Initially, a new land force, the Afghan National Army (ANA), was created, whose planned size grew from 70,000 in 2002 to, eventually, a target of 194,000 set in mid-2011.[1][2] The army's air arm, the Afghan National Army Air Corps was renamed the Afghan Air Force (AAF) in 2010.[3][4]Commandos and Special Forces were also trained as part of the army. The army was supervised by the Afghan Ministry of Defence. Training was managed initially by the U.S. Office of Military Cooperation-Afghanistan (2002–05);[5] followed by the Office of Security Cooperation-Afghanistan (2005–06); and then Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (2006); then integrated into the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (2009), finally succeeded by the Resolute Support Mission from 2014.[6] Sedra comments that the 'constant changes to the architecture of the reform process contributed to the 'institutional schizophrenia' that engulfed it.[2] Constant turnover in the U.S. Army personnel supervising the programmes would not have helped.
By 2006, more than 60,000 former militiamen from around the country were disarmed. In 2007, it was reported that Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration programmes had dismantled 274 paramilitary organizations, reintegrated over 62,000 militia members into civilian life, and recovered more than 84,000 weapons, including heavy weapons. But The New York Times also reported a rise in hoarded weapons and a growing Taliban threat, even in the north of the country.[7] The Afghan National Development Strategy of 2008 explained that the aim of Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups programme was to ban all illegal armed groups in all provinces of the country. Approximately 2,000 such groups were identified; most of them surrendered to the Afghan government or joined the new armed forces.[citation needed]
Army
Soldiers from the Afghan army patrolling a village in Khost Province in 2010
During the Bonn Conference on Afghanistan, on 1 December 2001, President Hamid Karzai issued a decree reestablishing a unified army, the Afghan National Army.[6] The decree set a size target of 70,000 and laid out the planned army structure. There had been significant disagreement over the size of the army that was needed. A Ministry of Defense-issued paper said that at least 200,000 active troops were needed.[8] The Afghan Ministry of Defence loudly objected to the smaller, volunteer, nature of the new army, a change from the previous usage of conscripts.[9] Afghan factions jostled to either delay the development of the ANA, or acquire as much control over it as possible.[10]
Afghan Commandos practice infiltration techniques, 1 April 2010 at Camp Morehead in the outer regions of Kabul.
In 2010, the army had limited fighting capacity.[11] Even the best Afghan units lacked training, discipline and adequate reinforcements. In one new unit in Baghlan Province, soldiers had been found cowering in ditches rather than fighting.[12] Some were suspected of collaborating with the Taliban.[11] "They don't have the basics, so they lay down," said Capt. Michael Bell, who was one of a team of US and Hungarian mentors tasked with training Afghan soldiers. "I ran around for an hour trying to get them to shoot, getting fired on. I couldn't get them to shoot their weapons."[11] In addition, 9 out of 10 soldiers in the Afghan National Army were illiterate.[13]
The Afghan Army was plagued by inefficiency and endemic corruption.[14] US training efforts were drastically slowed by the problems.[15] US trainers reported missing vehicles, weapons and other military equipment, and outright theft of fuel.[11] Death threats were leveled against US officers who tried to stop Afghan soldiers from stealing. Afghan soldiers often snipped the command wires of IEDs instead of marking them and waiting for US forces to come to detonate them. This allowed insurgents to return and reconnect them.[11] US trainers frequently removed the cell phones of Afghan soldiers hours before a mission for fear that the operation would be compromised.[16] American trainers often spent much time verifying that Afghan rosters were accurate — that they were not padded with "ghosts" being "paid" by Afghan commanders who stole the wages.[17]
US Marines and Afghan National Army soldiers take cover in Marja on 13 February 2010 during their offensive to secure the city from the Taliban.
Desertion was a significant problem. One in every four combat soldiers quit the Afghan Army during the 12-month period ending in September 2009, according to data from the US Defense Department and the Inspector General for Reconstruction in Afghanistan.[18]
An Afghan soldier surveying a valley during an anti-Taliban operation
The motto of the army was reported as “God, Country, Duty”[19]
In early 2015, Philip Munch of the Afghanistan Analysts' Network wrote that "...the available evidence suggests that many senior ANSF members, in particular, use their positions to enrich themselves. Within the ANSF there are also strong external loyalties to factions who themselves compete for influence and access to resources. All this means that the ANSF may not work as they officially should. Rather it appears that the political economy of the ANSF prevents them from working like modern organisations – the very prerequisite of the Resolute Support Mission."[20] Formal and informal income, Munch said, which can be generated through state positions, is rent-seeking – income without a corresponding investment of labour or capital. "Reportedly, ANA appointees also often maintain clients, so that patron-client networks, structured into competing factions, can be traced within the ANA down to the lowest levels. [...] There is evidence that Afghan officers and officials, especially in the higher echelons, appropriate large parts of the vast resource flows which are directed by international donors into the ANA."[21]
"Green-on-blue" or "insider attacks," in which Afghan soldiers or police officers turned their weapons on American or European counterparts, became a major concern in 2010 and peaked in 2012—when they accounted for nearly 25% of ISAF casualties—before declining during 2013–2014 as international forces withdrew from the conflict.
The scale of the insider attacks shocked CIA analysts, who could find no similar phenomenon during the Vietnam War, the Soviet–Afghan War, or any other counter-insurgency in modern history. The attacks accelerated during the Muslim holy month of Ramadan (which did not correlate with increased frequency of other kinds of militant activity in 2012) and a "copycat pattern" marked by an elevated risk of follow-up attacks within two days of the original incident was observed, but the underlying causes of this violence were debated. One theory—based on a 2011 study conducted by research psychologist Major Jeffrey T. Bordin, who interviewed Afghan and American troops regarding their perceptions of each other—posited that the insider attacks were the result of cultural incompatibility and resentment. However, a 2013 study by forensic psychiatrist Marc Sageman, a former CIA officer and academic, based on the US military's "15–6" case files and other documentary evidence, found zero insider attacks during 2012 that escalated directly from a feud or cultural misunderstanding between two officers who worked together.
While approximately 10% of the cases were linked to high-profile provocations such as the 2012 Afghanistan Quran burning protests and the Kandahar massacre, Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System intercepts showed that 56% of inside attackers interacted with the Taliban before deciding to strike, and there was circumstantial evidence of Taliban contact in a further 19% of cases. According to Sageman, the attackers were not Taliban cadres sent to infiltrate the Afghan army, but rather defectors who were persuaded to kill their erstwhile allies on their way out; to the extent that they were motivated by grievances, these were collective affronts to "Afghans" or "Muslims" as such, not personal slights, and their retaliatory violence was often indiscriminate, following the profile of a mass shooter. To reduce "green-on-blue" violence, ISAF soldiers were reminded to "respect Islam" and "avoid arrogance," armed guards were deployed as "guardian angels" to watch over joint exercises, and counterintelligence surveillance of previously vetted Afghan troops was expanded, among other preventative measures.[22]
The U.S. original targets as of April 2002 were ambitious, aiming to have 12,000 trained men ready by April 2003.[23] A few months later it became obvious that such target was never going to be met and the training schedule was revised down to 9,000 men ready by November 2003.
Among initial plans were 31 Kandaks, or battalions. At one point, 28 of 31 battalions were publicly declared as combat ready. Four regional corps headquarters were initially created, growing by 2019 to seven.
US policy called for boosting the army's size to 134,000 soldiers by October 2010. By May 2010 the Afghan Army had accomplished this interim goal and was on track to reach its ultimate number of 171,000 by 2011.[24] Actual numbers (as opposed to planned numbers) were around 164,000 in May 2011.[25] This increase in Afghan troops allowed the US to begin withdrawing its forces in July 2011.[26][27]
Determining ANSF strength is fraught with challenges. US and coalition forces rely on the Afghan forces to report their own personnel strength numbers. ..[T]he Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan.. noted that.. there is "no viable method of validating [the ANA's] personnel numbers."
It was reported in 2016 that the Afghan National Army had close to 1,000 officers with the rank of general, more than the number of generals in the United States Army.[29]
Total Afghan Armed Forces manpower was approximately 186,000 as of 2021.[44]
Human right abuses
According to American journalist Annie Jacobsen, most Afghan fighters being trained by the US habitually used opium, and it was a constant struggle to field them in a sober state. The same book claimed that rape of Afghan recruits by other Afghan soldiers occurred in US-run military facilities, undermining combat readiness. Jacobsen wrote that a 2018 report by a US inspector general noted 5,753 cases of "gross human rights abuses by Afghan forces", including "routine enslavement and rape of underage boys by Afghan commanders"[45] Partly this reporting is referring to aggravated Bacha bazi type practices, which are centuries old.
According to a 2017 report by the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), between of 2010 and 2016, the Department of Defense made 5,753 Leahy Law vetting requests for Afghan security forces.[46] The Leahy law prohibits U.S. funding of foreign security units if there are credible reports of gross violation of human rights. According to SIGAR, between 2010 and 2016, 75 allegations of gross violations of human rights by Afghan security forces, including murder and 16 cases of child sexual assault were reported to the Department of Defense. Around a dozen Afghan units accused of abuses continued to receive U.S. funding due to an exception in the law allowing funding to continue if units are deemed to be important for "national security concern."[47][48]
Sizable numbers of Afghan officers were trained in India, either at the Indian Military Academy in Dehradun, the National Defence Academy near Pune or the Officers Training Academy in Chennai. The Officers Training Academy on the other hand provided a 49-week course to graduate officer candidates. The Indian Military Academy provided a four-year degree to army officers, while the National Defence Academy provided a three-year degree after which officers undergo a one-year specialization in their respective service colleges. In 2014 the number of Afghan officers in training in India was nearly 1,100.[51]
The Afghan Air Force was relatively capable before and during the 1980s but by late 2001, the number of operational aircraft available was minimal.[52] The United States and its allies quickly eliminated the remaining strength and ability of the Taliban to operate aircraft in the opening stages of the United States invasion of Afghanistan. With the occupation of airbases by American forces it became clear how destitute the Air Force had become since the withdrawal of the Soviet Union. Most aircraft were only remnants rusting away for a decade or more. Many others were relocated to neighboring countries for storage purposes or sold cheaply. The AAF was reduced to a very small force while the country was torn by civil war. It was gradually strengthened by CSTC-A's NATO-led multinational Combined Air Power Transition Force.[53]
The United States provided billions of dollars in military aid. One package included 2,500 Humvees, tens of thousands of M16 assault rifles and body armoured-jackets. It also included the building of a national military command center as well as training compounds in several provinces of the country. The Canadian Forces supplied some surplus Canadian-made Colt Canada C7 rifles but the Afghans returned the C7 in favor of the American-made M16 rifle, because the parts of the two rifles, despite being similar, were not fully interchangeable.
Besides the United States and its allies/partners, Afghanistan increasingly turned to India and Russia for assistance. Both countries had supported the Northern Alliance, with funding, training, supplies and medical treatment of wounded fighters, against the Taliban prior to 2002. India had been reluctant to provide military aid due to fears of antagonizing its regional rival Pakistan. In 2013, after years of subtle reminders, the Afghan government sent a wish list of heavy weapons to India.The list includes as many as 150 T-72 battle tanks, 120 (105mm) field guns, a large number of 82mm mortars, one Antonov An-32 medium lift transport aircraft, two squadrons of Mil Mi-17 medium lift and Mi-35 attack helicopters, and a large number of trucks. In 2014, India signed a deal with Russia and Afghanistan where it would pay Russia for all the heavy equipment requested by Afghanistan instead of directly supplying them. The deal also includes the refurbishment of heavy weapons left behind since the Soviet war.[51][54]
The military budget reached $12 billion USD by 2011, mostly provided by aid.[55] From 2001–2021, the United States spent an estimated $83 billion on the Afghan armed forces through the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund and an additional $36 billion to support the Afghan government.[56]
As the size of the Armed Forces grew, so did the need for aircraft and vehicles. It was announced in 2011 that the Afghan Armed Forces would be provided with 145 aircraft, 21 helicopters and 23,000 vehicles.[citation needed] In 2012, Afghanistan became a major non-NATO ally of the United States. This meant the country was able to purchase and receive weapons from the United States without restrictions. In the meantime, the Afghan Air Force began seeking fighter aircraft and other advanced weapons. Defense Minister Wardak explained that "what we are asking to acquire is just the ability to defend ourselves, and also to be relevant in the future so that our friends and allies can count on us to participate in peacekeeping and other operations of mutual interest."[57]
Whatever foreign advisors perceived as the right equipment mix, Afghans wanted main battle tanks, more artillery, other heavy weapons, as well as fighter and ground attack aircraft, plus attack helicopters. Donors' protests that equipment serviceability rates were dire, and such forces implausible, did not stop the requests coming.[58]
The Military history of Afghanistan began before 1709 when the Hotaki dynasty was established in Kandahar followed by the Durrani Empire. The Afghan military was re-organized with assistance from the British in 1880, when the country was ruled by Amir Abdur Rahman Khan. It was modernized during King Amanullah Khan's rule in the early 20th century, and then during King Zahir Shah's forty-year rule; the Soviet Union supplied almost all weapons, training and military needs between the 1950s and 1970s. From 1978 to 1992, the Soviet-backed Afghan Armed Forces engaged in heavy fighting with the multi-national mujahideen groups who were then backed by the United States, Pakistan and others. After President Najibullah's resignation in 1992 and the end of Soviet support, the Afghan military dissolved into portions controlled by different factions. This era was followed by the Taliban regime, whose leaders were trained and influenced by the Pakistan Armed Forces.
The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) was a multinational military mission in Afghanistan from 2001 to 2014. It was established by United Nations Security Council Resolution 1386 according to the Bonn Agreement, which outlined the establishment of a permanent Afghan government following the U.S. invasion in October 2001. ISAF's primary goal was to train the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and assist Afghanistan in rebuilding key government institutions; it gradually took part in the broader war in Afghanistan against the Taliban insurgency.
Bagram Airfield-BAF, also known as Bagram Air Base, is located 11 kilometres (6.8 mi) southeast of Charikar in the Parwan Province of Afghanistan. It is under the Afghan Ministry of Defense. Sitting on the site of the ancient Bagram at an elevation of 1,492 metres (4,895 ft) above sea level, the air base has two concrete runways. The main one measures 3,602 by 46 metres, capable of handling large military aircraft, including the Lockheed Martin C-5 Galaxy. The second runway measures 2,953 by 26 metres. The air base also has at least three large hangars, a control tower, numerous support buildings, and various housing areas. There are also more than 13 hectares of ramp space and five aircraft dispersal areas, with over 110 revetments.
The Islamic National Army, also referred to as the Islamic Emirate Army and the Afghan Army, is the land force branch of the Afghan Armed Forces. The roots of an army in Afghanistan can be traced back to the early 18th century when the Hotak dynasty was established in Kandahar followed by Ahmad Shah Durrani's rise to power. It was reorganized in 1880 during Emir Abdur Rahman Khan's reign. Afghanistan remained neutral during the First and Second World Wars. From the 1960s to the early 1990s, the Afghan Army was equipped by the Soviet Union.
The General Command of the Air Force ,(Dari: فرماندهی کل نیروی هوایی) also referred to as the Islamic Emirate Air Force and the Afghan Air Force, is the air force branch of the Afghan Armed Forces.
The Taliban insurgency began after the group's fall from power during the 2001 War in Afghanistan. The Taliban forces fought against the Afghan government, led by President Hamid Karzai, and later by President Ashraf Ghani, and against a US-led coalition of forces that has included all members of NATO; the 2021 Taliban offensive resulted in the collapse of the government of Ashraf Ghani. The private sector in Pakistan extends financial aid to the Taliban, contributing to their financial sustenance.
Shindand Air Base is an Afghan air base located in the western part of Afghanistan in the Shindand District of Herat Province, seven miles (11 km) northeast of the city of Shindand. The runway has a concrete surface. An all-weather asphalt road connects it with the Kandahar–Herat Highway, part of Highway 1. The base is of great strategic importance because it is just 75 miles (121 km) from the border of Iran. It is capable of housing over one hundred military aircraft.
The National Military Academy of Afghanistan (NMAA) was one of three academic institutions of the Marshal Fahim National Defense University. It was a four-year military development institution dedicated to commissioning officers for the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the Afghan Air Force (AAF). The mission of the NMAA was to produce officers for the Afghan Armed Forces that also have a four-year college level bachelor's degree. The academy was based upon the United States Military Academy and United States Air Force Academy. After the fall of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan on August 15, 2021, to the Taliban, and the simultaneous collapse of the Afghan National Army and Afghan Air Force the same day, the Academy was officially shut down.
The Afghan National Police, also known as the Afghan Police, is the national police force of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, serving as a single law enforcement agency all across the country. The Afghan Border Police, which has stations along the nation's border and at major airports, is a separate component of the force. The ANP is under the responsibility of the Ministry of Interior Affairs in Kabul, Afghanistan, and is headed by Sirajuddin Haqqani. It has nearly 200,000 members as of April 2023. Although the GDI are also a part of the secret police agency of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan after the Fall of Kabul in August 2021, and the GCPSU are the special police forces.
Operation Harekate Yolo was a two-part military operation involving NATO ISAF and Afghanistan government forces against the Taliban as part of the War in Afghanistan.
The 2nd Battalion, 87th Infantry Regiment is a United States Army infantry battalion. Originally formed during World War II, the battalion took part in the Aleutian and Italian campaigns before being deactivated after the war. Later, however, it was reactivated and in recent times has served in the Sinai Peninsula and in Afghanistan.
Task Force Phoenix, or more properly known as Combined Joint Task Force Phoenix, was an international military formation. It was organized by the United States Central Command (CENTCOM) in 2003-2004 to train and mentor the newly created Afghan National Army/Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) to establish and maintain law and order throughout Afghanistan using Embedded Training Teams or ETTs.
The following addresses the events in Northern Afghanistan between April 2009 and 2014. While this part of the country had long been relatively peaceful compared to the all-out war zones of the south and east, tensions would flare up again in 2008 when the German soldiers deployed to the area came under attack more often, leading to the deaths of the several soldiers. Previously hindered by national caveats, the deteroriating security situation prompted the German-led Regional Command North to launch a series of operations to take on the rising insurgency. Concerted operations began after an insurgent attack on PRT Kunduz within minutes of German Chancellor Angela Merkel's departure from a visit. Within two years, the German presence would be doubled and additional reinforcements from the American ISAF contingent were called in, including heavy German armoured vehicles and US aviation assets, allowing for a more aggressive approach towards the insurgency.
The Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), also known as the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF), were the military and internal security forces of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan.
The NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A) was a multinational military organisation, activated in November 2009, tasked with providing a higher-level training for the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan Air Force (AAF), including defense colleges and academies, as well as being responsible for doctrine development, and training and advising Afghan National Police (ANP). The commanding officer was dual-hatted and commanded both NTM-A and Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan (CSTC-A) and reported to the Commander of ISAF.
Marshal Fahim National Defense University (MFNDU) is a military university located in Kabul, the capital city of Afghanistan. Established in 2005, the university is named after the late Marshal Mohammad Qasim Fahim, an Afghan political and military leader who served as the First Vice President of Afghanistan from 2004 until his death in 2014.
The Afghan National Army Special Operations Command was the combatant command charged with overseeing the various special warfare operations component commands of the of the Afghan National Army, established in 2011.
The Afghan Armed Forces, officially the Armed Forces of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan also referred to as the Islamic Emirate Armed Forces, is the military of Afghanistan, commanded by the Taliban government from 1997 to 2001 and since August 2021. According to Afghanistan's Ministry of Defense, its total manpower is 170,000.
The 2021 Taliban offensive was a military offensive by the Taliban insurgent group and allied militants that led to the fall of the Kabul-based Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and the end of the nearly 20-year War in Afghanistan that had begun following the United States invasion of the country. The Taliban victory had widespread domestic and international ramifications regarding human rights and proliferation of terrorism. The offensive included a continuation of the bottom-up succession of negotiated or paid surrenders to the Taliban from the village level upwards that started following the February 2020 US–Taliban deal.
The Battle of Kandahar began on 9 July 2021, as Taliban insurgents assaulted the city to capture it from the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). After heavy fighting for weeks the city's defenses had started to dissolve in August. This allowed the Taliban to enter and overrun most of the city on 12 August 2021, including the Sarposa prison, which included the release of over 1,000 prisoners, and ultimately the capture of the city. However, the siege for the nearby airport continued, where government loyalists held out until being evacuated on 16 August.
↑ SIGAR Report to Congress, January 30, 2013, pp. 73–74, cited in Cordesman, The Afghan War in 2013: Meeting the Challenges of Transition – Volume III Security and the ANSF, working draft, March 28, 2013, 58.
↑ "Briefings"(PDF). Soldiers: The Official U.S. Army Magazine. Vol.58, no.3. March 2003. p.16. Archived from the original(PDF) on 2009-04-18. Retrieved 2011-02-11.[clarification needed]
↑ "Afghanistan". The World Factbook. Central Intelligence Agency. Retrieved 2021-07-26.
↑ Annie Jacobsen, "Surprise, Kill, Vanish: The Secret History of CIA Paramilitary Armies, Operators, and Assassins," (New York: Little, Brown and Company, 2019), p. 409-411
↑ Lukas Müller (2020). Wings Over the Hindu Kush: Air Forces, Aircraft and Air Warfare of Afghanistan, 1989–2001. Asia @ War. Helion. ISBN9781913118662.
Bhatia, Michael; Sedra, Mark (2008). Afghanistan, Arms and Conflict: Armed groups, disarmament, and security in a postwar society. Abingdon: Routledge. ISBN978-0-415-47734-5.
Antonio Giustozzi (2016). The Army of Afghanistan: A Political History of a Fragile Institution. London: C Hurst & Co. ISBN9781849044813. 288 pp.; £35.00.
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