Maj. Gen. Mikhail Andreevich Pronin Col. Ivan Nikolaevich Pleshakov Col. Fyodor Dmitrievich Yablokov Col. Andrei Avvakumovich Kaplun Col. Aleksandr Alekseevich Donets Col. Nikolai Timofeevich Zorin
Military unit
The 144th Rifle Division was formed as an infantry division of the Red Army in September 1939 in the Moscow Military District, based on the shtat (table of organization and equipment) of later that month. It remained in the same District until the beginning of the German invasion in June 1941, initially as part of 20th Army. It was railed to the front, significantly understrength, in the last days of June, rejoining its Army, and was almost immediately pocketed near Smolensk. It took part in a counterattack which briefly retook the town of Rudnya, but rapidly lost strength in this precarious position. In the first days of August the remnants of the division emerged from the pocket and took up defensive positions along the Dniepr River for rebuilding. During August and September it was involved in several abortive attempts to retake Dukhovshchina, and the associated losses put it in a poor state to resist when the German offensive on Moscow was renewed in the first days of October. Still holding near Smolensk it did not come under direct attack but was deeply encircled and had to withdraw over 100km without adequate communications or supplies and only several hundred men escaped. This was enough to allow another rebuilding in early November before it was assigned to 5th Army, where it served through the defense of Moscow.
Kombrig Mikhail Andreevich Pronin was given command of the 144th on the day it began forming in Ivanovo Oblast of the Moscow Military District. He had previously led the 175th Rifle Regiment of the 1st Moscow Proletarian Rifle Division. His rank would be modernized to that of major general on June 4, 1940. At the start of the German invasion the division was still in Ivanovo Oblast, under 20th Army of the Reserve of the STAVKA High Command, in 61st Rifle Corps with 110th and 172nd Rifle Divisions.[1] Its order of battle was as follows:
217th Signal Battalion (later 217th Signal Company)
205th Medical/Sanitation Battalion (later 50th)
86th Chemical Defense (Anti-gas) Company
155th Motor Transport Company (later 228th)
284th Field Bakery
193rd Divisional Veterinary Hospital
926th Field Postal Station
656th Field Office of the State Bank
As of July 1 the 144th was still in the Reserve, but now as part of the separate 20th Rifle Corps with the 160th Rifle Division. It was already moving west, where on July 2 it rejoined 20th Army as a separate division. The Army was now under command of Western Front.[3] In a July 27 report by Lt. Gen. P. A. Kurochkin he described the state of some of his units as they arrived at the fighting front:
Army formations: 73rd RD, 5th MC, 57th TD, 229th RD, 144th RD, and a TD arrived in the army at considerably reduced strength... Army divisional strengths range from 4,000 to 6,500 men, and, to a considerable degree, these people were in rear service and supporting units... During this period [July 1 - 25] we received 1,600 reinforcements, while we needed 70.000 men and 9,000 horses.
The report further stated the Army's signal units had only 25-30 percent of their communications equipment and transport. On the same day the 144th rejoined the Army, it was struck by elements of German 4th Army.[4]
Battle of Smolensk
Map of the Battle of Smolensk 1941
20th Army was now part of the Group of Reserve Armies which had been assigned to Western Front and it had been ordered to prepare defenses along a sector on the approaches to Orsha. The Front was now under command of Marshal S. K. Timoshenko; he quickly assigned the 5th and 7th Mechanized Corps, with a total of over 1,500 tanks, to the support of the Army. At 0030 hours on July 5, as directed by Timoshenko, General Kurochkin ordered his Army to "prepare and conduct an attack against the flank and rear of the enemy grouping operating along the Polotsk axis." This counterblow effectively came to nothing apart heavy losses in tanks. By July 12 the 144th was attempting to hold crossings over the Dniepr River in the sector from Rossasna to Klimenki. Meanwhile Timoshenko was planning a massive counteroffensive scheduled to begin the next day in which 20th Army would destroy the German forces that had crossed the Dniepr near Astroŭna. Given the actual situation, no part of Timoshenko's plan was even remotely feasible. The next day the Marshal modified his directions to the Army; it was now to liquidate the penetrations in the Orsha and Shklow areas by the end of July 16 but this was no more realistic.[5]
In heavy fighting on July 15 the 17th Panzer Division captured Orsha and, together with much of the rest of 2nd Panzer Group, drove the bulk of 20th and 19th Armies, including the 144th and up to 19 other divisions of various types, into an elongated pocket along and north of the Dniepr west of Smolensk. Despite this, Timoshenko was able to report on July 16 at 2000 hours that the division, now part of 69th Rifle Corps of 20th Army, had "seized Lyady from two companies of enemy infantry and 5-7 tanks" with an advanced battalion. In a further report two days later the stated, in part:
20th Army - fighting intensely with enemy panzer and mechanized forces but running short of ammunition, fuel and foodstuffs. 144th RD - attacking part of 12th PzD near Rudnya [65km west of Smolensk], but totally out of fuel.
Kurochkin was by now in command of all forces in the pocket and set about regrouping his units so as to keep in contact with Group Rokossovskii, which was holding open the line of communications to the east.[6][7] Timoshenko's next report at 0800 hours on July 21 first asserted that Western Front's forces "continued to conduct sustained fighting with enemy units..." before specifically stating:
20th Army - concentrating along a new defensive line and counterattacking toward Rudnya. 144th RD - forced to abandon Rudnya at 2000 hours of 20 July by an enemy infantry division with artillery and tanks, with its right wing withdrawing to the Dvorishche and Batkovo line [20-25km northwest of Smolensk].
In a further report at 2000 hours on July 23, 20th Army was said to have regrouped to attack the German forces penetrating toward the city while also defending the north bank of the Dniepr, while the 144th had been hit by sustained ground and air attacks, after which it had withdrawn to a line from Molevo Boloto to Bolshaya Ploskaya Station by 1100 on July 22.[8] It was at about this time that the 270th Antitank Battalion was removed from the division in order to help form a separate antitank regiment within the Army.[9]
As the fighting continued Army Group Center was determined to disengage its panzer divisions to forestall further Red Army counterattacks from the east and to, hopefully, restore momentum to the drive on Moscow. Infantry corps had begun arriving in the area on July 18 and the panzers began moving on July 23, barely anticipating Timoshenko's new counteroffensive which would be led by 20 divisions of the Front of the Reserve Armies. It was crucial to the plan that the 16th, 19th, and 20th Armies in the pocket remain in the fight. Timoshenko directed that the 16th and 20th, both now under Kurochkin's overall command, retake Smolensk while also making local attacks on the perimeter to try to link up with the advancing groups of Reserve Front. The counterstroke began on a staggered fashion on July 23, with the full 20 divisions committed only two days later.[10]
Timoshenko again reported to the STAVKA on July 24 in optimistic terms. 20th Army was said to be "repulsing attacks by up to 7 enemy divisions, defeated two German divisions, including 5th ID attacking toward Rudnya with three volleys of Katyushas..." At 2100 hours the next day Kurochkin stated that 20th Army was "defending and preventing an enemy penetration to Smolensk", and 69th Corps (now containing the 144th and 229th) was:
...taking over the Vydra, Debritsy, and Zybki sector from 153rd RD and 57th TD at 2400 hours on 25 July and occupying and defending the Vydra, Hill 213.7, Zybki, Rebiaki, and Kurino line by 0400 hours on 26 July, with a regiment in reserve in the Kholm region [20km northwest of Smolensk].
The headquarters of Western Front signaled at 0800 on July 26 that the 144th, 153rd, and 57th Tanks were engaged in day and night fighting with 5th Infantry. General Pronin received orders to withdraw his division into Army reserve overnight on July 26/27 to the Matyushino, Zamoshe, and Kozarevo area, 8-10km north-northeast of Smolensk, with the 153rd covering the move.[11]
Despite these reports the pocket was shrinking, and by July 27 the counteroffensive was waning. The Front of the Reserve Armies was reorganized into Reserve Front on July 30, with Army Gen. G. K. Zhukov in command.[12] On July 26 Kurochkin had prepared a strength return which stated the 144th had 30 artillery pieces remaining, roughly average for his Army's rifle divisions at that point.[13] At the same time he recommended that his Army could prevent a German advance from north of the pocket with the 73rd, 153rd, and 144th while the remainder attacked the flank and rear of 7th Panzer Division at Dukhovshchina in an effort to keep the pocket open in cooperation with Group Rokossovskii.[14]
As of August 1, 69th Corps had the 73rd, 144th and 233rd Rifle Divisions under command.[15] 20th Army, however, was down to some 40,000 personnel, of which about one-third were "bayonets" (riflemen and sappers), facing double the number of German troops. In the previous days the 144th, 233rd and 1st Motorized had halted the 15th Infantry Division along the line they held. Despite the best efforts of 17th and 7th Panzers, Group Rokossovskii (now called Group Yartsevo) maintained a 10km-wide gap in the outer encirclement line from north of Ratchino on the Dniepr to Malinovka. It was now clear that 16th and 20th Armies would not survive unless reinforced or withdrawn. The pocket had shrunken in size to 20km east to west and 28km north to south and contained fewer than 100,000 men who were running out of all supplies.[16]
Kurochkin ordered at 1930 hours on August 2 that 69th Corps (now the 144th and 153rd) was to defend the line of the Khmost River with part of its forces by 0400 on August 3 while also conducting a mobile defense along the Nadva and Orleya in an effort to reach the Dniepr crossings, then take up defenses along that river from Zabore to the mouth of the Ustrom by 0500 on August 4. Rear services were to precede this move. Kurochkin made clear to all his commanders:
You are personally responsible to the Motherland and government for taking all of your weapons with you during the withdrawal behind the Dniepr River... During the crossings, give priority, first and foremost, to the wounded, to the artillery and tanks that lack ammunition and fuel, and to the army's rear services, and, later, to the army's troop formations and units.
The withdrawal began in earnest overnight on August 2/3, engaging outposts manned in company strength by forces of 20th Motorized Division. Those units that could not find the gap near Ratchino faced the riskier prospect of penetrating or infiltrating through this defensive cordon.[17]
Timoshenko's operational summary of 2000 hours, August 3, stated in part that 20th and 16th Armies were "conducting rear guard actions" along the Khmost to the Dniepr at Malinovka and were being resupplied on the west bank of the latter. The retreating troops fended off pickets of 17th Panzer and were forced to run a gauntlet through the corridor, often under artillery fire and air strikes, fording the Dniepr wherever it was less than 60cm deep. The breakout lasted just over 48 hours, ending by dawn on August 5. 20th Army's forces were now ordered to pull back to the Dorogobuzh area for rest and refitting.[18] At this time the 144th had just 440 "bayonets" remaining,[19] although individuals and small groups would filter out of the pocket during the coming weeks. Rebuilding began immediately, still in 20th Army, and by August 15 the division had 559 officers, 626 NCOs, and 3,352 other ranks plus 1,000 new recruits. Armaments were as follow: 3,353 rifles; 46 sub-machine guns; 30 heavy machine guns; 53 light machine guns; one antiaircraft machine gun; one 45mm antitank gun plus four 12.7mm machine guns on the antitank role; three 76mm cannon; three 122mm howitzers; three 122mm cannon; five 50mm, 12 82mm, and two 120mm mortars.[20]
Dukhovshchina Offensives
20th Army had come under command of Lt. Gen. M. F. Lukin on August 6. From August 9-15 the main forces of the Army were engaged in an offensive to tie down German forces on the west bank of the Dniepr. The 144th-
captured the Makeevo, Hill 165.9, and the woods to the south line from 9-12 August and approached Makeevo, Pnevo, and Mit'kovo, where it encountered heavy enemy resistance and dug in. Subsequent attempts to capture this line were unsuccessful.
At the end of this period the division was reported as being on a line from Korovniki to Osova, but still with two battalion-size detachments on the west bank of the Dniepr. Marshal Timoshenko was aiming to cut German communications between Dukhovshchina and Yelnya with 20th Army in support of 19th Army. At noon on August 15 he submitted a proposal to Stalin "to prevent the enemy from restoring order in his units, and also to destroy the enemy grouping in the Dukhovshchina region." 20th Army was to carry on its assigned missions while making preparations to exploit any gains made by 19th Army. The offensive was to begin on August 17. Lukin issued his orders at 1430 hours on August 16. The 144th was to defend the Dniepr from Solovevo south to a wood 2km east of Lagunovo, maintaining forward detachments at Makeevo, Pnevo, and Mitkovo, and also relieving the 153rd Division from the Dniepr bend to the wood overnight on August 17/18.[21]
Western Front reported at 0800 hours on August 17 that "the offensive by 20th Army on the left wing is developing slowly against stubborn enemy resistance." At the same time it was still withdrawing artillery, vehicles, and equipment in small quantities across the Dniepr. At 1800 Timoshenko ordered Lukin to resume the attack, but this did not include the 144th, which was fortifying its scant holdings on the west bank. The orders for the next day again directed the division against Mitkovo. All this activity was a contingency to allow an advance on Dukhovshchina from the south in case of success by 19th Army. The 144th was reported as fighting with its forward units from south of Makeevo to a farm west of Marker 165.9 and to a ravine south of Mitkovo, with its main forces in combat on a sector from west of Korovniki to Marker 195.6, while taking "intense artillery fire from Makeevo, Pnevo, and Liakhovo." On August 19 the division made another attack which failed to take Mitkovo.[22]
In an August 20 report on the fighting at Makeevo the 144th's opponent was identified as the 2nd SS Motorized Division Das Reich. This confrontation continued the following day. 20th Army was expected to attack again at 0900 hours on August 22 in an effort to reach the Khmost River, with the 144th now attacking Mitkovo again. At this point the 3rd Panzer Group was unleashed against 22nd Army on Western Front's right flank near Velikiye Luki, which would create a crisis forcing the end of the offensive on Dukhovshchina. 20th Army would attack again on August 23 with every intention of continuing on the next, although the division was now defending against German attacks from Solovevo. Its situation did not change on August 24.[23]
The 144th was now to be transferred to 16th Army, which was given orders to go over to the defense until August 30; at this time the division was go on a general offensive with three other divisions. Prior to this shift, it remained in its previous positions with the 73rd Division, and on August 26 the 308th Artillery Regiment was said to have destroyed one machine gun emplacement and suppressed two German batteries near Skrushevo. The next day the two divisions continued to hold their ground, conduct reconnaissance, and exchange artillery fire. By August 28 the transfer was cancelled as Lukin was ordered to form a shock group of six divisions to begin a new offensive to envelop Smolensk from the south beginning on September 1. This was to kick off at 1000 hours, again with the initial objective of reaching the Khmost. The 144th would have the support of a battalion of the 592nd Gun Artillery Regiment, was first to take over part of the sector of the 153rd, and then:
... while attacking toward Skrushevo and Pnevo with one regiment to capture both points, attack toward Mit'kovo and Liakhovo with the remaining forces at 1000 hours on 1 September and capture the Mashkino and Fedurno line by day's end, while protecting the right flank of the army's shock group.
The Army's engineers were to construct two bridges over the Dniepr in the division's sector by 0300. Altogether the six divisions fielded some 25,000 men, but no tanks, while about 8,000 German troops defended.[24]
When the offensive began 20th Army was facing the 8th Infantry Division of VIII Army Corps, while 2nd SS had been moved back to the reserve. At the outset the 144th ran into heavy fire from Pnevo and intense resistance at Lyakhovo which halted its advance and forced it to dig in 1,000m east of Skrushevo to 200m east of Pnevo and 1,000m northeast of Mitkovo and Lyakhovo. The next day the best the Army's shock group could do was to exchange fire and make minimal advances. For September 3 the division, less the 449th Rifle Regiment (protecting the Army's right flank), was to take Pnevo with two battalions, plus Mitkovo by attacking from the east and northeast with one regiment, and also prepare to attack Mashkino. During the day it, and the 153rd, pushed at Mitkovo repeatedly without success, which continued on September 4.[25]
For September 6, Pronin received the following orders as the offensive ran down on this front:
144th RD (with one regiment from 153rd RD, 1st and 3rd Bns, 592nd [Gun Artillery Regiment], and two batteries of 872nd [Antitank Regiment] - after relieving 153rd RD by 0100 hours on 6 September, occupy defenses along the eastern bank of the Dnepr River from the mouth of the Vop' River to Ratchino, while paying special attention to defending the Solov'evo and Korovniki axis, and protect the army's boundary with 16th Army. Hold on to your positions on the Dnepr River's western bank with forward detachments occupying strongpoints and the high ground and fortify the gaps intervals between them with strong obstacles.
Overnight on September 7/8 the regiment of the 153rd was to be released so it could concentrate in the rear with the rest of its division. As of the beginning of September 9 the 144th was reported as defending between Buyanovo and Osova on the east bank of the Dniepr.[26]
Operation Typhoon
As the fighting shifted to other fronts later in September, and as Soviet mobilization hit its stride, the forces of Western Front were able to rebuild to the point that the average rifle division had 10,500 personnel on September 30,[27] although this includes new divisions arriving from the east. At this time 20th Army, now under the leadership of Lt. Gen. F. A. Yershakov, had only four rifle divisions (229th, 73rd, 129th and 144th) under command.[28]
Operation Typhoon (northern sector). Note initial position of 20th Army.
The German offensive on Moscow began on this sector on October 2. The 144th and 73rd were still holding along the Dniepr while the 229th and 129th were echeloned to the southeast, facing elements of the XXVII and IX Army Corps. This placed the Army exactly midway between the thrusts of 3rd Panzer Group to the north and 4th Panzer Group to the south. By October 5 the Army's position was becoming increasingly precarious as the armored spearheads began to converge on Vyazma well to the rear.[29] At 0750 hours the next day the new commander of Western Front, Col. Gen. I. S. Konev, sent out orders by radio for Western Front to commence a general retreat. By now the tips of the German pincers were separated by just 40-50km, while the 144th and 129th were 110-120km from Vyazma in a direct line.[30]
With the transfer of 73rd and 229th Divisions to 16th Army, Yershakov now had the 144th and 129th, plus the 112th and 108th Rifle Divisions, under command. He was directed to withdraw the forces west of the Dniepr to the east bank and then both divisions along the Uzha River to Vederniki, and he set this in motion at 0500 hours on October 7, although it was utterly inadequate to the situation. The retreat was to be covered by separate regiments along three river lines, while he also kept a "strong reserve" on the left flank. For its part the 144th, with the attached 471st Rifle Regiment of the 73rd and the 302nd Howitzer Artillery Regiment, would travel through Korovniki, Mikhailovo, and Artyushkino. Once the withdrawal was complete the 129th would become the Army's reserve. Yershakov attempted to regulate the movement as best as possible:
... 8. All division commanders when planning the withdrawal must first anticipate the withdrawal of the artillery. 9. During the withdrawal of the covering units, all road structures, telephone and telegraph lines and similar objects... are to be destroyed. 10. Division and unit commanders are to arrange through local organs of authority and by administrative means the driving of cattle from the areas abandoned by the troops. All agricultural reserves from local resources, which cannot be evacuated, are to be destroyed.
For an army in contact with the enemy and about to be deeply encircled such directions were simply unrealistic. The new line of defense was designated as another section of the Dniepr some 50-55km to the rear. Konev failed to coordinate with Reserve Front to protect the junction of its 24th Army and his 20th.[31]
Already at 1920 hours on October 6, Konev was adjusting his orders for the withdrawal, directing Yershakov to pull back overnight to a line from Grigorevo to Krasnoe. German forces detected the withdrawal and immediately set out to pursue, but were held up by rearguards, plus minefields near Yartsevo. However, 19th Army, which was farther east to begin with, pulled back at a faster pace leaving the 20th in a difficult position as German troops reached the Moscow–Minsk highway, which it was using, forcing it to shift to the south. The back roads and the old Smolensk highway were jammed with rear-area transport of 24th Army. However, the German pursuit lessened as XXVII Corps was more interested in pressing east along the highway. Far to the rear, on the morning of October 7 the panzer groups linked up just west of Vyazma, encircling four Soviet armies.[32]
According to Western Front's operational summary issued at 2000 hours on October 8 no report had been received from 20th Army during the day. Radio communications were intermittent throughout the Front, and a liaison officer sent to Yershakov had not returned. At 1745 several additional officers had been sent by U-2 aircraft with orders to speed up the withdrawal to Vyazma to take up a line from Shimonovo to Ugriumovo Station, 55km east of the city. In case German forces prevented this he was to fall back to a line south of Gzhatsk. That this would require moving at a pace of some 70km per day was overlooked, as was the fact that the encirclement had been completed. As desperation set in several headquarters began broadcasting in the clear; these messages were intercepted by German intelligence and gave away plans to break out in certain places.[33]
Sometime between 1700 and 1900 the headquarters of 24th Army received an order from Yershakov that it was being subordinated to 20th Army in order to organize a breakout. His plan was to maintain an all-round defense as 20th Army broke out across a line from Vyazma to Volosta to Piatnitsa [20km in width]. By now discipline was breaking down, making any organized effort across such a wide front impossible. In addition, all three places were now firmly in German hands. General Zhukov now ordered all trapped forces: "In the course of 10 and 11 October, breach the enemy's line and at whatever cost escape the encirclement..." 20th and 24th Armies were to penetrate to the southeast, despite Konev's earlier orders to do so to the southwest. A radio link with Yershakov had been briefly established, over which he reported he planned to break out south of Vyazma.[34]
By October 10 Army Group Center was becoming anxious to destroy the encircled armies so as to continue the advance on Moscow as the weather was already deteriorating. Over the next week individuals, small and larger groups managed to reach friendly lines. On October 18 General Pronin and a small cadre of the 144th escaped through the sector designated for 24th Army, near Dorokhovo, with the commander of that Army and some 460 of his troops following. Pronin still had enough of a cadre that the division escaped being disbanded.[35] This cadre was rebuilt with the 25th and 185th Reserve Rifle Regiments.[36] By the beginning of November the remnants had returned to the front, reassigned to 5th Army, still in Western Front.[37] As the division recuperated its rifle regiments were temporarily redesignated, with a 438th from November 13 to November 23, a 457th from November 24 to December 20, and a 1310th from November 24 to December 23, after which all reverted to the original numbers.
Battle of Moscow
5th Army was under command of Lt. Gen. of Artillery L. A. Govorov, and as of November 16 was defending with part of his forces (the 144th, 32nd, and 50th Rifle Divisions, three tank brigades, 82nd Motorized Rifle Division, and 36th Motorcycle Regiment) on a line from Fomkino to Tuchkovo to Bolshye Semyonychi, with a division in reserve near Zvenigorod. This 50km-wide front bordered 33rd Army on the left at Kulakovo.[38]
↑ Charles C. Sharp, "Red Legions", Soviet Rifle Divisions Formed Before June 1941, Soviet Order of Battle World War II, Vol. VIII, Nafziger, 1996, p. 72
↑ The fighting at Rudnya on July 14 was notable for the first combat use of the Katyusha rocket launcher. Georgii Zhukov, Marshal of Victory: The Autobiography of General Georgy Zhukov, Pen & Sword Military, Barnsley, UK, 2013, p. 495.
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