The mass media in North Korea is amongst the most strictly controlled in the world. The constitution nominally provides for freedom of speech and the press. However, the government routinely disregards these rights, and seeks to mold information at its source. A typical example of this was the death of Kim Jong Il, news of which was not divulged until two days after it occurred. Kim Jong Un, who replaced his father as the leader, has largely followed in the footsteps of both his grandfather, Kim Il Sung, and his father. However, new technologies are being made more freely available in the country. State-run media outlets are setting up websites, while mobile phone ownership in the country has escalated rapidly. "There is no country which monopolizes and controls successfully the internet and information as North Korea does," said Kang Shin-sam, an expert on North Korean technology and co-head of the International Solidarity for Freedom of Information in North Korea, a nonprofit based in South Korea. North Korea has about four million mobile-phone subscribers circa 2022—roughly one-sixth of the population and four times the number in 2012, according to an estimate by Kim Yon-ho, a senior researcher at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies.[1]
Reporters Without Borders has consistently ranked North Korea at or near the bottom of its yearly Press Freedom Index since it was first issued in 2002. The latest report, published in 2024, puts North Korea at the 177th slot out of 180.[2]
The state news agencies are the only outlets in North Korea.[3]
The late Kim Jong Il's book, The Great Teacher of Journalists, advises that "newspapers carry articles in which they unfailingly hold the president in high esteem, adore him and praise him as the great revolutionary leader".[6] Media reports in North Korea are often one-sided and exaggerated, playing "little or no role in gathering and disseminating vital information true to facts" and providing propaganda for the regime.[7]
All North Korean journalists are members of the Workers' Party.[8] Candidates for journalism school must not only prove themselves ideologically clean but also come from politically reliable families.[9] Journalists who do not follow the strict laws face punishment in the form of hard labour or imprisonment, or sometimes even execution.[8][10] Only news that favours the regime is permitted, whilst news that covers the economic and political problems in the country, or criticisms of the regime from abroad is not allowed.[11] Domestic media and the population itself are not allowed to carry or read stories by foreign media and can be punished for doing so.[8][12]
Cult of personality
Media maintains a cult of personality for the Kim family, including Kim Il Sung.
The media have consistently upheld the personality cult of the Kim family since the country's formation. It frequently reported on the activities of late leader Kim Jong Il, regularly reporting on his daily activities, including "prayers" to founding leader Kim Il Sung. Previously, media would refer to Kim Jong Il as the "Dear Leader", though this was dropped in 2004.[13] However, in January 1981, during the first few months of Kim Jong Il's entry into politics, a survey revealed economic concerns in the media, rather than upholding the cult—60% to 70% of media coverage was focused on the economy in January that year, and between January and September, 54% of editorials in the Rodong Sinmun also referred to economic problems, with only 20% on politics, 10% on reunification and 4% on foreign affairs.[14] All indications are that this has continued under the country's third and current leader, Kim Jong-un; soon after his father's death he was acclaimed as the "Great Successor".[15]
Approximately 90% of airtime on international news broadcasts in North Korea is propaganda spent describing the publication of works by Kim Jong Il and showing various study groups in foreign countries, to allegedly mislead the North Korean public as to the outside world's perceptions of the country.[16] When Kim Jong Il visited Russia in August 2001, official DPRK media reported Russians as being "awestruck" by the encounter, revering Kim Jong Il's ability to "stop the rain and make the sun come out".[17]
Domestic and international coverage
Pyongyang TV Tower
The media is used to promote contrasting domestic and international agendas. Kim Il Sung was said to recognise its power to influence North Koreans and confuse the outside world.[17] Often, the news is released to the international community and withheld from the domestic North Korean population, and other news is released domestically but not internationally.[18]
Though some international news coverage is given in DPRK media, much is ignored,[19] is mentioned very briefly,[20] or is announced several days after the event, as was the case with the Ryongchon disaster in 2004.[21][22] Reports are also notoriously secretive. The media remained silent on domestic issues, by not reporting on economic reforms introduced by the government such as increasing wages and food prices,[23] rarely mentioning Kim Jong Il until his first party position in 1980[24] and the launching of missiles.[25] Restrictions on the dissemination of information do not only apply to the civilian population but North Korean officials themselves, depending on ranking.[26]
In contrast, the idea of reunification of the two Koreas is a pervasive theme in the North Korean media,[27] as is the near-constant "threat" of an "imminent attack" by the foreign countries.[28] In recent years, the media describes in detail satellite launches launched by the country as a sign of the DPRK's "economic prowess."[28] The media rarely reports bad news from the country; however on one rare occasion, the press acknowledged a famine and food shortages in the 1990s.[29]
It has had a role in supporting anti-government demonstrations in South Korea; in the late 1980s, it launched a propaganda campaign urging South Koreans to "fight against the 'government' without concessions and compromise", using false claims to portray the demonstrations as fighting for communism, which, rather, were in support of liberal democracy.[30] It continues to support South Korean anti-government groups, quoting relevant societies and unions critical of the government policy[31] and denouncing government "crackdowns", calling for freedom of expression and democracy for South Korean citizens.[32] From January 1 to June 22, 2009, North Korean media was reported to have criticised Lee Myung-bak, then-President of South Korea 1,700 times — an average of 9.9 times daily.[33]
During the Khrushchev era of the Soviet Union when relations were tense, North Korean media would openly reprint articles critical of the USSR, often written by North Korean officials.[34] However, once relations between the DPRK and the Soviet Union improved, the articles would no longer appear.[35] In the following years, both North Korean and Soviet media would play down sensitive anniversaries.[36]
North Korea has 12 principal newspapers and 20 major periodicals, all published in Pyongyang.[37] Foreign newspapers are not sold on the streets of the capital.[38] Every year, North Korean press jointly publishes a New Year editorial, also broadcast by KCNA, which regularly attracts the attention of the international news media.[39][40][41][42]
Several newspaper journalists from North Korea were secretly trained in China to covertly report on events inside North Korea. The newspapers include restricted circulation papers such as Chamgo Sinmun[43] that is an international affairs newspaper published by the Central Committee Publications Department and distributed only to party officials. November 2007 marked the first publication of the Rimjingang magazine, which is distributed secretly in North Korea and neighbouring countries. The magazine covers the economic and political situation in the country. The journalists have also provided footage of public executions to South Korean and Japanese media.[10]
Photojournalism
Photojournalism is heavily regulated by the government. Due to the extremely limited flow of information out of the country, there is no consensus over what rules are actually in place to govern photojournalism by members of foreign press services. The government-owned Korean Central News Agency employs many photojournalists and photo editors.
North Korean leaders believe that their rules and censorship system is necessary in order to keep people under control, "to prevent the rise of criticism about the government."[44]
Television broadcasting is managed by the Central Broadcasting Committee of Korea (until 2009 called Radio and Television Committee of the DPRK). Radio and TV sets in North Korea are supplied pre-tuned to North Korean stations and must be checked and registered with the police, though some North Koreans own Chinese radios which can receive foreign stations.[11] It is prohibited to tune into foreign broadcasts. There are four major television stations: Korean Central Television, Ryongnamsan Television (former Korean Educational and Cultural Network[ko]), Kaesong Television (which targets South Korea) and Sport Television[zh] (since August 15, 2015)[45][46] State television is always off-air until its 5:00 pm evening news broadcast, except on weekends, which start at 6:00 am, and in emergency events, live events and national holidays.[47] In August 2016, North Korea introduced an over-the-topstreaming service known as Manbang (meaning "everywhere" or "every direction"), which carries live TV (including educational station Mansudae Television),[48][49] on-demand video, and newspaper articles (from the state newspaper Rodong Sinmun) over the internet.[50][48][51] KCTV described the service as a "respite from radio interference".[52]
North Korean newscasts are known for their showmanship. KCTV's principal newsreader from 1974 to 2012, Ri Chun-hee, was well known for the wavering, exuberant tone she used when praising the nation's leaders and the hateful one she used in denouncing countries seen as hostile to the regime. Some North Korean journalists who have defected to the South have noted the contrasts with the more conversational South Korean broadcasting style.[53]
Open-air television in Pyongyang
All broadcast media in some way promotes the regime's ideologies and positions, such as Juche, and regularly condemns actions by South Korea, Japan, China, Israel, the United States, and other nations. The media in recent years condemns the United Nations, and its position against the country's nuclear program. Media is generally without adverts, though some advertisement of local brands occurs on Mansudae Television.[49]
Due to the economic conditions in the country and the short broadcast day, radio is the most widely used medium. In 2006, there were 16 AM, 14 FM, and 11 shortwave radio broadcast stations. The main radio stations are the Pyongyang FM Station, Voice of Korea, and the Korean Central Broadcasting Station. There is also a black propaganda station called Propaganda Radio – which purports to be broadcasting from South Korea.[54] Some foreign broadcast radio stations that target North Korea are often jammed, though this can vary. The authorities designate such foreign media as "enemies of the regime".[11]
Some particularly politically sensitive material is available only through wired radio connections.[55] The system was likely built with infrastructure imported from the Soviet Union, which operated a similar system known as radiotochka ("radio socket" in English). The cable radio transmissions are known by North Koreans as the "Third Broadcast" or the 'Third Network.[56] It was reported that the third network was complete in 1982. After Kim Jong Un's stated the intention of improving 'wire broadcasting', the third network has seen installation in new apartment units, although in the 90s, distribution cables were apparently plundered for scrap metal.[57] Similar to the Soviet wired radio system the radio sets are technologically simple affairs with few electronic components inside them besides a loudspeaker and a control coil for the volume, they have no "off" switch but can be unplugged.[58]
South Korean television programmes cannot be received in North Korea due to incompatibilities between the television systems (PAL in North Korea and NTSC/ATSC in South Korea) and the sets being pre-tuned. South Korean soap operas, films and Western Hollywood films according to defectors, are said to be spreading at a "rapid rate" throughout North Korea despite the threat of punishment;[59] As of 2011, USB flash drives were selling well in North Korea, primarily used for watching South Korean dramas and films on personal computers.[60]
North Korean broadcasts have been picked up in South Korea,[61] and are monitored by the Unification Ministry in Seoul, which handles cross-border relations and media exchanges.[62]
Defectors are also streaming North Korean television broadcasts on the Internet.[63]
Internet access in North Korea is restricted to Internet cafés or hotels designated for foreign tourists in Pyongyang, and is limited for North Koreans to essential users like international businesses. Nearly all of North Korea's Internet traffic is routed through China.[64][65] The general population of North Korea does not have internet access, however, they do have access to Kwangmyong, an intranet set up by the government. North Korea itself has a limited presence on the internet, with several sites on their national .kp domain. The Mosquito Net filtering model used in North Korea attempts to attract foreign investment, while the filter simultaneously blocks foreign ideas.[66]
Video games
Accessibility to video games increased over the late 2000s and 2010s as mobile phones began to enter the North Korean market, with simple domestically produced mobile games becoming more common.[67] Web games developed by North Korean companies have also been developed throughout the 2010s, often with a focus on education.[68]
In September 2019 state-run media announced the release of a motion-based video game system named the Moranbong. The system appears to exhibit similar features to the Nintendo Wii and PlayStation Move. The system has two wands similar in appearance to Wii controllers, a motion detector similar in appearance to the Kinect, and a sensor-based mat that detects foot-based input.[69] The system is effectively a rebranded version of the Subor G80, a Chinese console running Android OS.[70]
Access to foreign media
Despite extremely strict regulations and draconian penalties, North Koreans, particularly elite citizens, have increasing access to news and other media outside the state-controlled media authorized by the government. While access to the internet is tightly controlled, radio, DVDs, and USB drives are common media accessed, and in border areas, television.[71][72] Penalties vary depending on the source of the media; being found with South Korean media may be punished more harshly than access to Chinese media.[73] One estimate is that approx. 92% of North Koreans access foreign media at least once a month.[74]
Telecommunications in North Korea refers to the communication services available in North Korea. North Korea has not fully adopted mainstream Internet technology due to some restrictions on foreign interventions.
The contemporary culture of North Korea is based on traditional Korean culture, but has developed since the division of Korea in 1945. Juche, officially the Juche idea, is the state ideology of North Korea; It is considered a variation of Marxist-Leninism. Juche displays Korea's cultural distinctiveness as North Korea is the creator and sole adopter of the ideology.
Let's trim our hair in accordance with the socialist lifestyle was a television program broadcast on state-run Korean Central Television in North Korea between 2004 and 2005 as part of a longstanding government propaganda against haircuts and fashions deemed at odds with "socialist values". The program claimed that long hair could adversely affect human intelligence.
Rodong Sinmun is a North Korean newspaper that serves as the official newspaper of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea. It was first published on 1 November 1945, as Chŏngro, serving as a communication channel for the North Korea Bureau of the Communist Party of Korea. It was renamed in September 1946 to its current name upon the steady development of the Workers' Party of Korea. Quoted frequently by the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) and international media, it is regarded as a source of official North Korean viewpoints on many issues.
The Down-with-Imperialism Union was allegedly founded on 17 October 1926 in Hwatian County, Kirin, China, in order to fight against Japanese imperialism and to promote Marxism–Leninism. It is considered by the Workers' Party of Korea to be its root and foundation and its creation is celebrated every year.
North Korea ranks among some of the most extreme censorship in the world, with the government able to take strict control over communications. North Korea sits at one of the lowest places of Reporters Without Borders' 2024 Press Freedom Index, ranking 177 out of the 180 countries investigated.
Propaganda is widely used and produced by the government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Most propaganda is based on the Juche ideology, veneration of the ruling Kim family, the promotion of the Workers' Party of Korea, and hostilities against both the Republic of Korea and the United States.
The Pyongyang Times is a weekly state-controlled English and French-language newspaper published in the North Korean capital, Pyongyang, by the Foreign Languages Publishing House. It is the foreign-language edition of the Pyongyang Sinmun.
Minju Choson is a state-run North Korean government newspaper. It is published in Pyongyang. It was started in 1945. It is the principal newspaper of the Cabinet of North Korea and the Standing Committee of the Supreme People's Assembly.
The Information Center on North Korea is an institution under the Ministry of Unification devoted to collect and study North Korea-related materials in South Korea. The center, located on the fifth floor of the National Library of Korea in Seoul, has a vast collection of over 100,000 North Korean publications and videos, including every edition of the Rodong Sinmun and the complete works of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il. Besides political propaganda, its collection also includes children's books, textbooks and daily artifacts. The center obtained these materials through the official liaison with Pyongyang or purchasing them from Russia and China. It is an important hub for North Korea study for researchers in and outside Korea.
Labor Hero is one of the highest titles of honor of North Korea and the highest decoration of the country overall. The award was probably scheduled for establishment in the summer of 1950, but the Korean War postponed these plans. When the war had entered a phase of stalemate along the 38th parallel, the government had time to officially launch the decoration, originally under the name Korea Hero of Labor. 16 people were decorated Labor Heroes during the war and more since then. The decoration is based on its Soviet equivalent, Hero of Socialist Labour.
Tobacco smoking is popular in North Korea and culturally acceptable among men, but not for women. As of 2019, some 43.6% of men are reported to smoke daily, whilst in contrast only 4.5% of women smoke daily, with most of these being older women from rural areas. Smoking is a leading cause of death in North Korea, and as of 2021 mortality figures indicate that 14.2% of north koreans die due to smoking-related causes, which is the 6th highest rate after China, Greenland, Kiribati, Denmark and Micronesia. There are tobacco control programs in North Korea, and although smoking was not prohibited in all public spaces, the smoking rates have declined since their peak in the 2000s.
The Propaganda and Agitation Department, officially translated as the Publicity and Information Department, is a department of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea (WPK) tasked with coordinating the creation and dissemination of propaganda in North Korea. It is the highest propaganda organization in the country.
Kim Jong Un has been the supreme leader of North Korea since the death of Kim Jong Il in 2011.
Chongnyon Jonwi is a daily newspaper in North Korea. It is the official organ of the Central Committee of the Socialist Patriotic Youth League. It is one of the three most important newspapers in the country, the other two being Rodong Sinmun and Joson Inmingun. Chongnyon Jonwi is particularly known for jointly publishing New Year editorials with the two papers under the rule of Kim Jong-il. Most of its regular articles are commentary on the contents of Rodong Sinmun from a youth perspective. The editor-in-chief is Choe Sun-chol.
The United Front Department of the Workers' Party of Korea is a department of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea (WPK) tasked with relations with South Korea. It conducts propaganda operations and espionage and manages front organizations, including the Chongryon.
The Workers' Party of Korea Publishing House is the principal publishing house of the Workers' Party of Korea (WPK) and one of the two main publishers in the country. It publishes magazines and books on politics, such as the works of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il, posters and works of fiction. The current director-general and editor-in-chief is Ri Yong-chol.
The COVID-19 pandemic in North Korea was part of a global pandemic of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19), a novel infectious disease caused by severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2). North Korea confirmed its first case on 8 May 2022.
Officially, the Workers' Party of Korea (WPK) – the ruling party of North Korea – is a communist party guided by Kimilsungism–Kimjongilism, a synthesis of the ideas of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il. The party is committed to Juche, an ideology attributed to Kim Il Sung which promotes national independence and development through the efforts of the masses. Although Juche was originally presented as the Korean interpretation of Marxism–Leninism, the party now presents it as a freestanding philosophy of Kim Il Sung. The WPK recognizes the ruling Kim family as the ultimate source of its political thought. The fourth party conference, held in 2012, amended the party rules to state that Kimilsungism–Kimjongilism was "the only guiding idea of the party". Under Kim Jong Il, who governed as chairman of the National Defence Commission, communism was steadily removed from party and state documents in favour of Songun, or military-first politics. The military, rather than the working class, was established as the base of political power. However, Kim Jong Il's successor Kim Jong Un reversed this position in 2021, replacing Songun with "people-first politics" as the party's political method and reasserting the party's commitment to communism.
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