![]() | It has been suggested that this article be merged into Hezbollah–Syria clashes (2024–present) . (Discuss) Proposed since March 2025. |
Lebanon–Syria border clashes (March 2025–present) | ||||||||
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Part of the spillover of the Syrian civil war and the Hezbollah–Syria clashes (2024–present) | ||||||||
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Belligerents | ||||||||
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Commanders and leaders | ||||||||
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Units involved | ||||||||
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Casualties and losses | ||||||||
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7 Lebanese Civilians Killed [6] 52 Lebanese Civilians wounded [7] |
Significant military confrontations between Syrian government forces and Shia Lebanese tribal clans aligned with the Hezbollah militant group [8] arose along the Lebanese-Syrian border region beginning on 16 March 2025, particularly around Baalbek-Hermel.
The confrontations escalated on 16 March 2025, when Hezbollah-affiliated militants kidnapped and murdered three Syrian soldiers near Zeita Dam in the west of Homs. [9] The conflict led to the involvement of the Lebanese Armed Forces, creating a destabilized security situation characterized by cross-border artillery exchanges, military buildups along the border, and increasing humanitarian concerns for civilian safety. The instability represented one of the most serious cross-border incidents between the two nations since border clashes from 2012 to 2017. [10]
The Baalbek-Hermel Governorate, situated in northeastern Lebanon, shares its eastern border with Syria's Homs Governorate, an area that has experienced significant conflict during the Syrian Civil War. [10]
The United Nations Refugee Agency reported that during the 2025 massacres of Syrian Alawites committed by Syrian government-associated forces, more than 6,000 people had fled across the border into northern Lebanon by 11 March to avoid persecution. [11] Many Alawite families crossed the Nahr al-Kabir to do so. [12]
On March 16, a violent altercation took place between members of Lebanese tribal groups and personnel from the Syrian Ministry of Defence's Luwaa Ali Bin Aby Taleb unit. During this initial encounter, one tribal member reportedly sustained stabbing injuries. Following this, three members of the Luwaa Ali Bin Aby Taleb unit were killed within Lebanese territory by the armed tribal groups in the Jard Al-Harmal region. The tribal groups were reported as potentially belonging to smuggling networks allegedly connected to Hezbollah. The incident occurred near Al-Sad Road, opposite Al-Qasr Village along the Syrian-Lebanese border. According to reporting by the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR), Syrian military personnel were allegedly enticed across the border into Lebanese territory, where they were subsequently ambushed. A video taken of the ambush indicated that one victim was fatally attacked with stones. Following the ambush, the tribal members took the remains to the Lebanese Army, who then gave them back to Syria. [13]
Syrian military authorities deployed substantial reinforcements toward the border region adjacent to Lebanon's northern Beqaa Valley, establishing a presence along the border and targeting areas where tribal armed groups were reportedly active. Syrian defense forces concentrated their efforts in the terrain surrounding Jard Al-Harmal, particularly near the Lebanese settlement of Hawik Village. [10] [14]
Intelligence reports indicated military convoys moving from central Syrian positions toward the border zone. Additionally, armed contingents reportedly arrived from Syria's Idlib Governorate and the Ghab Plain, suggesting a coordinated military response by Damascus. The Syrian Ministry of Defense publicly announced through its official news agency SANA its intention to implement "all necessary countermeasures" as a response to what it characterized as "a serious escalation" along its western border with Lebanon. [10] The statement accused the tribe members of being part of a Hezbollah-affiliated militia, and of kidnapping the three Syrian troops from near the Zeita Dam in Homs' western countryside into Lebanon before killing them. [15] [16] Hezbollah formally distanced itself from the conflict, issuing an official statement explicitly denying any role in the ambush, border clashes, or associated military operations. [10] [15]
In response to the mobilization of the Syrian military, the Lebanese Armed Forces dispatched reinforcement units to defend the affected border communities. Lebanese military reconnaissance aircraft have been observed conducting surveillance operations over the border area. The Lebanese military faced direct military attacks, with reports indicating projectiles landing near army positions. [10]
Fighting intensified around the Lebanese town of Qasr in the northern Beqaa Valley. Artillery shells from the Al-Qusayr countryside in Syria struck locations within Lebanese territory, with impacts reportedly from Grad rocket systems being recorded in the Hermel District of Lebanon. Guided missiles targeted vehicles traversing the border region. Mortar rounds and indiscriminate gunfire from Syria struck several Lebanese residential neighborhoods, raising humanitarian concerns due to the great risk of civilian casualties and displacement. [10] On the evening of March 17, 2025, reports indicated a further escalation as gunfire erupted between the Lebanese Armed Forces and the Syrian Army on the outskirts of Hawsh al-Sayyid Ali, near Lebanon’s northern border. [17] [18] Syrian forces would capture the border-crossing villages of Hawsh al-Sayyid Ali and Hawch Beit Ismail announcing they would not advance past them. [19]
Humanitarian organizations operating in the region faced severe operational constraints due to the fighting. The risk to aid workers necessitated the suspension of field activities in border-adjacent areas in Lebanon and Syria, restricting the movement of aid and potentially disrupting assistance to vulnerable populations. SARI Global reported that the indiscriminate targeting of Lebanese villages threatened to create new displacement flows, and could further strain humanitarian access to communities in need. [10]