Libya (GNA)–Turkey maritime deal

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Libya (GNA)–Turkey maritime deal
Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the Republic of Turkey and the Government of National Accord – State of Libya on delimitation of the maritime jurisdiction areas in the Mediterranean
Libya (GNA)-Turkey 2019 Istanbul Agreement.png
Signed27 November 2019 (2019-11-27)
Location Istanbul, Turkey
Parties
Languages

Turkey and the Government of National Accord (GNA) of Libya signed a maritime boundary treaty [a] in November 2019, in order to establish an exclusive economic zone in the Mediterranean Sea, which meant that they could claim rights to seabed resources. [2] However, fears were expressed that the agreement may fuel an "energy showdown" in this region, because it was highly contentious. [3]

Contents

The agreement was controversial [4] [5] [6] and drew widespread condemnation by the states in the region and the international community, including the rival Tobruk-based government led by Libya's Parliament (House of Representatives) and the Libyan National Army, the European Union, the United States of America, Greece, Russia, Egypt, Cyprus, Malta, France, Germany, Italy, Sweden, Serbia, Israel, Syria, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and the Arab League, as a violation of the International Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and the article 8 of the Skhirat Agreement which prohibits the Libyan Prime Minister from making international agreements without the unanimous consent of the cabinet members. [b] The accord's legitimacy and the legal consequences have been disputed. According to the European Union, it "infringed upon the sovereign rights of third States, did not comply with the United Nations' Law of the Sea and could not produce any legal consequences for third states". [35] Both Cyprus and Egypt had dismissed the deal as "illegal", while Greece regarded it as "void" and "geographically absurd", because it ignored the presence of the Greek islands of Crete, Kasos, Karpathos, Kastellorizo and Rhodes between the Turkish–Libyan coasts. [36]

On 5 December 2019, the Turkish Parliament ratified the maritime deal, where it had a strong backing by four of Turkey's five major political parties – with the exception of the pro-Kurdish People's Democracy Party (HDP). [37] [38] The Libyan Parliament however blocked the ratification and rejected the deal unanimously, with the President of the Parliament, Aguila Saleh Issa, sending a letter to the United Nations declaring it as null and void. [39] Even though the ratification by the Libyan Parliament failed, GNA deposited the maritime agreement to the United Nations on 27 December, [40] with Turkey following on 2 March of the next year. [41] On 14 July 2020, it is revealed that five countries sent a joint note verbale to the UN Secretariat calling for the agreement to not be registered and accepted, noting that, per UN procedures, its ratification by the Libyan Parliament is a prerequisite. [33] On 1 October, the UN Secretary-General, Antonio Guterres, registered the Turkey-GNA deal on the delimitation of maritime jurisdiction areas in the Mediterranean. The agreement "has been registered with the Secretariat, in accordance with Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations," said the certificate of registration. [42] [43] The retired Turkish admiral Cihat Yaycı clarified that the agreement being registered by the UN should not be perceived as an approval by the organization; this is actually a typical procedure, after member states have notified the UN of their agreements. [44]

Nine months later, in August 2020, Greece and Egypt signed a maritime deal, demarcating an exclusive economic zone for oil and gas drilling rights, to counter the Turkey-GNA agreement. [45]

The Turkish-GNA memorandum on maritime zones was cancelled by the Al-Bayda Court of Appeals of Libya in its 27 January 2021 ruling. [46]

Turkey and GNA's position

According to the Turkish Newspaper Daily Sabah, the new agreement consists of the establishment of 200 Nautical miles of EEZ, and an establishment of 18.6 nautical miles of Continental shelf. [47] The Turkish position, according to Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is that it is protecting its sovereign rights to the Blue economy and defending their legal claims to the disputed territory in the Mediterranean. [48] Also, according to Anadolu Agency, EEZ boundaries' legality in the Mediterranean should be determined by continental shelves and mainland countries, rather than island based calculations. [49]

In Libya, the signing of the memorandum was met with varying responses: it was welcomed by the supporters of the Tripoli-based Government of National Accord, but rejected by the Tobruk-based government which is backed by the Libyan House of Representatives and Khalifa Haftar's Libyan National Army (LNA). Ahmad Al Mismari, the official spokesman of Haftar's forces, rejected the agreement and warned that “military force will be deployed to prevent any violation of Libyan sovereignty”. [50] Members of the Libyan Parliament expressed similar sentiments, while its Speaker, Aguila Saleh Issa, sent a letter to UN Secretary-General, António Guterres, describing the deal as "null and void". Saleh argued that the agreement should be ratified by the Libyan Parliament, and that "Libya and Turkey do not have common maritime boundaries". [51]

International reactions

The United States of America stated that the deal was "provocative" and a threat to the stability of the region. [52] [53]

European Commission Vice President Josep Borrell stated that the agreement signed by Turkey and GNA creates an infringement for third states, and does not comply with the Law of the sea. [54] The president of The Republic of Cyprus, Nicos Anastasiades aimed to create a diplomatic movement in order to nullify the GNA-Turkish agreement. He has also stated that this movement would not include military options. [55] Greece lodged objections to the UN and expelled the Libyan ambassador in response to the deal, infuriated at a pact which skirts the Greek island of Crete and infringes its continental shelf. [56]

In Germany, the German Federal Parliament (Bundestag)'s research service reviewed the Turkey-GNA maritime deal and found it to be illegal under international law, and detrimental to third parties. [57]

Israel's acting foreign minister Israel Katz announced his country's opposition to the maritime border accord between Ankara and Tripoli, and confirmed that the deal was "illegal". [58] The Israeli perspective offered by the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs also comments that the deal does not give sovereignty over the claimed waters to Turkey and Libya. [59] Furthermore, it states that the third states were kept in the dark regarding the Libyan-Turkish agreement, hence leading to questions regarding its legitimacy. [59]

In a Joint Declaration issued on 11 May 2020, Greece, Cyprus, Egypt joined by France and the United Arab Emirates, denounced the deal, arguing that it "cannot produce any legal consequences for third States", as it infringes upon the sovereign rights of Greece, and does not comply with the UN's Law of the Sea. [60] Turkey called the Joint Statement hypocritical by "a group of countries who are seeking regional chaos and instability". [61]

In August 2020, Egypt and Greece signed an agreement, designating an exclusive economic zone between the two countries. The announcement was made at a joint press conference with the Foreign Ministers of the two countries, stating inter-alliance that the deal established a partial demarcation of the sea boundaries between the two countries and that the remaining demarcation would be achieved through consultations. [62] The parliaments of the two countries ratified the agreement swiftly, and in October 2020 Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi signed the deal, which was then published by the official gazette of the country. [63] Turkey dismissed the Greece – Egypt deal as “null and void”, adding Greece and Egypt have no mutual sea border. [64]

Consequences

Following the agreement, Turkey and Libya's UN-recognized government had seen an increase in co-operation. This cooperation ranges from Turkish offshore exploration efforts to providing aid for the Government of National Accord for the Libyan Civil War (2014–2020). [65] As the issues arising due to the dispute are still developing, the full consequences of this maritime dispute are yet to be seen.

A maritime deal between Egypt and Greece has been signed in response. [66] [67]

On 19 May 2023, Claudio Descalzi, the CEO of Italian energy company Eni, said that any agreement for the construction of the EastMed pipeline must include Turkey; he added that "there are disputes between Turkey and Cyprus that are difficult to remedy, furthermore Turkey has made an agreement with Libya to define a very vast platform that covers almost the entire EastMed, therefore not only Turkey but also Libya will have a say." In response to these comments, George Papanastasiou, the Cypriot Minister of Energy, Commerce and Industry, stated that not all people agree with the opinions expressed by Descalzi, and that he respects his opinion. [68] These remarks follow reports that Eni, Cyprus and Israel are working on a deal for constructing a natural gas pipeline in the Eastern Mediterranean, connecting both the Cypriot and Israeli offshore gas fields to a processing plant in Cyprus, where the gas will be liquefied for export by ship to Italy and the rest of Europe. [69] [70]

Cancellation by House of Representatives

The maritime deal was canceled by the Al-Bayda Court of Appeals of Libya in its 27 January 2021 ruling. The court ruled in favor of the Libyan House of Representatives which filed a lawsuit to declare the Memorandum as invalid. [46] [71] [72] According to Turkish researcher Şafak Yıldırım, the agreement cannot be cancelled unilaterally due to the principle of parallelism in authority and procedure. [73] Unlike Turkey, Libya is a signatory to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, which defined the exclusive economic zone of Greece in 1982; though, it has not ratified it. [74] [75]

2022 preliminary energy exploration deal

In October 2022, Turkey and the Government of National Unity (Libya) (GNU) signed a preliminary energy exploration deal based on the previous deal. Greece and Egypt warned that they would oppose any activity in disputed areas, while the House of Representatives rejected the deal and said that it was signed by a government which doesn't have a mandate. [76]

The European Union said that the details of the new agreement are not known yet and couldn't make a statement on that deal, but reminded that the previous agreement "does not comply with the Law of the Sea and cannot produce any legal consequences for third states". [77]

On 9 January 2023, a Libyan court in Tripoli suspended the deal. [78] The Turkish Foreign Minister said that the Libya's Government of National Unity (GNU) backs the deal despite the court suspension and that GNU told him "not to take seriously" the court ruling. [79] The Libyan General Bar Association agreed with the court ruling. [80]

On 19 February 2024, the Court of Appeal in Tripoli ruled to cancel the agreement. [81] [82] [83]

Haftar's shift toward Turkey in 2025

At the end of 2024, Turkey reopened its consulate in Benghazi. In April 2025, Khalifa Haftar's son and potential successor, Saddam Haftar, visited Ankara as part of efforts to secure Turkish support. He had previously traveled to Qatar for similar discussions. [84] In July 2025, the Turkish Defense Minister Yasar Guler met with Saddam Haftar in Istanbul, on the sidelines of IDEF25 (a major annual defense fair held in Istanbul). [85]

By early June 2025, media reports indicated that Libya's eastern-based parliament, aligned with General Haftar, was considering ratifying the maritime agreement with Turkey. The Tobruk-based House of Representatives subsequently formed a committee to review the deal previously endorsed by Tripoli. According to the reports, Greek officials were expected to raise the issue with their Egyptian counterparts. [86] Experts cited in The New Arab newspaper suggested this change of stance was a calculated move by Haftar's camp to gain favor with Turkey, encouraging Ankara to shift support away from Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dbeibeh's weakening Government of National Unity, thereby positioning themselves advantageously in Libya's ongoing power struggle. [87]

In late June 2025, Libya's National Oil Corporation (NOC) signed a memorandum of understanding with Turkey's state-owned oil company TPAO to conduct geological and geophysical surveys in four offshore zones, [88] a move that prompted statements from Greece and the EU, followed by counter-statements from Turkey and Libya. [89] Meanwhile, Egypt expressed concern that TPAO's planned surveys could encroach on its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) [84] and, according to regional officials, asked the United States to intervene to prevent Libya's eastern-based parliament from ratifying the maritime deal with Turkey. [84]

In July 2025, Libya formally submitted a diplomatic complaint to the United Nations, opposing Greece's claims to maritime zones located south and west of Crete. This is the first time Libya has officially asserted its own claims over parts of the Eastern Mediterranean that Greece had previously identified for offshore oil and gas exploration. In its diplomatic note, Libya rejected the "median line" proposed by Greece as the basis for licensing exploration blocks in the area. It also urged the international community and the UN to help maintain peace and stability in the region, and to prevent steps that could heighten tensions. [90]

There was also a significant surge in migrant arrivals to Greece from Libya, with the European Commission estimating an increase of approximately 173%. An EU diplomat said that there were indications that Libya may be attempting to weaponize migration in coordination with Turkey to advance shared political objectives. [91] The European Union's attempt to address surging migrant flows through Libya backfired dramatically when an EU delegation, led by Migration Commissioner Magnus Brunner, was expelled from Benghazi by Haftar. The mission aimed to explore cooperation on migration management with local authorities. According to sources familiar with the incident, the EU delegation initially wanted to meet only with Haftar and refused to engage with his ministers, citing the fact that the Benghazi government is not recognized by the United Nations. Later, the EU team agreed to meet with the ministers, but only on the condition that no photographs be taken. Haftar rejected the compromise and declared the delegation persona non grata, ordering their swift expulsion from the region. The situation triggered a crisis within the EU delegation, with EU officials later describing the incident as "a clear blunder", and calling for a reassessment of internal policy coordination and decision-making processes. One EU source admitted that concerns had existed from the outset about the risk of walking into a political trap set by Haftar. [92] In response to the surge in migration, Greece has deployed two warships to patrol the sea borders between Greece and Libya, introduced stricter migration regulations for migrants arriving by sea from Libya, and begun training Libyan coast guard personnel from both western and eastern Libya. [93] [94] In August 2025, the leaders of Turkey, Italy, and Libya, convened in Istanbul to discuss migration, and explore other potential areas of cooperation. They agreed to reconvene in the future to assess the outcomes of their cooperation committees' decisions. [95]

In a further indication of warming relations, Turkey has resumed direct flights to Benghazi via Turkish Airlines, [96] and major Turkish construction firms are involved in rebuilding the city and reviving industrial production. [97] In addition, in August 2025, the Turkish Navy corvette TCG Kınalıada docked at the port of Benghazi as part of a Turkish Naval Forces tour of Libyan ports. This followed an earlier visit to Tripoli, where the vessel was welcomed by Libyan Army Chief of Staff, General Mohammed Al-Haddad. In Tripoli, Turkish and Libyan naval forces, including the Turkish TCB-59 helicopter, conducted joint maritime exercises. [98] During that visit, Turkish officials also held discussions with Al-Haddad, focusing on expanding military cooperation especially in the areas of training and collaboration across naval, air, and air defense sectors. [99] The subsequent visit to Benghazi was accompanied by a high-level Turkish delegation led by the Turkish Ambassador Guven Begec, Director-General at the Turkish Ministry of National Defense Lieutenant General Ilkay Altindag, and the Turkish Consul General in Benghazi Serkan Keramanlioglu. The Turkish delegation also included Rear Admirals Refik Levent Tezcan and Huseyin Tigli, along with Navy Captain Ilkay Beril Aydemir, the Armed Forces attaché in Tripoli. [98] They were received at the port by Saddam Khalifa. A bilateral meeting was held during the visit, focusing on enhancing military and naval cooperation, as well as the exchange of technical and technological expertise. [100] The objective of the "One Libya, One Army" project was also discussed during the meeting. [96] Following the discussions, Saddam Khalifa toured the warship and inspected its advanced systems and capabilities. [100] In the following days, Turkish National Intelligence Organization chief, Ibrahim Kalin, met with Khalifa Haftar, Saddam Haftar, and Belgassim Haftar (director general of the Libyan Development and Reconstruction Fund) in Benghazi. [98] [101] In addition, a high-level Turkish delegation, led by the head of the Turkish Intelligence Agency, was received by the Board of Directors of the University of Benghazi. [102] According to Turkish officials, Turkey is also considering deploying military advisers and trainers in Eastern Libya. [97]

The possibility of Turkish exploration highlights changing geopolitical dynamics in the region. According to OilPrice.com, with Russia focused on Ukraine, the U.S. and U.K. are also seeking to strengthen their influence throughout the Middle East and North Africa, supporting economic stability linked to energy projects in countries such as Syria and Libya. [103]

See also

Notes

  1. ↑ Officially the Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the Republic of Turkey and the Government of National Accord – State of Libya on delimitation of the maritime jurisdiction areas in the Mediterranean (Turkish: Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Hükümeti ile Libya Devleti Hükümeti Arasında Akdeniz'de Deniz Yetki Alanlarının Sınırlandırılmasına İlişkin Mutabakat Muhtırası). [1]
  2. ↑ See: [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] [24] [25] [26] [27] [28] [29] [30] [31] [32] [33] [34]

References

  1. ↑ Yaycı, Cihat (30 September 2020). "Türkiye-Libya Arasında İmzalanan Münhasır Ekonomik Bölge Andlaşmasının Sonuç ve Etkileri". Kriter Dergi.
  2. ↑ "ANALYSIS – Strategic, legal aspects of Turkey-Libya deal". aa.com.tr. Archived from the original on 29 March 2020. Retrieved 2 May 2020.
  3. ↑ Hacaoglu, Selcan; Kozok, Firat (5 December 2019). "Turkey's Maritime Muscle Flexing Roils Eastern Mediterranean". Bloomberg. Retrieved 5 May 2020.
  4. ↑ "Turkey gets a free pass from big powers". Gulf News. 2 December 2019. Retrieved 2 December 2019.
  5. ↑ "Greece hopes talks with Erdoğan will ease maritime frictions". The Guardian. 3 December 2019. Retrieved 4 December 2019.
  6. ↑ "Greece expels Libyan ambassador in dispute with Turkey". Washington Post. 6 December 2019. Archived from the original on 6 December 2019. Retrieved 6 December 2019.
  7. ↑ "Egypt condemns MoUs signed between Turkey, Libyan PM". ahram online. 29 November 2019. Retrieved 30 November 2019.
  8. ↑ "The provocative Turkey-Libya agreement opens the way for EEZ (original: Η προκλητική συμφωνία Τουρκίας – Λιβύης ανοίγει το δρόμο για ΑΟΖ)". in.gr. 29 November 2019. Retrieved 30 November 2019. Another attempt in the realization of the «Blue Homeland» whereby Turkey seeks to seize parts of the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean by asserting the position that no islands are entitled to maritime zones beyond territorial waters. (original: Μία ακόμα κίνηση στον σχεδιασμό της «Γαλάζιας Πατρίδας», βάσει του οποίου η Τουρκία επιχειρεί να οικειοποιηθεί μέρος του Αιγαίου και της Ανατολικής Μεσογείου υποστηρίζοντας τη θέση ότι τα νησιά δεν δικαιούνται θαλάσσιες ζώνες πέραν των χωρικών υδάτων)
  9. ↑ "Libya divided over EEZ deal with Ankara: Government confirms it – Opposition says "illegal" (original: Διχασμένη η Λιβύη για την συμφωνία της ΑΟΖ με την Άγκυρα: Η κυβέρνηση την επιβεβαιώνει – "Παράνομη" λέει η αντιπολίτευση)". Real.gr. 28 November 2019. Retrieved 30 November 2019.
  10. ↑ "Cyprus, Greece and Egypt condemn Turkey-Libya deal (updated)". Cyprus Mail. 29 November 2019. Retrieved 30 November 2019.
  11. ↑ "Cyprus decries Turkey-Libya maritime border deal". Kathimerini. 29 November 2019. Retrieved 30 November 2019.
  12. ↑ "Greece, Cyprus and Egypt outraged by Libyan-Turkish maritime border agreement amid oil-drilling row". Al Araby. 29 November 2019. Retrieved 30 November 2019.
  13. ↑ "Turkey and Libya sign maritime deal to counter Greek drilling". Middle East Eye. 28 November 2019. Retrieved 30 November 2019.
  14. ↑ "Antonio Lopez: Turkey's Actions in Eastern Mediterranean Unlawful, as well as MoU with Libya". The National Herald. 30 November 2019. Retrieved 30 November 2019.
  15. ↑ "Greek ultimatum to Libya over deal with Turkey – Mitsotakis: Those who dispute sovereign rights will find Europe standing against them (Τελεσίγραφο της Ελλάδας στη Λιβύη για τη συμφωνία με Τουρκία – Μητσοτάκης: Όποιοι αμφισβητούν κυριαρχικά δικαιώματα θα βρουν απέναντί τους την Ευρώπη)". NewsPost. 29 November 2019. Retrieved 30 November 2019.
  16. ↑ "Through Libya, Erdogan builds the "Blue Homeland" (original: Μέσω Λιβύης χτίζει τη "Γαλάζια Πατρίδα" ο Ερντογάν)". SLPress. 29 November 2019. Retrieved 30 November 2019.
  17. ↑ "Istúriz – Tajani condemn Turkey's illegal actions and back Greece (original: Ιστουρίζ – Ταγιάνι καταδικάζουν τις παράνομες ενέργειες της Τουρκίας και στηρίζουν Ελλάδα)". SLPress. 30 November 2019. Retrieved 30 November 2019.
  18. ↑ ""Turkey should respect the international law": EU Commission against Ankara on the agreement with Libya (original: "Η Τουρκία να σέβεται το διεθνές δίκαιο": Κομισιόν κατά Άγκυρας για τη συμφωνία με τη Λιβύη)". Eleutheros Typos. 2 December 2019. Retrieved 2 December 2019.
  19. ↑ "EU asks to see Turkey-Libya maritime border deal". Kathimerini. 4 December 2019. Retrieved 4 December 2019. The European Union on Wednesday called for the publication of a memorandum of understanding signed between Turkey and Libya which ostensibly delineates maritime borders between the two countries, and expressed its full support for the sovereign rights of Greece and Cyprus.
  20. ↑ "Libya's Haftar hopes to have normal relations with Israel". Middle East Monitor. 2 December 2019. Retrieved 2 December 2019. The official condemned Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan's actions in the Middle East. This was a reference to the deal struck between Turkey and the UN-backed Libyan government last Wednesday relating to trade and arms sales. Al-Howeej claimed that the deal was signed with those who have "no right to give to those against whom we are battling."
  21. ↑ "Harsh message by Macron to Erdogan: Respect Greece's sovereign rights (original: Αυστηρό μήνυμα Μακρόν σε Ερντογάν: Να σεβαστείς τα κυριαρχικά δικαιώματα της Ελλάδας)". CNN. 4 December 2019. Retrieved 4 December 2019. «Turkey must respect the sovereign rights of NATO members. I support Greece's concerns over the Libya-Turkey Agreement» Macron said, commenting on the Turkish provocations and the agreement between Turkey and Libya on defining maritime borders and EEZ.)
  22. ↑ "FM of Israel: We are on Greece's side (Original: ΥΠΕΞ Ισραήλ: Είμαστε στο πλευρό της Ελλάδας)". News 247. 4 December 2019. Retrieved 4 December 2019.
  23. ↑ "Turkey-Libya agreement 'arbitrary and illegal'". GUE/NGL. 4 December 2019. Retrieved 4 December 2019.
  24. ↑ "Moscow calls on Turkey, Libya to avoid stoking tensions in region". Kathimerini. 3 December 2019. Retrieved 4 December 2019.
  25. ↑ "Pavlopoulos: who does Farraj represents? Voucic: we recognize Greece's integrity (original: Παυλόπουλος: Ποιον εκπροσωπεί ο Σαράζ; Βούτσιτς: Αναγνωρίζουμε ακεραιότητα της Ελλάδας)". Kathimerini. 9 December 2019. Retrieved 10 December 2019. the Serbian president has made clear that his country will always recognize the territory and the integrity of Greece as well as of Cyprus.
  26. ↑ "A strong message in favor of Greece and Cyprus by Conte (original: Ηχηρό μήνυμα υπέρ Ελλάδας και Κύπρου από τον Κόντε)". EfSyn. 11 December 2019. Retrieved 11 December 2019.
  27. ↑ "Message by Berlin to Ankara for the respect of sovereign rights (original: Μήνυμα Βερολίνου στην Αγκυρα για σεβασμό των κυριαρχικών δικαιωμάτων)". Kathimerini. 11 December 2019. Retrieved 11 December 2019. The European Union's position of solidarity with Greece and Cyprus is "expressly endorsed" by Berlin, German Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Adebahr recently said, urging Turkey and Libya "to respect the sovereignty and sovereignty of all member states of the EU and to follow the delimitation of maritime areas in accordance with applicable international law."
  28. ↑ Istanbul, Hannah Lucinda Smith (23 August 2020). "United Arab Emirates joins Greece in Mediterranean gas drilling dispute with Turkey". The Times . Retrieved 18 October 2020.
  29. ↑ "Malta condemns Erdogan's pseudo-agreement with Sarraj regime and the Turkish involvement in Libya (original:Η Μάλτα καταδίκασε τα ψευδομνημόνια του Ερντογάν με το καθεστώς Σαράτζ και την τουρκική ανάμιξη στη Λιβύη)". Tribune. 18 May 2020. Retrieved 18 May 2020.
  30. ↑ "Germany decries Turkey's actions in eastern Mediterranean". The Associated Press. 13 October 2020. Retrieved 18 October 2020.
  31. ↑ "Syria condemned the Ankara-Tripoly pseudo-memorandum with a letter to the United Nations. (Original: Η Συρία καταδίκασε το ψευδομνημόνιο Άγκυρας-Τρίπολης με επιστολή στον ΟΗΕ)". Liberal.gr. 21 May 2020. Retrieved 21 May 2020.
  32. ↑ "Letter dated 29 April 2020 from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General". United Nations. 29 April 2020. Retrieved 21 May 2020.
  33. 1 2 "5 countries demand that the UN reject the Turko-Libyan agreement (original: Να μην αποδεχθεί ο ΟΗΕ την τουρκολιβυκή συμφωνία ζητούν 5 χώρες)". To Pontiki. 14 July 2020. Retrieved 14 July 2020.
  34. ↑ "Press conference: Egyptian, Greek FMs sign deal to establish exclusive economic zone". Egypt Today. 6 August 2020. Retrieved 7 August 2020. According to a statement by the Egyptian Foreign Ministry, the foreign ministers of Egypt, Greece and Cyprus agreed that these MoUs "has no legal effect", as the signing exceeds the powers of Sarraj in accordance with the Skhirat Agreement, which was announced in December 2015. In another statement by Egypt's Ministry of Foreign affairs it was stated that Skhirat Agreement, agreed upon by Libyans in December 2015, set the powers of the Government of National Accord. The eighth article of the agreement prohibited the Libyan prime minister from solely clinching international deals without consent of all the cabinet members. As the current Government of National Accord lacks full representation of all the Libyan regions, the current government is a caretaker cabinet with limited powers, the Foreign Ministry said in its statement. Such deals are not binding or affecting the interests and the rights of any third parties, it added.
  35. ↑ "Europe's leaders to reject Turkey-Libya maritime border deal". New Europe. 13 December 2019. Retrieved 5 May 2020.
  36. ↑ "Cyprus rallies neighbors to buck Turkey-Libya maritime deal". AP NEWS. 20 December 2019. Archived from the original on 12 February 2020. Retrieved 2 May 2020.
    * "Turkey-Libya maritime deal rattles East Mediterranean". Reuters. 25 December 2019. Archived from the original on 17 February 2020. Retrieved 1 May 2020.
    * "Turkey signs maritime boundaries deal with Libya amid exploration row". Reuters. 28 November 2019. Retrieved 5 May 2020.
    * "UN to post EEZ maps of Libya, Turkey deal". Kathimerini. 16 February 2020. Retrieved 16 February 2020.
  37. ↑ "Greece expels Libyan envoy following Turkish vote on East Mediterranean deal". Middle East Eye. 6 December 2019. Retrieved 6 December 2019.
  38. ↑ "Turkish lawmakers ratify contentious maritime borders deal with Libya". Kathimerini. 5 December 2019. Retrieved 6 December 2019.
  39. ↑
  40. ↑ Letter dated 26 December 2019 from the Charge d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Libya to the UN addressed to the SG
  41. ↑ Letter dated 27 February 2020 from the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the UN addressed to the SG
  42. ↑ "UN registers Turkey's maritime deal with Libya". TRT World. Retrieved 1 October 2020.
  43. ↑ "U.N. registers Turkey-Libya maritime deal – Turkish ministry". Reuters. 2 October 2020.
  44. ↑ Yaycı, Cihat (2 October 2020). "Cihat Yaycı anlattı: BM'nin Türkiye-Libya deniz anlaşmasını tescili ne anlama geliyor?" (in Turkish). Sputnik. Retrieved 17 June 2024.
  45. ↑ Elhennawy, Noha (6 August 2020). "Egypt, Greece sign maritime deal to counter Libya-Turkey one". AP News. Retrieved 14 October 2020.
  46. 1 2 "محكمة استئناف البيضاء تصدر حكما بانعدام اتفاقية التعاون وترسيم الحدود بين الرئاسي و تركيا". Parliament of Libya. 27 January 2021. Retrieved 27 January 2021.
  47. ↑ Oruç, Merve Şebnem (11 December 2019). "After Turkey-Libya deal, Greece and Israel can no longer exclude other coastal states". Daily Sabah. Archived from the original on 27 April 2020. Retrieved 1 May 2020.
  48. ↑ "Turkey-Libya maritime deal rattles East Mediterranean". Reuters. 25 December 2019. Archived from the original on 17 February 2020. Retrieved 1 May 2020.
  49. ↑ "ANALYSIS – Strategic, legal aspects of Turkey-Libya deal". aa.com.tr. Archived from the original on 29 March 2020. Retrieved 1 May 2020.
  50. ↑ "The Libya-Turkey Memorandum of Understanding: Local and Regional Repercussions". Arab Center Washington DC. 1 February 2020. Retrieved 21 May 2020.
  51. ↑ Sawsan Abu, Hussein; Khalid, Mahmoud (12 October 2019). "Mahmoud". Asharq Al-Awsat. Cairo. Retrieved 21 May 2020.
  52. ↑ "Pyatt: Turkey-Libya deal undermining regional stability". Kathimerini. 3 December 2019. Retrieved 3 December 2019.
  53. ↑ "State Department: Turkey-Libya deal on maritime borders 'provocative'". Kathimerini. 3 December 2019. Retrieved 3 December 2019.
  54. ↑ "Answer for question E-004501/19". European Parliament. Retrieved 2 May 2020.
  55. ↑ "Cyprus rallies neighbors to buck Turkey-Libya maritime deal". AP NEWS. 20 December 2019. Archived from the original on 12 February 2020. Retrieved 2 May 2020.
  56. ↑ "Greece says Libya-Turkish deal invalid, in bad faith". Reuters. 10 December 2019.
  57. ↑ "Bundestag service views Turkey-Libya maritime deal illegal, detrimental to third parties". Naftemporiki. 18 October 2020. Retrieved 18 October 2020.
  58. ↑ "Israel opposes Turkey-Libya maritime border accord". Reuters. 23 December 2019.
  59. 1 2 "Dore Gold: The Turkish-Libyan Maritime Agreement and the Struggle over the Mediterranean". Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs. Retrieved 2 May 2020.
  60. ↑ Antonopoulos, Paul (12 May 2020). "Greece, Egypt, Cyprus, France & UAE denounce Turkey in joint statement". Greek City Times. Retrieved 12 May 2020.
  61. ↑ "Turkey slams joint statement by five nations on east Med Sea, Libya". Hurriyet Daily News. 12 May 2020. Retrieved 13 May 2020.
  62. ↑
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