On 2 December 2025, the Southern Transitional Council (STC) launched a military offensive across southern Yemen, beginning in the Hadhramaut Governorate, which was then under the control of the internationally-recognized government of Yemen. The STC moved in and captured several areas belonging to the Yemeni government in the northern Wadi Hadhramaut area, including the main cities of Seiyun and Tarim. Afterward, they expanded their offensive into the neighboring Al-Mahrah Governorate, and other adjacent governorates. The STC refers to the offensive as "Operation Promising Future".[14] By 8 December, the STC had captured most of the regions comprising the 6 governorates of the former South Yemen.
Political and military control in Yemen at the start of the offensive
Yemen has been embroiled in a multi-sided civil war since 2014. In fighting the Houthis—who control most of northern Yemen, including the capital, Sanaa—the internationally-recognized government, along with the Saudi-led coalition, partnered with the secessionist Southern Movement, which, since 2017 has been dominated by the Southern Transitional Council (STC). Although officially a component of the government, the STC, which receives extensive support and funding from the United Arab Emirates, independently controls and administers most of southern Yemen and continues to voice its intentions to secede and establish a proposed federal "State of South Arabia".[15][16]
Hadhramaut is Yemen's largest governorate, covering around a third of the country while holding nearly 80% of its oil reserves and other valuable minerals.[17] Control over the territory had previously been split between the STC on the southern coast and the Yemeni Government further north, in an area known as Wadi Hadhramaut (Hadhramaut Valley). The STC had claimed that Wadi Hadhramaut had become rife with smuggling operations benefitting the Houthis, along with local Islamist groups, such as al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).[14]
Prelude
Tensions had been rising in Hadhramaut since November 2025, between the STC and the Hadhramaut Tribal Alliance, a Saudi-backed group led by Amr bin Habrish. On 29 November, the Hadhramaut Protection Forces, the military wing of the tribal alliance, deployed around the Masila oil fields in Hadhramaut belonging to PetroMasila, the largest oil company in Yemen, in order to "defend national resources from any potential aggression or the external interference" according to Habrish. Oil production was blocked, which triggered energy shortages across the region, particularly hurting STC-held regions, which the STC saw as a threat. In response, the STC began a buildup of its military forces in Hadhramaut.[14][17][18]
Offensive
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Wadi Hadhramaut
The flag of South Yemen raised atop a government building in Seiyun after the offensive.
On 2 December, a large number of Southern Movement troops started advancing north through the Sah District, and by the end of the day they were a few tens of kilometres from Seiyun.[19]
The offensive in Wadi Hadhramaut was initiated by the STC's Southern Armed Forces on the morning of 3 December, led by the Hadhrami Elite Forces.[20][21] In Seiyun, Southern Transitional Council forces were positioned in the Jathma area, before launching a bombardment against the headquarters of the 1st Military Region and other key targets in the city.[22] The STC followed up the bombardment with a lightning offensive, leaving Yemeni Government forces in disarray.[18] Brief clashes were reported between the STC and the 1st Military Region of the Yemeni Army, including at the presidential palace and the Seiyun International Airport.[21] Within hours of fighting, Southern Transitional Council personnel captured several positions and government facilities from the 1st Military Region,[23] leading to the latter withdrawing its forces. From there, STC forces were able to capture the remainder of Seiyun by nightfall, before proceeding to rapidly advance throughout Wadi Hadhramaut, taking several other towns and military bases.[15][18] By the end of the day, STC forces had captured nearly every strategically significant area in Wadi Hadhramaut, including Seiyun and its airport, the 1st Military Region headquarters, Tarim, Al-Qatn, Hawra', Al-Raddood, and Al-Khasha'a.[23][24]
Southern Transitional Council forces were reportedly seen equipped with Emirati armoured vehicles and Chinese 155mm AH-4 howitzers, which the UAE has supplied to other proxies.[21] Four deaths were reported among STC fighters from the 14th Lightning Brigade, 5th Support and Reinforcement Brigade, and Barshid Brigade.[25] Casualties were also reportedly inflicted on Yemeni forces.[21]
During the early hours of 4 December, STC forces seized the PetroMasila facility and the surrounding military positions from the Hadhramaut Tribal Alliance. The alliance withdrew from the area as part of a Saudi-backed agreement, ultimately relocating to the As Sawm District,[26][failed verification] though the STC reported the deaths of four of their soldiers in small-scale clashes in the area.[27] In Hadhramaut, Southern forces announced the capture of the 23rd Mechanized Brigade in the Al Abr area of Wadi Hadhramaut and the 11th Border Guard Brigade at the Rama camp.[8] At the end of the day, the control of Al Abr camp was handed over to the Saudi-backed National Shield Forces.[28]
On 5 December, the National Shield Forces attempted to recapture Seiyun, but were repulsed by the Southern forces.[29] Saudi pressure caused the STC to temporarily surrender some of their captured sites; however, STC forces quickly counterattacked and recaptured all those areas almost immediately.[18] The National Shield Forces took control of the 37th Armored Brigade's camp in Al-Khasha'a.[30]
On 6 December, the 1st Support and Reinforcement Brigade of Hadrami Elite Forces captured the 315th Armored Brigade's camp in Thamud district of northern Hadramaut.[31] Meanwhile, the 11th Border Guard Brigade's Ramah checkpoint was captured by the Al-Manahil tribesmen after an attack.[32] Four members of the Giants Brigades were killed when an IED targeted their convoy in Hadhramaut Governorate.[7] Very little actual resistance to STC advances was reported after the Southern Transitional Council took Seiyun, with Saudi-backed Yemeni Government forces withdrawing in the face of STC advances, and STC forces reportedly secured control of Hadhramaut Governorate roughly 48 hours later.[33]
Mahrah Governorate
On 4 December, Southern forces seized Al Ghaydah, the capital of Al-Mahrah Governorate, without a fight, as well as the port of Nishtun.[8] On 5 December, the National Shield Forces handed over control of the Al Ghaydah Airport and the port of Nishtun.[28]
On 7 December, Southern forces entered Al Ghaydah after the sudden withdrawal of the Shield Forces from some positions inside the city.[34] They also took control of the Sayhut, Qishn, and Al Masilah districts in the province.[35] By the end of the day they also entered without a fight key coastal and border position including Shahn crossing with Oman and the port of Nishtun.[36] On 10 December Southern forces took control of the west gate of the Ghaydah International Airport while Shield Forces retained control of the airport itself.[37]
Shabwah Governorate
On 3 December, in the Arma District of Shabwa Governorate, STC forces claimed they had taken control of "a camp belonging to the Muslim Brotherhood" in the Arin desert.[24] On 8 December, Southern forces took control of the Al-Uqlah oil field in the province.[38]
On 7 December, hundreds of demonstrators took to the streets of Khor Maksar, Aden Governorate, calling for the secession of South Yemen.[39] By 8 December, STC forces had seized control of most of the regions that were once part of South Yemen, including the entire southern coastline of Yemen, the border region with Oman, as well as Dhale Governorate and the oil fields in Hadhramaut Governorate, leaving Yemeni Government forces controlling only the northern reaches of those governorates;[9][40] the Southern Transitional Council claimed control over all 8 governorates by 9 December.[41][18] By 9 December, STC forces were estimated to control 90–95% of the populated areas in the former South Yemen, in addition to holding at least 80% of Yemen's proven oil reserves.[18] Of all the regions seized by the Southern Transitional Council, the Hadhramaut Governorate was the most strategically valuable one by far, with its control seen as critical for both the Yemeni Government and the STC's secession project.[40]
This was seen as a significant setback for Saudi ambitions in the region, and could set the conditions for the Southern Transitional Council eventually declaring a secession of southern Yemen. Saudi Arabia withdrew their forces from Aden and its airport during the STC offensive.[9][42] The offensive was described as resembling more of a "handover" than an actual fight, with little actual combat occurring and Yemeni Government-affiliated tribal forces largely handing over control of their positions.[43] Some analysts saw the STC's offensive as a way to prevent Saudi leaders from offering the Houthis any significant concessions in future peace talks, and to build their leverage over the Yemeni Government as well. Writing for the Guardian, Patrick Wintour noted that immediate secession would likely be difficult for the Southern Transitional Council, citing the mere partial recognition of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic during the Western Sahara conflict.[9]
The Southern Transitional Council's offensive was seen as potentially damaging to the Houthis, as the STC and their allies worked to cut off the Houthis from their fuel and overland supply routes, and also part of the UAE's wider campaign to outflank Iran and its Axis of Resistance. Analysts were unsure if the STC would use the offensive to launch a renewed campaign against the Houthis, and they noted that any new operation against the Houthis would require substantial UAE military support.[43] On 9 December, Brigadier General Tareq Saleh claimed that the STC offensive was carried out in order to "unite the military theater", and to prepare for an eventual offensive against the Houthis in northern Yemen.[40]
12"Saudi-UAE tensions rise over Yemen clashes". Financial Times. 11 December 2025. Retrieved 11 December 2025. The STC now claims to be in control across southern Yemen, dealing Riyadh a significant setback and shifting the power dynamics in the south in the UAE's favour. "It's a game-changer," said Ahmed Nagi, a Yemeni analyst at the Crisis Group think-tank. "The key question is to what extent the two countries are able to find common ground and understanding. If not, I'm afraid we are heading to a new crisis in the Gulf."
↑Al-Atrush, Samer (12 December 2025). "Yemen will never be united, say separatists backed by the UAE". The Times. Retrieved 12 December 2025. The STC claimed that its forces came under fire from Saudi jets as they consolidated control of Hadramout this week. "We can confirm Saudi Arabia carried out airstrikes against the Southern Armed Forces after they had reached the 23 brigade in Al Abr," an STC official said. Saudi Arabia did not confirm the strike.
↑Tawfiq al-Shanwah (3 December 2025). "الانتقالي الجنوبي يتوسع في حضرموت اليمنية"[The Southern Transitional Council expands its influence in Yemen's Hadramawt region]. اندبندنت عربية (in Arabic). Independent Arabia. Retrieved 10 December 2025.
↑Al-Shmeri, Ahmed (13 December 2025). "الجيش اليمني: «الانتقالي» قتل وأصاب 77 جندياً وضابطاً في حضرموت". عكاظ. أعلنت رئاسة هيئة الأركان العامة اليمنية اليوم (السبت) مقتل 32 جندياً وضابطاً، وجرح 45 آخرين من أفراد القوات الحكومية في المنطقة العسكرية الأولى علي يد مجاميع تابعة للمجلس الانتقالي الجنوبي خلال اقتحامها في الأيام الماضية لمقر قيادة المنطقة.[The Yemeni General Staff announced today (Saturday) that 32 soldiers and officers were killed and 45 others from the government forces in the first military region were wounded by groups affiliated with the Southern Transitional Council during their raid on the region's headquarters in recent days.]
↑Wajdi, Izzat (6 October 2025). "حل الدولتين.. في اليمن"[The two-state solution... in Yemen]. الحرة (in Arabic). Retrieved 4 December 2025. القطيعة مع فكرة يمن موحد، حسب الزبيدي، "ستكون نهائية. لن يحمل اسم الدولة القادمة حتى كلمة اليمن". "دولة الجنوب العربي" هو الأكثر قبولاً لدى أنصار المجلس الانتقالي، وهو اسم قديم يعود إلى الاتحاد الذي أنشأه المستعمر البريطاني عند توحيده عددا من المشيخات والسلطنات في الجنوب قبل الاستقلال عام 1967.[The break with the idea of a unified Yemen, according to Al-Zubaidi, "will be final. The name of the future state will not even include the word Yemen." "The State of South Arabia" is the most acceptable name among supporters of the Transitional Council. It is an old name that dates back to the union created by the British colonists when they unified a number of sheikhdoms and sultanates in the south before independence in 1967.]
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Al-Qaeda [4] 
Aidarus al-Zoubaidi 
Saleh al-Ja'imlani 
Amr bin Habrish 
Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula [4] 
