National Resistance Front of Afghanistan

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National Resistance Front
Dari: جبهه مقاومت ملی
Pashto: د ملي مقاومت جبهه
Leader Ahmad Massoud
Head of Foreign Relations Ali Nazary
Chief of staff Qadam Shah Shahim [1]
Spokesperson Muhammad Fahim Dashti   † (17 August – 6 September 2021)
Sibghatullah Ahmadi (6 September 2021 – 8 August 2023) [2]
Dates of operation17 August 2021 – present
(4 years, 3 months, 2 weeks and 6 days)
Headquarters Dushanbe, Tajikistan (Political base)
Active regionsActive in Panjshir, Parwan, Baghlan, Wardak, Daykundi, and Samangan provinces, and reported to have expanded guerilla operations into Herat, Kabul, and Takhar provinces, Afghanistan. [3] [4]
Ideology Human rights [5]
Counter-Terrorism [6]
Democratization [7]
Decentralization [8]
Multiculturalism [9]
Social justice [10]
StatusActive
SizeUnknown; [11] NRF reported claim of 5,000 fighters [12]
AlliesState allies

Non-state allies

Opponents
Battles and wars Afghan conflict

Afghanistan–Pakistan border skirmishes

The National Resistance Front (NRF) [a] is a military organization of Afghan resistance fighters opposed to the Taliban. The group was founded by Ahmad Massoud following the fall of Kabul in August 2021 and began the republican insurgency in Afghanistan. It has been regarded as a successor to the historic anti-Taliban Northern Alliance military resistance (1996–2001).

Contents

The NRF exercised de facto control over the Panjshir Valley and was the only region out of the Taliban's control until September 2021 when the Taliban seized Panjshir, forcing NRF fighters to retreat while Massoud subsequently fled to neighboring Tajikistan. From there, he has been leading NRF operations inside Tajikistan and working to gain support from the international community. Nevertheless, the NRF continues to carry out hit and run guerilla attacks in Afghanistan against the Taliban regime, with operations reported in multiple provinces beyond its original base. [21]

The NRF's ideology consists of decentralization, and a commitment to a democratic political system that upholds human rights. [22] [23] [24] The group is composed mainly of Tajiks, Hazaras and Uzbeks with a sizeable minority of anti-Taliban Pashtuns. The NRF is also allegedly supported by Tajikistan, and by some accounts, Iran and Pakistan, all of which have a complex relationship with the Taliban.

History

View of the Panjshir valley Road Tai-Siwai Jer-Ali - panoramio.jpg
View of the Panjshir valley

A mountainous region, Panjshir was a formidable base of operations for anti-Soviet fighters and later for the original Northern Alliance. [25] [26] [27]

In July 2021, during the 2021 Taliban offensive, the remnants of the Northern Alliance began mobilizing under an umbrella. [28] [29]

On 9 September, the NRF announced that a parallel government will be created in response to the Taliban's formation of its government in Kabul. [30]

On 1 November, it was reported that the NRF has opened a liaison office in Washington, D.C. after being registered with the US Justice Department in order to carry out lobbying missions to various politicians working in the city. [31]

On 23 November, Sibghatullah Ahmadi was appointed as the new spokesman of the NRF. The position was previously held by Muhammad Fahim Dashti, who was killed during the Taliban offensive into Panjshir on 5 September. [32] Ahmadi served in this capacity until his resignation in August 2023. [33] Ali Nazary, the Head of Foreign Relations, subsequently became the most prominent and quoted spokesperson for the NRF in international forums, including the Vienna Process for a Democratic Afghanistan in 2025. [34]

On 1 September 2024, Ahmad Massoud claimed in an interview that the NRF has 5,000 fighters. [35] Massoud also highlighted the NRF's operational shift to guerrilla warfare due to the Taliban seizing approximately $8 billion worth of sophisticated U.S. military equipment during the withdrawal. [36]

Coalescence in Panjshir

When the Taliban captured Kabul on 15 August 2021, anti-Taliban forces including those of Ahmad Massoud and Amrullah Saleh moved into the Panjshir Valley, the only area of Afghanistan not controlled by the Taliban. [37]

Political rifts within the broader opposition led to the NRF and Jamiat-e Islami suspending cooperation with the National Council for the Salvation of Afghanistan in 2024. [38]

As of 17 August, the Panjshir Valley was—according to one observer—"under siege on all sides" but had not come under direct attack. [39]

On 6 September 2021, the Taliban claimed victory in controlling the province. The NRF, however, denied the Taliban victory, stating they continued to hold positions across the valley. [40] Since then, the NRF has not controlled any territory but has continued to carry out hit and run guerrilla attacks. Although the NRF claimed over 380 successful operations in 2024, analysts confirm that these remain low-intensity attacks that have not yet achieved the ability to "change the balance of power" nationally. [41] [42] The NRF sustains itself primarily through the local purchase of arms, often from corrupt Taliban officials, given the lack of direct foreign military aid. [43]

Baghlan and operational focus

On 20 August 2021, a group of anti-Taliban forces was organised in Baghlan Province, headed by Abdul Hamid Dadgar. [44]

The NRF's operational focus has consistently shifted from Panjshir towards the Andarab valley in Baghlan and surrounding Northern provinces (Parwan, Takhar). NRF leaders emphasize that these areas, due to their mountainous terrain, are crucial for sustaining the long-term guerrilla insurgency against the Taliban's administrative control. [45]

Overseas work and geopolitics

On 16 September 2022, Ahmad Massoud urged fellow Afghanstani living overseas to work together to find a way to end Taliban rule and bring them back to negotiations. [46] On 30 November – 1 December 2022, Karen Decker, charge d'affaires of the U.S. mission to Afghanistan, attended a meeting with anti-Taliban figures in Tajikistan. [47] On February 18, 2025, NRF leadership attended the fifth Vienna Process Conference for a Democratic Afghanistan in Austria, which brought together over 90 participants from anti-Taliban factions. The conference emphasized the NRF's commitment to a political solution centered on a national dialogue and a political roadmap for Afghanistan. [48]

The NRF also employs a diplomatic strategy aimed at raising international concerns over Afghanistan becoming a "global terrorist haven" under the Taliban, thereby pressuring global powers to withdraw recognition and support from the de facto authorities. [49] The Taliban's increased diplomatic activity and efforts to normalize relations with neighboring countries have complicated the NRF's ability to maintain secure "safe havens" and logistical routes in the region, particularly through Central Asian states like Tajikistan. [50]

Presence

As of late 2024, the National Resistance Front (NRF) asserts a widespread organizational and operational presence across approximately 20 provinces of Afghanistan. This presence is overwhelmingly characterized by a strategy of guerrilla (hit-and-run) attacks rather than sustained territorial control. [51] [52]

The provinces where the NRF is reported to have fighters present include Panjshir, Baghlan, Parwan, Kapisa, Badakhshan, Takhar, Kunar, Kunduz, Kabul, Laghman, Nangahar, Nuristan, Samangan, Balkh, Badghis, Ghor, Herat, Farah, Nimroz, and Sar-i-Pul. [53]

The NRF claimed to have conducted 401 targeted operations across 19 provinces from March 2024 to March 2025, claiming 651 Taliban fighters were killed. [54] Notably, the most intense operational activity remains focused on the central and northern provinces. [54] For instance, 126 of these claimed attacks were concentrated in Kabul province alone, demonstrating the NRF's focus on maintaining pressure on the capital. [54] However, analysts note that the operational tempo in the western and southern provinces (such as Farah and Nimroz) largely consists of low-intensity networking and infiltration rather than high-intensity combat. [55]

Foreign support

Iran

Since 2021, some sources have claimed that Iran has provided economic and military assistance to the NRF as a counterweight to the Islamic Emirate. Anti-Taliban commanders of the NRF like Ahmad Massoud and Amrullah Saleh have been hosted in Iran. [17] [56] However, since the re-establishment of the Islamic Emirate, Iran has been strengthening its ties with the Taliban and has declared it does not support anti-Taliban militias in Afghanistan. [57] [58] Despite its public stance, analysts suggest that Tehran maintains covert logistical support and permits the political activity of NRF leaders as a strategic "leverage card" against the Taliban, particularly regarding border and water disputes, and shared concerns over IS-KP activity. [59]

Pakistan

Since 2024, following Pakistan's fall with the Taliban, several sources have asserted that Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) established covert relations with the NRF. [60] Analysts asserted Pakistan may have been backing the NRF as payback for the Taliban backing the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). [61] This represents a significant strategic pivot where the two groups found temporary, tactical alignment against a shared enemy. [62]

During the 2025 Afghanistan–Pakistan conflict, the NRF released a statement in support of the Pakistani strikes against the Taliban. [63] The NRF itself conducted an attack on 15 October, assassinating Qari Bashir, the deputy head of the Taliban's Propagation of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice in Kunduz. [64]

Tajikistan

Tajikistan, which has officially designated the Taliban as a terrorist organization since 2021, [65] has been accused to be the main supporter of the NRF. [66] [67] Tajikistan continues to be the NRF's most critical political sanctuary, allowing the former Afghanistan embassy in Dushanbe to remain in the hands of the previous government (closely aligned with the NRF) and hosting opposition political conferences. [68] Despite pressure from both the Taliban and Russia, Tajikistan has resisted fully normalizing relations with the Islamic Emirate, maintaining the NRF as an ongoing, though undeclared, political asset. [69]

Other foreign support and funding

In the absence of direct military aid from any major state, the NRF relies on a complex network of support for its survival and operations. The primary and most stable source of financial support for the NRF comes from the Afghanistani diaspora residing in the West (US, Canada, Europe). Funds are channeled through private networks and the traditional Hawala system to finance fighter necessities and logistics. [70]

Russia tolerates the NRF's political activities as an anti-ISIS lever, while Western powers limit engagement to political dialogue (the Vienna Process), explicitly refusing to supply weapons to avoid fueling a larger civil war. [71] Countries like China, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan are strongly opposed to supporting the NRF, focusing instead on economic ties and security cooperation with the Taliban. [72]

The NRF's supply of arms depends largely on stockpiles from the previous government and purchases from the regional black market, often facilitated by corrupt Taliban personnel and smuggling networks near the Pakistan and Central Asian borders. [73]

The NRF has also formed an operational and political union with the Afghanistan Freedom Front (AFF), aimed at consolidating military efforts and presenting a more unified opposition front in political forums. [74]

Analysis

Early challenges

Following the fall of Kabul, many international observers expressed skepticism regarding the long-term viability of the NRF. Russian Ambassador to Afghanistan Dmitry Zhirnov labeled the resistance as "doomed" and that the resistance would fail, adding that they have "no military prospects". [75] According to The Economist , the resistance's cause looked "forlorn". [76]

Early concerns focused on the likelihood of NRF fighters being outmatched by the Taliban, who had captured Western-made military weapons. [77] Analyst Bill Roggio argued that the Panjshir resistance's "prospects are bleak," while Afghan specialist Gilles Dorronsoro suggested the Taliban could easily enforce a lockdown, as the NRF was not a major threat. [78]

Survival and strategic shift

Subsequent analysis in 2024–2025 challenged the initial predictions of the NRF's immediate failure. Despite the loss of territorial control, the NRF's survival demonstrated the viability of a permanent shift toward classic guerrilla warfare across multiple northern provinces. [79] This has turned the NRF into a persistent, but not existential, security challenge for the Taliban.

The move from holding territory to decentralized "hit-and-run" operations and reliance on small arms and IEDs has enabled longevity against the Taliban's heavier equipment. [80] The vital need for the NRF to act as a broad coalition (as suggested by David Loyn) was confirmed by the AFF alliance and continued political engagement in forums like the Vienna Process. [81]

Contrary to the ambassadorial dismissal, Russia's continued political tolerance for the NRF is now viewed as a calculated strategy, preserving the NRF as an "anti-ISIS leverage card" against the Taliban to serve Moscow's security interests. [82]

Military structure and operations

Following the loss of Panjshir in 2021, the NRF restructured itself into a decentralized guerrilla force estimated to consist of 2,000 to 5,000 active fighters, mainly composed of former Afghanistan Army and police personnel. [83]

The NRF is commanded by Ahmad Massoud but relies on strong regional commanders who operate with high degrees of autonomy. The primary zones of guerrilla activity are the mountainous regions of Baghlan (particularly Andarab), Takhar, Parwan, and Kapisa. [84]

Key figures include Ali Sami (Panjshir/Parwan area) and Salahuddin Ayubi (Andarabs). The military coordination council ensures operational coherence with allied groups like the AFF. [85]

The NRF's logistics are entirely dependent on financial aid from the diaspora, used to purchase small arms and ammunition from the regional black market and through corrupt Taliban personnel. [73] Reports also suggest NRF and allied forces generate limited internal funds through unofficial "taxes" or compulsory donations in their influence zones. [86]

Political platform and ideology

The NRF's political platform is centred on reversing the Taliban's centralized governance model. The NRF advocates for a non-centralized political system, with a strong preference for a federal structure to ensure equitable power distribution among Afghanistan’s diverse ethnic groups and prevent single-group dominance. [87]

The resistance insists on the establishment of a truly inclusive government that respects the democratic and civil rights of all citizens, particularly the rights of women and ethnic minorities. [88] Political figure Ali Maisam Nazary actively engages in diplomatic lobbying in Europe (such as Germany and France) and the United States, positioning the NRF as the main political alternative to the Taliban and attempting to prevent international recognition of the Islamic Emirate. [89]

Human rights context and civilian impact

The ongoing conflict in NRF operational zones has been marked by significant human rights violations directed against non-combatants, primarily by Taliban forces. [90]

International organizations have documented the Taliban's use of collective punishment against local communities in Panjshir and Andarab, including arbitrary arrests, torture, and house seizures of individuals suspected of supporting the NRF. [91] Reports highlight extrajudicial executions and forced disappearances of individuals accused of affiliation with the resistance. These security operations have also led to the internal displacement of numerous civilians from conflict-affected valleys. [92]

While NRF benefits from strong support among the ethnic groups of the former Northern Alliance, particularly the diaspora, continued operations also pose a challenge: civilians face pressure both from Taliban reprisals and the logistical demands of the guerrilla fighters. [93]

Notes

  1. ↑ Dari: جبهه مقاومت ملی; Pashto: د ملي مقاومت جبهه

References

  1. ↑ "The US Should Support the National Resistance Front of Afghanistan | Hudson Institute". www.hudson.org. 5 September 2025. The head of the NRF's military committee is former Chief of Staff of the Afghan National Army General Qadam Shah Shahim.
  2. ↑ Afghan Chronicle (8 April 2023). "Sibghatullah Ahmadi, the spokesman of the National Resistance Front of Afghanistan, resigned from his position". Twitter. Archived from the original on 30 May 2023. Retrieved 13 April 2023.
  3. ↑ "The US Should Support the National Resistance Front of Afghanistan". Hudson Institute. 5 September 2025. The NRF's operational scope has reportedly expanded beyond the traditional north-east to include attacks in eastern Afghanistan and Kabul, with recent actions noted in Herat.
  4. ↑ "Afghanistan Regional Instability Assessment 1". Institute for the Study of War . 15 November 2022. NRF activity increased in Takhar Province and expanded outside of the Andarab valley and Panjshir, indicating an effort to broaden their operational territory.
  5. ↑ "The Future of the Resistance in Afghanistan: An Interview with Ali Nazary". Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI). 24 October 2022. Nazary stated that the political objective of the NRF is a non-centralized, democratic Afghanistan that respects human rights and gender equality.
  6. ↑ "Afghanistan's National Resistance Front (NRF) and its Evolving Role Amidst Regional Dynamics". Middle East Institute (MEI). 30 March 2023. The NRF continues to position itself as a counter-terrorism bulwark, aiming to attract Western support by stressing its opposition to the Taliban and allied groups like Al-Qaeda and ISIS-K.
  7. ↑ Ali Maisam Nazary (19 August 2021). "What the Taliban Really Fear". Foreign Affairs . Archived from the original on 18 March 2023.
  8. ↑ Peter Bergen (1 September 2021). "The leader of the anti-Taliban resistance speaks out". CNN . Archived from the original on 26 May 2023.
  9. ↑ Peter Bergen (1 September 2021). "The leader of the anti-Taliban resistance speaks out". CNN . Archived from the original on 26 May 2023.
  10. ↑ Peter Bergen (1 September 2021). "The leader of the anti-Taliban resistance speaks out". CNN . Archived from the original on 26 May 2023.
  11. ↑ "Do the Taliban Face Potent Armed Resistance in Afghanistan?". VOA. 14 August 2022. Retrieved 28 April 2023.
  12. ↑ "Leader of Afghanistan's resistance movement says he will defeat the Taliban 'no matter the odds'". CNN. 1 September 2024.
  13. ↑ "Afghan resistance has sanctuary in Tajikistan, but fighting Taliban a 'non-viable prospect'". France24 . 10 October 2021. Archived from the original on 30 March 2023. Retrieved 7 December 2021.
  14. ↑ "Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan diverge on approaches to Afghanistan". eurasianet . 24 September 2021. Archived from the original on 1 February 2023.
  15. ↑ "Pakistan's Strategic Leverage and Afghanistan's Pinpoints". Modern Diplomacy.eu. 1 January 2025. The Pakistani military and intelligence agencies maintain extensive networks within Afghanistan and the Afghan diaspora, which they leverage to support resistance movements opposed to the Taliban. Groups such as the National Resistance Front (NRF), which challenge the Taliban's authority in various parts of the country, often look to Pakistan for support in their efforts.
  16. ↑ "Pakistan's Afghan dilemma: Bad options, worse outcomes". ORF Online. Pakistani media handles, believed to be acting as mouthpieces of the Pakistan Army, declared that the ISI was now engaging rag-tag Afghan resistance groups based in Tajikistan, like the National Resistance Front (NRF). They pointed to the sudden increase in activity of the NRF and other anti-Taliban groups in Afghanistan, hinting that this was, in part, because Pakistan had started backing these groups as payback for the Taliban backing the TTP.
  17. 1 2 Stone, Rupert (25 August 2022). "For Tehran, Afghanistan is a problem not an opportunity". Middle East Eye. Archived from the original on 27 August 2022.
  18. ↑ Ahmad Sayer Daudzai (1 August 2024). "Iran strives to become a pan-sectarian Islamic power". Middle East Institute.
  19. ↑ "چرا ایران از احمد مسعود فرمانده جبهه مقاومت افغانستان حمایت نمی‌کند؟" [Why doesn't Iran support Ahmad Massoud, commander of the Afghan Resistance Front?]. Rouydad 24 (in Persian). Retrieved 7 June 2023.
  20. ↑ "Political figures' council denies formal talks with Taliban". Amu TV. 12 October 2024. Retrieved 25 November 2024.
  21. ↑ "The US Should Support the National Resistance Front of Afghanistan". Hudson Institute. 5 September 2025. The NRF's operational scope has reportedly expanded beyond the traditional north-east to include attacks in eastern Afghanistan and Kabul, with recent actions noted in Herat.
  22. ↑ "The Future of the Resistance in Afghanistan: An Interview with Ali Nazary". Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI). 24 October 2022. Nazary stated that the political objective of the NRF is a non-centralized, democratic Afghanistan that respects human rights and gender equality.
  23. ↑ "The National Resistance Front of Afghanistan: Seeking a Path Forward". United States Institute of Peace (USIP). 10 October 2023. Massoud has publicly called for the reestablishment of a democratic system based on the 2004 Constitution, albeit with amendments to ensure greater decentralization.
  24. ↑ "Afghanistan's National Resistance Front (NRF) and its Evolving Role Amidst Regional Dynamics". Middle East Institute (MEI). 30 March 2023. The NRF continues to position itself as a counter-terrorism bulwark, aiming to attract Western support by stressing its opposition to the Taliban and allied groups like Al-Qaeda and ISIS-K.
  25. ↑ Graham-Harrison, Emma (18 August 2021). "'Panjshir stands strong': Afghanistan's last holdout against the Taliban". The Guardian . Archived from the original on 24 May 2023. Retrieved 19 August 2021.
  26. ↑ Peter Bergen (1 September 2021). "The leader of the anti-Taliban resistance speaks out". CNN . Archived from the original on 26 May 2023.
  27. ↑ "The mujahideen resistance to the Taliban begins now. But we need help". Washington Post . 18 August 2021. Archived from the original on 12 May 2023. Retrieved 18 August 2021.
  28. ↑ Brick Murtazashvili, Jennifer (28 July 2021). "Northern Afghanistan once kept out the Taliban. Why has it fallen so quickly this time?". The Washington Post . Archived from the original on 16 August 2021. Retrieved 17 August 2021.
  29. ↑ Chaudhury, Dipanjan Roy (13 July 2021). "Northern Alliance plans to regroup: Resistance leaders seek arms to fight Taliban in Northern Afghanistan". The Economic Times . Archived from the original on 13 July 2021. Retrieved 17 August 2021.
  30. ↑ "Panjshir resistance to declare parallel govt in Afghanistan". 9 September 2021. Archived from the original on 18 June 2022.
  31. ↑ Gul, Ayaz (1 November 2021). "Anti-Taliban Group Registers with US to Try to Build Afghan Resistance". Voice of America . Archived from the original on 2 January 2023.
  32. ↑ "NRF introduces its new spokesperson". Aamaj News. 23 November 2021. Archived from the original on 5 February 2023. Retrieved 25 November 2021.
  33. ↑ "Sibghatullah Ahmadi Resigns from NRF Spokesperson Role". Khaama Press. 8 August 2023.
  34. ↑ "Anti-Taliban groups conclude fifth Vienna Conference". The Long War Journal. 4 March 2025.
  35. ↑ "The Taliban resistance lives on in the Lion of Panjshir's son". Responsible Statecraft. 10 September 2024.
  36. ↑ . VOA. 5 December 2023 https://www.voanews.com/a/afghan-insurgent-groups-step-up-attacks-political-campaign-against-taliban-/7386099.html . Retrieved 12 December 2023.{{cite web}}: Missing or empty |title= (help)
  37. ↑ "Defiant Afghan ex-vp vows new fight with Taliban". Digital Journal. AFP. 17 August 2021. Archived from the original on 15 March 2023. Retrieved 17 August 2021.
  38. ↑ . VOA. 5 December 2023 https://www.voanews.com/a/afghan-insurgent-groups-step-up-attacks-political-campaign-against-taliban-/7386099.html . Retrieved 12 December 2023.{{cite web}}: Missing or empty |title= (help)
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  40. ↑ Robertson, Nic; Kohzad, Nilly; Lister, Tim; Regan, Helen (6 September 2021). "Taliban claims victory in Panjshir, but resistance forces say they still control strategic position in the valley". CNN . Archived from the original on 27 May 2023. Retrieved 6 September 2021.
  41. ↑ Dawi, Akmal (20 December 2022). "Frustrated with the Taliban, US Officials Meet Anti-Taliban Figures". Voice of America . Archived from the original on 26 May 2023. Retrieved 30 December 2022. The NRF has executed hit-and-run attacks against the Taliban in some parts of Afghanistan but has not been able to hold territory.
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  44. ↑ "Anti-Taliban militia take hold of Baghlan province" . The Independent. 20 August 2021. Archived from the original on 18 June 2022.
  45. ↑ "Afghanistan Regional Instability Assessment 1". Institute for the Study of War . 15 November 2022. NRF activity increased in Takhar Province and expanded outside of the Andarab valley and Panjshir, indicating an effort to broaden their operational territory.
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  48. ↑ "Anti-Taliban groups conclude fifth Vienna Conference". The Long War Journal. 4 March 2025.
  49. ↑ "Future of Afghan Resistance After the Taliban Takeover". George Mason University . 20 March 2024.
  50. ↑ "Tajikistan's Tightrope Walk with the Taliban". Carnegie Endowment for International Peace . 15 November 2024.
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  53. ↑ "The US Should Support the National Resistance Front of Afghanistan | Hudson Institute". 10 September 2024.
  54. 1 2 3 ڈیسک, ویب (18 September 2025). "درگیری میان جبهۀ مقاومت ملی و طالبان: یک چالش مداوم". Khabar Kada (in Dari). Retrieved 6 December 2025.
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  56. ↑ "The Future of the Resistance in Afghanistan: An Interview with Ali Nazary". Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI). 24 October 2022. Nazary stated that the political objective of the NRF is a non-centralized, democratic Afghanistan that respects human rights and gender equality.
  57. ↑ "Iran strives to become a pan-sectarian Islamic power". Middle East Institute. Retrieved 6 December 2025.
  58. ↑ جمشید یما امیری (2 February 2025). "چگونه جمهوری اسلامی نزدیک‌ترین دوست طالبان شد؟" [How did the Islamic Republic become the Taliban's closest friend?]. Afghanistan International (in Persian).
  59. ↑ "Iran's Afghanistan Policy: Balancing Pragmatism and Ideology". Middle East Institute. 15 April 2025.
  60. ↑ "Pakistan's Strategic Leverage and Afghanistan's Pinpoints". Modern Diplomacy.eu. 1 January 2025. The Pakistani military and intelligence agencies maintain extensive networks within Afghanistan and the Afghan diaspora, which they leverage to support resistance movements opposed to the Taliban. Groups such as the National Resistance Front (NRF), which challenge the Taliban's authority in various parts of the country, often look to Pakistan for support in their efforts.
  61. ↑ "Pakistan's Afghan dilemma: Bad options, worse outcomes". ORF Online. Pakistani media handles, believed to be acting as mouthpieces of the Pakistan Army, declared that the ISI was now engaging rag-tag Afghan resistance groups based in Tajikistan, like the National Resistance Front (NRF). They pointed to the sudden increase in activity of the NRF and other anti-Taliban groups in Afghanistan, hinting that this was, in part, because Pakistan had started backing these groups as payback for the Taliban backing the TTP.
  62. ↑ "Pakistan and Afghan Resistance: A Strategic Pivot?". Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. 12 January 2025.
  63. ↑ @NRF_Pashto (10 October 2025). "د افغانستان ملي مقاومت جبهه په کابل او پکتیا ولایتونو د پاکستان هوايي بریدونه ستایي او ملاتړ یې کوي. د نړۍوال قانون او اصولو په اساس پاکستان حق لري چې په افغانستان کې ترهګر په نښه کړي او خپل ولس ته ډاډمن امنیت تضمین کړي" [The National Resistance Front applauds and supports Pakistan's airstrikes in Kabul and Paktia provinces. According to international law and principles، Pakistan has the right to target terrorists in Afghanistan and ensure the security of its people.] (Tweet) – via Twitter.
  64. ↑ "جبهه‌های آزادی و مقاومت از 'کشتن دو مقام طالبان' در قندوز خبر دادند". Afghanistan International (in Persian). 16 October 2025. Retrieved 6 November 2025.
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  85. ↑ "Key NRF Military Commanders Mapped". Afghanistan International. 1 May 2024.
  86. ↑ "Local Resistance Groups Resort to Unofficial Taxes". Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. 1 May 2025.
  87. ↑ "The Future of Afghanistan: Federalism and the Resistance". Middle East Institute. 15 November 2024.
  88. ↑ "NRF's Vision for Afghanistan: A Decentralized State". Afghanistan International. 1 November 2024.
  89. ↑ "Afghan Resistance Boosts Diplomatic Efforts in Europe". Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. 12 January 2025.
  90. ↑ "Afghanistan: Taliban Abuses Continue in Resistance Areas". Human Rights Watch. 12 March 2025.
  91. ↑ "Afghanistan: Torture and Abuses Mount in Resistance Zones". Amnesty International. 24 February 2025.
  92. ↑ "Afghanistan's Security Challenges Under Taliban Rule". International Crisis Group. 24 February 2025.
  93. ↑ "The Heavy Burden of Supporting the Afghan Resistance". Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. 1 May 2025.
  94. Dikshit, Sandeep (18 August 2021). "Afghan crisis: Panjshiris remain defiant, claim Uzbek leader Dostum's support". The Tribune . Archived from the original on 19 August 2021. Retrieved 19 August 2021.
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