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Parochial altruism is a concept in social psychology, evolutionary biology, and anthropology that describes altruism towards an in-group, often accompanied by hostility towards an out-group. It is a combination of altruism, defined as behavior done for the benefit of others without direct effect on the self, and parochialism, which refers to having a limited viewpoint. Together, these concepts create parochial altruism, or altruism which is limited in scope to one's in-group. Parochial altruism is closely related to the concepts of in-group favoritism and out-group discrimination. Research has suggested that parochial altruism may have evolved in humans to promote high levels of in-group cooperation, which is advantageous for group survival. Parochial altruism is often evoked to explain social behaviors within and between groups, such as why people are cooperative within their social groups and why they may be aggressive towards other social groups.
References
- ↑ Webpage of Urs Fischbacher at the University of Konstanz. Retrieved February 17, 2018.
- ↑ Balietti, Stefano (18 November 2016). "nodeGame: Real-time, synchronous, online experiments in the browser". Behavior Research Methods. 49 (5): 1696–1715. doi: 10.3758/s13428-016-0824-z . PMID 27864814.
- ↑ "Offizielle Webpräsenz von z-Tree" . Retrieved February 17, 2018.
- ↑ "Interview with Science Watch" . Retrieved February 17, 2018.
- ↑ Webpage of Urs Fischbacher on the website of the University of Konstanz (incl. CV). Retrieved February 17th, 2018.
- ↑ Ranking of economists on IDEAS/RePEc. Retrieved February 17th, 2018.
- ↑ Fischbacher, U.; Gachter, S.; Fehr, E. (2001). "Are people conditionally cooperative? Evidence from a public goods experiment". Economics Letters. 71 (3): 397–404. doi:10.1016/s0165-1765(01)00394-9. hdl: 20.500.11850/146559 . S2CID 15885836.
- ↑ Falk A., Fischbacher U. (2006). "A theory of reciprocity". Games and Economic Behavior. 54 (2): 293–315. doi:10.1016/j.geb.2005.03.001. S2CID 5714242.
- ↑ Falk A., Fehr E., Fischbacher U. (2003). "On the Nature of Fair Behavior". Economic Inquiry. 41 (1): 20–26. doi: 10.1093/ei/41.1.20 .
{{cite journal}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link) - ↑ Fehr E., Fischbacher U. (2002). "Why Social Preferences Matter - The Impact of Non-Selfish Motives on Competition, Cooperation and Incentives". Economic Journal. 112 (478): 1–33. doi:10.1111/1468-0297.00027. hdl: 20.500.11850/146625 . S2CID 15380244.
- ↑ Fischbacher U., Gachter S. (2010). "Social Preferences, Beliefs, and the Dynamics of Free Riding in Public Goods Experiments". American Economic Review. 100 (1): 541–556. doi:10.1257/aer.100.1.541. S2CID 8204954.
- ↑ Armin F., Fehr E., Fischbacher U. (2008). "Testing theories of fairness - Intentions matter". Games and Economic Behavior. 62 (1): 287–303. doi:10.1016/j.geb.2007.06.001. hdl: 20.500.11850/146605 .
{{cite journal}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link) - ↑ Fischbacher U., Föllmi-Heusi F. (2013). "Lies in Disguise - An Experimental Study on Cheating". Journal of the European Economic Association. 11 (3): 525–547. doi: 10.1111/jeea.12014 .
- ↑ Falk A., Fehr E., Fischbacher U. (2005). "Driving Forces Behind Informal Sanctions". Econometrica. 73 (6): 2017–2030. doi:10.1111/j.1468-0262.2005.00644.x. hdl: 10419/33524 . S2CID 13426232.
{{cite journal}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link) - ↑ "Highly Cited Researchers 2014" . Retrieved February 17, 2018.
- ↑ "F.A.Z.:: Economist ranking in 2014". Faz.net. Retrieved February 17, 2018.
- ↑ "Southwest Press, in 8 December 2016". Archived from the original on 23 December 2016. Retrieved 17 February 2018.
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