Uljin–Samcheok Landings

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Ulchin-Samcheok landings
Part of the Korean War and the Cold War
PPS-43, compasses and fake ID from the Ulchin-Samcheok Landings.jpg
PPS-43, compasses, grenade, and fake ID from the Ulchin-Samcheok landings at the War Memorial of Korea
DateOctober 30, 1968 – December 26, 1968
Location
Ulchin, Samcheok, Gangwon Province
Result South Korea–American victory
Belligerents
Flag of South Korea (1949-1984).svg South Korea
Flag of the United States (Pantone).svg  United States 		Flag of North Korea.svg  North Korea
Commanders and leaders
Flag of South Korea (1949-1984).svg Park Chung Hee
Flag of the United States (Pantone).svg Charles Bonesteel III Lyndon B Johnson 		Flag of North Korea.svg Kim Il Sung
Strength

US 6th Combat Aviation Platoon
26th Rear Area Security Division
Republic of Korea Reserve Forces
Republic of Korea Marine Corps
U.S. 2nd Infantry Division

Total Strength:

Contents


70,000

KPA Unit 124





Total Strength:
120
Casualties and losses
Total casualties:
Flag of South Korea (1949-1984).svg South Korea
63 killed (incl. 23 civilians) [1]
Flag of the United States (Pantone).svg United States
3 killed
3 wounded [2] 		Total casualties:
Flag of North Korea.svg North Korea
110 killed
7 captured
3 unaccounted for

DMZ skirmishes and tensions (1966–1967)

A concrete wall and a guard tower at the Korean Demilitarized Zone View of the concrete wall and barbed wire separating South Korea from North Korea Kijong-Dong "Propaganda Village". Note the Communist red star located on the guard tower. The Milit - DPLA - be871a3539dd58b35850eb05c81ba43c.jpeg
A concrete wall and a guard tower at the Korean Demilitarized Zone

The years of 1966 and 1967 were riddled with a number of low-intensity border skirmishes, which mainly involved coordinated DPRK spy activity along the DMZ (avoiding the American guarded sector) accompanied by several firefights. On November 2, 1966, North Korean forces ambushed the 23rd Infantry Regiment two days after U.S. president Lyndon B Johnson's visit to South Korea. In 1967, the number of incidents increased, but they were of lower magnitude, consisting primarily of brief coordinated ambushes which resulted in casualties from both sides, and the destruction of military property such as jeeps and patrol boats. [4]

The DPRK agents also began sizing up the South Korean defenses in order to lay the groundwork for insurrection. Most belonged to the Reconnaissance General Bureau, an important subdivision under the KWP liaison department responsible for a majority of DMZ activity. These guerrilla agents preferred to strike in the favourable conditions of autumn: the longer nights, dry ground, and fog. Unlike the North, the South possessed no counter-guerrilla units in 1966, although by January 1967, motivated by the "November 2nd incident," General Bonesteel and his personal committee devised a new four-layer anti-infiltration strategy to hamper the DPRK under the Counter Infiltration Guerilla Concepts Requirements Plan of 1967. [14] In terms of sea infiltration, the defense was largely left up to the ROKA, which were uncoordinated and ill-equipped with necessary radio and communications. Meanwhile, while the allies fortified their defenses as best they could, Kim launched a domestic crash program to train elite special warfare units, which would eventually amount to the completion of the all-officer 124th and 283d Army Units in 1968. [15]

However, internal tensions were already mounting between the allies. The South Korean leadership demonstrated aggressive hopes of reunification and an escalation of the conflict. However, Bonesteel, according to the United States priority in Vietnam, remained committed only to defending South Korea against DPRK threats. Bonesteel avoided deploying heavy weaponry and artillery in order to avoid entangling South Koreans in the casualties, which Park viewed as representative of the U.S.' uncommitted nature and indecisiveness. [16] Ultimately, Bonesteel intended to keep the status quo in which South Korea played second fiddle to Vietnam, even if it meant costing lives and suppressing the South Korean leadership, while maintaining unceasing vigilance along the border in case of any further major DPRK attack. [17]

Blue House raid and the USS Pueblo incident (1968)

In 1966–67, Kim grew increasingly impatient as his unconventional tactics along the DMZ continued to fail in severing the U.S. and South Korea alliance. Bonesteel and Park seemed to be working closer than ever before, showing signs of developing a capable counter-insurgency plan coordinated with information gathered from failed DPRK attacks. As time began to slip, the DPRK made two bold moves on January in 1968. [18]

The Blue House Korea-Seoul-Blue House (Cheongwadae) Reception Center 0688&9-07 cropped.jpg
The Blue House

First, Kim ordered a band of DPRK commandos to assassinate Park at the Blue House. By doing so, he hoped to agitate the South Korean people to rise up against their government and the "American imperialists." [16] On the evening of the 17th, they penetrated into the U.S. 2nd Infantry Division sector disguised in ROK army uniforms. For two days and nights, they moved in stealth towards Seoul, but made the mistake of trying to indoctrinate villagers on the 19th, who later notified authorities. The commandos were eventually halted by a police contingent just 800 meters from the presidential house, which prompted a nationwide manhunt. [19] The Blue House raid also coincided with the capture of 82 crew members aboard the USS Pueblo (January 23) by disguised North Korean patrol boats.

The USS Pueblo on display in North Korea after its capture Laika ac USS Pueblo (7960099660).jpg
The USS Pueblo on display in North Korea after its capture

These two attacks occurred in tandem with the Tet Offensive in Vietnam, which further burdened the U.S. military effort. Pyongyang welcomed the timing of the Tet Offensive and the sudden seizure of the Pueblo as chances to further dissuade the U.S. from maintaining its presence in South Korea. [20] Meanwhile, the Blue House raid vastly elevated the threat of the DPRK in the eyes of Seoul, but not the U.S., thus threatening to divide the allies. Under these conditions, In the aftermath of January 1968, the U.S.' response was of marked contrast to that of South Korea. President Johnson primarily reacted to the Tet Offensive and the Pueblo incident by ordering Bonesteel to initiate talks with the DPRK through Panmunjom in order to return American hostages.

In comparison, Seoul viewed the Tet Offensive as a sideshow in response to the immense threat of the DPRK, culminating in the creation of Homeland Defense Reserve Forces under Instruction 18. [21] It functioned not only as a militia but also conducted anti-communist education aimed towards rural villagers in order to defeat the indoctrination attempts by the North. [22] The ROK accused the United States of having implemented a policy of appeasement and refused to negotiate with U.S. representatives. However, Park's anger quickly subsided due to fear of losing U.S. backing and an increased flow of military resources into South Korea. By the end of 1968, the DMZ had become increasingly hard to penetrate. However, the same could not be said for the coastal border, where terrain and sub-par technological obstacles provided the DPRK with another avenue of invasion.

Landings

124th Army Unit landing

South Korea topography with the Taebaek Mountains marked South Korea location map topography with taebaek mountains marked.jpg
South Korea topography with the Taebaek Mountains marked
Samcheok Beach, where the 124th Army Unit commandos landed, in 2009 Korea-Samcheok-Beach-01.jpg
Samcheok Beach, where the 124th Army Unit commandos landed, in 2009

The Ulchin–Samcheok landings occurred at midnight on October 30, 1968, along the North Gyeongsang Province and Gangwon Province. In total, 120 North Korean commandos were dispatched from Unit 124. The force was organized into three groups, two of which consisted of 30 troops with one group of 60. These groups avoided detection and landed in eight predetermined locations along the eastern seacoast of South Korea, later separating at the Taebaek Mountains. [4] The target landing areas represented vast expanses of relative wilderness and thus were the weakest zones of the already sub-par surveillance net erected by the Allies. However, the plan was drawn without any knowledge that the area had previously hosted a number of Park's anti-communist programmes, one of which was the Medical Enlightenment teams who had educated rural villagers there just months prior. [23]

Indoctrination attempt

The DPRK prepared to take advantage of social instability, a product of South Korea's economic growth, and part in parcel to Park's rise to power in 1960–61. Kim believed that local, less educated farmers who lived in separation from this new wealth according to traditional, often superstitious lifestyles embodied ripe targets who could easily be indoctrinated according to Juche . [18] The North were also ready to portray the South Korean government as having sold out unification for capitalist resources and economic development, in order to win over their targets by keeping in line with the original concept of reunification. [23]

The DPRK commandos were expecting to be welcomed as long-awaited liberators which led to the conception that indoctrinating South Korean villagers was a readily feasible task. [24] In eight villages, the commandos appeared at daybreak in front of sleepy and confused villagers, dragging them to the local assembly hall to receive lectures and DPRK propaganda. However, the South Koreans were unready to cooperate. Tempers quickly flared and violence broke out. However, amidst the general confusion, word slipped out towards the local police, who alerted the authorities of the invasion. [25]

Manhunt

Upon detection, a 70,000 man ROKA force launched a large-scale operation to apprehend the DPRK commandos. These forces arrived by air, land and sea. Among those deployed were the U.S. 6th Combat Aviation Platoon operating Bell UH-1 Iroquois helicopters summoned by the newly erected U.S.-ROK Operational Planning Staff. The allied counter-infiltration manhunt consisted of thousands of Park's newly created Home Defense Reserves, the 26th Rear Area Security Division, one Republic of Korea Marine Corps battalion and various police companies stationed nearby. [26] Within two weeks, a majority of the commandos were captured or killed, effectively neutralizing the mission. By December 26, Park withdrew the counter-guerrilla alert, signaling the end of the manhunt.

Casualties

After the operation, the ROK announced that 110 DPRK commandos had been killed, while seven were captured. South Korea sustained 63 deaths, 23 of whom were civilians. [27] The other South Koreans killed included army recruits, reserved police forces and militiamen. The U.S. military sustained three deaths and three wounded.

One notable civilian casualty was 9-year-old Lee Seung-bok at his home in the Gybang Mountain. [28]

Aftermath

Reasons for failure

Saemaul Undong gyoyug sajin.jpg
Saemaul Undong

Encouraged by the popularity of the Homeland reserve Force, Park had decided to launch the "New Community Movement" (Saemaul Undong) to ensure the people's loyalty. Park sought to instill a sense of democracy and nationalism, facilitated by elevating living standards in rural areas under the Korean traditional communalism - Hyangyak and Doorae. [29] The first move embodied the construction of "Reconstruction Villages" by populating areas south of the DMZ with ex-soldiers and their families ready to repel northern infiltrators. Next, Park instituted a civil action program requiring ROK soldiers to build basic infrastructure and schools holding anti-communist classes in rural areas as part of the larger counter-propaganda scheme as well as strengthening ties between the military and villagers.

Under the cover of medical assistance, in various localities soldiers were actually trained members of "Medical Enlightenment" teams, whose purpose was to instill support for Park and cultivate a citizenry ready to dismiss the North's Communist line. [29] Meanwhile, under the inspection of General William P. Yarborough, cooperation between the United States Eighth Army and the Korean Augmentation to the United States Army flourished. A new "Cold War Program" included "Welcome to Korea" classes facilitated by American contributions to social welfare in the form of building schools, visiting orphanages, and conducting cultural exchanges at local universities. Overall, the acceptance of American soldiers by the South Korean populace preemptively dispelled the power of North Korean ideology which characterized American soldiers as violent colonizers and foreign occupiers. [30]

Overall, the DPRK strategy lacked discipline and proper logistics. As a result of Park's aggressive policies which rallied popular participation against the DPRK threat, the public transformed into valuable informants for the government. Under the guidance of the Korean National Intelligence Service (NIS), 132 North Korean spies had already been captured by 1967. [4] The North Korean leadership was ignorant of the extent to which South Korean nationalism and citizens were loyal to Park. Additionally, the lack of consistent major offensives prior to the Ulchin-Samcheok landing allowed for the regrouping and unified deployment of allied resources in the form of effective counterinsurgency measures. Ultimately, the DPRK failed to conduct a series of well-orchestrated strikes aimed at continually whithering down their opponent, which contributed to the mission's failure. [31]

Domestic reactions

The success in countering the Ulchin-Samcheok landings validated Park's increased security measures and propaganda campaigns. Prior to the landings, Park's anti-ideological campaigns sought to instill a sense of patriotism and loyalty towards the government. Ulchin-Samcheok became proof that those efforts had not been wasted, and moreover deflected suspicion which regarded Parks top-down assimilation of South Korean military forces under a unified chain of command, as a ploy for consolidating personal power. Instead, South Koreans not only felt protected by Park's regime but also that they had contributed in protecting their country. These two factors allowed Park to consolidate his authority in the eyes of the South Korean people. [16]

In contrast, Kim, in light of the massive DPRK failure, scapegoated his generals. The KWP's position was not that the policy was unpopular in the South but rather that it had been implemented incorrectly. [32] Following two years of unsuccessful guerrilla warfare, punishment by death or imprisonment was implemented for senior military officials responsible for failing to implement the party line. Along with the disbandment of Unit 124, several prominent members of the DPRK who also received punishment included the defense minister - General Kim Chong-bong, KPA chairman - General Ho Pong-haek, and KWP secretary - Cho Tong-chol. [33] After the military purge, Kim resumed unified control over military activity by placing the KWP as a political watchdog over the military. [34]

Diffusion of conflict

John H. Michaelis GEN John H. Michaelis (cropped).jpg
John H. Michaelis

The DPRK's campaign ended in failure. In addition, infighting between Kim's two largest communist benefactors left the DPRK to fend for itself, while the alliance between the U.S. and the ROK gradually strengthened. The loss at Ulchin-Samcheok was the last straw for Kim, who promptly reshuffled the DPRK's ranks and overall military structure. However, these upgrades did not bolster the strength of the DPRK military, nor did it make up for the purge of highly trained and skilled units. By 1969, the DPRK had largely abandoned unconventional warfare, and hostility gradually waned. [35] When KPA forces shot down a U.S. Navy Lockheed EC-121 Warning Star aircraft over the Sea of Japan on April 15 of that year, which were accompanied by several more light skirmishes, these events embodied spurts of overt warfare, rather the steady implementation of highly coordinated and unconventional tactics.

In contrast, allied forces prospered. While the UNC bolstered defenses along the DMZ after Ulchin-Samcheok, the South's economy and population had continued to grow despite DPRK provocations. New security upgrades embodied the steady influx of new military resources such as the usage of powerful F-4D Phantom Jets along the DMZ as well as heightened cooperation between U.S. and ROKA forces. In particular, new ROKA southern and Eastern Coast Security commands were erected to prevent another attempted coastal landing. Between June and December 1969, the ROKA forces scored numerous victories against the dwindling military capacity of the North. [36] Meanwhile, the U.S. Department of Defense formalized the diversion of resources from Korea. Ultimately, the fortification of the border dissuaded further DPRK activity. By 1969, conflicts circulating around the DMZ reduced significantly. Bonesteel's 1969 departure and replacement by Korean war hero General John H. Michaelis on October 1, marked the effective end of the conflict.

Post-conflict authoritarianism in South Korea

In handling the Korean DMZ conflict of 1966–1969, Park enabled industrial progress while suppressing the rights of the South Korean people. According to Major Daniel P. Bolger's analysis, Park enjoyed the emergency powers at his disposal in the time of conflict, which he preserved until 1979. The military, intelligence and police forces he consolidated in order to defeat the DPRK were re-calibrated towards suppressing human rights, domestic opponents and restricting freedom of speech and press. [37] The adoption of the Yusin Constitution on November 21, 1972, granted Park full control over South Korea by co-opting the rule of law until his assassination in 1979 at the hands of secret service chief Kim Jae-kyu. Some historians argue that the consolidation of the military established under Park paved the way for continued authoritarianism even after Park's death.

See also

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References

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  3. ↑ Young-yee Shin, Stella (December 2001). No Longer Forgotten: North Korea-South Korea Relations Since the Korean War. Ethics of Development in a Global Environment.
  4. 1 2 3 4 5 6 Bolger, Daniel P. (1999). Unconventional warrior: General Charles H. Bonesteel III and the second Korean conflict 1966–69. Small Wars & Insurgencies.
  5. ↑ "USFK Combined Forces Command". www.usfk.mil. Retrieved 2018-01-17.
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  8. ↑ Farley, Robert. "How the Soviet Union and China Almost Started World War III". The National Interest. Retrieved 2018-01-17.
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  16. 1 2 3 Miyoshi Jager, Sheila (June 2014). Brothers at War: The Unending Conflict in Korea 1st Edition. W W Norton & Company. ISBN   978-0-393-34885-9.
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  18. 1 2 "Weekly Summary," Central Intelligence Agency, CIA-RDP79-00927A006700070001-3, CIA Records Search Tool (CREST), NARA, Nov. 15, 1968.
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  23. 1 2 풀뿌리, 이름없는 (30 September 2015). "제2의 62 5전쟁( 2)울진삼척토벌 상세보고서". Daum .net. Archived from the original on 22 September 2018. Retrieved 17 January 2018.
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  25. ↑ Mitchell Lerner (December 2010). "Mostly Propaganda in Nature:" Kim Il Sung, the Juche Ideology, and the Second Korean War" (PDF). The North Korea International Documentation Project. Retrieved 3 May 2012.
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  32. ↑ Transcript of press interview with Kim Sin-cho, Jan. 26, 1968, RG 59, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Office of the Country Director for Korea, Subject Files 1966-1974, Box 2, POL 1968 Blue House Raid, NARA.
  33. ↑ Pike, John (20 March 2016). "North Korean Purges - Kim Il-sung". GlobalSecurity.org.
  34. ↑ Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "DPRK Intelligence Services 1967-1971, Part 2," KPA Journal, Vol. 1, No. 5., May 2010. [Online]
  35. ↑ "Confrontation in Korea," SNIE 14.2-69, Central Intelligence Agency, 0001218149, CIA Records Search Tool (CREST), NARA, Jan. 30, 1969. [Online]
  36. ↑ Lavelle, Moira (August 20, 2015). "A Brief History of Border Conflict between North and South Korea." Public Radio International". PRI.
  37. ↑ Carter J, Eckert (November 2016). Park Chung Hee and Modern Korea: The Roots of Militarism. Belknap Press. p. 60. ISBN   9780674659865.
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Ulchin-Samcheok Landings