131st Rifle Division

Last updated
131st Rifle Division (August 1939 – June 1, 1940)
131st Motorized Division (June 1, 1940 – July 29, 1941)
131st Rifle Division (July 29, 1941 – December 27, 1941)
131st Rifle Division (December 25, 1941 – May 8, 1946)
Active1939–1946
CountryFlag of the Soviet Union (1936 - 1955).svg Soviet Union
Branch Red Army flag.svg Red Army (1939-46)
TypeInfantry
SizeDivision
Engagements Operation Barbarossa
Battle of Brody (1941)
Battle of Kiev (1941)
Case Blue
Battle of Stalingrad
Siege of Leningrad
Leningrad–Novgorod offensive
Krasnoye Selo–Ropsha offensive
Battle of Narva (1944)
Moonsund operation
Courland Pocket
Decorations Order of Red Banner.svg   Order of the Red Banner (2nd Formation)
Battle honours Ropsha (2nd Formation)
Commanders
Notable
commanders
Col. Nikolai Vasilevich Kalinin
Col. Pavel Ivanovich Morozov
Col. Fyodor Ivanovich Komarov
Col. Kirill Kochoevich Dzhakhua
Col. Mikhail Aleksandrovich Pesochin
Maj. Gen. Pyotr Logvinovich Romanenko Hero of the Soviet Union medal.png

The 131st Rifle Division was first formed as an infantry division of the Red Army in August 1939 in the Kiev Special Military District, based on the shtat (table of organization and equipment) of the following month. In May 1940 it was selected for conversion to a motorized division, which officially took place on June 1. In March 1941 it was assigned to Maj. Gen. K. K. Rokossovskii's 9th Mechanized Corps and was under this command west of Kyiv when the German invasion began in June. Rokossovskii immediately took measures to provide additional transport to the division so it was able to intervene in the fighting around Lutsk on June 24, but this was unable to do more than delay the German advance, at considerable cost in men and machines. Over the following weeks it fell back to the northeast, gradually losing strength until on July 29 it was again designated as the 131st Rifle Division. In this guise it continued to fight into mid-September when it was trapped, along with its 5th Army and Southwestern Front, in the Kyiv encirclement.

Contents

A new division had been formed in the Ural Military District in late December and it was soon designated as the new 131st. After a diversion to the north the division moved back southward, becoming part of 1st Reserve Army, which would become 64th Army in July. When it arrived at the fighting front it joined Stalingrad Front, but was soon moved to that Front's 1st Tank Army. When this Army was disbanded it returned the 64th Army briefly, then to 62nd Army.

131st Motorized Division

The division was originally formed at Novohrad-Volynskyi in western Ukraine in the late summer of 1939 during the Red Army's pre-war buildup, but in the spring of 1940 orders came to begin its conversion to a motorized division. At this time it was under command of Col. Nikolai Vasilevich Kalinin. In March of 1941 it was assigned to the 9th Mechanized Corps in the same general area. It was unusual in that it had three motorized regiments instead of the usual two. On April 28 the Corps commander, Maj. Gen. K. K. Rokossovskii, reported on the readiness of his units, noting that he had just three percent of required engineers and 22 percent of materiel support technicians. [1] At the start of the German invasion the 131st was at full strength for personnel, but had only 595 trucks and 69 tractors of all types, and of its allotment of 104 BT tanks, only 41 percent were serviceable. [2] Its order of battle was as follows:

9th Mechanized was assigned to 5th Army, and also contained the 20th and 35th Tank Divisions and 32nd Motorcycle Regiment. [3] On June 22 the 131st and 35th were still in and about Novohrad-Volynskyi, while the 20th was positioned northwest of Shepetivka. [4]

Battle of Brody

Rokossovskii was awoken at 0400 with the delivery of a telegram from 5th Army headquarters authorizing him to open a top secret operational packet. This contained a directive from the STAVKA to bring 9th Mechanized to immediate combat readiness and set out toward Rivne Lutsk Kovel. On his own responsibility he ordered the nearby main supply dumps to be opened to access food, fuel, and ammunition. He also requisitioned motor vehicles from the civilian economy in order to more adequately transport the 131st:

The motorized rifle division, which had the possibility of giving a ride to its infantry aboard its tanks and vehicles, albeit with heavy overloading, succeeding in reaching its designated objective by day's end, and having left the rest of the 9th Mechanized Corps 50 kilometres behind it, arrived in the Rovno area.

The situation of the tank divisions (and 58th Tank Regiment) was more difficult as their vehicles, entirely BT and T-26 types, were old and largely worn out from training, with engines and tracks near the end of their usefulness. [5] In his memoirs the then Col. I. Kh. Bagramyan, chief of operations of Southwestern Front (former Kiev Special Military District), recalled events near the end of June 24:

On the Southwestern Front, the situation was becoming increasingly alarming. In particular, a threat was hanging over Lutsk, where... 15th Mechanized Corps was in need of urgent support... Encircled elements of the 87th and 124th Rifle Divisions near Lutsk were awaiting relief. Yet as we at Front headquarters were racking our brains, trying to find some way to come to the Lutsk grouping's aid, the main forces of the 131st Motorized Division and the forward elements of the tank divisions of K. K. Rokossovsky's 9th Mechanized Corps were arriving there. Reading his message about this, we literally couldn't believe our eyes. How did Konstantin Konstantinovich manage to do this? After all, his so-called motorized division could only move ... on foot. It turns out that the resolute and enterprising corps commander on the very first day of the war at his own peril and risk had gathered all the vehicles from the district reserve in Shepetovka - there were approximately 200 of them - loaded his infantry aboard them and got his corps rolling forward. The arrival of his units in the Lutsk area saved the situation.

The Corps began by launching an attack toward Lyniv which failed to retake any ground but managed to check the advancing III Motorized Corps along the RivneLutsk highway, although at considerable cost. [6]

By the end of June 27 the 14th Panzer Division had regrouped and forced the 131st out of Lutsk and toward the east, taking up positions at Palche by July 1. [7] By this time Maj. Gen. R. N. Morgunov, deputy commander of Southwestern Front, was reporting that "9th Mechanized Corps is functioning as a rifle corps and defending along the Stuba River in the Klevan' region." On the other hand, during July 7 Col. Gen. M. P. Kirponos, commander of the Front, reported to the STAVKA that the tank strength of 9th Mechanized had declined to 164 vehicles, which was actually better than most such corps. [8] On July 2 Colonel Kalinin, who had just been awarded the Order of the Red Banner, left the 131st, soon becoming the chief of staff, and then deputy commander and acting commander, of the 31st Rifle Corps, being promoted to the rank of major general on August 12. He would later lead the 91st and 159th Rifle Divisions, apart from serving in several other positions, before the end of the war. Col. Pavel Ivanovich Morozov took over the division on July 3; he had previously been Kalinin's deputy commander.

Kirponos ordered a counterattack on July 10 by 5th Army, involving the 31st Rifle Corps and three mechanized corps, including the 9th, and the 131st was able to regain the village of Nesolon, where it continued to hold until July 15. By now its strength amounted to 1,283 personnel, with 12 tanks, 27 artillery pieces, and 319 vehicles remaining. After this the Corps continued falling back east of Novohrad-Volynskyi, reaching the area southwest of Korosten by July 23. [9] Reality was finally faced on July 29 when the division was officially reorganized as the 131st Rifle Division. [10]

1st Formation

The reorganized division was under direct command of 5th Army, [11] and had an order of battle very similar to that of its previous incarnation:

Colonel Morozov would remain in command until the division was disbanded. By the end of August 11 it had retreated to positions north of Korosten under pressure from 79th Infantry Division. By this time elements of Army Group South had been stalled in front of the Kiev Fortified Region since late June. Furthermore, the continued existence of 5th Army appeared to constitute a threat to the flanks of both it and Army Group Center to the north. In the third week of the month Hitler decided to strike south with the 2nd Panzer Group in order to link up with 1st Panzer Group advancing from the Dniepr well south of Kyiv to encircle the bulk of Southwestern Front. By now 5th Army was deployed on a line generally to the northwest and northeast of Chernihiv, facing German 2nd Army, although the 131st had been moved south to positions along the Dniepr northwest of Oster. [12] Its strength on August 25 was reported as 4,500 personnel, 40 artillery pieces of all calibres, 17 mortars, and roughly 70 machine guns. [13]

By the beginning of September the German operation was well underway but even on September 11 Stalin was forbidding Kirponos from making any sort of retreat. The next day 1st Panzer Group decisively broke out of its bridgehead at Kremenchuk, and on September 13 lead elements of 3rd Panzer Division reached Lokhvytsia from the north; this would soon be the link-up point of the two panzer groups. That night Stalin again insisted that 5th Army cease any preparations for withdrawal. On September 15 the encirclement was complete and four entire Soviet armies, including the 5th, were trapped; the latter was deep in the cauldron with little chance to escape. Kyiv fell on September 19, and two days later the remnants of 5th and 21st Armies were concentrated south of the Pyriatyn Lokhvytsia road. [14] In the ensuing chaos Colonel Morozov and much of his staff were able to get free, but only small groups and individuals managed to do the same. The 131st remained on the books until December 27 when it, along with the other formations lost in the debacle, were officially written off. Morozov had already taken command of the 339th Rifle Division, and would go on to lead the 83rd Mountain, 20th Mountain, and 181st Rifle Divisions before the war's end.

2nd Formation

A new division began forming at Kirov in the Ural Military District on December 25, and it was soon assigned the designation of the 131st. [15] It was filled mainly with militia and volunteers from that region, and was soon moved to the Moscow Military District. [16] It was noted that 90 percent of its personnel were of Russian nationality. [17] Col. Fyodor Ivanovich Komarov was immediately assigned to command, but he would leave on March 28, 1942, being replaced on April 15 by Col. Kirill Kochoevich Dzhakhua, who had previously led the 52nd Rifle Division. Its order of battle was similar to that of the first formation:

In April the division was railed north where it was assigned to the Arkhangelsk Military District, but this decision was reconsidered as it was returned to the south in May, joining the 1st Reserve Army. [19] By this time it was becoming clear that the main German effort in the summer of 1942 would come in the south, although the STAVKA continued to suspect a renewed drive on Moscow from this direction, so the eight reserve armies were positioned appropriately.

Battle of Stalingrad

On July 10 the STAKVA reorganized its forces in the Stalingrad region. Stalingrad Front was created under command of Marshal S. K. Timoshenko, with three Armies, the 62nd, 63rd, and 64th. The latter was the previous 1st Reserve, with six divisions including the 131st. [20] The division entered the active army on July 12, but was reassigned to 1st Tank Army on July 26. On the same day Colonel Dzhakhua was placed at the disposal of Timoshenko's headquarters, being replaced by Col. Mikhail Aleksandrovich Pesochin. Dzhakhua would go on to lead the 120th and 60th Guards Rifle Divisions, while Pesochin had led the 411th Rifle Division.

1st Tank Army, as well as its companion 4th Tank Army, were still in the process of forming, but had a combined force of 600 tanks which Stalin insisted on being thrown into action on the west bank of the Don River against the oncoming German 6th Army. 1st Tanks, under command of Maj. Gen. K. S. Moskalenko, was slated to be combat-ready by July 28 but nevertheless received orders at 2000 hours on July 26:

13th and 28th Tank Corps, 158th Tank Brigade, and 131st Rifle Division will attack from the march from the Kalach region toward Verkhne-Buzinovka to destroy the opposing enemy and capture the Verkhne-Buzinovka region by day's end on 27 July. Subsequently, the army will attack toward Kletskaia. Begin the attack at 0300 hours on 27 July.

This attack would also involve elements of 21st, 62nd, and 64th Armies, plus 8th Air Army. [21]

Most of 1st Tanks was already in action; 13th Tank Corps was down to some 80 vehicles after a battle with 16th Panzer Division. Logistical support for the Army was weak. Despite these difficulties it stepped off at the appointed time, while 4th Tanks was delayed by two days. Attacking northward across a 45km-wide front, 1st Tanks was struck by over 1,000 Luftwaffe aircraft sorties and made only limited gains by nightfall. 28th Tank Corps, with one regiment of the 131st, reached Lipo-LebedevskiiLipo-Logovskii, some 20-23km north of Kalach. XIV Panzer Corps had also suffered attrition during its advance during the previous month and was down to some 100 tanks. On July 28 the attack effectively stalled, while the 131st, 196th Rifle Division, and 28th Tanks threw back two counterattacks, claiming 40 tanks destroyed. In confused fighting through the last days of the month the 13th Tank Corps managed to break through to the encircled Group Kolpakchi to the north and then led a much-reduced force to the lines of 4th Tank Army late on July 31. [22]

German Advance to Kalach

From August 1–6 the German 6th Army was forced to stand motionless due to further shortages of fuel. During this time it obtained infantry reinforcements. At 0530 hours on August 4 the STAVKA again reorganized its forces in the Stalingrad area by splitting Stalingrad Front into Stalingrad and Southeastern Fronts, with the latter containing 64th Army, now with the 131st again under command. The new Front was under command of Col. Gen. A. I. Yeryomenko. All this was effective August 7. The immediate mission of Southeastern Front was "to halt further movement of the enemy toward the southern face of the Stalingrad external defense line from the south... as well as preventing the enemy from reaching the Volga south of Stalingrad." Yeryomenko was planning a defense against 4th Panzer Army along the Myshkova River and the Abganerovo area. 64th Army was to cover a 120km-wide sector from the Don to Tinguta Station blocking the shortest German route to Stalingrad. [23]

Meanwhile, German 6th Army was closing up to Kalach against what remained of 62nd Army, and the 131st was now transferred to that command. The German commander, Gen. F. Paulus, was determined to crush the 62nd's bridgehead in an encirclement operation. The Army was attempting to hold its bridgehead with eight rifle divisions, including the 131st, plus two tank corps, assorted remnants of other tank units, and two student rifle regiments; altogether some 100,000 troops were on the defense backed by something under 150 tanks. The advance began on August 7. The northern pincer, consisting of several battlegroups of 16th Panzer, attacked from the Mayorovskii area, 30km northwest of Kalach, and broke the defenses of the 131st and 33rd Guards Rifle Division, pushing to the outskirts of the town by dusk. During the evening the Red Army General Staff's daily summary painted a disastrous picture of the overall situation. While the 33rd Guards was reported as taking up new positions from the 181st Rifle Division, no information appeared from the 131st. [24]

Two bridges crossed the Don at Kalach, which was 200m wide at this point, with steep banks. The next morning the 16th Panzer set out for these prizes. At Hill 150.7 20 Soviet tanks were defeated at the cost of several German losses. As the panzer troopers entered the valley both bridges caught fire and one later exploded, but the encirclement was completed. The evening operational summary noted that the 131st and the 28th Tanks (now without tanks) were "withdrawing to the Rubezhnyi region, 10 kilometres north of Kalach, under heavy pressure..." Over the next three days Paulus proceeded to mop up the Kalach pocket. On August 10 the division was reported as occupying a defense along the line IlmenskiiKustovskii. Despite having failed to destroy 62nd Army, Paulus declared victory on August 12, claiming eight divisions, including the 131st, as wiped out, plus a number of other units. In fact, although four divisions were largely destroyed, the 131st managed to get most of the 6,279 men it had begun the battle with over the Don to take up new defenses on the east bank. [25]

Defense of Stalingrad

During August 9-12 Yeryomenko had been planning for the defense of Stalingrad itself. The "intact" portion of 62nd Army (131st, 112th, and 399th Rifle Divisions, 28th Tanks, 20th Motorized Brigade, 115th Fortified Region) was to defend the Don while also assisting the escape of the troops still trapped to the west. The 131st dug in along a line from Ryumino-Krasnoiskii to Kanyshi. In addition to defensive missions Yeryomenko intended to disrupt Paulus' plans through coordinated counterattacks on August 19-20:

62nd Army will force the Don in the Vertiachii and Peskovatka sectors on the night of 19-20 August with two rifle divisions, reinforced by tank brigades, and reach the Golubaia River in the Hill 197 and Malonabatovskii sector [west of the Don] by attacking toward the north and northwest where it will dig in.

The 131st was not part of this plan. In the event it was made moot by the renewed German advance on August 21. [26]

Overnight on August 20/21 6th Army's assault force took up positions across from Vertiachii. The opposed crossings the next day were difficult but successful, and by 1630 hours a pontoon bridge was in place at Lutchenskii. All this was considerably north of the 131st's sector. At dawn on August 23 the Soviet defense collapsed and XIV Panzer Corps began a headlong advance across the unbroken steppe toward the north end of Stalingrad. Under the circumstances the division, along with the 399th and 20th Motorized, had little option but to retreat to the Rossoshka River. The corridor driven by the panzers to the Volga was narrow and appeared vulnerable to counterattack. The commander of 62nd Army, Lt. Gen. A. I. Lopatin, was ordered to strike toward Vertiachii, in cooperation with 4th Tank Army, on August 24, but this failed, while overnight two regiments of the 71st Infantry Division got over the Don just north of Kalach, forcing the 131st and 399th to begin to fall back 5-8km, although Yeryomenko forbade a full withdrawal to the Rossoshka. This finally took place by August 31, but by late on that day the LI Army Corps penetrated the defense of this line, leaving a large part of both 64th and 62nd Armies, including the 131st, partly encircled west of the Chervlennaya River. At 2000 on September 1 Yeryomenko finally authorized a withdrawal by the two Armies to the "Novaia Nadezhda, Peschanka, and Ivanovka line as rapidly as possible." Paulus had an opportunity to cut off this withdrawal with XIV Panzer, but delayed until the force had pulled back to the city's defenses. [27]

Into the suburbs

By late of September 2 the 131st had taken up its new positions, which were described as follows:

Occupy Hill 115.8, Hill 144.9, and Verkhniaia El'shanka (incl.) defensive region and prepare counterattacks along the Babaevo, Peschanka, Zelenaia Poliana axes.

This placed it and the 35th Guards Rifle Division on the left flank of the Army, a flank that was largely uncovered by the withdrawal of 64th Army to the south. According to the plan to penetrate the city itself the XXXXVIII Panzer Corps of 4th Panzer Army deployed from Voroponovo Station to Elkhi, with the objective of driving through to the Volga before seizing the portion of the city south of the Tsaritsa River, which was the boundary between the two Soviet armies. The defense would be based on the 35th Guards, 87th, the reinforcing 244th Rifle Division, and what remained of 33rd Guards. The attack began at dawn on September 3, and the defenses of 33rd Guards were soon overrun, leaving the eastern approaches to Peschanka open. However, in spite of losing some ground west of that place, Pesochin's troops, with the help of 20th Antitank Brigade of 64th Army, managed to hold an organized defense in the Voroponovo and Peschanka sectors, as well as Staro-Dubovka to the south. [28]

Over the next few days this defense, now backed by 35th Guards and the remnants of 33rd Guards, continued to hold against the 24th Panzer Division. XXXXVIII Panzer regrouped on September 7, in the course of which the commander of 24th Panzer was severely wounded and the commander of its 4th Motorcycle Battalion was killed, the latter by Soviet shellfire. The next day the XXXXVIII Panzer renewed its drive into south Stalingrad. 14th Panzer Division, with fewer than 24 tanks remaining, finally forced the 131st, 35th Guards, and 20th Antitank to abandon Peschanka; they pulled back to new defenses from just west of Elshanka south along the southern fringes of Kuporosnoye. On September 10 the 29th Motorized Division reached the Volga at that place, splitting the 62nd and 64th Armies. As of the next day the strength of the 131st was reported as 2,540 personnel, one of the highest in 62nd Army. [29]

References

Citations

  1. David M. Glantz, Stumbling Colossus, University Press of Kansas, Lawrence, KS, 1998, p. 118
  2. Charles C. Sharp, "The Deadly Beginning", Soviet Tank, Mechanized, Motorized Divisions and Tank Brigades of 1940 - 1942, Soviet Order of Battle World War II, Vol. I, Nafziger, 1995, p. 59
  3. Combat Composition of the Soviet Army, 1941, p. 9
  4. Artyom Drabkin and Alexei Isaev, Barbarossa Through Soviet Eyes, trans. C. Summerville, Pen & Sword Books, Ltd., Barnsley, UK, 2012, p. xiii
  5. Dr. Boris Sokolov, Marshal K. K. Rokossovsky, ed. & trans. S. Britton, Helion & Co., Ltd., Solihull, UK, 2015, pp. 75, 79
  6. Sokolov, Marshal K. K. Rokossovsky, pp. 80, 82
  7. David Stahel, Kiev 1941, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 2012, pp. 71-72
  8. Glantz, Stumbling Colossus, pp. 138, 144
  9. Stahel, Kiev 1941, pp. 84-85
  10. Sharp, "The Deadly Beginning", p. 59. Commanders of Corps and Divisions (see Bibliography) gives the date of the reorganization as July 3, but this is contradicted by all other sources.
  11. Combat Composition of the Soviet Army, 1941, p. 33
  12. Stahel, Kiev 1941, pp. 83-85, 113-14, 210, 262
  13. Sharp, "The Deadly Beginning", p. 59
  14. Stahel, Kiev 1941, p. 215-20, 224, 228-29, 260
  15. Walter S. Dunn Jr., Stalin's Keys to Victory, Stackpole Books, Mechanicsburg, PA, 2007, p. 101
  16. Sharp, "Red Swarm", Soviet Rifle Divisions Formed from 1942 to 1945, Soviet Order of Battle World War II, Nafziger, 1996, p. 49
  17. Glantz, Colossus Reborn, University Press of Kansas, Lawrence, KS, 2005, p. 592
  18. Sharp, "Red Swarm", p. 49
  19. Combat Composition of the Soviet Army, 1942, pp. 94, 113
  20. Glantz, To the Gates of Stalingrad, University Press of Kansas, Lawrence, KS, 2009, p. 187
  21. Glantz, To the Gates of Stalingrad, pp. 231-32
  22. Glantz, To the Gates of Stalingrad, pp. 232-34, 239-40
  23. Glantz, To the Gates of Stalingrad, pp. 282-83, 286-87
  24. Glantz, To the Gates of Stalingrad, pp. 290-93, 295
  25. Glantz, To the Gates of Stalingrad, pp. 295-99, 302, 557
  26. Glantz, To the Gates of Stalingrad, pp. 304-05, 312, 328-29
  27. Glantz, To the Gates of Stalingrad, pp. 329-31, 333, 339, 360-62, 379
  28. Glantz, Armageddon in Stalingrad, University Press of Kansas, Lawrence, KS, 2009, pp. 62-65, 67
  29. Glantz, Armageddon in Stalingrad, pp. 74, 77-78, 81, 84-85

Bibliography