137th Rifle Division (Soviet Union)

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137th Rifle Division
ActiveSeptember 1939 – August 1945
CountryFlag of the Soviet Union (1936 - 1955).svg Soviet Union
Branch Red Army flag.svg Red Army
TypeInfantry
SizeDivision
Engagements Battle of Smolensk (1941)
Roslavl–Novozybkov offensive
Battle of Moscow
Voronezh–Kastornoye offensive
Battle of Kursk
Lower Dnieper Offensive
Operation Bagration
Lublin-Brest offensive
Vistula-Oder offensive
East Prussian offensive
Decorations Order of Suvorov 2nd class.png   Order of Suvorov
Battle honours Bobruisk
Commanders
Notable
commanders
Maj. Gen. Sergei Evlampievich Danilov
Col. Ivan Tikhonovich Grishin Hero of the Soviet Union medal.png
Col. Mikhail Grigorevich Volovich
Maj. Gen. Aleksei Ivanovich Alferov
Col. Sergei Mikhailovich Tarasov
Maj. Gen. Fyodor Nikitich Zhabrev
Col. Mikhail Pavlovich Serebrov

The 137th Rifle Division was formed as an infantry division of the Red Army in early September 1939 in the Moscow Military District, based on the shtat (table of organization and equipment) of September 13. At the start of the German invasion on June 22, 1941 it was still in that District under 20th Army and soon began moving by rail west toward Orsha where it was resubordinated to 13th Army of Western Front. By late August, much depleted after escaping encirclement, it was again moved, now to 3rd Army of Bryansk Front, defending near Trubchevsk. During Operation Typhoon it was deeply encircled but enough of a cadre was eventually able to escape that it was not disbanded, taking up positions east of Oryol. The division spent 1942 on this relative quiet front, gradually rebuilding, before taking part in the offensive that retook Kastornoye in January, 1943, after which it was transferred to 48th Army, where it remained for the duration of the war.

Contents

Formation

The division was organized at Gorkiy in the Moscow Military District in September 1939, based on a cadre from the 51st Rifle Regiment of the 17th Rifle Division, as part of the major pre-World War II mobilization of the Red Army. [1] Kombrig Sergei Evlampievich Danilov was appointed as commander on the day it formed; this officer had been serving as an instructor at the Frunze Military Academy and would have his rank modernized to major general on June 4, 1940. He was succeeded on October 25 by Col. Ivan Tikhonovich Grishin. During this time the division was serving as a garrison unit at Gorkiy. On June 22, 1941, its order of battle was as follows:

On June 25, the division was subordinated to 20th Army's 20th Rifle Corps, part of the Group of Armies of the STAVKA Reserve. [4] Beginning on June 26, the division was transferred to Orsha. The first trains carrying men of the 771st Rifle Regiment arrived there on June 29. [1] At the beginning of July, the division was subordinated to the 13th Army. The division was also transferred to the 61st Rifle Corps. It held positions at Ponizova (south of Orsha) and on the Dniepr, a front of 20 kilometers. On July 5, the division's 176th Reconnaissance Company, operating in advance of the division at Barysaw, was heavily assaulted by German tanks and withdrew to the Dniepr. On July 8, the division was ordered to move east and hold positions on the Resta River. However, the division at this point had only the 771st Rifle Regiment, elements of the 624th Rifle Regiment and the two artillery regiments actually at the front; the transports of the 409th Rifle Regiment and the remainder of the 624th were still approaching Krychaw, and later joined the 7th Airborne Brigade (4th Airborne Corps). The division's antiaircraft artillery battalion was heavily bombed by German aircraft and ceased to exist as an effective combat unit. The medical battalion reached Roslavl and was attached to a different unit. [1]

Battle of Smolensk

On July 10, elements of the 2nd Panzer Group crossed the Dniepr and seized a bridgehead. The 137th was ordered to counterattack and eliminate this lodgement. On July 11, the division began the march westward to the line of Dubrovka, Volkovichi and Usushek, during which time it was resubordinated to the 45th Rifle Corps. By July 13, the division was at the starting line for the attack. The immediate objective was to capture Seredyna-Buda, Pustoy Osovets, Chervonny Osovets and Davidovichi. On the right flank, the 132nd Rifle Division was also attacking as the 148th Rifle Division moved forward on the 137th's left. The German troops repulsed the division's attack and soon moved forward themselves. The 771st Rifle Regiment had captured Chervonny Osovets, but was forced to retreat under pressure from German tanks. The division did not retreat beyond its jumping-off line but was bypassed on the flanks by German armor. [1]

After six weeks of heavy fighting around Smolensk, the 137th was reduced to the equivalent of only two or three rifle battalions. [5] A report by Lt. Gen. K. D. Golubev, commander of 13th Army, on the same date, states that the 137th had been relieved by the 282nd Rifle Division before being pulled back to Army reserve, and implies that the 137th, along with three other rifle divisions, had barely escaped encirclement by running a gauntlet eastward through the advancing forces of the German XXIV Motorized Corps and therefore were in no shape to continue active operations. 13th Army was now part of the new Bryansk Front. On August 23 the commander of the Front, Lt. Gen. A. I. Yeryomenko, tasked Golubev with defending the Pochep area, which he saw as key to retaining Bryansk, as well as retaking Starodub. Two days later he effectively created a new 3rd Army, under command of Maj. Gen. Ya. G. Kreizer, through a series of transfers, one of which was the 137th. Effective at midnight on August 28 this Army was to take up positions between 13th and 50th Armies. [6]

Roslavl-Novozybkov Offensive

The specific assignment for Colonel Grishin was to:

occupy the bridgehead at Trubchevsk by the morning of 27 August and defend it against attack from Pochep, while protecting the crossings over the Desna River.

What remained of the division, described as a "composite battalion" on August 29, was now in the Army's third line of defense. At this time 2nd Panzer Group, under Gen. H. Guderian, was maneuvering for jumping off positions for a drive south to encircle Southwestern Front. The STAVKA, still not grasping the significance of Guderian's moves, demanded that Yeryomenko join in on a general counteroffensive by Western and Reserve Fronts set for August 30 and September 1. In his first orders only 13th Army would be involved, but on the morning of August 30 the STAVKA complicated the situation by ordering all of his Front take part. Specifically, the 3rd Army was to:

...attack from the Lipki, Vitovka, and Semtsy front [10-20km south of Pochep] toward Starodub and Novozybkov with at least two RDs with tanks, smash the enemy's mobile grouping in the Starodub, Novgorod-Severskii, and Trubchevsk region, together with 13th Army, and reach the Klimovichi and Belaya Dubrovka front by 15 September.

This was utterly unrealistic given the Front's inadequate forces, and Guderian's presence in their midst. At this time 3rd Army had five rifle divisions in various states of repair, one cavalry division, one tank division and a tank brigades, plus a separate tank battalion. Meanwhile, a 20km-wide gap separated his Front and Central Front's 21st Army. Yeryomenko issued his orders to Kreizer to comply with Moscow's demands, but the 137th was in no position to take part in the shock group. The Front reported on August 30 that the division, as "a composite battalion", continued to guard the approaches to Trubchevsk. [7]

The offensive began on September 2. By September 3 the division's strength was reported as "one regiment [the 771st], with its remaining forces and headquarters", still in the same positions. On the same day a counterattack by 18th Panzer Division forced the 282nd Division back to within 3km of the 137th's defenses. Ordered into an attack against elements of 17th Panzer Division on September 5 the remnants of the division made no gains and, in fact, ended up ceding ground. Overnight on September 6/7 Kreizer restored order among his troops, and the 137th was reported as being on a line from some 6km north to 6km west of Trubchevsk, having captured four German mortars and a pair of automatic weapons. On September 7, an attack by a German motorized regiment with tanks was beaten off, and the division pushed forward as much as 4km. The next day Yeryomenko reported that 3rd Army was fortifying its positions and beating off local attacks on its right wing. [8] By now it was apparent that Bryansk Front had shot its bolt, and while the STAVKA persisted in ordering attacks as late as September 12 a disaster loomed to the south. On September 16 the 2nd and 1st Panzer Groups officially linked up south of Lokhvytsia, and Southwestern Front was encircled.

Operation Typhoon

Bryansk encirclement, October 1941. Note position of 3rd Army. Karte - Kesselschlacht bei Brjansk 1941.png
Bryansk encirclement, October 1941. Note position of 3rd Army.

The division continued to hold in these positions until late September. Once the Kyiv pocket was eliminated it was obvious that German attentions would again be directed at Moscow. Bryansk Front's counterattacks had weakened its armies to an extent that can be seen in Kreizer's report to Yeryomenko on September 29. He stated the 3rd Army was deployed on a front of 68km with just five rifle divisions, most of which were deficient in artillery and mortars. The 137th was the only one with a reasonable strength in this arm, but could not be withdrawn to form a reserve without fatally weakening the line. [9]

2nd Panzer Group struck on September 30 south of 13th Army, while 2nd Army attacked toward Bryansk on October 2, cutting between 3rd and 50th Armies. Orders came from the STAVKA, likely directly from Stalin, for Yeryomenko the same day:

The Stavka demands no later than the morning of the 3rd to go on the offensive; launch a concentrated blow. Don't strike with an opened palm.
A) With the forces of the 307th and 6th Rifle Divisions, and if possible the 137th Rifle Division [attack] from the woods north of Seredina-Buda in the direction of Khutor-Mikhailovskii and Svessa...
It has been ordered to inform you that it is necessary to destroy the enemy at whatever the cost and chase him back beyond our front line.

This was followed by a phone call from the chief of the General Staff, Marshal B. M. Shaposhnikov, to Col. I. A. Dolgov of the Bryansk Front staff, asking if he was aware of the situation and emphasizing the necessity of adding the 137th to the attack. [10] In the event this attack did nothing to change the situation.

Trubchevsk was finally given up on October 9. By October 12, Yeryomenko was attempting to get out of encirclement with several of Kreizer's units in a night attack and eventually succeeded, but Kreizer's headquarters lost contact with most of the rest of his forces. During October 17-20 the 137th and 269th Rifle Divisions, along with 42nd Tank Brigade, the Army commander, and his staff remained in complete encirclement 20km north of Dmitrovsk-Orlovskii. The 269th headquarters and artillery came under heavy air attacks, and the grouping's motor transport became stuck in the swampy terrain while the tanks ran out of fuel, despite efforts at air supply. The decision was taken to destroy heavy equipment and weapons and attempt to slip through German lines. On October 19 Luftwaffe reconnaissance reported that two Soviet groups, each of about divisional size, had been spotted, with further columns approaching from the southwest. Fighting took place in difficult terrain until on October 21 elements of 3rd Army penetrated the German front, having crossed an entire swamp, before slipping across the Fatezh Kromy highway to friendly territory near Ponyri two nights later. Yeryomenko claimed that about 13,000 men of 3rd Army managed to escape. [11]

Service in 1942

The army managed to stabilize its positions between Mikhaylov and Yelets by late November, [12] before beginning the counteroffensive against the southern flank of Army Group Center on December 6. [13] The counteroffensive ended in late winter with the 137th and its army well to the east of Oryol; it would hold these positions for nearly a year. General Grishin left the division on March 17, 1942, having recently been appointed chief of staff of 50th Army. He would go on to lead 49th Army into peacetime, being made a Hero of the Soviet Union on April 10, 1945, having already reached the rank of colonel general. He was replaced by Col. Aleksei Viktorovich Vladimirskii, who had previously been serving as 3rd Army's deputy chief of staff. In April he lost important documents in combat near Mtsensk and was relieved of command, being moved to deputy command of the 287th Rifle Division. His successor, Lt. Col. Vasilii Andreevich Konovalov, was appointed on May 12, but was in turn replaced on June 17 by Col. Mikhail Grigorevich Volovich.

Voronezh–Kastornoye Offensive

At the start of 1943 the 137th was still in 3rd Army, [14] but later in January it was moved to direct command of Bryansk Front. By this time it was clear that a massive victory was about to be won at Stalingrad, and the STAVKA set about planning to expand this success on other fronts. By January 20 Bryansk Front, now under command of Lt. Gen. M. A. Reyter, and consisting of 3rd, 13th, and 48th Armies, plus 15th Air Army, was on a line from Bolshye Golubochki to Novosil to Gremyachaya to Kozinka. 13th Army, now with seven rifle divisions, formed the Front's left wing, on a 100km-wide zone from Sidorovka to Kozinka. It had been defending along this line since the previous July, hanging over the Axis forces in the area of Voronezh Kastornoye. [15]

Voronezh-Kastornoye Offensive. 13th Army attacked from the north. Voronezh-Kastornoye Offensive (24 January - 17 February 1943) RU.jpg
Voronezh–Kastornoye Offensive. 13th Army attacked from the north.

Bryansk Front's offensive toward Kastornoye was set for January 26. This joint operation with Voronezh Front targeted the German 2nd and Hungarian 2nd Armies. 13th Army, under command of Lt. Gen. N. P. Pukhov, was to break through along an 18km-wide sector between the Kshen and Olym rivers with a shock group of all seven rifle divisions. There were three divisions in second echelon, as well as a mobile group consisting of the 129th Tank Brigade, two aerosan battalions, plus a mortar and an antitank regiment. The second echelon divisions were, upon the arrival of the first echelon divisions in the area VolochikNizhne-BolshoeVysshee-Bolshoe, to develop the offensive to the west and southwest to create an external encirclement front. Meanwhile, the 137th and 6th Guards Rifle Divisions, plus the 19th Tank Corps, would form Reyter's reserve, concentrated in the 13th Army sector. [16]

The offensive opened at 0808 hours with a 65-minute artillery preparation, totaling 30 minutes of fire onslaughts and 35 minutes of aimed fire, altogether to a depth of 7-8km. Air attacks began at 0855. This preparation failed to suppress the defense completely and German fire from small arms and antitank guns from strongpoints particularly affected the shock group's flanks. During the opening day the main body of the first echelon broke through the German defense and advanced up to 8km in depth but was unable to develop this success. The next day the strongpoints at Lomigory and Mishino continued to hold out. After an outflanking movement the German forces abandoned both places overnight on January 27/28 and retreated to the south. At the same time, Reyter brought up his reserve force to the breakthrough sector, to be committed as circumstances required. Later in the day a pursuit took the attackers to a defense line from Volovchik to Volovo to Lipovchik. This covered the northern approaches to Kastornoye, and offered stubborn resistance. To take it, Pukhov decided to commit the 129th Tanks which, despite air attacks and deep snow, broke into Volovo, followed up by these divisions to take the entire line. Meanwhile, the second echelon had advanced to the TurchanovoZamaraikaKshen line in readiness to develop the attack to the west. By now the Army had penetrated to a depth of 20km through a 25km-wide gap and routed the main forces of the German 82nd Infantry Division, creating an immediate threat to Kastornoye from the north. [17]

On January 28, while the first echelon fought for Kastornoye, the second echelon divisions and reserve began their drive from the Kshen River to the west, facing the 383rd Infantry Division. By day's end they had begun to develop the offensive toward the Tim River. At the end of the day the 13th and 38th Armies, plus elements of 40th Army, had linked up, and the main escape routes of Axis Voronezh-Kastornoye grouping had been cut. 4th Panzer Division was moving from the Oryol area but was just beginning to arrive near Kursk. The latter was the new objective of Bryansk Front's left wing forces. [18] After capturing several villages on February 3, the 137th reached a line between Novofedorovka and Pavlovka. At around this time the division was reassigned to 48th Army; it would remain in this army for the duration, [5] apart from a brief reassignment to Western Front in April 1944.

Oryol Offensive

By February 9, 48th and 13th Armies were splitting German 2nd Army and 2nd Panzer Army apart; the 137th had taken the southwestern outskirts of Smirnye. The offensive slowed in late February due to German forces being evacuated from the Rzhev salient, as well as lax practices on the part of lower-level commands. On February 17, Bryansk Front reported about the 48th Army operations east of Maloarkhangelsk, admonishing lower level headquarters against concentrating in the relative warmth and comfort of villages:

"On 11–12 February, the headquarters of 137th Rifle Division, the headquarters of the 12th Artillery Division, and the headquarters of a guards-mortar regiment gathered in the village of Markino... On 12 February enemy aircraft bombed the village of Markino... We had intolerable losses in men and equipment."

On March 6 the division was combined with the 143rd Rifle Division to form a shock group, supported by the 28th and 30th Guards Tank Regiments, in a supporting attack along the Pokrovskoe–Oryol road, but after two days of fighting did not manage to dent the German defenses, while suffering considerable losses. The front soon went over to the defense. [19]

Later in March the 48th Army was reassigned to Gen. K.K. Rokossovsky's Central Front. [20] At the outset of the Battle of Kursk the 137th was a separate division, although still alongside the 143rd. [21] 48th Army was on the right flank of its front, on the north shoulder of the Kursk salient. The main blow of the German 9th Army attack fell on the 13th Army to the west. When the German assault ran down by July 12, 48th Army was in good shape to take part in the counteroffensive towards Oryol, which continued into August. [22]

Advance

During September and October the 137th advanced, along with the rest of its army, in the direction of Gomel. Following the crossing of the Dnepr River and the liberation of Kiev in November, Rokossovski's Front (now named Belorussian) continued a remorseless western advance along the southern fringes of the Pripet Marshes. At around this time the division, by order of the front command, formed a separate Submachine Gun Battalion for "assault and... counterattack duties". This unit was organized as follows:

This battalion was formed from experienced "young men... from 19 to 33 years old", and was placed under command of the 771st Rifle Regiment. During the winter of 1943-44 the division also formed its own ski battalion, but this was disbanded at the end of the winter. [23]

In January 1944, the division became part of the 42nd Rifle Corps, where it would remain for the duration. Belorussian Front was renamed 1st Belorussian in February. During the Soviet summer offensive, Operation Bagration, the 42nd Corps was concentrated north of Rahachow to assist its partner 29th Rifle Corps and units of the 3rd Army to break through the positions of the German 134th and 296th Infantry Divisions. By late on June 24 this had been achieved, with the Germans overwhelmed and the 9th Tank Corps exploiting to the rear. The 137th was given part of the credit for the liberation of the city of Bobruisk on June 29 and was awarded its name as an honorific. [24] With the defenses of Army Group Center shattered, the division trekked westward towards Poland.

48th Army was transferred to 2nd Belorussian Front in the late autumn of 1944. During the Vistula-Oder Offensive the 137th pushed on through northern Poland before the army was once again transferred to 3rd Belorussian Front. The division fought in the East Prussian Offensive, and ended the war near Elbing. [25]

Ten men of the division were named as Heroes of the Soviet Union, five of them posthumously. At the end of the war the men and women of the division carried the full title 137th Rifle, Bobryusk, Order of Suvorov Division. (Russian : 137-я стрелковая Бобруйская ордена Суворова дивизия.) The division was part of the 42nd Rifle Corps, 48th Army of the 3rd Belorussian Front in May 1945. [26]

On 12 May, the division was moved to Elbing for garrison duty. In late May, the older personnel of the division were demobilized. The division was ordered to disbanded in August 1945. Remaining personnel were demobilized or transferred to other units. [1] The division was disbanded in the Baltic Military District on August 31, 1945. [27]

References

Citations

  1. 1 2 3 4 5 Kiselyov, Valeriy (2005). Однополчане: документальное повествование [Odnopolchane: A Documentary History] (in Russian). Nizhpoligraf.
  2. At some point later in 1941 these two artillery regiments were removed and the 17th Artillery Regiment took their places. http://www.cgsc.edu/CARL/nafziger/943RGCC.PDF Archived 2016-03-04 at the Wayback Machine , p 39.
  3. Charles C. Sharp, "Red Legions", Soviet Rifle Divisions Formed Before June 1941, Soviet Order of Battle World War II, vol. VIII, Nafziger, 1996, p. 69
  4. 137 sd - 137-я стрелковая дивизия [137th Rifle Division]. samsv.narod.ru (in Russian). Archived from the original on 2015-04-04. Retrieved 2016-01-30.
  5. 1 2 Sharp, p. 69
  6. David M. Glantz, Barbarossa Derailed, Vol. 2, Helion & Co., Ltd., Solihull, UK, 2012, pp. 73-74, 80-81, 93
  7. Glantz, Barbarossa Derailed, Vol. 2, pp. 117, 369, 371-75, 377, 383, 400
  8. Glantz, Barbarossa Derailed, Vol. 2, pp. 434-35, 449-50, 472, 478, 494
  9. Lev Lopukhovsky, The Viaz'ma Catastrophe 1941, Helion & Co., Ltd., Solihull, UK, 2013, Kindle ed., Part 2
  10. Lopukhovsky, The Viaz'ma Catastrophe 1941, Kindle ed., Part 3
  11. Lopukhovsky, The Viaz'ma Catastrophe 1941, Kindle ed., Part 5
  12. David Stahel, The Battle for Moscow, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 2015, map on p. 220
  13. Michael Jones, The Retreat, John Murray (Publishers), London, 2009, p. 142
  14. Combat Composition of the Soviet Army, 1943, p. 14
  15. Soviet General Staff, Rollback, ed. & trans. R. W. Harrison, Helion & Co., Ltd., Solihull, UK, 2015, Kindle ed., part IV, ch. 2. This source misidentifies the 13th as the 38th Army in part of this chapter.
  16. Soviet General Staff, Rollback, Kindle ed., part IV, ch. 2
  17. Soviet General Staff, Rollback, Kindle ed., part IV, chs. 2, 3
  18. Soviet General Staff, Rollback, Kindle ed., part IV, ch. 3
  19. Glantz, After Stalingrad, Helion & Co., Ltd, Solihull, UK, 2009, p 235, 237, 245, 307, 345, 381
  20. Dr. Boris Sokolov, Marshal K.K. Rokossovsky, trans. and ed. S. Britton, Helion & Co., Ltd., Solihull, UK, 2015, p 239
  21. http://www.cgsc.edu/CARL/nafziger/943RGCC.PDF Archived 2016-03-04 at the Wayback Machine , p 39
  22. Sokolov, p 266
  23. Sharp, pp 69-70
  24. Walter S. Dunn, Jr., Soviet Blitzkrieg, Stackpole Books, Mechanicsburg, PA, 2008, p 182, 185-89, 199
  25. Sharp, p 70
  26. Combat composition of the Soviet Army
  27. Kasyanov & Maltsev 1946, p. 2.

Bibliography

Further reading

Sergei Evlampievich Danilov Ivan Tikhonovich Grishin Aleksei Ivanovich Alferov Sergei Mikhailovich Tarasov Fyodor Nikitich Zhabrev