohammed Sahib Al-Daraji.[5]
Ideology
Iraqi Nationalism
The bloc promotes a vision of Iraqi nationalism grounded in pluralism, sovereignty, and reform. It supports Iraq’s democratic and federal system, emphasizing inclusive governance and the protection of the country’s cultural and religious diversity.[6] The alliance advocates state authority over armed groups and frames its stance against militia influence as part of a broader anti-corruption and institution-building agenda.[7]
Iraqi nationalism is closely tied to the safeguarding and preservation of Mesopotamian heritage. Al-Sudani's government has made significant efforts to recover ancient Iraqi artifacts,[8][9] which al-Sudani describes as representing “the nation’s identity, history, and civilization... highlighting Iraq’s contributions to human history".[10] In a speech on Engineer's Day, Al-Sudani described Iraqi engineers as “an extension of our creative Mesopotamian heritage".[11] He has also tied water policy to the preservation of Iraq’s ancient identity, warning that the drying of the Tigris and Euphrates threatens the “cradle of civilization”.[12]
Economic Liberalism
The alliance backs an open, investment-led model that expands the private sector and diversifies beyond oil. According to government figures, Iraq has attracted more than $100 billion in investments between 2023 and 2025,[13] with a stated target of $250 billion more by 2027.[14] Furthermore, the alliance promotes sovereign guarantees up to 85% of project value to de-risk foreign direct investment (FDI).[15]
For mass housing, Iraq employs public-private partnership (PPP) models in which the state plays a central role in shaping pricing and financing terms. Under the National Investment Commission’s housing program, the government grants land and licenses to developers on a conditional basis while capping target sales prices to maintain affordability. The program also coordinates with the Trade Bank of Iraq to arrange down-payment schemes, mortgages, and financing packages, providing mechanisms for long-term payment plans and cost recovery for developers.[16]
Tourism is a significant component of the alliance’s plans to diversify Iraq’s economy. Prime Minister Mohammed Shia' al-Sudani’s government has launched a national tourism strategy for 2025–2035 intended to increase Iraq’s role in cultural and religious tourism. Despite Iraq’s extensive archaeological and religious heritage, tourism currently contributes less than 0.5% to GDP. The strategy aims to increase this share to 5–10% within a decade through structural reforms, visa facilitation, and partnerships with private and international investors.[17][18]
Pragmatism
Al-Sudani’s government has pursued a pragmatic foreign policy aimed at securing Iraq’s stability and long-term interests amid shifting regional dynamics.[19][20][21] Following the fall of Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad in December 2024, Baghdad recalibrated its stance toward Syria, engaging with the transitional government led by interim president Ahmed al-Sharaa (a former al-Qaeda member known as Abu Mohammad al-Jolani) despite widespread public outrage over his past actions in Iraq.[19] Iraqi intelligence has initiated cooperation with Syrian authorities on counterterrorism and intensified efforts to secure the Iraqi-Syrian border.[20] Baghdad has also partnered with Damascus to combat Captagon trafficking, targeting production facilities in Syria that expanded under what the Arab Center Washington DC describes Assad's "narco-state".[19] Security risks from the al-Hawl camp, which houses thousands of families of suspected ISIS fighters and individuals displaced from former conflict zones, is also a reason for closer coordination with Damascus. Iraq became the first country to begin dismantling the camp, which Iraqi officials have referred to as a “time-delayed bomb”, and has repatriated more than 15,000 Iraqi nationals under rehabilitation programs.[22]
Al-Sudani’s government withdrew a controversial draft law to expand the powers of the Popular Mobilization Units (PMU) after U.S. warnings of “severe sanctions”, a move that the UK-based Amwaj.media analysis described as a tactical compromise aimed at easing U.S. pressure while avoiding clashes with Iran-aligned factions.[23]
Non-alignment
Iraq under al-Sudani has emphasized distance from regional blocs while coordinating selectively on security and economic interests. During the Iran–Israel war, the government thwarted 29 attempted launches by Iran-aligned factions from Iraqi territory, while in a UN setting Al-Sudani described Israel as the aggressor and called for de-escalation and humanitarian access to Gaza.[24] At the regional level, Baghdad has pursued a return to the Arab fold and deeper Gulf ties, drawing new Saudi, Emirati and Qatari investment and hosting the Arab League summit in May 2025.[25] Economically, Iraq launched the Development Road with Türkiye to link Basra and the Grand Faw Port to Europe via Turkish corridors, alongside energy talks on oil, gas, petrochemicals, and electricity.[26] In parallel, Baghdad has diversified partnerships across major powers, advancing multi-billion-dollar energy projects with French TotalEnergies,[27] UK's BP,[28] and American Chevron,[29] while also announcing civil nuclear cooperation with China[30] and Russia.[31]
As part of diversifying regional partnerships, Iraq has deepened strategic ties with Oman, signing 24 memoranda of understanding and two agreements covering energy, investment, trade, scientific research, and youth programs.[32] Both governments have underscored dialogue, mutual respect, and non-interference in regional affairs as the basis of their cooperation.[33] While Iraq has moved to limit the influence of Iran-aligned factions and curb efforts to build parallel structures within its borders, it has simultaneously deepened state-to-state cooperation with Tehran through a 21-point agreement on border security, trade facilitation, and pilgrimage coordination, as well as a tourism partnership targeting 10 million annual visitors across religious, medical, and cultural sectors.[34][35]
Reformism
Under Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani, Iraq has pursued a reform agenda focused on modernizing state institutions, integrating into global markets, and improving governance. Iraq joined the TIR Convention to streamline cross-border freight transit and strengthen its role as a regional trade corridor.[36] It has also resumed negotiations to join the World Trade Organization (WTO) after a 16-year hiatus, updating trade regulations to align with global standards.[37][38] On security, Baghdad launched a high-level political dialogue with NATO to enhance cooperation on counterterrorism, border security, and staff training.[39] Iraq has also begun automating customs and border crossings via the ASYCUDA system to curb corruption, reduce smuggling, and increase transparency in trade facilitation.[40][41] The anti-corruption measures undertaken by al-Sudani have been praised by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).[42]
Al-Sudani's reforms aligning financial regulations with international norms have drawn recognition from the U.S. Treasury for their progress.[43] Furthermore, the government introduced a regulation aimed at reducing cash dependency and improving financial inclusion. Al-Sudani highlighted its impact, noting that digital payment collections increased from 2.6 trillion IQD in January 2023 to 7.6 trillion IQD by late 2024.[44] Since July 2025, all Iraqi government institutions have fully transitioned to electronic payment systems for revenue collection and transactions, a reform intended to enhance transparency and reduce opportunities for financial corruption.[45]
History
The bloc’s formation took place amid widening divisions within the Coordination Framework (CF). In early 2025, several CF factions expressed unease over the prime minister’s growing local political base, particularly through alliances with governors Asaad Al Eidani of Basra, Nassif Al-Khattabi of Karbala, and Muhammad Al-Mayahi of Wasit. The alliance also attracted prominent figures from CF-affiliated parties, such as Oil Minister Hayan Abdul Ghani and MP Alia Nassif, further heightening tensions with his former partners.[46]
Political relations and rivalries
Prime Minister Mohammed Shia’ al-Sudani’s relations with influential Shiite figures Muqtada al-Sadr and Grand AyatollahAli al-Sistani have shaped Iraq’s current political dynamics. Sistani’s religious establishment in Najaf has recently asserted greater influence in Baghdad,[47][48] rejecting the idea of Iraq being part of regional external alliances.[49] Sudani has engaged with Najaf’s positions, with Sistani’s representative Abdul Mahdi al-Karbalai urging the government to limit weapons to state authorities and strengthen state institutions.[48] Regarding al-Sadr, while he has reaffirmed his boycott of the November 2025 elections, sources note that he has signaled readiness to support an “alternative bloc” that commits to his reform program, which includes restricting weapons to state forces and dissolving militias.[7] This has prompted concerns among some Coordination Framework factions about a potential tacit alignment between al-Sadr and Sudani on issues of militia control, which could influence electoral dynamics ahead of the vote.[50]
The coalition’s primary rival is the State of Law Coalition led by former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki.[51][52][53] Multiple analyses describe a direct contest between Sudani and Maliki, especially in Baghdad, with Maliki personally running there and retaining strong organization across southern provinces such as Basra, Dhi Qar, Muthanna, and Karbala.[52][53] Maliki’s support base is reported to include middle-class voters, state employees, and military personnel, and his ties to the Supreme Judicial Council have helped him resist efforts to sideline him.[53] The rivalry has also surfaced in provincial contests, including the Baghdad governorship race, where the two blocs backed opposing candidates.[54] Furthermore, the Iran-aligned militia Kata'ib Hezbollah and President Abdul Latif Rashid have both been reported as supporting measures to block Al-Sudani’s legislative reforms ahead of the elections.[55][56]
Controversies
Criticism has been directed toward Sudani over his handling of disputes with the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) regarding budget transfers.[57] Baghdad has withheld fiscal allocations,[57] accusing KRG of exceeding production quotas and smuggling oil to Iran and Turkey.[58][59] In 2025, parliament approved a list of 91 ambassadorial nominees,[60] which critics said reflected political bargaining and nepotism.[61] Reports alleged that several appointees were relatives of senior officials.[61] While the approved list included Shiite, Sunni, Kurdish, Christian, Yazidi, and Sabian candidates,[62] lawmakers and observers said the process reflected Iraq’s entrenched ethno-sectarian quota system, which has prioritized party interests over competence since 2003.[61]
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