Oscar Ortiz (Bolivian politician)

This article is about the Bolivian politician. For the Salvadoran politician, see Óscar Ortiz (Salvadoran politician). For other uses, see Oscar Ortiz.

In this Spanish name, the first or paternal surname is Ortiz and the second or maternal family name is Antelo.

2020) ^[1]

Oscar Ortiz
Minister of Economy and Public Finance
In office 7 July 2020 –28 September 2020
Other political affiliations	Popular Consensus (2009–2013)
Alma mater	Private University of Santa Cruz de la Sierra (BBA; MBL)
Occupation	Businessman politician
Signature
Website	oscarortiz.com.bo

Oscar Miguel Ortiz Antelo (born 28 September 1969) is a Bolivian businessman and politician who served as minister of economy and public finance from July to September 2020 and as minister of productive development from May to July 2020. As a member of the Social Democratic Movement, he previously served two terms as a senator for Santa Cruz from 2015 to 2020 on behalf of the Democratic Unity coalition and from 2006 to 2010 on behalf of the Social Democratic Power alliance. Nearing the end of his second term, Ortiz was his party's presidential candidate, attaining fourth place in the annulled 2019 general elections. During his first term, he served as president of the Senate from 2008 to 2010, the last opposition legislator to preside over the upper chamber as of 2024. Outside of national politics, Ortiz served as president of the Union of Latin American Parties from 2018 to 2021 and has been the rector of the Bolivian Catholic University at Santa Cruz since 2021. ^{[2] [3]}

Early life and career

Oscar Ortiz was born on 28 September 1969 in Santa Cruz de la Sierra, the son of a prestigious doctor from a middle-class family. ^{[4] [5]} He attended his city's Marist School, later studying at the Private University of Santa Cruz de la Sierra, where he graduated with a bachelor's degree in business administration and a master's in corporate law. Throughout his career, Ortiz held numerous administrative positions in the institutions most relevant to Santa Cruz's business community. Between 1991 and 2005, he served as an executive and later general manager of the Chamber of Industry and Commerce, and sat on the boards of the Business Development Foundation, the Federation of Private Entrepreneurs, and the Santa Cruz Exhibition Fair, among others. ^{[6] [7]}

During the democratic administration of Hugo Banzer, between 1997 and 1999, Ortiz served as a senior advisor to the Ministry of Foreign Trade and as general counsel for the Ministry of Housing. Around this time, he developed political links with Vice President Jorge Quiroga, and though he was never a member of the governing party, he promoted a change in leadership within Nationalist Democratic Action through the adhesion of young, professional, and liberal-minded figures to its ranks. ^{[8] [9]}

Chamber of Senators

First term (2006–2010)

2005 general election

Further information: 2005 Bolivian general election

Significant social conflicts at the turn of the twentieth century fostered a change in political action in Santa Cruz. Emulating the tactic of mass mobilization utilized by the country's indigenous and unionist sectors to achieve their goals, Cruceños took to the streets demanding expanded departmental autonomy. By 2004, Ortiz's early support for the decentralization process had led him to gain regional notoriety. When Quiroga contested the presidency in 2005, Ortiz was invited to join the former vice president's Social Democratic Power (PODEMOS) alliance as its candidate for senator. The election presented mixed results for the conservative coalition. While Evo Morales of the Movement for Socialism (MAS-IPSP) won the presidency, PODEMOS won the most Senate seats. ^{[10] [11]}

Tenure

The control exercised by the opposition over the upper chamber constituted the main counterweight to Morales's ability to legislate during his first term. ^[10] Though the MAS defeated Ortiz to win the presidency of the Senate in 2006—owing to the votes of the two senators from National Unity (UN) and the Revolutionary Nationalist Movement (MNR)—it was unable to repeat that victory in ensuing years. In 2007, neither the MAS nor PODEMOS won control of the Senate, with Senator José Villavicencio of UN being elected to preside over the body. ^{[12] [13]} By 2008, however, both the MNR and UN opted to lend their support to PODEMOS, which put forward Ortiz to hold the position, beating out the more conciliatory Carlos Böhrt for the nomination. The promotion of Ortiz as head of the upper chamber was a considerable setback for the ruling party as, compared to his more centrist predecessor, Ortiz aligned himself with more right-wing sects of the opposition. ^{[14] [15] [16]} Attempts by the MAS to dislodge Ortiz from the presidency the following year also failed, with his bid for reelection counting the support of most of the opposition and even two ruling party defectors. ^[17]

Throughout Ortiz's term, the Senate found itself primarily preoccupied with the ongoing process of entirely reforming the nation's Constitution, a project spearheaded by Morales. Just over a month after assuming office, in March 2006, Ortiz voted in favor of sanctioning the convocation of a Constituent Assembly charged with drafting a new constitution, a decision approved unanimously by both the MAS and opposition. ^{[18] [19]} Inaugurated in Sucre on 6 August, the Constituent Assembly was tasked with completing its work within a year but quickly found itself bogged down by disputes over which sections of the text necessitated two-thirds majority approval. ^[20] On 3 August 2007, three days before its initially prescribed mandate expired, the Senate's four caucuses agreed to extend the Assembly's term to 14 December. Ortiz initially supported the decision, believing that the agreement consolidated the threshold of two-thirds for the approval of the document's final text. ^{[21] [22]} Three months later, however, amid mass protests in Sucre, the MAS majority in the assembly opted to reconvene itself in Oruro, where the final draft was approved in a marathon session boycotted by PODEMOS. ^{[23] [24]} The circumstances of its passage led Ortiz to later state that the new constitution "never had legitimacy." ^[25]

In 2008, seeking to bolster his mandate amid continued unrest, Morales sought the support of Congress for the approval of a recall referendum against himself and the nine departmental prefects. ^{[26] [27]} At internal meetings regarding the topic, the majority of the PODEMOS caucus opted to support the referendum as a means of blocking the pending enactment of the new constitution. Though Ortiz personally opposed the decision, as president of the Senate, he chose not to use his power to block the plebiscite's convocation. Ultimately, Morales survived the vote with the support of sixty-seven percent of the population, while the opposition suffered the loss of two of its prefects in Cochabamba and La Paz. ^{[28] [29]}

Following its inability to remove Morales from office, the opposition reinitiated negotiations with the government. In October, the MAS and PODEMOS reached an agreement in which the opposition-controlled Senate would approve the call for a referendum to ratify the new constitution. In exchange, the MAS conceded to the modification of over a hundred articles in the draft document and the convocation of new general elections ahead of schedule, with Morales pledging not to seek reelection after 2009. ^{[30] [31]} Ortiz opposed the agreement, leading a group of around thirty parliamentarians who voted against the referendum. ^[32]

2009 general election

Further information: 2009 Bolivian general election

Ortiz's opposition to the new constitution led to his estrangement from Quiroga and PODEMOS, which suffered an internal implosion around this time. ^{[10] [32]} In March 2009, the still-president of the Senate announced his defection from the alliance, taking eleven of its Santa Cruz parliamentarians with him and establishing Popular Consensus (CP), a regional civic group led by himself that sought to contest that year's general elections. ^{[33] [34] [35]} Following the presentation of the new party, senators from both the MAS and PODEMOS called on Ortiz to resign as president of the Senate, arguing that he no longer belonged to any of the upper chamber's recognized caucuses. Ortiz refused, maintaining administrative control of the Senate for the duration of his term. ^{[7] [36] [37]}

In August 2009, CP and UN agreed to establish an electoral coalition, forming the Alliance for Consensus and National Unity (UN-CP). The group nominated UN's Samuel Doria Medina for the presidency, with Ortiz seeking reelection as UN-CP's candidate for senator. By the end of the campaign, the alliance failed to attain significant support, exiting third on election day with five percent of the vote, a margin insufficient to keep Ortiz in office for a second term. ^{[38] [39]}

Ortiz served as secretary-general of the Social Democratic Movement.

Between terms

During the 2010 regional elections, Ortiz supported the gubernatorial candidacy of Santa Cruz Prefect Rubén Costas, aligning CP with Costas's Truth and Social Democracy (VERDES). ^[40] Shortly after assuming office, Costas appointed Ortiz to his cabinet as head of the newly established Secretariat of Institutional Coordination and Autonomous Development. ^[41] While in the Costas administration, Ortiz assisted the governor in formulating the Social Democratic Movement (MDS), a political project that sought to unite the disparate parties of the Media Luna region into a single national opposition front capable of challenging the MAS. More than thirteen groups made up the movement, including Ortiz's CP, Costas's VERDES, and Savina Cuéllar's Liberty and Renovating Democracy (LÍDER). ^[42] In May 2013, the three main organizations presented a merger request to the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE), which rejected it on the grounds that the law only allowed political parties to be fused, not civic groups. ^[43] To circumvent this, Ortiz's party requested authorization from the TSE to legally change its name from Popular Consensus to Social Democratic Movement, which was accepted. ^[44] The decision gave rise to the MDS's formal establishment four months later at a Founding Congress in which Ortiz was elected as the party's secretary-general. ^{[7] [45]}

Second term (2015–2020)

2014 general election

Further information: 2014 Bolivian general election

Official portrait, 2018

For the 2014 electoral campaign, the MDS aligned itself with UN, forming the Democratic Unity (UD) coalition to combat the MAS as a single front. ^[46] As part of its strategy of nominating former parliamentarians and politically experienced professionals to guarantee a high degree of representation in the legislature, UD selected Ortiz as its candidate for senator. ^[47] The coalition attained a distant second place at the polls, returning Ortiz to the Senate to complete a non-consecutive second term. ^[48]

Tenure

Ortiz's tenure as a member of the opposition focused its efforts on investigating and denouncing acts of corruption within the government. ^[4] Between 2015 and 2016, in his capacity as president of the Rural Native Indigenous Peoples and Nations Commission, Ortiz conducted an audit of the country's Indigenous Fund. In 2017, he presented Chronicle of a Betrayal, a 400-page report alleging rampant embezzlement and financial mismanagement within the organization. Ortiz's investigation found that of 1,110 projects commissioned to provide Bs 730 million worth of aid to the indigenous population, only 107 were executed to completion, and over half had irregularities. Additionally, some Bs 692 million destined for 1,048 projects were redirected into private accounts, with the rate of these acts increasing in periods preceding elections, leading Ortiz to conclude that the ruling party had used aid money to finance its electoral campaigns. According to the senator, the combined economic damage done to the State amounted to almost Bs 700 million, though estimates by the government comptroller placed the financial loss at a little over Bs 100 million. ^{[49] [50]} "The main victims of this scandal were the indigenous peoples who saw their cause delegitimized [and] their organizations prostituted", Ortiz stated in a later op-ed published by Página Siete . ^[51]

2019 presidential campaign

Further information: 2019 Bolivian general election

As its secretary-general, Ortiz sought to position the MDS as a national political party with a view toward the 2019 general elections. For Ortiz, the prospect of not participating in the election was out of the question, with internal discussions on whether the party would go it alone or form an alliance taking place long before the start of the campaign. Should the MDS have competed on its own, the nomination of its leader, Costas, was a "natural" choice, with Ortiz profiled as a possible vice-presidential candidate. ^[52] During negotiations with the Revolutionary Left Front (FRI)—which nominated former president Carlos Mesa—the MDS conditioned an alliance on the inclusion of Ortiz on the ticket as Mesa's running mate. The FRI rejected this option as Mesa preferred to choose his own companion, frustrating negotiations. ^[53]

Logo of Bolivia Says No

Ultimately, the MDS settled on allying with UN, its longtime partner, effectively continuing the previous UD coalition under a new name. The alliance, dubbed Bolivia Says No (BDN), was sealed on 13 November 2018 and formally launched the following day. ^{[54] [55]} Shortly thereafter, BDN began analyzing whether it would nominate a single presidential ticket or if candidates from UN and MDS would separately contest the primary elections scheduled for January 2019. The latter option would have made the alliance one of the only fronts facing a competitive primary. ^{[56] [lower-greek 1]} While Doria Medina was the only presidential candidate profiled by UN, the MDS considered the likes of Costas, Ortiz, and former Beni governor Ernesto Suárez, with the latter two also seen as "ideal" running mates. ^{[58] [59]} By 27 November, BDN had settled on a compromise, nominating Doria Medina for the presidency with Ortiz seeking the vice-presidency. However, within hours of the scheduled announcement, Doria Medina publicized his and his party's decision to withdraw from the alliance, instead choosing to sit out the 2019 election cycle. ^{[60] [61]}

From left to right: Edwin Rodríguez and Shirley Franco

Two days after the rupture of the BDN alliance, the MDS presented Oscar Ortiz as its presidential candidate, with Senator Edwin Rodríguez of Potosí as his running mate. ^[62] Their campaign was officially launched on 2 January 2019, the first working day of the year. Ortiz outlined his intention to tour the entire country, conducting meetings with differing sectors of the population to present BDN's platform and hear the needs of the citizenry. ^[5] Throughout the campaign, Ortiz maintained a steady third place in opinion polling, hovering at around six to eight percent of the vote. Ortiz's low likelihood of attaining enough support to challenge Morales in an eventual runoff led many critics to call on him to drop out of the race in order to avoid a split in the opposition vote. ^{[63] [lower-greek 2]} Among those sharing such concerns included Ortiz's own running mate, Rodríguez, who unexpectedly withdrew his candidacy in July while Ortiz was on a campaign visit to Brazil. ^[64] Nonetheless, Ortiz vehemently refused to remove himself from the race, accusing Rodríguez of having been bought by opposing candidates. ^{[65] [66]} A month later, BDN selected Deputy Shirley Franco of Cochabamba to serve as Ortiz's new running mate. ^[67]

Nearing the end of the campaign, BDN continued to see increasing calls for Ortiz to drop out of the race, even from among internal groups. In October, a multitude of prominent national and regional legislators, including the entirety of the MDS caucus in the Cochabamba Departmental Assembly, withdrew their support from Ortiz, calling on supporters to lend their vote to Mesa. ^{[68] [69]} By election day, the final results gave Ortiz little more than four percent of the vote, leaving him in fourth place, having been displaced from third by the unprecedented support attained by evangelical pastor Chi Hyun Chung. ^{[70] [71]} Following his loss, Ortiz endorsed Mesa's campaign to confront Morales in an expected second round. ^[72]

Political crisis and transition

Main article: 2019 Bolivian political crisis

Further information: 2019 Bolivian protests

Ortiz at a Senate press conference, 18 December 2019.

No runoff ever occurred. Following the election, widespread allegations of fraud and subsequent mass mobilizations paralyzed the country. After three weeks of protests, continued social unrest culminated in the resignation of Morales from the presidency, opening a vacuum of power in the country. ^[73] In ensuing days, Ortiz attended a series of meetings sponsored by the Bolivian Episcopal Conference, serving as a representative for the MDS. Per the Church's account, the MAS delegates suggested two means of presidential succession that they found acceptable, both of which were rejected as unconstitutional by the others in attendance. Conversely, both Adriana Salvatierra and Susana Rivero—presidents of the upper and lower chambers, respectively—rejected the option of assuming the presidency themselves, nor did they accept the suggestion that Jeanine Áñez, second vice president of the Senate, succeed Morales. With dialogue quickly proving fruitless, Salvatierra requested a closed-door meeting, attended only by herself, Rivero, and Ortiz, with Monsignor Eugenio Scarpellini present as a mediator. The contents of the discussions were not disclosed, though, after their conclusion, the plenary meeting resumed, with Salvatierra and Rivero agreeing to facilitate Áñez's succession. ^{[74] [lower-greek 3]}

With Morales's ouster, the opposition had won control of the executive. However, the new government's ability to conduct the transition remained reliant on the legislature, dominated by a MAS supermajority. As dean of the Senate, Ortiz took charge of reestablishing dialogue with his MAS colleagues, seeking to reach agreements in the legislature with the aim of annulling the previous elections, convoking new ones, appointing new electoral authorities, and extending the government's soon-to-expire mandate. ^{[77] [78]} To do this, he initially sought to negotiate the necessary MAS support to be elected president of the Senate. According to Chuquisaca Senator Omar Aguilar, the option of granting Ortiz control over the upper house was supported by Efraín Chambi, head of the MAS caucus in the Senate, who was willing to exchange the position for a ministerial role, granting the MAS a presence in the executive. Aguilar opposed this idea because it would have given Ortiz virtual control over the Legislative Assembly. ^{[lower-greek 4]} Ultimately, Ortiz backed down after the MAS threatened to reinstate Salvatierra as president of the Senate, given that she had never formally resigned. With that, MAS Senator Eva Copa was elected to preside over the chamber. ^[80]

Following the election of its new directorate, the Senate moved to reconfigure its committees and commissions. Ortiz was selected to serve as president of the Constitution Commission, granting him a high degree of control over the process of drafting a bill to call new elections. After a series of intensive negotiations, Ortiz succeeded in reaching an agreement with the MAS's "conciliatory wing", who agreed to pass a law scheduling new elections in which Morales would not be allowed to participate. ^{[81] [82]} With that, Ortiz subsequently oversaw the process of designating six new electoral authorities to chair the TSE and was one of the architects of the law extending the terms of the country's elected officials. ^{[83] [84] [85]} Ortiz's ability to attain MAS support for these initiatives was due in part to the party's internal divisions and the political inexperience of its legislators. "When the technical groups that would elaborate the laws were formed, [the MAS] realized that they had never worked in that way because all the bills came from the executive and the ruling party only had to approve them", Ortiz stated. ^[86]

Minister of Economy

Given Áñez's membership in the party, her assumption of office granted the MDS a great deal of influence over the transitional government. In particular, a large part of the Áñez Cabinet was composed of individuals aligned with Ortiz's wing of the MDS. While not initially a minister himself, Ortiz served as a close advisor to the president. Per a report by Opinión , the selection of Oscar Mercado as minister of labor would have been at his suggestion. Additionally, the newly-appointed minister of government, Arturo Murillo, was known to have been Ortiz's "right-hand and political advisor." ^[87] These factors led El Deber to describe Ortiz as "a vital cog in the new government", stating that his political power had "grown exponentially." ^[78]

With the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, the transitional government saw the loss of Wilfredo Rojo, minister of productive development, due to disagreements over the implementation of quarantine measures. ^[88] In his place, Áñez appointed Ortiz, charging him with the task of reactivating the economy in the face of the health crisis and implementing a previously announced employment plan. To do the latter, the president established the National Reactivation Council, chaired by Ortiz with the presence of seven other ministers. Speaking to media outlets, Ortiz pledged to coordinate economic reactivation with the private and public sectors, including working closely with small businesses and entrepreneurs to alleviate their concerns. Ortiz's newfound influence over the government's economic policy led ERBOL to dub him the "superminister of economic reactivation." ^{[89] [90]} However, as noted by El Deber, with Ortiz's entry into the executive, Áñez lost her "best negotiator" and main strategist in the legislature, a move some government officials later admitted "was a mistake". For the duration of the transition, "the [legislature] ... absolutely blocked the executive", leaving Áñez unable to enact her economic, electoral, and health policies. ^{[85] [91]}

Ortiz is sworn in as minister of economy, 7 July 2020.

In early July, Ortiz was appointed to take the reins of the Ministry of Economy, a position he used to launch the government's economic reactivation plan. ^[92] The program was based on five pillars: provide working capital to companies and producers; establish new sources of employment; encourage the consumption and purchase of national products; and reduce public spending. For the first and second points, Ortiz outlined that the government would seek to support businesses and agricultural producers through the allocation of credit, while entrepreneurs would be granted tax incentives for their business endeavors. To encourage the consumption of national products, a system was to be implemented favoring national suppliers in state purchases. Adding to this, Ortiz announced that the Central Bank had been directed to inject liquidity to finance national production and tourism projects. In terms of cutting unnecessary costs, Ortiz estimated that the plan would seek to reduce state spending by up to fifteen percent, an idea El País described as "classic austerity measures recommended by IMF (International Monetary Fund) orthodoxy." ^{[93] [94]}

Ortiz discusses the deferral of bank loan payments, 31 August 2020.

While extensive, the plan was criticized by analysts and economists for being too ambitious and taking too long to execute, given that the transitional government was set to conclude its work within mere months. Economist Gonzalo Chávez called it a "long-term plan", requiring at least ten to fifteen years to fully implement. While the program also included short and medium-term elements, financial specialist Jaime Dunn expressed doubt over Ortiz's ability to execute them by the election date. In particular, much of the financing relied on external credit, necessitating approval from the Legislative Assembly. For these reasons, Ortiz was criticized for having "electoralized" the government's economic program, creating a plan that bolstered Áñez's presidential candidacy rather than focusing on short-term crises, as his predecessor had done. Chávez regarded that outcome as expected, given that Ortiz was "a politician before an economist." ^{[94] [95]}

Up until May, Ortiz had served as Áñez's campaign manager, supporting her effort to retain a hold over the presidency through the Juntos alliance, led by the MDS. ^[96] Though Ortiz officially ceased campaign functions upon entering the cabinet, ^[97] political calculations continued to influence his decision-making. In September, amid low poll numbers, Áñez withdrew her candidacy, a decision Ortiz "adamantly opposed". Without a presidential candidate at the top of the ticket, the MDS's entire ballot was annulled, leaving the party devoid of parliamentary representation, a fact that caused great unrest among its leadership. Tensions between Áñez and Ortiz peaked in late September after he disobeyed the president's order to block the payment of legislators' salaries, a move intended to pressure the Legislative Assembly into authorizing health funds. "This fact greatly annoyed President Áñez, who interpreted it as a clear and explicit disobedience to her authority." ^[85]

The culmination of Ortiz's rupture with the president came on 22 September, following Áñez's decision to yield the government's ninety-two percent stake in the Cochabamba Light and Power Company (ELFEC) to its former owner, the Cochabamba Mixed Telecommunications Cooperative. ELFEC was nationalized in 2010, with its annual profits transferred to the National Electricity Company from there on. The decree authorizing the return of shares was formulated by the Ministry of Government, headed by Murillo, despite the fact that electrification policy was not part of the ministry's purview. Economists criticized the decision as an attempt at privatization through an irregular fast-tracked procedure. ^[98] For Ortiz, the decree "[went] against the legal system" by returning the shares without a prior audit process or legal review. For these reasons, he remained unwilling to sign the document, resulting in his departure from office, accompanied by two other ministers. ^{[99] [100]}

Murillo blamed the cabinet crisis on "regionalism," accusing Ortiz of responding to the political interests of "lodges and regional powers." ^{[lower-greek 5]} For his part, Ortiz stated that the transitional government in its final weeks had taken an interest in speeding up last-minute contracts and taking on new financial obligations, something he believed should be left to the incoming government. He blamed the minister of government for these dealings, accusing Áñez of having "handed over the future of the government and the country to Minister Murillo, who is a person who does not have the capacity." ^{[102] [103]}

Ideology and political positions

Ortiz's political ideology has been referred to as center-right conservative. ^{[71] [104]} He is an adherent of democratic republicanism, advocating limited government in which power is distributed between the national government and the nine departments. ^[5] To achieve this, Ortiz has proposed further decentralizing the country's pre-existing departmental autonomies by implementing a federalist system, granting them broader powers over their internal fiscal and domestic policies. ^[105] Ortiz's economic views have been described as generally liberal, and he has been linked to Santa Cruz's agribusiness elite, with small personal investments in land and cattle. ^{[106] [107]} During his presidential campaign, he advocated restructuring the country's tax policy, implementing a system with fewer taxes on individuals and loosened regulations on corporations but with more effective coverage and collection capacity. At the same time, Ortiz's economic program never contemplated the privatization or closure of State-owned enterprises previously established or nationalized during the Morales era, nor did it consider major changes to the pre-existing salary policy. ^[108]

A practicing Roman Catholic, Ortiz has expressed opposition to the legalization of abortion; as a senator, he voted against reforms to the Penal Code that would have expanded the grounds for legally terminating a pregnancy. Instead, Ortiz stated that authorities "should not wait for a femicide to occur", outlining the expansion of criminal sanctions and access to public services as a means of reducing the need for abortions. On LGBT rights, Ortiz conveyed his support for the community's right to life without discrimination, though he opposes the recognition of same-sex unions as marriages or the adoption of minors by same-sex couples. ^[5] During his 2019 campaign, Ortiz referred to the evangelist presidential candidacy of Chi Hyun Chung, conveying his belief that "the presidency is [not] a religious position." ^[109]

Electoral history

Electoral history of Oscar Ortiz

Year	Office	Party		Alliance		Votes			Result	Ref.
						Total	%	P.
2005	Senator		Independent		Social Democratic Power	261,845	41.80%	1st	Won	[110] [lower-greek 6]
2009			Popular Consensus		Consensus and National Unity	46,451	4.30%	3rd	Lost	[111] [lower-greek 6]
2014			Social Democratic Movement		Democratic Unity	506,704	39.82%	2nd	Won	[112] [lower-greek 6]
2019	President		Social Democratic Movement		Bolivia Says No	260,316	4.24%	4th	Annulled	[113]
Source: Plurinational Electoral Organ | Electoral Atlas

Publications

• Ortiz Antelo, Oscar (2017). Crónica de una Traición: Investigación del Fondo Indígena (in Spanish) (1st ed.). La Paz: Plural Editores. ISBN   978-99954-1-776-5.

References

Notes

1. The 2019 primaries were unique in that each political organization chose which of its members would run in them, ultimately resulting in nine entirely uncontested races. ^[57]
2. In Bolivia, a second round is avoided by one candidate either reaching fifty percent of the vote or achieving a forty percent plurality with ten percent more votes than the next closest competitor. ^[63]
3. The MAS later reneged on this pledge, ostensibly due to the lack of security guarantees. As such, Áñez's succession occurred ipso facto without the presence of MAS legislators. ^{[75] [76]}
4. The presidency of the Legislative Assembly is a vice-presidential prerogative. Given the resignation of Álvaro García Linera, the vice presidency remained vacant, making the president of the Senate the effective head of the Legislative Assembly. ^[79]
5. Ortiz's history working for business entities historically dominated by Los Caballeros del Oriente—one of Santa Cruz's two most influential secret societies, together with Los Toborochi—had been the source of longstanding speculation and hearsay. ^[101] Ortiz routinely denied these claims, stating that he never belonged "to any lodge or secret society". ^[5]
6. Presented on an electoral list. The data shown represents the share of the vote the entire party/alliance received in that constituency.

Footnotes

1. "Ortiz y Peña rompen con Demócratas: 'Es la expresión de nuestro rechazo a formas antidemocráticas en la organización'". UNITEL (in Spanish). Santa Cruz de la Sierra. 21 December 2020. Archived from the original on 11 July 2022. Retrieved 11 July 2022.
2. "Oscar Ortiz preside Unión de Partidos Latinoamericanos". El Diario (in Spanish). La Paz. 11 June 2018. Archived from the original on 11 July 2022. Retrieved 11 July 2022.
3. "Oscar Ortiz asume como rector de sede de la Universidad Católica San Pablo en Santa Cruz". UNITEL (in Spanish). Santa Cruz de la Sierra. 23 November 2021. Archived from the original on 24 November 2021. Retrieved 11 July 2022.
4. Corrales Arandia, Geraldine (15 October 2019). "Alianza BDN basa sus propuestas en el 21F y el federalismo". Los Tiempos (in Spanish). Cochabamba. Archived from the original on 29 October 2021. Retrieved 5 July 2022.
5. "'Hay que tener el control de las actas, ahí se juega la democracia'" . Página Siete (in Spanish). La Paz. 20 January 2019. Archived from the original on 7 July 2022. Retrieved 7 July 2022.
6. Romero Ballivián 2018, pp. 426–427.
7. "¿Quién es quién?: Oscar Ortiz Antelo". El Diario (in Spanish). La Paz. 3 August 2014. Archived from the original on 3 July 2022. Retrieved 3 July 2022.
8. Romero Ballivián 2018, p. 426.
9. Oviedo 2019, 5:50–6:06.
10. Romero Ballivián 2018, p. 427.
11. Rico, Maite (19 December 2005). Written at La Paz. "Victoria arrolladora de Evo Morales". El País (in Spanish). Madrid. Archived from the original on 13 August 2014. Retrieved 3 July 2022.
12. "Santos Ramírez es nuevo Presidente de Senadores". El Diario (in Spanish). La Paz. 19 January 2006. Archived from the original on 3 February 2023. Retrieved 2 February 2023.
13. Staff writer (24 January 2007). Written at La Paz. "Partido de Morales pierde el control del Senado". La Prensa (in Spanish). Ciudad de Panamá. EFE. Archived from the original on 3 July 2022. Retrieved 3 July 2022.
14. "Oscar Ortiz de Podemos fue elegido presidente del Senado" (in Spanish). La Paz. Agencia de Noticias Fides. 18 January 2008. Archived from the original on 3 July 2022. Retrieved 3 July 2022.
15. "Ortiz asume la presidencia del Senado y en el MAS ya hay dos disidentes" (in Spanish). La Paz. Agencia de Noticias Fides. 18 January 2008. Archived from the original on 3 July 2022. Retrieved 3 July 2022.
16. "Bolivia: Un empresario, presidente del Senado". Clarín (in Spanish). Buenos Aires. 19 January 2008. Archived from the original on 3 July 2022. Retrieved 3 July 2022.
17. Staff writer (16 June 2008). Written at La Paz. "Ala radical se impone en el Senado y reeligen a Ortiz como presidente". Opinión (in Spanish). Cochabamba. Agencia Boliviana de Información. Archived from the original on 3 July 2022. Retrieved 3 July 2022.
18. Zuazo, Alvaro (3 March 2006). "Congreso boliviano aprueba ley de convocatoria a Constituyente". Plainview Herald (in Spanish). Archived from the original on 4 July 2022. Retrieved 3 July 2022.
19. Staff writer (5 March 2006). Written at La Paz. "El Congreso boliviano aprueba la Ley Especial de Convocatoria a la Asamblea Constituyente". Europa Press (in Spanish). Madrid. Archived from the original on 4 July 2022. Retrieved 3 July 2022.
20. Rojas Tudela, Farit (6 February 2009). "13 años de la CPE". La Razón (in Spanish). La Paz. Archived from the original on 20 February 2022. Retrieved 3 July 2022.
21. "Sesión clave en Bolivia por la Asamblea Constituyente". Infobae (in Spanish). Buenos Aires. 3 August 2007. Archived from the original on 4 July 2022. Retrieved 3 July 2022.
22. Oviedo 2019, 12:31–14:03.
23. Ibaibarriaga, Mercedes (23 November 2007). Written at La Paz. "La Asamblea Constituyente de Bolivia se traslada a un cuartel militar por seguridad". El Mundo (in Spanish). Madrid. Archived from the original on 24 November 2007. Retrieved 3 July 2022.
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27. Painter, James (9 August 2008). "Divided Bolivia set for referendum". BBC News . London. Archived from the original on 26 January 2010. Retrieved 4 July 2022.
28. Oviedo 2019, 7:35–12:18.
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34. Staff writer (23 May 2009). Written at Santa Cruz de la Sierra. "Consenso Popular liderado por Ortiz empieza a trabajar". Los Tiempos (in Spanish). Cochabamba. El Deber. Archived from the original on 1 March 2022. Retrieved 4 July 2022.
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36. Staff writer (14 July 2009). Written at La Paz. "El MAS quiere que Ortiz renuncie a la Presidencia de la Cámara de Senadores". Los Tiempos (in Spanish). Cochabamba. Agencia de Noticias Fides. Archived from the original on 2 July 2022. Retrieved 4 July 2022.
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40. Staff writer (16 January 2010). Written at Santa Cruz de la Sierra. "Conforman una 'megaalianza'". Los Tiempos (in Spanish). Cochabamba. El Deber. Archived from the original on 4 July 2022. Retrieved 4 July 2022.
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51. Ortiz Antelo, Oscar (26 April 2022). "El Fondo Indígena y la infamia del Estado". Página Siete (in Spanish). La Paz. Archived from the original on 5 July 2022. Retrieved 5 July 2022.  ... las principales víctimas de este escándalo fueron los pueblos indígenas que vieron su causa deslegitimada [y] sus organizaciones prostituidas ...
52. "Oscar Ortiz: 'No creemos que todos los opositores deban estar dentro'" . Página Siete (in Spanish). La Paz. 16 September 2018. Archived from the original on 5 July 2022. Retrieved 5 July 2022.
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56. "Alianza de Demócratas y UN baraja más de un binomio en las primarias" (in Spanish). La Paz. Agencia de Noticias Fides. 14 November 2018. Archived from the original on 7 July 2022. Retrieved 7 July 2022.
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58. Pomacahua, Pamela (16 November 2018). "Samuel, Ortiz y Suárez se perfilan para internas en Bolivia Dice No" . Página Siete (in Spanish). La Paz. Archived from the original on 7 July 2022. Retrieved 7 July 2022.
59. Layme, Beatriz (27 November 2018). "Ortiz, Cárdenas y Suárez suenan para la Vice por Bolivia Dice No" . Página Siete (in Spanish). La Paz. Archived from the original on 7 July 2022. Retrieved 7 July 2022.
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64. "Edwin Rodríguez renuncia a su candidatura a la vicepresidencia". Correo del Sur (in Spanish). Sucre. El Día. 12 July 2019. Archived from the original on 13 July 2019. Retrieved 8 July 2022.
65. Sánchez, César (12 July 2019). "Ortiz afirma que no renunciará a su candidatura e insinúa que Rodríguez se 'vendió' a otro partido". Oxígeno.bo (in Spanish). La Paz. Archived from the original on 8 July 2022. Retrieved 8 July 2022.
66. "Ortiz acusa a CC de comprar a Rodríguez y armar una guerra sucia contra Bolivia Dice No" (in Spanish). La Paz. Agencia de Noticias Fides. 17 July 2019. Archived from the original on 8 July 2022. Retrieved 8 July 2022.
67. "Shirley Franco sustituye a Edwin Rodríguez en Bolivia Dice No". El Potosí (in Spanish). Cochabamba. El Deber. 15 August 2019. Archived from the original on 30 September 2020. Retrieved 8 July 2022.
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74. Bolivian Episcopal Conference 2021, pp. 12–13.
75. "Bolivia: Jeanine Áñez se proclama presidenta del país por sucesión constitucional". France24 (in Spanish). Paris. EFE and Reuters. 13 November 2019. Archived from the original on 15 January 2022. Retrieved 4 February 2022.
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77. "Ortiz convoca al MAS a la mesa del diálogo" . Página Siete (in Spanish). La Paz. 13 November 2019. Archived from the original on 9 July 2022. Retrieved 9 July 2022.
78. Paredes, Ivan Alejandro (26 January 2020). "Ortiz y Aguilar son los artífices de la 'democracia pactada'" . El Deber (in Spanish). Santa Cruz de la Sierra. Archived from the original on 9 July 2022. Retrieved 9 July 2022.
79. "Núñez dice que Eva Copa podría usar el avión FAB-002, si demuestra que es Vicepresidenta" (in Spanish). La Paz. ERBOL. 10 June 2020. Archived from the original on 25 January 2022. Retrieved 9 July 2022. Actualmente, Eva Copa ejerce como Presidenta de la Asamblea, que es una prerrogativa vicepresidencial, debido a que preside el Senado. Además, la senadora tiene el control de las instalaciones de la Vicepresidencia en La Paz.
80. "Exsenador revela que Copa asumió la Presidencia del Senado con la aprobación de Morales". Los Tiempos (in Spanish). Cochabamba. Agencia de Noticias Fides. 29 April 2021. Archived from the original on 1 May 2021. Retrieved 9 July 2022.
81. Jaramillo Velarde, Diego (20 November 2019). "Asume una nueva Comisión de Constitución en el Senado que tratará la ley de nuevas elecciones" . El Deber (in Spanish). Santa Cruz de la Sierra. Archived from the original on 10 July 2022. Retrieved 9 July 2022.
82. Layme, Beatriz (22 November 2019). "Pese a radicales del MAS, se perfila pacto para comicios sin Evo Morales" . Página Siete (in Spanish). La Paz. Archived from the original on 10 July 2022. Retrieved 9 July 2022.
83. "La Comisión Mixta de la Asamblea de Bolivia aprueba el reglamento de selección de vocales del TSE". Europa Press (in Spanish). Madrid. 27 November 2019. Archived from the original on 27 November 2019. Retrieved 10 July 2022.
84. "Senado consultará al TCP la ampliación de mandato de autoridades del Ejecutivo y Legislativo". Los Tiempos (in Spanish). Cochabamba. 18 December 2019. Archived from the original on 20 January 2020. Retrieved 10 July 2022.
85. "Hay tensiones sin resolver en el gabinete de Jeanine Áñez" . El Deber (in Spanish). Santa Cruz de la Sierra. 28 September 2020. Archived from the original on 11 July 2022. Retrieved 11 July 2022.
86. Paredes, Ivan Alejandro (26 January 2020). "Ortiz y Aguilar son los artífices de la 'democracia pactada'" . El Deber (in Spanish). Santa Cruz de la Sierra. Archived from the original on 9 July 2022. Retrieved 9 July 2022. [Ortiz] relató que al formarse las mesas técnicas que elaborarían las leyes, se dieron cuenta que [el MAS] nunca habían trabajado de ese modo porque todos los proyectos de Ley venían desde el Ejecutivo y la bancada oficialista solo debía aprobar el mismo ...
87. Revollo P., Melissa (7 December 2019). "Hay siete personas que deciden en el Gobierno transitorio de Áñez". Opinión (in Spanish). Cochabamba. Archived from the original on 2 July 2022. Retrieved 1 July 2022.
88. "Pugnas de poder derivan en el cambio de cuatro altos cargos" . Página Siete (in Spanish). La Paz. 9 May 2020. Archived from the original on 10 July 2022. Retrieved 10 July 2022.
89. Paz Vargas, Carla (8 May 2020). "Ortiz asume el Ministerio de Desarrollo Productivo con el desafío de crear empleo masivo y reactivar la economía" . El Deber (in Spanish). Santa Cruz de la Sierra. Archived from the original on 10 July 2022. Retrieved 10 July 2022.
90. "Áñez convierte a Oscar Ortiz en superministro de la reactivación económica" (in Spanish). La Paz. ERBOL. 9 May 2020. Archived from the original on 19 September 2020. Retrieved 10 July 2022.
91. Vegas Rondon, Leopoldo Jose (10 May 2020). "El círculo íntimo de la presidenta provocó una crisis política en el gobierno durante la última semana" . El Deber (in Spanish). Santa Cruz de la Sierra. Archived from the original on 23 September 2020. Retrieved 1 July 2022.
92. Staff writer (7 July 2020). Written at La Paz. "Un nuevo ministro de economía asume el reto de crear empleos en Bolivia". EFE (in Spanish). Madrid. Archived from the original on 8 July 2020. Retrieved 10 July 2022.
93. "Ortiz se abona a la austeridad para buscar la reactivación económica del país". El País (in Spanish). Tarija. 24 June 2020. Archived from the original on 11 July 2022. Retrieved 10 July 2022.
94. Estremadoiro Flores, Ernesto (8 July 2020). "Plan de reactivación demorará y Ortiz tendrá que negociar para aplicarlo después de septiembre" . El Deber (in Spanish). Santa Cruz de la Sierra. Archived from the original on 10 July 2022. Retrieved 10 July 2022.
95. "Analistas: Parada salió porque Ortiz electoralizó el programa económico" . Página Siete (in Spanish). La Paz. 8 July 2020. Archived from the original on 10 July 2022. Retrieved 10 July 2022.
96. "Oscar Ortiz es jefe de campaña de Jeanine Áñez". Opinión (in Spanish). Cochabamba. Agencia Boliviana de Información. 11 February 2020. Archived from the original on 11 July 2022. Retrieved 11 July 2022.
97. "Oscar Ortiz deja de ser jefe de campaña de la alianza Juntos, que postula a Áñez". El Potosí (in Spanish). El Deber. 11 May 2020. Archived from the original on 11 July 2022. Retrieved 11 July 2022.
98. Manzaneda, Laura (22 September 2020). "¿Privatización o restitución? Difieren sobre retorno de acciones de Elfec". Los Tiempos (in Spanish). Cochabamba. Archived from the original on 22 October 2020. Retrieved 11 July 2022.
99. Carrasco, Gloria (28 September 2020). "Jeanine Áñez releva a tres ministros de su gabinete en Bolivia". CN͠N (in Spanish). Atlanta. Archived from the original on 1 December 2021. Retrieved 1 December 2021.
100. Alanoca, Jesus (28 September 2020). "Oscar Ortiz anuncia su despido de ministro, dice que no renunció pero que ya designaron a su sucesor" . El Deber (in Spanish). Santa Cruz de la Sierra. Archived from the original on 10 July 2022. Retrieved 11 July 2022.
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103. Tedesqui Vargas, Luis Marcelo (30 September 2020). "La pugna entre Ortiz y Murillo desnuda grietas en fase final del gobierno" . El Deber (in Spanish). Santa Cruz de la Sierra. Archived from the original on 14 July 2022. Retrieved 14 July 2022.
104. "Casado conversa con el senador boliviano Oscar Ortiz sobre el incidente diplomático entre España y Bolivia". Europa Press (in Spanish). Madrid. 30 October 2019. Archived from the original on 3 January 2020. Retrieved 2 July 2022.
105. Curi, Marco (1 December 2018). Written at Santa Cruz de la Sierra. "Oscar Ortiz: 'Vamos a buscar una segunda vuelta'". La Razón (in Spanish). La Paz. Archived from the original on 2 December 2018. Retrieved 8 July 2022.
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108. Aré Vásquez, Tuffí (17 August 2019). Written at Santa Cruz de la Sierra. "Un modelo económico que no se toca: las propuestas de la oposición boliviana para enfrentar a Evo Morales". Infobae (in Spanish). Buenos Aires. Archived from the original on 31 October 2019. Retrieved 8 July 2022.
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Bibliography

• Memoria del Proceso de Facilitación de Diálogo (PDF). Bolivian Episcopal Conference (in Spanish). La Paz. 2021. Archived from the original (PDF) on 16 June 2021.
• Lansford, Tom, ed. (2015). Political Handbook of the World . CQ Press. p. 162. ISBN   978-1-4833-7157-3. ISSN   0193-175X. OCLC   912321323 – via the Internet Archive.
• Oviedo, Gabriela (6 October 2019). Así Decidimos: Oscar Ortiz, Candidato a la Presidencia por 'Bolivia Dice No' (Television production) (in Spanish). Santa Cruz de la Sierra: UNITEL – via YouTube.
• Romero Ballivián, Salvador (2018). Quiroga Velasco, Camilo Sergio (ed.). Diccionario Biográfico de Parlamentarios 1979–2019 (in Spanish) (2nd ed.). La Paz: Fundación de Apoyo al Parlamento y la Participación Ciudadana; Fundación Konrad Adenauer. pp. 426–427. ISBN   978-99974-0-021-5. OCLC   1050945993 – via ResearchGate.

External links

• Official website (in Spanish).
• Senate profile Vice Presidency (in Spanish).
• Senate profile Chamber of Senators (in Spanish). Archived from the original on 16 November 2019.
• Ministerial profile Ministry of Productive Development (in Spanish). Archived from the original on 17 June 2020.
• Ministerial profile Ministry of Economy (in Spanish). Archived from the original on 22 September 2020.
• Opinion columns for El Deber (in Spanish).
• Opinion columns for Los Tiempos (in Spanish).
• Opinion columns for Página Siete (in Spanish).