Maj. Gen. Dmitrii Potapovich Safonov Maj. Gen. Georgii Alekseevich Kurnosov Col. Aleksandr Alekseevich Startsev Col. Dmitrii Ivanovich Lukin Maj. Gen. Mitrofan Moiseevich Zaikin
Military unit
The 143rd Rifle Division was formed as an infantry division of the Red Army in early September 1939 in the Byelorussian Military District, based on the shtat (table of organization and equipment) of September 13. It took part in the invasion of eastern Poland later that month, and the occupation of Lithuania in 1940. At the time of the German invasion on June 22, 1941 it was in 47th Rifle Corps, a reserve corps of Western Special Military District. In the initial chaos it moved west and quickly collided with advancing German forces, becoming encircled in the Minsk pocket, but emerging with enough strength to be subordinated to 4th Army. Shortly before that Army was disbanded the division was transferred to 13th Army, soon part of Central Front, and barely escaped being encircled again in early August, falling back to, and then beyond the Desna River. When Bryansk Front was established 13th Army was subordinated to it.
The division was formed on the basis of the 98th "Samara" Rifle Regiment of 33rd Rifle Division at Gomel in the Byelorussian Military District during September 6-11, 1939. Given this experienced cadre it was able to take part in the invasion of eastern Poland later that month. Kombrig Dmitrii Potapovich Safonov was given command of the 143rd on May 9, 1940, and would have his rank modernized to that of major general on June 5. As an artillery officer he had previously led the artillery of 24th Rifle Corps. Under his command the 143rd would participate in the occupation of Lithuania beginning on June 15. At the start of the German invasion the division was deployed in positions southwest of Baranavichy.[1] It was in the 47th Rifle Corps of the Western Special Military District (soon redesignated Western Front), which also contained the 55th and 121st Rifle Divisions.[2] Its order of battle was as follows:
165th Signal Battalion (later 24th Signal Company)
206th Medical/Sanitation Battalion
203rd Chemical Defense (Anti-gas) Company
34th Motor Transport Company (later 154th)
340th Field Bakery
229th Divisional Veterinary Hospital
794th Field Postal Station
298th Field Office of the State Bank
The division which, as part of the "6000 class", had under that number of personnel, was supposed to be brought up to full strength with men and vehicles from the Volga Military District, according to the mobilization plan. In the event, little of this actually arrived before the division was swept up into the fighting;[4] the 487th Regiment also failed to arrive near Baranavichy and was forced to serve under other commands, eventually forming part of the garrison of Mogilev under 172nd Rifle Division.[5]
Minsk Pocket
Maj. Gen. S. I. Povetkin, whose 47th Corps was headquartered at Babruysk, quickly began moving his remaining divisions and other elements toward Baranavichy and Slonim, where they met advancing German forces. Heavy fighting developed around the latter place in which the understrength 143rd suffered heavy casualties, soon being encircled in the Minsk pocket with the remnants of 3rd, 4th, and 10th Armies. While attempting to lead his men out of the encirclement on June 26 General Safonov was killed in action near Baranavichy, and his place of burial remains unknown. By June 30 about one-third of the original strength of the division had managed to escape,[6] and it, plus the rest of 47th Corps, now with the 155th Rifle Division in place of the 121st, was officially subordinated to 4th Army.[7]
In the uncertainty around Safonov's fate, he was not officially replaced until July 16, when Col. Georgii Alekseevich Kurnosov was brought in from his position as chief of the Combat Training Section of 13th Army. This officer had been in command of a rifle regiment in September 1937 when he was removed from this post; in June 1938 he was dismissed from the Red Army and then arrested as part of the Great Purge. He was released and reinstated in February 1940 and had then mostly served as an instructor and inspector.
By the start of July the leaderless and partly disarmed 143rd was positioned along a line from Degtianov to Yalovka to Kruglitsa in eastern Belarus.[8] Around dusk on July 3 Western Front reported to the STAVKA that while remnants of 4th and 13th Armies had managed to cross the Dniepr River, few from 3rd and 10th Armies had done so. 4th Army units included the Army headquarters and those of 28th and 47th Corps, 14th Mechanized Corps, and six rifle divisions including the 143rd, 55th, 155th, and 121st. The Front commander, Marshal S. K. Timoshenko, ordered 21st Army to consolidate a defense along the river and send out advance detachments to stop or delay the advance of 2nd Panzer Group, which proved surprisingly effective.[9] By July 10 the 143rd had been resubordinated to 4th Army's 28th Rifle Corps.[10]
Battle of Smolensk
The commander of 2nd Panzer, Gen. H. Guderian, was searching for a crossing point over the Dniepr, and believed he had found two, on either side of Mogilev. At this time the 28th Corps was recuperating along the Sozh River south of Krychaw with the rest of 4th Army, now under command of Maj. Gen. L. M. Sandalov. On July 10 2nd Panzer and 3rd Panzer Groups began twin thrusts over the Dniepr, with Smolensk as the intermediate objective. By the end of the next day Guderian's XXXXVII Motorized Corps was across at Kopys, XXXXVI Motorized at Shklov, and XXIV Motorized at Bykhaw. The Sozh was the next obstacle in his path as XXIV Corps advanced on Krychaw.[11]
The operational summary of Western Front issued at 2000 hours on July 13 made clear that Timoshenko was losing control of the situation as the German advance continued. 13th Army was threatened with encirclement near Mogilev. Despite this, the STAVKA ordered counterattacks, including, "Conduct active operations along the Gomel and Bobruisk axis to threaten the rear of the enemy's Mogilev grouping." This effort would largely involve 21st Army, but 13th and 4th Armies were to clear the German bridgeheads east of the Dniepr, which was in no way feasible. The 13th was withdrawing to the Sozh with panzers deep in its rear areas. Late in the day Timoshenko reported that 28th Corps was continuing to "fill out and reorganize" its divisions, now along the Pronia River in the area of Chavusy and Propoisk. On July 14 Sandalov was directed to "destroy the enemy mechanized grouping penetrating toward Gorki by attacking from the Riasna, Shirki, and Osinovka region" with the 143rd, 42nd, and 55th Divisions, in cooperation with 13th Army. Over the next two days Timoshenko dialed back on such overoptimistic goals. On July 15 the 29th Motorized Division entered Smolensk.[12]
The 3rd Panzer Division of XXIV Motorized captured Chavusy on July 15, while 4th Panzer Division took Propoisk. However, until 2nd Army arrived from the west 2nd Panzer Group would be forced to besiege the now-encircled Mogilev for the next few days. At 2000 hours on July 16 Timoshenko reported that as of that morning the 143rd was occupying a line from Zareche to Berezovka, from 45km east-southeast to 62km southeast of Mogilev. Shortly after, Sandalov pulled back what remained of 4th Army over the Sozh despite communication issues making it difficult to transmit orders. Timoshenko first ordered him to "stand fast" or, if not, to defend along the Pronia, west of the Sozh. Indicative of these difficulties, at dawn on July 21 the 13th Army headquarters, which now had the 143rd under command, stated that it had received no information from it. At about the same time the rifle corps were abolished and the 143rd came under direct Army command. As the situation along the Sozh developed on July 23 the STAVKA split off a new Central Front from the southern armies of Western Front, (13th and 21st) and disbanded 4th Army, with its remnant forces assigned to 13th Army. However, the 143rd came directly under Front command. Central Front was intended to cover the junction between Western and Southwestern Fronts while also unrealistically conducting "active operations" toward Gomel and Babruysk.[13]
Battles on the Desna
During the first week of August Guderian's XXIV Motorized carried out an encirclement operation against 28th Army's Group Kachalov, which had been attacking northward to retake Propoisk. Once this had played out the front stabilized while the German command debated future moves. A new Bryansk Front was formed on August 14, initially with 13th and 50th Armies, although 3rd and 21st were intended to join soon. The Front, under command of Lt. Gen. A. I. Yeryomenko, was directed to create a viable defense along the Desna River. The 13th Army commander, Maj. Gen. K. D. Golubev, began this task in earnest at 1520 hours on August 21, issuing his Combat Order No. 056. His Army was to occupy a line some 70km in length from 30km north-northeast to 40km south of Pogar. The 143rd, which had barely escaped the encirclement by XXIV Motorized but had still taken serious losses during its retreat to the Desna, was acknowledged as being incapable of active operations and was ordered to take up positions south of Saguteva, 20km southwest of Trubchevsk, for rest and replenishment. Within days a steady stream of replacements sent forward from the Front nominally restored the division to fighting strength, but many of these men were partly-trained reservists and untrained conscripts, and up to half even lacked rifles.[14]
At 1920 hours of the same day, Golubev sent orders to Colonel Kurnosov as follow:
1. The enemy's Starodub grouping has created a threat of spreading out toward the south and southeast, while threatening our left flank at the boundary of 21st Army. 2. To liquidate this threat, as a change to Order No. 056, 143rd RD, with 699th ATR [Antitank Regiment] and 12th AABn [Antiaircraft Battalion] (located in Novgorod-Severskii), will move to and create all-round defenses in the Semenovka [50km west-northwest of Novgorod-Severskii] and Novgorod-Severskii regions by day's end on 22 August 1941. To strengthen the division, include the remnants of 148th Rifle Division, which is located in Novgorod-Severskii, and one march battalion of 1,000 bayonets, which is being transferred by rail to Pirogovka Station.
By this time Guderian had received orders to advance south into Ukraine, setting up the encirclement of Southwestern Front. However, on August 22 two divisions of XXXXVII Motorized Corps, 17th Panzer and 29th Motorized, began moving east toward the Desna. During the next two days Yeryomenko scrambled to protect or retake Pochep, directing Golubev at 2000 on August 23 to use his 11 rifle, three cavalry, and 50th Tank Division, many of which were remnants, to "defend the Pochep, eastern bank of the Sudost' River, Pogar, Borshchevo, and Luzhki line."[15] Golubev submitted a defense plan to Yeryomenko on August 24, which was approved. Kurnosov was ordered to:
- transfer your defenses at Novgorod-Severskii and Semenovka to 283rd RD and move forward to occupy defenses along the Ponurovka, Voronok, and Luzhki front [70km southwest to 85km west-southwest of Trubchevsk] by 25 August.
He was to establish his command post at Lomakovka. The 143rd had priority for replenishment of forces along with the 6th, 137th, and 155th Divisions. The following day Central Front was disbanded and Bryansk Front expanded to four Armies. Pochep fell to 17th Panzer on the afternoon of August 25, while 3rd Panzer was moving on Novhorod-Siverskyi, where two bridges spanned the Desna. These were defended by the 143rd plus remnants of the 148th; Kurnosov had ordered his men to construct antitank ditches and dig timbers into the ground on the far bank, covered with fire. The first effort by 6th Panzer Regiment and the motorcycle battalion to rush the bridges failed under concentrated Soviet artillery and mortar fire, plus air attacks. The river's flood plain was over 5km wide here and taking at least one bridge was vital to the German plan.[16]
Overnight the commander of 3rd Panzer, Gen. W. Model, organized a special assault group with anti-demolition training to seize the bridges by coup-de-main, while elements of the 283rd Rifle reinforced the bridgehead. As the artillery preparation began, some of the hastily-raised and marginally trained defenders surrendered, while others fought half-heartedly. The armored assault group penetrated into the outskirts of the town and headed for the main bridge under cover of smoke. The raid succeeded in defusing the demolitions on the bridge and it came under German control. Platoon-sized demolition groups from the 143rd and 283rd attempted to climb into the trestle from underneath and destroy the bridge with fuel, explosives, and Molotov cocktails, but they were mostly stopped at the water's edge; a few bags of explosive were placed but soon removed. After the fighting ended Golubev reported that communications had been lost to the 383rd (the replacement for the 487th) and 800th Rifle Regiments, and the 635th had been reduced to 600 mostly unarmed men. On August 27 the 6th Panzer Regiment was sent on a raid to the south which took more bridges and compromised the line of the Desna. Despite this, the STAVKA was informed by Yeryomenko that 13th Army would organize a counterstroke at dawn to retake Starodub and eliminate all German forces west of Novhorod-Siverskyi. The 143rd specifically would "contain the enemy attacks and prevent him from reaching Smiach'e, Sheptaki, and Forostovichi line."[17]
Counterattacks against 2nd Panzer Group (Roslavl-Novozibkov Offensive). Note position of 13th Army.
Golubev reported to Yeryomenko at 0945 hours on August 29 admitting that there was still no information available about the 383rd and 800th Regiments, but that the 635th was assembling in the area of Mikhailovskii Farm, about 20km south of Novhorod-Siverskyi, still with just 600 unarmed men. In spite of the state of his 11 divisions he was about to be ordered to attack a force with roughly 250 tanks on strength. The STAVKA, still not grasping the significance of Guderian's moves, demanded that Yeryomenko join in on a general counteroffensive by Western and Reserve Fronts set for August 30 and September 1. In his first orders only 13th Army would be involved, but on the morning of August 30 the STAVKA complicated the situation by ordering all of his Front take part. 13th Army, now under command of Maj. Gen. A. M. Gorodnianskii, was to:
continue your attack with the main efforts toward Zheleznyi Most and Semenovka with five divisions and tanks, destroy the enemy's Novgorod-Severskii grouping, together with 3rd Army, and reach the Belaia Dubrovka and Guta-Koretskaia front [155km west to 180km southwest of Bryansk] by 15 September.
This was utterly unrealistic given the Front's inadequate forces, and Guderian's presence in their midst.[18]
References
Citations
↑ Artyom Drabkin and Alexei Isaev, Barbarossa Through Soviet Eyes, trans. C. Summerville, Pen & Sword Books Ltd., Barnsley, UK, 2012, p. xii
↑ Charles C. Sharp, "Red Legions", Soviet Rifle Divisions Formed Before June 1941, Soviet Order of Battle World War II, Vol. VIII, Nafziger, 1996, p. 71
↑ David M. Glantz, Barbarossa Derailed, Vol. 1, Helion & Co., Ltd., Solihull, UK, 2010, Kindle ed., ch. 6
↑ Aleksander A. Maslov, Fallen Soviet Generals, ed. & trans. D. M. Glantz, Frank Cass Publishers, London, UK, 1998, pp. 2-4. Note this source misspells the general's name as "Safronov".
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