Libya (GNA)–Turkey maritime deal

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Libya (GNA)–Turkey maritime deal
Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the Republic of Turkey and the Government of National Accord – State of Libya on delimitation of the maritime jurisdiction areas in the Mediterranean
Libya (GNA)-Turkey 2019 Istanbul Agreement.png
Signed27 November 2019 (2019-11-27)
Location Istanbul, Turkey
Parties
Languages

Turkey and the Government of National Accord (GNA) of Libya signed a maritime boundary treaty [a] in November 2019, in order to establish an exclusive economic zone in the Mediterranean Sea, which meant that they could claim rights to seabed resources. [2] However, fears were expressed that the agreement may fuel an "energy showdown" in this region, because it was highly contentious. [3]

Contents

The agreement was controversial [4] [5] [6] and drew widespread condemnation by the states in the region and the international community, including the rival Tobruk-based government led by Libya's Parliament (House of Representatives) and the Libyan National Army, the European Union, the United States of America, Greece, Russia, Egypt, Cyprus, Malta, France, Germany, Italy, Sweden, Serbia, Israel, Syria, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and the Arab League, as a violation of the International Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and the article 8 of the Skhirat Agreement which prohibits the Libyan Prime Minister from making international agreements without the unanimous consent of the cabinet members. [b] The accord's legitimacy and the legal consequences have been disputed. According to the European Union, it "infringed upon the sovereign rights of third States, did not comply with the United Nations' Law of the Sea and could not produce any legal consequences for third states". [35] Both Cyprus and Egypt had dismissed the deal as "illegal", while Greece regarded it as "void" and "geographically absurd", because it ignored the presence of the Greek islands of Crete, Kasos, Karpathos, Kastellorizo and Rhodes between the Turkish–Libyan coasts. [36]

On 5 December 2019, the Turkish Parliament ratified the maritime deal, where it had a strong backing by four of Turkey's five major political parties – with the exception of the pro-Kurdish People's Democracy Party (HDP). [37] [38] The Libyan Parliament however blocked the ratification and rejected the deal unanimously, with the President of the Parliament, Aguila Saleh Issa, sending a letter to the United Nations declaring it as null and void. [39] Even though the ratification by the Libyan Parliament failed, GNA deposited the maritime agreement to the United Nations on 27 December, [40] with Turkey following on 2 March of the next year. [41] On 14 July 2020, it is revealed that five countries sent a joint note verbale to the UN Secretariat calling for the agreement to not be registered and accepted, noting that, per UN procedures, its ratification by the Libyan Parliament is a prerequisite. [33] On 1 October, the UN Secretary-General, Antonio Guterres, registered the Turkey-GNA deal on the delimitation of maritime jurisdiction areas in the Mediterranean. The agreement "has been registered with the Secretariat, in accordance with Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations," said the certificate of registration. [42] [43] The retired Turkish admiral Cihat Yaycı clarified that the agreement being registered by the UN should not be perceived as an approval by the organization; this is actually a typical procedure, after member states have notified the UN of their agreements. [44]

Nine months later, in August 2020, Greece and Egypt signed a maritime deal, demarcating an exclusive economic zone for oil and gas drilling rights, to counter the Turkey-GNA agreement. [45]

The Turkish-GNA memorandum on maritime zones was cancelled by the Al-Bayda Court of Appeals of Libya in its 27 January 2021 ruling. [46]

Turkey and GNA's position

According to the Turkish Newspaper Daily Sabah, the new agreement consists of the establishment of 200 Nautical miles of EEZ, and an establishment of 18.6 nautical miles of Continental shelf. [47] The Turkish position, according to Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is that it is protecting its sovereign rights to the Blue economy and defending their legal claims to the disputed territory in the Mediterranean. [48] Also, according to Anadolu Agency, EEZ boundaries' legality in the Mediterranean should be determined by continental shelves and mainland countries, rather than island based calculations. [49]

In Libya, the signing of the memorandum was met with varying responses: it was welcomed by the supporters of the Tripoli-based Government of National Accord, but rejected by the Tobruk-based government which is backed by the Libyan House of Representatives and Khalifa Haftar's Libyan National Army (LNA). Ahmad Al Mismari, the official spokesman of Haftar's forces, rejected the agreement and warned that “military force will be deployed to prevent any violation of Libyan sovereignty”. [50] Members of the Libyan Parliament expressed similar sentiments, while its Speaker, Aguila Saleh Issa, sent a letter to UN Secretary-General, António Guterres, describing the deal as "null and void". Saleh argued that the agreement should be ratified by the Libyan Parliament, and that "Libya and Turkey do not have common maritime boundaries". [51]

International reactions

The United States of America stated that the deal was "provocative" and a threat to the stability of the region. [52] [53]

European Commission Vice President Josep Borrell stated that the agreement signed by Turkey and GNA creates an infringement for third states, and does not comply with the Law of the sea. [54] The president of The Republic of Cyprus, Nicos Anastasiades aimed to create a diplomatic movement in order to nullify the GNA-Turkish agreement. He has also stated that this movement would not include military options. [55] Greece lodged objections to the UN and expelled the Libyan ambassador in response to the deal, infuriated at a pact which skirts the Greek island of Crete and infringes its continental shelf. [56]

In Germany, the German Federal Parliament (Bundestag)'s research service reviewed the Turkey-GNA maritime deal and found it to be illegal under international law, and detrimental to third parties. [57]

Israel's acting foreign minister Israel Katz announced his country's opposition to the maritime border accord between Ankara and Tripoli, and confirmed that the deal was "illegal". [58] The Israeli perspective offered by the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs also comments that the deal does not give sovereignty over the claimed waters to Turkey and Libya. [59] Furthermore, it states that the third states were kept in the dark regarding the Libyan-Turkish agreement, hence leading to questions regarding its legitimacy. [59]

In a Joint Declaration issued on 11 May 2020, Greece, Cyprus, Egypt joined by France and the United Arab Emirates, denounced the deal, arguing that it "cannot produce any legal consequences for third States", as it infringes upon the sovereign rights of Greece, and does not comply with the UN's Law of the Sea. [60] Turkey called the Joint Statement hypocritical by "a group of countries who are seeking regional chaos and instability". [61]

In August 2020, Egypt and Greece signed an agreement, designating an exclusive economic zone between the two countries. The announcement was made at a joint press conference with the Foreign Ministers of the two countries, stating inter-alliance that the deal established a partial demarcation of the sea boundaries between the two countries and that the remaining demarcation would be achieved through consultations. [62] The parliaments of the two countries ratified the agreement swiftly, and in October 2020 Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi signed the deal, which was then published by the official gazette of the country. [63] Turkey dismissed the Greece – Egypt deal as “null and void”, adding Greece and Egypt have no mutual sea border. [64]

Consequences

Following the agreement, Turkey and Libya's UN-recognized government had seen an increase in co-operation. This cooperation ranges from Turkish offshore exploration efforts to providing aid for the Government of National Accord for the Libyan Civil War (2014–2020). [65] As the issues arising due to the dispute are still developing, the full consequences of this maritime dispute are yet to be seen.

A maritime deal between Egypt and Greece has been signed in response. [66] [67]

On 19 May 2023, Claudio Descalzi, the CEO of Italian energy company Eni, said that any agreement for the construction of the EastMed pipeline must include Turkey; he added that "there are disputes between Turkey and Cyprus that are difficult to remedy, furthermore Turkey has made an agreement with Libya to define a very vast platform that covers almost the entire EastMed, therefore not only Turkey but also Libya will have a say." In response to these comments, George Papanastasiou, the Cypriot Minister of Energy, Commerce and Industry, stated that not all people agree with the opinions expressed by Descalzi, and that he respects his opinion. [68] These remarks follow reports that Eni, Cyprus and Israel are working on a deal for constructing a natural gas pipeline in the Eastern Mediterranean, connecting both the Cypriot and Israeli offshore gas fields to a processing plant in Cyprus, where the gas will be liquefied for export by ship to Italy and the rest of Europe. [69] [70]

Cancellation by House of Representatives

The maritime deal was canceled by the Al-Bayda Court of Appeals of Libya in its 27 January 2021 ruling. The court ruled in favor of the Libyan House of Representatives which filed a lawsuit to declare the Memorandum as invalid. [46] [71] [72] According to Turkish researcher Şafak Yıldırım, the agreement cannot be cancelled unilaterally due to the principle of parallelism in authority and procedure. [73] Unlike Turkey, Libya is a signatory to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, which defined the exclusive economic zone of Greece in 1982; though, it has not ratified it. [74] [75]

2022 preliminary energy exploration deal

In October 2022, Turkey and the Government of National Unity (Libya) (GNU) signed a preliminary energy exploration deal based on the previous deal. Greece and Egypt warned that they would oppose any activity in disputed areas, while the House of Representatives rejected the deal and said that it was signed by a government which doesn't have a mandate. [76]

The European Union said that the details of the new agreement are not known yet and couldn't make a statement on that deal, but reminded that the previous agreement "does not comply with the Law of the Sea and cannot produce any legal consequences for third states". [77]

On 9 January 2023, a Libyan court in Tripoli suspended the deal. [78] The Turkish Foreign Minister said that the Libya's Government of National Unity (GNU) backs the deal despite the court suspension and that GNU told him "not to take seriously" the court ruling. [79] The Libyan General Bar Association agreed with the court ruling. [80]

On 19 February 2024, the Court of Appeal in Tripoli ruled to cancel the agreement. [81] [82] [83]

2025 shift in Haftar–Turkey relations and subsequent events

At the end of 2024, Turkey reopened its consulate in Benghazi. [84]

In January 2025, Turkey resumed direct flights to Benghazi via its national flag carrier, the Turkish Airlines. [85] Shortly after, Turkish Airlines also restarted flights to Misrata, in western Libya. Misrata became the third Libyan destination served by the airline after Tripoli and Benghazi. The inaugural landing at Misrata International Airport was marked by an official ceremony attended by Turkey's Ambassador to Tripoli, Guven Begec, Libyan Transport Minister, Muhammad Al-Shahoubi, Turkish Airlines Sales President, Mahmut Yayla, and other senior officials. [86]

In April 2025, Khalifa Haftar's son and potential successor, Saddam Haftar, visited Ankara as part of efforts to secure Turkish support. During his visit, he met with high-ranking Turkish officials, including Defense Minister Yasar Guler. [84] He had previously traveled to Qatar for similar discussions. [87] In addition, major Turkish construction firms became increasingly active in eastern Libya, signing contracts with the Libya Development and Reconstruction Fund, an institutional body established by Libya's eastern-based House of Representatives, and headed by Belgassim Haftar, son of Khalifa Haftar, for projects in cities such as Benghazi, Al-Bayda, Shahhat, and Tobruk. [88] [89]

By early June 2025, media reports indicated that Libya's eastern-based parliament, aligned with General Haftar, was considering ratifying the maritime agreement with Turkey. The Tobruk-based House of Representatives subsequently formed a committee to review the deal previously endorsed by Tripoli. According to the reports, Greek officials were expected to raise the issue with their Egyptian counterparts. [90] Experts cited in The New Arab newspaper suggested this change of stance was a calculated move by Haftar's camp to gain favor with Turkey, encouraging Ankara to shift support away from Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dbeibeh's weakening Government of National Unity, thereby positioning themselves advantageously in Libya's ongoing power struggle. [91]

In late June 2025, Libya's National Oil Corporation (NOC) signed a memorandum of understanding with Turkey's state-owned oil company TPAO to conduct geological and geophysical surveys in four offshore zones, [92] a move that prompted statements from Greece and the EU, followed by counter-statements from Turkey and Libya. [93] Meanwhile, Malta, in a formal diplomatic protest, called for the removal of a section of Block 1, claiming it overlaps with its continental shelf, and requested that Libya halt any seismic or geological exploration in the disputed area. [94] [95] Egypt expressed concern that TPAO's planned surveys could encroach on its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) [87] and, according to regional officials, asked the United States to intervene to prevent Libya's eastern-based parliament from ratifying the maritime deal with Turkey. [87]

In July 2025, Libya formally submitted a diplomatic complaint to the United Nations, opposing Greece's claims to maritime zones located south and west of Crete. This is the first time Libya officially asserted its own claims over parts of the Eastern Mediterranean that Greece had previously identified for offshore oil and gas exploration. In its diplomatic note, Libya rejected the "median line" proposed by Greece as the basis for licensing exploration blocks in the area. It also urged the international community and the UN to help maintain peace and stability in the region, and to prevent steps that could heighten tensions. [96] In addition, high ranking Turkish officials, including the Minister of Defense, the Chief of the General Staff, and the Commander of the Turkish Land Forces, met with Saddam Haftar in Istanbul on the sidelines of IDEF 2025, a major annual defense fair held in the city. [84] [97] On the same day, at the same event, the Chief of the Turkish General Staff and the head of Turkish military intelligence also held a meeting with Major General Mahmoud Hamza, Commander of the 444th Infantry Brigade and Director of Military Intelligence for the Libyan Army, which operates under the government of the western Libya. [97]

There was also a significant surge in migrant arrivals to Greece from Libya, with the European Commission estimating an increase of approximately 173%. An EU diplomat said that there were indications that Libya may be attempting to weaponize migration in coordination with Turkey to advance shared political objectives. [98] The European Union's attempt to address surging migrant flows through Libya backfired dramatically when an EU delegation, led by Migration Commissioner Magnus Brunner, was expelled from Benghazi by Haftar. The mission aimed to explore cooperation on migration management with local authorities. According to sources familiar with the incident, the EU delegation initially wanted to meet only with Haftar and refused to engage with his ministers, citing the fact that the Benghazi government is not recognized by the United Nations. Later, the EU team agreed to meet with the ministers, but only on the condition that no photographs be taken. Haftar rejected the compromise and declared the delegation persona non grata, ordering their swift expulsion from the region. The situation triggered a crisis within the EU delegation, with EU officials later describing the incident as "a clear blunder", and calling for a reassessment of internal policy coordination and decision-making processes. One EU source admitted that concerns had existed from the outset about the risk of walking into a political trap set by Haftar. [99] In response to the surge in migration, Greece deployed two warships to patrol the sea borders between Greece and Libya, introduced stricter migration regulations for migrants arriving by sea from Libya, and begun training Libyan coast guard personnel from both western and eastern Libya. [100] [101] In August 2025, the leaders of Turkey, Italy, and Libya, convened in Istanbul to discuss migration, and explore other potential areas of cooperation. They agreed to reconvene in the future to assess the outcomes of their cooperation committees' decisions. [102]

In August 2025, the Turkish Navy corvette TCG Kınalıada docked at the port of Benghazi as part of a Turkish Naval Forces tour of Libyan ports. This followed an earlier visit to Tripoli, where the vessel was welcomed by Libyan Army Chief of Staff, General Mohammed Al-Haddad. In Tripoli, Turkish and Libyan naval forces, including the Turkish TCB-59 helicopter, conducted joint maritime exercises. [103] During that visit, Turkish officials also held discussions with Al-Haddad, focusing on expanding military cooperation especially in the areas of training and collaboration across naval, air, and air defense sectors. [104] The subsequent visit to Benghazi was accompanied by a high-level Turkish delegation led by the Turkish Ambassador Guven Begec, Director-General at the Turkish Ministry of National Defense Lieutenant General Ilkay Altindag, and the Turkish Consul General in Benghazi Serkan Keramanlioglu. The Turkish delegation also included Rear Admirals Refik Levent Tezcan and Huseyin Tigli, along with Navy Captain Ilkay Beril Aydemir, the Armed Forces attaché in Tripoli. [103] They were received at the port by Saddam Khalifa. A bilateral meeting was held during the visit, focusing on enhancing military and naval cooperation, as well as the exchange of technical and technological expertise. [105] The objective of the "One Libya, One Army" project was also discussed during the meeting. [106] Following the discussions, Saddam Khalifa toured the warship and inspected its advanced systems and capabilities. [105] Notably, the TCG Kinaliada had previously visited Alexandria, Egypt, in August 2024, where Turkish officials met with their Egyptian counterparts, a visit that symbolized a significant thaw and improvement in Turkish–Egyptian relations. [107] In the following days, Turkish National Intelligence Organization chief, Ibrahim Kalin, met with Khalifa Haftar, Saddam Haftar, and Belgassim Haftar (director general of the Libyan Development and Reconstruction Fund) in Benghazi. [103] [108] During his visit, Kalin invited Khalifa Haftar to visit Turkey, and Khalifa Haftar agreed, expressing willingness to travel there in September. [109] In addition, a high-level Turkish delegation, led by the head of the Turkish Intelligence Agency, was received by the Board of Directors of the University of Benghazi. [110] According to Turkish officials, Turkey is also considering deploying military advisers and trainers in Eastern Libya. [88] On 18 August, Malta issued an official diplomatic protest to Libya's Government of National Unity, rejecting the maritime map and coordinates that Tripoli had submitted to the United Nations. Malta asserted that Libya's maritime claims violate international law and encroach upon Malta's continental shelf and Exclusive Economic Zone. It called for both sides to engage in dialogue to reach a resolution based on international legal principles, including the UNCLOS. [95]

At the end of August, news outlets reported that, according to sources in Turkey and Libya, Libya's eastern parliament was preparing to vote in favor of the maritime deal in the coming weeks. [111] If approved, the deal would bolster Turkey's efforts to challenge what it describes as a Greek-imposed blockade enforced by the Greek islands. It would also provide Ankara with political justification to conduct gas exploration and drilling in a disputed maritime zone, while supporting a sustained Turkish naval presence in the central Mediterranean. In return, Eastern Libya stands to gain both investment and increased political influence. [112]

The possibility of Turkish exploration highlights changing geopolitical dynamics in the region. According to OilPrice.com, with Russia focused on Ukraine, the U.S. and U.K. are also seeking to strengthen their influence throughout the Middle East and North Africa, supporting economic stability linked to energy projects in countries such as Syria and Libya. [113] According to the Turkish think tank Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research (SETA), Turkey's recent efforts to engage with eastern Libya and maintain balanced relations with all sides in the country are also closely tied to its ongoing normalization process with Egypt. A potential trilateral understanding between Ankara, Cairo, and Benghazi could significantly reshape the geopolitical landscape of the Eastern Mediterranean, potentially affecting even the ongoing Gaza war, the situation in Lebanon, and tensions involving Israel. [114] According to an analysis by the Tripoli-based online newspaper The Libya Observer , Turkey's recent diplomatic moves have sparked significant anger and frustration on both sides of Libya. In eastern Libya, supporters of Haftar have been shocked by the sudden warmth toward Turkey, a country they had once vocally opposed. These same supporters now see Turkish officials being welcomed with open arms by the region's ruling elites. Despite their disillusionment, no one dares to openly criticize the shift. In western Libya, the reaction is one of betrayal and disappointment. Many believed Turkey would remain a steadfast ally of Tripoli. Some voices in Tripoli are now criticizing their leaders for over relying on Turkey while neglecting other potential alliances. Turkey's moves aims to secure economic investments in eastern Libya and strengthen its position in the Eastern Mediterranean gas region. Improved relations with Egypt have further opened diplomatic channels between Turkey and Haftar. There are growing concerns in Tripoli that Turkey may eventually abandon the West, or even support Haftar's efforts to seize the capital if it serves its interests. However, The Libya Observer argues that Turkey's broader strategic objectives suggest otherwise. By maintaining ties with both sides, Turkey is positioning itself as an indispensable actor in the Libyan conflict, ensuring that it cannot be excluded from any future settlement. [115] The Turkish think tank, Center for Diplomatic Affairs and Political Studies, stated in an analysis that Turkey is adjusting its Libya policy by shifting from confrontation to pragmatic engagement with all Libyan factions, including Haftar. A primary goal is to secure the Turkish–Libya maritime deal, which is vital to Turkey's Blue Homeland doctrine. Engaging with Haftar could help legitimize this agreement and facilitate Turkish energy exploration in the contested waters near Crete. Furthermore, reports indicate that Saddam Haftar has tentatively agreed to purchase Turkish-made drones and receive training for LNA personnel (military forces under Haftar's command). If realized, this would give Turkey influence as a defense supplier across Libya's fragmented landscape, positioning it for long-term involvement once Libya restructures its military. This move also signals to the U.S. that Turkey is willing to play a constructive role in unifying Libya's security sector, aligning with U.S. goals for stabilization while simultaneously promoting its own interests. [107] In an analysis for the American think tank Atlantic Council, Rama Yade, Senior Director of the Africa Center, and Defne Arslan, Senior Director and founder of Atlantic Council Turkey, argue that Turkey's growing influence and successes in Africa (including in Libya, where they specifically noted the agreement between Turkey and Libya to launch oil and gas exploration activities), across diplomacy, defense, energy, and infrastructure, make it a strategic partner for the U.S. and Europe in countering China's and Russia's footprint on the continent. They contend that by aligning their interests and fostering cooperation with Turkey, Western policymakers can more effectively engage with Africa's future while offering African nations a broader range of partnerships. [116]

The EU reaffirmed its opposition to the maritime deal in June and September 2025, stating it violates international law and threatens stability in the eastern Mediterranean. EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas emphasized that third countries, including Turkey and Libya, must comply with international law and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The European Council declared the agreement violates the sovereign rights of third states, does not align with customary international law, and has no legal effect on others. The EU stated that disputes must be resolved through dialogue grounded in international law to ensure regional stability. [117]

In early September 2025, the head of the Egyptian General Intelligence Service, held a meeting with the Director of Turkey's National Intelligence Organization. Their discussions focused on regional and international issues, with particular attention to the situations in Gaza, Sudan, and Libya. [118] Also in early September, during the Gastech 2025 conference in Milan, the premier forum for natural gas, LNG, hydrogen, climate technologies, and artificial intelligence, the Turkish Energy Minister Alparslan Bayraktar had a meeting with Libya's Oil and Gas Minister Khalifa Abdulsadek. Both ministers expressed mutual interest in expanding joint projects and investment opportunities in the energy sector. [119] Furthermore, Saddam Khalifa Haftar met in Rome with Ibrahim Dbeibah, a key adviser to Tripoli-based Prime Minister Abdulhamid Dbeibah, along with U.S. presidential adviser Massad Boulos. Their discussions focused on a wide range of issues, including security, military affairs, politics, and energy. [120] In addition, the Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan visited Italy to meet with his Italian counterpart, Antonio Tajani, for talks focused on energy security, Mediterranean connectivity, irregular migration (particularly from Libya), [121] defense industry collaboration, science and technology, and key regional issues, including Libya. [122] Fidan emphasized that Turkey has played a crucial role in reducing migration flows from Libya, and both countries signed a deal to deepen cooperation between their coast guards and law enforcement agencies to combat irregular migration in the Mediterranean and jointly work toward ensuring Libya's stability. [123] In the same period, the Libya Development and Reconstruction Fund, based in eastern Libya, announced it had signed memorandums of understanding with the Italian company GKSD S.r.L. The agreements cover cooperation in health, infrastructure, clean energy, and environmental sectors. The signing took place during a meeting between the Fund's Director General, Belgassim Khalifa Haftar, and the head of the Italian Intelligence Service, who led a high-level Italian delegation. The President of GKSD S.r.L. was also present. [124] Meanwhile in Greece, according to the Greek newspaper Kathimerini , Belgassim Haftar also visited Athens to discuss enhancing cooperation in the areas of construction, energy, investment, and transport. The visit also coincided with preparations for an upcoming Greek trade mission to Benghazi in the fall. During the talks, both sides highlighted the historic relations between Greece and Libya, and expressed a shared desire to strengthen and build a genuine dialogue. They also agreed to continue training Libyan coast guard officers in Greece, and Belgassim Haftar reportedly assured that the House of Representatives would not ratify the maritime memorandum. The Greek Foreign Minister also expressed satisfaction with the significant decline in migrant flows from Tobruk to Crete. [125] In addition, Chevron Corporation, in partnership with HelleniQ Energy, submitted a binding offer in Greece for four offshore blocks, some of which lie close to the median line that Greece claims as the boundary of its Exclusive Economic Zone. Greek officials consider Chevron's move a strong signal of trust, and they believe that if Chevron later pursues Libyan offshore blocks located south of Greece's claimed EEZ boundary, it could result in a de facto maritime delimitation, even in the absence of formal treaties. [126] Around the same time, during an official visit to Malta, the Government of National Unity of Libya and the Government of Malta reached an agreement to initiate discussions on maritime border issues. The talks, held between Libya's Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs, Al-Taher Al-Baour, and Maltese Foreign Minister Ian Borg, focused on resolving maritime boundaries through bilateral dialogue, with the possibility of expanding to multilateral talks if other countries become involved. Additional key topics included political developments in Libya, illegal migration, joint border management, coordination between coast guards, and development initiatives aimed at addressing the root causes of migration. [127]

In mid-September 2025, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan revealed that Saddam Haftar, the son of Khalifa Haftar, has been in regular contact with Turkish intelligence and the foreign ministry. Erdogan noted that this engagement reflects Turkey's recent shift toward a more multi-dimensional diplomatic approach in Libya. He expressed strong expectations that the Benghazi-based authorities could soon ratify the 2019 maritime delimitation agreement. According to Erdogan, such a move would be a significant step toward promoting peace and securing Libya's place in the international legal order. [128] [129] In addition, during a joint Turkish–Libyan working group meeting in Ankara, Turkish Trade Minister Omer Bolat announced that Turkey has proposed holding the Turkish–Libyan Joint Economic Commission meeting in December, the first time since 2009. He emphasized the strong potential for expanded cooperation between the two countries in several key sectors, including natural resources and renewable energy. He also revealed that Turkey has begun implementing a long-term, multiple-entry visa system for Libyan citizens. [130]

On 21 September, Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis announced that technical discussions on maritime delimitation with Libya have officially begun. A Libyan delegation visited Athens, and the next round of talks is scheduled to take place in Tripoli. According to analysts, this diplomatic engagement marks a shift toward greater responsibility by both countries. By choosing dialogue over confrontation, Greece and Libya may have opened the door to a long and complex negotiation process, which is seen as essential for maintaining regional stability and preventing direct conflict. However, expectations for concrete outcomes remain low, as Turkey continues to be a dominant force in the region. The recent deal between Greece and Chevron is widely seen as an effort by Greece to position itself, not Turkey, as Libya's legitimate maritime partner. Yet in reality, Turkey remains a central player. Turkey considers its agreement with Libya untouchable, and with Libya lacking both a unified political front and the will in Tripoli to annul the MoU, the deal remains in effect although Greece deems it "illegal". Turkey's entrenched influence in western Libya continues to undermine Greek efforts, severely limiting Athens ability to shift the status quo. For its part, Libya is attempting to balance its relationships with both Greece and Turkey, leveraging the dynamic to attract diplomatic attention, investment opportunities, and bargaining power in negotiations over migration with Europe. However, this balancing act carries significant risks, it could deepen internal divisions within Libya or provoke backlash from groups loyal to Turkey. [131] [132]

See also

Notes

  1. ↑ Officially the Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the Republic of Turkey and the Government of National Accord – State of Libya on delimitation of the maritime jurisdiction areas in the Mediterranean (Turkish: Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Hükümeti ile Libya Devleti Hükümeti Arasında Akdeniz'de Deniz Yetki Alanlarının Sınırlandırılmasına İlişkin Mutabakat Muhtırası). [1]
  2. ↑ See: [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] [24] [25] [26] [27] [28] [29] [30] [31] [32] [33] [34]

References

  1. ↑ Yaycı, Cihat (30 September 2020). "Türkiye-Libya Arasında İmzalanan Münhasır Ekonomik Bölge Andlaşmasının Sonuç ve Etkileri". Kriter Dergi.
  2. ↑ "ANALYSIS – Strategic, legal aspects of Turkey-Libya deal". aa.com.tr. Archived from the original on 29 March 2020. Retrieved 2 May 2020.
  3. ↑ Hacaoglu, Selcan; Kozok, Firat (5 December 2019). "Turkey's Maritime Muscle Flexing Roils Eastern Mediterranean". Bloomberg. Retrieved 5 May 2020.
  4. ↑ "Turkey gets a free pass from big powers". Gulf News. 2 December 2019. Retrieved 2 December 2019.
  5. ↑ "Greece hopes talks with Erdoğan will ease maritime frictions". The Guardian. 3 December 2019. Retrieved 4 December 2019.
  6. ↑ "Greece expels Libyan ambassador in dispute with Turkey". Washington Post. 6 December 2019. Archived from the original on 6 December 2019. Retrieved 6 December 2019.
  7. ↑ "Egypt condemns MoUs signed between Turkey, Libyan PM". ahram online. 29 November 2019. Retrieved 30 November 2019.
  8. ↑ "The provocative Turkey-Libya agreement opens the way for EEZ (original: Η προκλητική συμφωνία Τουρκίας – Λιβύης ανοίγει το δρόμο για ΑΟΖ)". in.gr. 29 November 2019. Retrieved 30 November 2019. Another attempt in the realization of the «Blue Homeland» whereby Turkey seeks to seize parts of the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean by asserting the position that no islands are entitled to maritime zones beyond territorial waters. (original: Μία ακόμα κίνηση στον σχεδιασμό της «Γαλάζιας Πατρίδας», βάσει του οποίου η Τουρκία επιχειρεί να οικειοποιηθεί μέρος του Αιγαίου και της Ανατολικής Μεσογείου υποστηρίζοντας τη θέση ότι τα νησιά δεν δικαιούνται θαλάσσιες ζώνες πέραν των χωρικών υδάτων)
  9. ↑ "Libya divided over EEZ deal with Ankara: Government confirms it – Opposition says "illegal" (original: Διχασμένη η Λιβύη για την συμφωνία της ΑΟΖ με την Άγκυρα: Η κυβέρνηση την επιβεβαιώνει – "Παράνομη" λέει η αντιπολίτευση)". Real.gr. 28 November 2019. Retrieved 30 November 2019.
  10. ↑ "Cyprus, Greece and Egypt condemn Turkey-Libya deal (updated)". Cyprus Mail. 29 November 2019. Archived from the original on 22 September 2020. Retrieved 30 November 2019.
  11. ↑ "Cyprus decries Turkey-Libya maritime border deal". Kathimerini. 29 November 2019. Retrieved 30 November 2019.
  12. ↑ "Greece, Cyprus and Egypt outraged by Libyan-Turkish maritime border agreement amid oil-drilling row". Al Araby. 29 November 2019. Retrieved 30 November 2019.
  13. ↑ "Turkey and Libya sign maritime deal to counter Greek drilling". Middle East Eye. 28 November 2019. Retrieved 30 November 2019.
  14. ↑ "Antonio Lopez: Turkey's Actions in Eastern Mediterranean Unlawful, as well as MoU with Libya". The National Herald. 30 November 2019. Archived from the original on 1 December 2019. Retrieved 30 November 2019.
  15. ↑ "Greek ultimatum to Libya over deal with Turkey – Mitsotakis: Those who dispute sovereign rights will find Europe standing against them (Τελεσίγραφο της Ελλάδας στη Λιβύη για τη συμφωνία με Τουρκία – Μητσοτάκης: Όποιοι αμφισβητούν κυριαρχικά δικαιώματα θα βρουν απέναντί τους την Ευρώπη)". NewsPost. 29 November 2019. Archived from the original on 30 November 2019. Retrieved 30 November 2019.
  16. ↑ "Through Libya, Erdogan builds the "Blue Homeland" (original: Μέσω Λιβύης χτίζει τη "Γαλάζια Πατρίδα" ο Ερντογάν)". SLPress. 29 November 2019. Retrieved 30 November 2019.
  17. ↑ "Istúriz – Tajani condemn Turkey's illegal actions and back Greece (original: Ιστουρίζ – Ταγιάνι καταδικάζουν τις παράνομες ενέργειες της Τουρκίας και στηρίζουν Ελλάδα)". SLPress. 30 November 2019. Retrieved 30 November 2019.
  18. ↑ ""Turkey should respect the international law": EU Commission against Ankara on the agreement with Libya (original: "Η Τουρκία να σέβεται το διεθνές δίκαιο": Κομισιόν κατά Άγκυρας για τη συμφωνία με τη Λιβύη)". Eleutheros Typos. 2 December 2019. Retrieved 2 December 2019.
  19. ↑ "EU asks to see Turkey-Libya maritime border deal". Kathimerini. 4 December 2019. Retrieved 4 December 2019. The European Union on Wednesday called for the publication of a memorandum of understanding signed between Turkey and Libya which ostensibly delineates maritime borders between the two countries, and expressed its full support for the sovereign rights of Greece and Cyprus.
  20. ↑ "Libya's Haftar hopes to have normal relations with Israel". Middle East Monitor. 2 December 2019. Retrieved 2 December 2019. The official condemned Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan's actions in the Middle East. This was a reference to the deal struck between Turkey and the UN-backed Libyan government last Wednesday relating to trade and arms sales. Al-Howeej claimed that the deal was signed with those who have "no right to give to those against whom we are battling."
  21. ↑ "Harsh message by Macron to Erdogan: Respect Greece's sovereign rights (original: Αυστηρό μήνυμα Μακρόν σε Ερντογάν: Να σεβαστείς τα κυριαρχικά δικαιώματα της Ελλάδας)". CNN. 4 December 2019. Retrieved 4 December 2019. «Turkey must respect the sovereign rights of NATO members. I support Greece's concerns over the Libya-Turkey Agreement» Macron said, commenting on the Turkish provocations and the agreement between Turkey and Libya on defining maritime borders and EEZ.)
  22. ↑ "FM of Israel: We are on Greece's side (Original: ΥΠΕΞ Ισραήλ: Είμαστε στο πλευρό της Ελλάδας)". News 247. 4 December 2019. Retrieved 4 December 2019.
  23. ↑ "Turkey-Libya agreement 'arbitrary and illegal'". GUE/NGL. 4 December 2019. Retrieved 4 December 2019.
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  25. ↑ "Pavlopoulos: who does Farraj represents? Voucic: we recognize Greece's integrity (original: Παυλόπουλος: Ποιον εκπροσωπεί ο Σαράζ; Βούτσιτς: Αναγνωρίζουμε ακεραιότητα της Ελλάδας)". Kathimerini. 9 December 2019. Retrieved 10 December 2019. the Serbian president has made clear that his country will always recognize the territory and the integrity of Greece as well as of Cyprus.
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  27. ↑ "Message by Berlin to Ankara for the respect of sovereign rights (original: Μήνυμα Βερολίνου στην Αγκυρα για σεβασμό των κυριαρχικών δικαιωμάτων)". Kathimerini. 11 December 2019. Retrieved 11 December 2019. The European Union's position of solidarity with Greece and Cyprus is "expressly endorsed" by Berlin, German Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Adebahr recently said, urging Turkey and Libya "to respect the sovereignty and sovereignty of all member states of the EU and to follow the delimitation of maritime areas in accordance with applicable international law."
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  33. 1 2 "5 countries demand that the UN reject the Turko-Libyan agreement (original: Να μην αποδεχθεί ο ΟΗΕ την τουρκολιβυκή συμφωνία ζητούν 5 χώρες)". To Pontiki. 14 July 2020. Retrieved 14 July 2020.
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