On 2 December 2025, the Southern Transitional Council (STC) launched a military offensive across southern Yemen, beginning in the Hadhramaut Governorate, which was then under the control of the internationally-recognized government of Yemen. The STC moved in and captured several areas belonging to the Yemeni government in the northern Wadi Hadhramaut area, including the main cities of Seiyun and Tarim. Afterward, they expanded their offensive into the neighboring Al-Mahrah Governorate, and other adjacent governorates. The STC refers to the offensive as "Operation Promising Future".[8] By 8 December, the STC had captured most of the regions comprising the 8 governorates of the former South Yemen.
Political and military control in Yemen at the start of the offensive
Yemen has been embroiled in a multi-sided civil war since 2014. In fighting the Houthis, who control most of northern Yemen, including the capital, Sanaa, the internationally-recognized government, along with the Saudi-led coalition, partnered with the secessionist Southern Movement, which, since 2017 has been dominated by the Southern Transitional Council (STC). Although officially a component of the government, the STC, which receives extensive support and funding from the United Arab Emirates, independently controls and administers most of southern Yemen and continues to voice its intentions to secede and establish a proposed federal "State of South Arabia".[9][10]
Hadhramaut is Yemen's largest governorate, covering around a third of the country while holding nearly 80% of its oil reserves and other valuable minerals.[11] Control over the territory had previously been split between the STC on the southern coast and the Yemeni Government further north, in an area known as Wadi Hadhramaut (Hadhramaut Valley). The STC had claimed that Wadi Hadhramaut had become rife with smuggling operations benefitting the Houthis, along with local Islamist groups, such as al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).[8]
Prelude
Tensions had been rising in Hadhramaut since November 2025, between the STC and the Hadhramaut Tribal Alliance, a Saudi-backed group led by Amr bin Habrish. On 29 November, the Hadhramaut Protection Forces, the military wing of the tribal alliance, deployed around the Masila oil fields in Hadhramaut belonging to PetroMasila, the largest oil company in Yemen, in order to "defend national resources from any potential aggression or the external interference" according to Habrish. Oil production was blocked, which triggered energy shortages across the region, particularly hurting STC-held regions, which the STC saw as a threat. In response, the STC began a buildup of its military forces in Hadhramaut.[8][11][12]
Offensive
Wadi Hadhramaut
The flag of South Yemen raised atop a government building in Seiyun after the offensive.
On 2 December, a large number of Southern Movement troops started advancing north through the Sah District, and by the end of the day they were a few tens of kilometres from Seiyun.[13]
The offensive in Wadi Hadhramaut was initiated by the STC's Southern Armed Forces on the morning of 3 December, led by the Hadhrami Elite Forces.[14][15] In Seiyun, STC forces were positioned in the Jathma area, before launching a bombardment against the headquarters of the 1st Military Region and other key targets in the city.[16] The STC followed up the bombardment with a lightning offensive, leaving Yemeni Government forces in disarray.[12] Brief clashes were reported between the STC and the 1st Military Region of the Yemeni Army, including at the presidential palace and the Seiyun International Airport.[15] Within hours of fighting, STC personnel captured several positions and government facilities from the 1st Military Region,[17] leading to the latter withdrawing its forces. From there, STC forces were able to capture the remainder of Seiyun by nightfall, before proceeding to rapidly advance throughout Wadi Hadhramaut, taking several other towns and military bases.[9][12] By the end of the day, STC forces had captured nearly every strategically significant area in Wadi Hadhramaut, including Seiyun and its airport, the 1st Military Region headquarters, Tarim, Al-Qatn, Hawra', Al-Raddood, and Al-Khasha'a.[17][18]
STC forces were reportedly seen equipped with Emirati armoured vehicles and Chinese 155mm AH-4 howitzers, which the UAE has supplied to other proxies.[15] Four deaths were reported among STC fighters from the 14th Lightning Brigade, 5th Support and Reinforcement Brigade, and Barshid Brigade.[19] Casualties were also reportedly inflicted on Yemeni forces.[15]
During the early hours of 4 December, STC forces seized the PetroMasila facility and the surrounding military positions from the Hadhramaut Tribal Alliance. The alliance withdrew from the area as part of a Saudi-backed agreement, ultimately relocating to the As Sawm district,[20] though the STC reported the deaths of four of their soldiers in small-scale clashes in the area.[21] In Hadramaut, Southern forces announced the capture of the 23rd Mechanized Brigade in the Al Abr area of Wadi Hadhramaut and the 11th Border Guard Brigade at the Rama camp.[4] At the end of the day the control of Al-Abr camp was handed over to Saudi-backed National Shield Forces.[22]
On 5 December, National Shield Forces attempted to recapture Seiyun but were repulsed by the Southern forces.[23] Saudi pressure caused the STC to temporarily surrender some of their captured sites; however, STC forces quickly counterattacked and recaptured all those areas almost immediately.[12]
On 6 December, Hadrami Elite Forces captured the Thamud camp in northern Hadramaut.[24] Meanwhile the Ramah checkpoint nearby was captured by the Al-Manahil tribesmen after an attack.[25] Four members of the Giants Briagdes were killed when an IED targeted their convoy in the Hadhramaut province.[3] Very little actual resistance to STC advances was reported after the STC had taken Seiyun, with Saudi-backed Yemeni Government forces withdrawing in the face of STC advances, and STC forces reportedly secured control of the Hadhramaut governorate roughly 48 hours later.[26]
Mahrah Governorate
On 4 December, Southern forces seized, the capital of the Al-Mahrah governorate, Al Ghaydah without a fight, as well as the port of Nishtun.[4] On 5 December, the National Shield Forces were also handed over control of the Al-Ghaydah Airport and the Nishtun Port.[22]
On 7 December, Southern forces entered the Al-Ghaydah after the sudden withdrawal of the Shield Forces from some positions inside the city.[27] They also took control of the Sayhut, Qishn, and Al Masilah districts in the province.[28]
Shabwah Governorate
On 3 December, in the Arma district of Shabwa Governorate, STC forces claimed they had taken control of "a camp belonging to the Muslim Brotherhood" in the Arin desert.[18] On 8 December, Southern forces took control of the Al-Uqlah oil field in the province.[29]
By 8 December, STC forces had seized control of most of the regions that were once part of South Yemen, in addition to Dhale Governorate, including the entire southern coastline of Yemen, the border region with Oman, and the oil fields in Hadhramaut Governorate, leaving Yemeni Government forces controlling only the northern reaches of those governorates;[5][31] the STC claimed control over all 8 governorates by 9 December.[32][12] By 9 December, STC forces were estimated to control 90–95% of the populated areas in the former South Yemen, in addition to holding at least 80% of Yemen's proven oil reserves.[12] Of all the regions seized by the STC, the Hadhramaut Governorate was the most strategically valuable one by far, with its control seen as critical for both the Yemeni Government and the STC's secession project.[31] This was seen as a significant setback for Saudi ambitions in the region, and could set the conditions for the STC eventually declaring a secession of southern Yemen. Saudi Arabia withdrew their forces from Aden and its airport during the STC offensive.[5][33] The offensive was described as resembling more of a "handover" than an actual fight, with little actual combat occurring and Yemeni Government-affiliated tribal forces largely handing over control of their positions.[34] Some analysts saw the STC's offensive as a way to prevent Saudi leaders from offering the Houthis any significant concessions in future peace talks, and to build their leverage over the Yemeni Government as well. The STC's offensive was seen as potentially damaging to the Houthis, as the STC and their allies worked to cut off the Houthis from their fuel and overland supply routes, and also part of the UAE's wider campaign to outflank Iran and its Axis of Resistance. Analysts were unsure if the STC would use the offensive to launch a renewed campaign against the Houthis, and they noted that any new operation against the Houthis would require substantial UAE military support.[34] On 9 December, Brigadier General Tareq Saleh claimed that the STC offensive was carried out in order to "unite the miliary theater", and to prepare for an eventual offensive against the Houthis in northern Yemen.[31]
↑Tawfiq al-Shanwah (3 December 2025). "الانتقالي الجنوبي يتوسع في حضرموت اليمنية"[The Southern Transitional Council expands its influence in Yemen's Hadramawt region]. اندبندنت عربية (in Arabic). Independent Arabia. Retrieved 10 December 2025.
↑Wajdi, Izzat (6 October 2025). "حل الدولتين.. في اليمن"[The two-state solution... in Yemen]. الحرة (in Arabic). Retrieved 4 December 2025. القطيعة مع فكرة يمن موحد، حسب الزبيدي، "ستكون نهائية. لن يحمل اسم الدولة القادمة حتى كلمة اليمن". "دولة الجنوب العربي" هو الأكثر قبولاً لدى أنصار المجلس الانتقالي، وهو اسم قديم يعود إلى الاتحاد الذي أنشأه المستعمر البريطاني عند توحيده عددا من المشيخات والسلطنات في الجنوب قبل الاستقلال عام 1967.[The break with the idea of a unified Yemen, according to Al-Zubaidi, "will be final. The name of the future state will not even include the word Yemen." "The State of South Arabia" is the most acceptable name among supporters of the Transitional Council. It is an old name that dates back to the union created by the British colonists when they unified a number of sheikhdoms and sultanates in the south before independence in 1967.]
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Aidarus al-Zoubaidi 
Saleh al-Ja'imlani 
Amr Bin Habrish 
