C&A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, New York, 511 U.S. 383 (1994), was a case before the United States Supreme Court in which the plaintiff, a private recycler with business in Clarkstown, New York, sought to ship its non-recyclable waste to cheaper waste processors out-of-state. Clarkstown opposed the move, and the company then brought suit, raising the unconstitutionality of Clarkstown's "flow control ordinance," which required solid wastes that were not recyclable or hazardous to be deposited at a particular private company's transfer facility. The ordinance involved fees that were above market rates. The Supreme Court sided with the plaintiff, concluding that Clarkstown's ordinance violated the Dormant Commerce Clause.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court held, "Discrimination against interstate commerce in favor of local business or investment is per se invalid," with a very narrow exception where the city can show, under rigorous scrutiny, that there are no other means to advance a legitimate local interest. In the case at hand, the city could have subsidized the waste disposal plant, which was at least one alternative to the discriminatory law that the city tried to use.
Justice Anthony Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court. It was held that the ordinance: (1) regulated interstate commerce, because (a) the company's recycling center processed waste from places other than the town, including from out of state, and (b) the ordinance: (i) drove up the cost for out-of-state interests to dispose of their solid waste, and (ii) deprived out-of-state businesses of access to a local market; and (2) violated the commerce clause by depriving competitors, including out-of-state firms, of access to a local market, because: (a) the ordinance: (i) discriminated by allowing only the favored operator to process waste within the town, (ii) hoarded solid waste, and the demand to get rid of it, for the benefit of the preferred processing facility, and (iii) squelched competition in waste-processing service, and (b) the town: (i) had nondiscriminatory alternatives, such as uniform safety regulations enacted without the object to discriminate, for addressing the health and environmental problems alleged to justify the ordinance, (ii) could not justify the ordinance as a way to steer solid waste away from out-of-town disposal sites that the town might deem harmful to the environment, where to do so would extend the town's police power beyond its jurisdictional bounds, and (iii) could subsidize the facility through general taxes or municipal bonds.
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, in an opinion concurring with the judgment of the Court, agreed with the majority that the ordinance violated the commerce clause, but rejected the view that the ordinance discriminated against interstate commerce. Instead, she believed that the ordinance was unconstitutional since it imposed an excessive burden on interstate commerce.
The Dormant Commerce Clause, or Negative Commerce Clause, in American constitutional law, is a legal doctrine that courts in the United States have inferred from the Commerce Clause in Article I of the US Constitution. The primary focus of the doctrine is barring state protectionism. The Dormant Commerce Clause is used to prohibit state legislation that discriminates against, or unduly burdens, interstate or international commerce. Courts first determine whether a state regulation discriminates on its face against interstate commerce or whether it has the purpose or effect of discriminating against interstate commerce. If the statute is discriminatory, the state has the burden to justify both the local benefits flowing from the statute and to show the state has no other means of advancing the legitimate local purpose.
Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460 (2005), was a court case decided by the Supreme Court of the United States in a 5–4 decision that ruled that laws in New York and Michigan that permitted in-state wineries to ship wine directly to consumers but prohibited out-of-state wineries from doing the same were unconstitutional. The case was unusual because the arguments centered on the rarely-invoked Twenty-First Amendment to the Constitution, ratified in 1933, which ended Prohibition in the United States.
City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978), was a case in which the Supreme Court of the United States held that states could not discriminate against another state's articles of commerce.
Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662 (1981), was a United States Supreme Court case involving the application of the Dormant Commerce Clause to an Iowa state statute restricting the length of tractor-trailers.
United Building & Construction Trades Council v. Mayor and Council of Camden, 465 U.S. 208 (1984), was a case in which the Supreme Court of the United States held that a city can pressure private employers to hire city residents, but the same exercise of power to bias private contractors against out-of-state residents may be called into account under the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article Four of the United States Constitution.
Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961), was a landmark case on the issue of religious and economic liberty decided by the United States Supreme Court. In a 6–3 decision, the Court held that a Pennsylvania blue law forbidding the sale of various retail products on Sunday was not an unconstitutional interference with religion as described in the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.
Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, Wisconsin, 340 U.S. 349 (1951), was a United States Supreme Court case dealing with the Dormant Commerce Clause, used to prohibit states from limiting interstate commerce.
Carter v. Carter Coal Company, 298 U.S. 238 (1936), is a United States Supreme Court decision interpreting the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution, which permits the United States Congress to "regulate Commerce... among the several States." Specifically, it analyzes the extent of Congress' power, according to the Commerce Clause, looking at whether or not they have the right to regulate manufacturing.
Southern Pacific Company v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held that the Arizona Train Limit Law of 1912, which prohibited passenger trains with more than fourteen cars and prohibited freight trains with more than seventy cars, placed an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce. The Court held that the law imposed a burden far greater than necessary to achieve Arizona's legitimate interest in lowering the rate of train accidents. This case is part of the Court's so-called negative commerce clause jurisprudence.
Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. v. Department of Environmental Quality of Oregon, 511 U.S. 93 (1994), is a United States Supreme Court decision focused on the aspect of state power and the interpretation of the Commerce Clause as a limitation on states' regulatory power. In this particular case, the Supreme Court considered whether the Oregon Department of Environmental Quality's alleged cost-based surcharge on the disposal of out-of-state waste violated the dormant commerce clause.
Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334 (1992), was a United States Supreme Court case that held that an Alabama law imposing a fee on out-of-state hazardous waste being disposed of in-state violated the Dormant Commerce Clause.
Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976), was a case argued before the Supreme Court of the United States. Maryland created a program that, 1) purchased junked cars, 2) paid a bounty for those with Maryland license plates and, 3) imposed more stringent documentation requirements on out-of-state processors, in an effort to reduce the number of abandoned cars in Maryland.
United Haulers Ass'n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Management Authority, 550 U.S. 330 (2007), was a United States Supreme Court case about interstate commerce. Chief Justice John Roberts wrote the opinion of the Court, holding that New York county ordinances forcing private waste management companies to deliver waste to a public facility did not discriminate against interstate commerce. Justice Samuel Alito wrote a dissent.
Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977), is a United States Supreme Court case regarding the Commerce Clause and sales tax.
West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186 (1994), was a United States Supreme Court case.
Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456 (1981), was a United States Supreme Court case which found no violation of the equal protection or commerce clauses in a Minnesota state statute banning retail sale of milk in plastic nonreturnable, nonrefillable containers, but permitting such sale in other nonreturnable, nonrefillable containers.
Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520 (1959), is a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held that the Illinois law requiring trucks to have unique mudguards was unconstitutional under the Commerce clause.
Breard v. City of Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951), was a United States Supreme Court case, which held that door-to-door solicitation could be restricted without violating the First Amendment or the Dormant Commerce Clause.
Comptroller of the Treasury of Maryland v. Wynne, 575 U.S. 542 (2015), is a 2015 U.S. Supreme Court decision that applied the Dormant Commerce Clause doctrine to Maryland's personal income tax scheme and found that the failure to provide a full credit for income taxes paid to other states was unconstitutional.
Portland Pipe Line Corp. v. City of South Portland is a lawsuit filed on February 6, 2015, in the United States District Court for the District of Maine. It involved a pipeline operator's challenge to South Portland, Maine's local ordinance prohibiting loading crude oil onto tankers and the construction of new structures for that purpose on the grounds that it violates the dormant Commerce Clause and Foreign Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution.
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