The media of North Korea is amongst the most strictly controlled in the whole world. The constitution nominally provides for freedom of speech and the press. However, the government prohibits the exercise of these rights incoming in and out of the country, but seeks to mold information at its source. A typical example of this was the death of Kim Jong-il, news of which was not divulged until two days after it occurred. Kim Jong-un, who replaced his father as leader, has given every indication he will largely follow in his father's footsteps. However, new technologies are being made more freely available in the country. State-run media outlets are setting up websites, while mobile phone ownership in the country has escalated rapidly. “There is no country which monopolizes and controls successfully the internet and information as North Korea does,” said Kang Shin-sam, an expert on North Korean technology and co-head of the International Solidarity for Freedom of Information in North Korea, a nonprofit based in South Korea. North Korea now has about four million mobile-phone subscribers—roughly one-sixth of the population and four times the number in 2012, according to an estimate by Kim Yon-ho, a senior researcher at Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies. North Korea.[1]
Reporters Without Borders has consistently ranked North Korea at or near the bottom of its yearly Press Freedom Index since it was first issued in 2002. The latest report, published in 2020, puts North Korea at the 180th slot just below Turkmenistan, which is the lowest possible.[2]
The state news agencies are the only outlets in North Korea.[3]
The late Kim Jong-il's book, The Great Teacher of Journalists, advises that "newspapers carry articles in which they unfailingly hold the president in high esteem, adore him and praise him as the great revolutionary leader".[7] Media reports in North Korea are often one-sided and exaggerated, playing "little or no role in gathering and disseminating vital information true to facts" and providing propaganda for the regime.[8]
All North Korean journalists are members of the Workers' Party.[9] Candidates for journalism school must not only prove themselves ideologically clean, but also come from politically reliable families.[10] Journalists who do not follow the strict laws face punishment in the form of hard labour or imprisonment, even for the smallest typing errors.[9][11] Only news that favours the regime is permitted, whilst news that covers the economic and political problems in the country, or criticisms of the regime from abroad is not allowed.[12] Domestic media and the population itself are not allowed to carry or read stories by foreign media and can be punished for doing so.[9]
Restrictions are also placed on the foreign journalists that are allowed into the country under supervision, though many are not permitted to enter.[9] All the information gathered by newspapers and magazines is disseminated by the main news agency, KCNA. No private press exists.[12] The media effectively paints the country in a positive light, describing itself "paradise on earth".[13] With this, it encourages the population to adopt the "socialist lifestyle"—on one occasion an intensive media campaign was launched against men with long hair, claiming it reduces intelligence.[14]
Cult of personality
Media maintains a cult of personality for the Kim family, including Kim Il-sung
The media have consistently upheld the personality cult of the Kim family since the country's formation. It frequently reported on the activities of late leader Kim Jong-il, regularly reporting on his daily activities, frequently including "prayers" to founding leader Kim Il-sung. Previously, media would refer to Kim Jong-il as the "Dear Leader", though this was dropped in 2004.[15] However, in January 1981, during the first few months of Kim Jong-il's entry into politics, a survey revealed economic concerns in the media, rather than upholding the cult—60% to 70% of media coverage was focused on the economy in January that year, and between January and September, 54% of editorials in the Rodong Sinmun also referred to economic problems, with only 20% on politics, 10% on reunification and 4% on foreign affairs.[16] All indications are that this has continued under the country's third and current leader, Kim Jong-un; soon after his father's death he was acclaimed as the "Great Successor".[17]
Approximately 90% of airtime on international news broadcasts in North Korea is propaganda spent describing the publication of works by Kim Jong-il and showing various study groups in foreign countries, in an effort to allegedly mislead the North Korean public as to the outside world's perceptions of the country.[18] When Kim Jong-il visited Russia in August 2001, official DPRK media reported Russians as being "awestruck" by the encounter, revering Kim Jong-il's ability to "stop the rain and make the sun come out".[19]
Domestic and international coverage
Pyongyang TV Tower
The media is used to promote contrasting domestic and international agendas. Kim Il-Sung was said to recognise its power to influence North Koreans and confuse the outside world.[19] Often, news is released to the international community and withheld from the domestic North Korean population, and other news is released domestically but not internationally.[20]
Though some international news coverage is given in DPRK media, much is ignored,[21] is mentioned very briefly,[22] or is announced several days after the event, as was the case with the Ryongchon disaster in 2004.[23][24] Reports are also notoriously secretive. The media remained silent on domestic issues, by not reporting on economic reforms introduced by the government such as increasing wages and food prices,[25] rarely mentioning Kim Jong-il until his first party position in 1980[26] and the launching of missiles.[27] Restrictions on the dissemination of information do not only apply to the civilian population, but to North Korean officials themselves, depending on ranking.[28]
In contrast, the idea of reunification of the two Koreas is a pervasive theme in the North Korean media,[29] as is the near constant "threat" of an "imminent attack" by the foreign countries.[30] In recent years, the media describes in detail satellite launches launched by the country as a sign of the DPRKs "economic prowess."[30] The media rarely reports bad news from the country; however on one rare occasion, the press acknowledged a famine and food shortages in the 1990s.[31]
It has had a role in supporting anti-government demonstrations in South Korea; in the late 1980s it launched a propaganda campaign urging South Koreans to "fight against the 'government' without concessions and compromise", using false claims to portray the demonstrations as fighting for communism, which, rather, were in support of liberal democracy.[32] It continues to support South Korean anti-government groups, quoting relevant societies and unions critical of the government policy[33] and denouncing government "crackdowns", calling for freedom of expression and democracy for South Korean citizens.[34] From January 1 to June 22, 2009, North Korean media was reported to have criticised the South Korean president 1,700 times — an average of 9.9 times daily.[35]
During the Khrushchev era of the Soviet Union when relations were tense, North Korean media would openly reprint articles critical of the USSR, often written by North Korean officials.[36] However, once relations between the DPRK and Soviet Union improved, the articles would no longer appear.[37] In the following years, both North Korean and Soviet media would play down sensitive anniversaries.[38]
North Korea has 12 principal newspapers and 20 major periodicals, all published in Pyongyang.[39] Foreign newspapers are not sold on the streets of the capital.[40] Every year, North Korean press jointly publishes a New Year editorial, also broadcast by KCNA, which regularly attracts the attention of the international news media.[41][42][43][44]
Several newspaper journalists from North Korea were secretly trained in China to covertly report on events inside North Korea. November 2007 marked the first publication of the Rimjingang magazine, which is distributed secretly in North Korea and in neighbouring countries. The magazine covers the economic and political situation in the country. The journalists have also provided footage of public executions to South Korean and Japanese media.[11]
The television broadcasting is managed by the Central Broadcasting Committee of Korea (until 2009 called Radio and Television Committee of the DPRK). Radio and TV sets in North Korea are supplied pre-tuned to North Korean stations and must be checked and registered with the police, though some North Koreans own Chinese radios which can receive foreign stations.[12] It is prohibited to tune into foreign broadcasts. There are five major television stations: Korean Central TV, Mansudae Television (an educational station[45] only available via Manbang IPTV system),[46]Ryongnamsan TV[ko] (former Korean Educational and Cultural Network[ko]), Kaesong Television (which targets South Korea) and the Sport Television[zh] (since August 15, 2015)[47][48] State television is always off air until its 5:00 pm evening news broadcast, except on weekends, which start at 6:00 am, and in emergency events, live events and national holidays.[49]
North Korean newscasts are known for their showmanship. KCTV's principal newsreader from 1974 to 2012, Ri Chun-hee, was well known for the wavering, exuberant tone she used when praising the nation's leaders and the hateful one she used in denouncing countries seen as hostile to the regime. Some North Korean journalists who have defected to the South have noted the contrasts with the more conversational South Korean broadcasting style.[50]
Open air television in Pyongyang
All broadcast media in some way promotes the regime's ideologies and positions, such as Juche, and regularly condemns actions by South Korea, Japan, China, Israel, the United States, and other nations. The media in recent years condemns the United Nations, and its position against the country's nuclear program. Media is generally without adverts, though some advertisement of local brands occurs on Mansudae Television.[45]
Due to the economic conditions in the country and the short broadcast day, radio is the most widely used medium. In 2006, there were 16 AM, 14 FM and 11 shortwave radio broadcast stations. The main radio stations are Pyongyang FM Station, Voice of Korea, and the Korean Central Broadcasting Station. There is also a black propaganda station called Propaganda Radio – which purports to be broadcasting from South Korea.[51] Some foreign broadcast radio stations that target North Korea are often jammed, though this can vary. The authorities designate such foreign media as "enemies of the regime".[12]
Some particularly politically sensitive material is available only through wired radio connections.[52] The cable radio transmissions are known by North Koreans as the "Third Broadcast".[53]
South Korean television programmes cannot be received in North Korea due to incompatibilities between the television systems (PAL in North Korea and NTSC/ATSC in South Korea) and the sets being pretuned. South Korean soap operas, movies and Western Hollywood movies according to defectors, are said to be spreading at a "rapid rate" throughout North Korea despite the threat of punishment;[54] As of 2011, USB flash drives were selling well in North Korea, primarily used for watching South Korean dramas and films on personal computers.[55]
North Korean broadcasts have been picked up in South Korea,[56] and are monitored by the Unification Ministry in Seoul, which handles cross-border relations and media exchanges.[57]
Defectors are also streaming North Korean television broadcasts on the Internet.[58]
In August 2016, it was reported that North Korea had launched a state-approved video streaming service which has been likened to Netflix.[59] The service, known as Manbang (meaning "everywhere" or "every direction") uses a set-top box to stream live TV, on-demand video and newspaper articles (from the state newspaper Rodong Sinmun) over the internet.[46][60] The state TV channel KCTV described the service as a "respite from radio interference".[61]
Internet access in North Korea is restricted to Internet cafés or hotels designated for foreign tourists in Pyongyang, connected via a satellite link. A few of the government elite with state approval are connected to the internet via a link to China.[62] The general population of North Korea do not have internet access, however the people do have access to Kwangmyong, an intranet set up by the government. North Korea itself has a limited presence on the internet, with several sites on their national .kp domain. The Mosquito Net filtering model used in North Korea attempts to attract foreign investment, while the filter simultaneously blocks foreign ideas.[63]
Video Games
In September 2019 state-run media announced the release of a motion-based video game system named the Moranbong. The system appears to exhibit similar features to the Nintendo Wii and Playstation Move. The system has two wands similar in appearance to Wii controllers, a motion detector similar in appearance to the Kinect, and a sensor-based mat that detects foot-based input.[64]
Access to foreign media
Despite extremely strict regulations and draconian penalties, North Koreans, particularly elite citizens, have increasing access to news and other media outside the state-controlled media authorized by the government. While access to the internet is tightly controlled, radio, DVDs and USB drives are common media accessed, and in border areas, television.[65][66] Penalties vary depending on the source of the media; being found with South Korean media may be punished more harshly than access to Chinese media.[67] One estimate is that approx. 92% of North Koreans access foreign media at least once a month.[68]
Telecommunications in North Korea refers to the communication services available in North Korea. North Korea has not fully adopted mainstream Internet technology due to its isolationist policies.
Kim Jong-il was a North Korean politician who served as the second Supreme Leader of North Korea from 1994 to 2011. He led North Korea from the 1994 death of his father Kim Il-sung, North Korea’s first Supreme Leader, until his own death in 2011, when he was succeeded by his son, Kim Jong-un.
The Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) is the state news agency of North Korea. The agency portrays the views of the North Korean government for both domestic and foreign consumption. It was established on December 5, 1946 and now features internet coverage.
Rodong Sinmun is a North Korean newspaper that serves as the official newspaper of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea. It was first published on November 1, 1945, as Chǒngro, serving as a communication channel for the North Korea Bureau of the Communist Party of Korea. It was renamed in September 1946 to its current name upon the steady development of the Workers' Party of Korea. Quoted frequently by the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) and international media, it is regarded as a source of official North Korean viewpoints on many issues.
The Radio and Television Broadcasting Committee of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, also known as Korean Central Broadcasting Committee and Korean Central Broadcasting, is a state-owned broadcaster of North Korea.
The Down-with-Imperialism Union, or DIU, was founded on 17 October 1926 in Huadian city, Jilin province, China, in order to fight against Japanese imperialism and to promote Marxism–Leninism. It is considered to be the root and foundation of the Workers' Party of Korea and its creation is celebrated every year.
The DPR Korea Premier Football League is a North Korean association football league that serves as the top-tier of the North Korean football league system. As of the 2017–18 season, featuring thirteen teams that play a full season of home-and-away matches. The current season started on 1 December 2018 and will continue until October 2019. April 25 leads all clubs in titles, with 19.
Censorship in North Korea ranks among some of the most extreme in the world, with the government able to take strict control over communications. North Korea is ranked at the bottom of Reporters Without Borders' annual Press Freedom Index, occupying the last place in 2017.
Jang Song-thaek was a leading figure in the government of North Korea. He was married to Kim Kyong-hui, the only daughter of North Korean Premier Kim Il-sung, and only sister of North Korean general secretary Kim Jong-il. He was therefore the uncle of current leader of North Korea, Kim Jong-un.
Propaganda is widely used and produced by the government of North Korea. Most propaganda is based on the Juche ideology and on the promotion of the Workers' Party of Korea. The first syllable, "ju", means "the main or fundamental" principle; the second syllable, "che", means body or self or the foundation of something — the same as the Chinese word "ti" in the famous phrase, "Chinese learning for the foundation and European learning for application." Article 3 of the Socialist Constitution proclaims, "The DPRK is guided in its activities by the Juche idea, a world outlook centered on people, a revolutionary ideology for achieving the independence of the masses of people."
Minju Choson is a state-run North Korean government newspaper. It is published in Pyongyang. It was started in 1945. It is the principal newspaper of the Cabinet of North Korea and the Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly.
Hyon Yong-chol is a former North Korean general and Workers' Party of Korea (WPK) politician. He served as Minister of Defence from 2014 to 2015. In 2015, he was removed from his post and reportedly executed; however, reports of his execution could not be verified and are likely erroneous.
Television in North Korea is subject to the Korean Central Broadcasting Committee and controlled by the Propaganda and Agitation Department of the Workers' Party of Korea. A study in 2017 found that 98% of households had a television set.
Kim Jong-il was the Supreme Leader of North Korea from 1994 to 2011.
The Order of Kim Il-sung is the highest order of North Korea, along with the Order of Kim Jong-il, and only second to one honorary title, the Hero of Labour.
The 7th Congress of the Workers' Party of Korea (WPK), the ruling party of North Korea, was held on 6–9 May 2016.
"We Will Go to Mount Paektu" is a 2015 North Korean light music song in praise of the country's leader, Kim Jong-un.
Chongnyon Jonwi is a daily newspaper in North Korea. It is the official organ of the Central Committee of the Kimilsungist-Kimjongilist Youth League. It is one of the three most important newspapers in the country, the other two being Rodong Sinmun and Joson Inmingun. Chongnyon Jonwi is particularly known for jointly publishing New Year editorials with the two papers under the rule of Kim Jong-il. The editor-in-chief is Choe Sun-chol.
The Workers' Party of Korea Publishing House is the principal publishing house of the Workers' Party of Korea. The publishing house is under the control of the party's Propaganda and Agitation Department. It was founded in October 1945 in Pyongyang, where it is still based. It is one of the two main publishers in North Korea, the other one being the Foreign Languages Publishing House.
↑ "Chapter V. Fundamental Rights and Duties of Citizens". Archived from the original on October 15, 2009. Article 67. Citizens are guaranteed freedom of speech, of the press, of assembly, demonstration and association. The State shall guarantee conditions for the free activity of democratic political parties and social organizations.
↑ Nat Kretchun, Jane Kim (May 10, 2012). "A Quiet Opening: North Koreans in a Changing Media Environment"(PDF). InterMedia. Archived from the original(PDF) on May 12, 2012. Retrieved May 10, 2012. The primary focus of the study was on the ability of North Koreans to access outside information from foreign sources through a variety of media, communication technologies and personal sources. The relationship between information exposure on North Koreans' perceptions of the outside world and their own country was also analyzed.
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