Dubbed the "King of Cocaine", Escobar was among the wealthiest criminals of his era. Contemporary Forbes lists—drawing partly on law-enforcement intelligence—placed his 1987 cash flow at least US$3billion and his net worth at over US$2billion, with later mentions declining to about US$1billion by 1993.[6][7]
Born in Rionegro and raised in Medellín, Escobar briefly attended the Universidad Autónoma Latinoamericana of Medellín but left without graduating.[1][4] He became involved in petty crime during his youth, including selling contraband cigarettes, forging lottery tickets, and stealing cars.[8][5] By the early 1970s, Escobar was working for established smugglers and occasionally engaged in kidnappings for ransom.[1]
Although journalistic accounts have alleged ties to the governments of Nicaragua and Cuba, and occasional use of guerrilla groups such as the ELN, scholarly studies emphasize Escobar's reliance on his own sicario networks for bombings, assassinations, and coercion.[4][1] Claims that his U.S. operations "created exponential demand" for cocaine, or that he personally directed monthly shipments of 70–80 tons, are widely repeated in popular media but not supported by academic or official consumption estimates, which placed total cocaine imports into the United States in the 1980s at several hundred tons annually.[9]
Escobar nonetheless amassed enormous wealth: Forbes magazine listed him among the world’s billionaires in the late 1980s.[6] His fortune and political power fueled violent conflicts with rival cartels and the Colombian state, resulting in massacres and the assassinations of judges, politicians, police officers, and civilians.[1][2]
In the 1982 Colombian parliamentary election, Escobar was elected as an alternate member (suplente) of the Chamber of Representatives for the Liberal Party.[4][1] During this period, he financed community projects—including housing developments such as the neighborhood later known as Barrio Pablo Escobar, as well as football pitches and public works—which increased his popularity in Medellín’s working-class comunas.[10][8] Escobar's political career ended in 1983 after Rodrigo Lara Bonilla, then Minister of Justice, publicly denounced him for his involvement in drug trafficking and alleged cartel financing of political campaigns.[4][1][3] Following Lara's statements, both the Colombian government and the United States increased pressure on Escobar, and his links to organized crime became a matter of national and international scrutiny.[4][1]
Escobar is widely believed to have ordered the 1989 bombings of Avianca Flight 203 and the DAS headquarters in Bogotá, attacks that killed over 100 people.[1][11] In 1991, he surrendered to authorities under an agreement with President César Gaviria that barred his extradition to the United States. He was confined in a luxury facility he built, known as La Catedral.[1] In 1992, after officials attempted to transfer him to a regular prison, Escobar escaped, prompting a nationwide manhunt.[1] The Medellín Cartel fragmented following his disappearance, and on 2 December 1993, one day after his 44th birthday, Escobar was killed in Medellín by the Colombian National Police.[12]
Escobar's legacy remains deeply controversial. Many Colombians denounce the violence and corruption he unleashed, while residents of Medellín’s working-class comunas sometimes remembered him as a "Robin Hood" figure because he financed housing projects, sports facilities, and local infrastructure.[4][10][13] Scholars note that such philanthropy also functioned as a means of building political capital and community protection for his organization.[13] His death was followed by a large public turnout; more than 25,000 people attended his funeral in Medellín.[1]
His former estate, Hacienda Nápoles, has since been converted into a safari-style theme park and tourist attraction.[14] Escobar's life has been widely dramatized in popular culture, inspiring films, television series such as Narcos, music, and literature examining the rise of so-called "Narcoculture".[15]
Early life
The city of Medellín, where Escobar grew up and began his criminal career
Pablo Emilio Escobar Gaviria was born on 1 December 1949 in Rionegro, Antioquia Department. He belonged to the Paisa ethnic subgroup. His family was of Spanish origin, specifically from the Basque Country, and also had Italian roots.[16] He was the third of seven children and grew up in poverty, in the neighboring city of Medellín. His father was a small farmer and his mother was a teacher. Escobar left high school in 1966 just before his 17th birthday, before returning two years later with his cousin Gustavo Gaviria. Escobar and his cousin Gustavo Gaviria returned to secondary school in the mid-1960s but struggled with discipline and eventually dropped out again after more than a year.[10] Accounts from teachers and classmates describe them as disruptive and prone to intimidation of peers, reflecting early patterns of defiance toward authority.[4]
Although formal studies were brief, Escobar reportedly aspired to become a lawyer and politician, at times expressing ambitions of the presidency. Using a forged high school diploma, he enrolled for a short period at the Universidad Autónoma Latinoamericana in Medellín, but financial constraints forced him to abandon these plans.[1][8]
Accounts of Escobar’s early criminal activities vary, but multiple sources describe his involvement in small-scale contraband and fraud. According to police records and later testimonies, he profited by reselling stolen tombstones that had been sandblasted to remove inscriptions, later sold to smugglers.[17]
After leaving secondary school, Escobar entered Medellín’s car-theft underworld, later expanding into violent crimes such as kidnappings for ransom. One of the most prominent victims was businessman Diego Echavarría Misas, abducted in 1971 and killed despite ransom payments. Escobar’s role remains debated, but contemporary investigations placed him within the network responsible.[18][19]
Formation of the Medellín Cartel (mid–late 1970s)
In 1976, Escobar was arrested by the Administrative Department of Security (DAS) with 39 kilograms of cocaine hidden in his car. He was quickly released after judicial bribery, and the lead officer in the case was later murdered.[20]
That same decade, Escobar partnered with the Ochoa brothers, Carlos Lehder, and Gonzalo Rodríguez Gacha, creating what became known as the Medellín Cartel. This loose syndicate drew on existing smuggling networks in Antioquia and Medellín to scale up cocaine trafficking.[21]
Lehder pioneered routes through the Bahamas, using Norman’s Cay as a fortified trans-shipment hub for multi-ton shipments into Florida. By 1978–79, cartel networks were moving cocaine via fleets of small aircraft, go-fast boats, and shipping containers, coordinating with U.S.-based criminal groups.[22]
Profits surged into the hundreds of millions annually. Escobar invested in Antioquia, purchasing the 20 km² estate Hacienda Nápoles, which featured a private airstrip, bullring, zoo, and sculpture gardens.[23] He simultaneously developed the “plata o plomo” (“silver or lead”) strategy: public officials were bribed to cooperate, and those who refused were assassinated.[24]
Escobar vs. the State (1982–1989)
Political entry and break with the state (1982–1984)
In 1982, Escobar was elected as an alternate member of the Colombian Chamber of Representatives for the Liberal Party. He funded housing and sports projects in Medellín’s poor districts, earning the nickname “Robin Hood Paisa.”[25]
In 1983, Minister of Justice Rodrigo Lara Bonilla denounced him as a trafficker. Liberal leader Luis Carlos Galán expelled Escobar from the New Liberalism movement, and in January 1984 he resigned his seat.[26]
On 30 April 1984, Lara was assassinated by cartel gunmen, marking the beginning of open conflict between Escobar and the Colombian state.[27]
Extradition conflict and the Palace of Justice siege (1984–1986)
Escobar and allies formed Los Extraditables, issuing threats against those supporting extradition to the United States.[28]
On 6–7 November 1985, the M-19 guerrilla stormed the Palace of Justice in Bogotá, taking hostages and demanding a trial of President Belisario Betancur. The Army retook the building in an assault that left over 100 dead, including 11 Supreme Court justices.[29]
Allegations persist that Escobar financed the operation to destroy extradition files, but evidence is inconclusive. A 1986 tribunal report found no proof, and the 2009–2010 Truth Commission judged his involvement “plausible but unproven.”[30]
In 1986, Colombia’s Supreme Court invalidated the 1979 U.S.–Colombia extradition treaty, though President Virgilio Barco Vargas later reinstated it.[31]
Political assassinations and terror campaign (1987–1989)
From 1987, Escobar escalated violence into a campaign of assassinations and bombings.[32]
On 18 August 1989, presidential frontrunner Luis Carlos Galán was assassinated at a rally by cartel gunmen.[33]
On 27 November 1989, Avianca Flight 203 was bombed, killing 107 people including two U.S. citizens. Authorities widely attributed the attack to Escobar, though judicial proceedings never conclusively proved his responsibility.[34] The bombing drew greater U.S. involvement in Colombian counter-narcotics operations.[35]
Surrender, La Catedral, and escape (1990–1992)
By 1990–91, Colombian authorities pursued partial surrender agreements. The 1991 Constitution banned extradition of Colombian nationals, widely seen as a concession to trafficker pressure.[36]
On 19 June 1991, Escobar surrendered under terms allowing confinement in La Catedral, a prison he designed. The facility included luxuries such as a football pitch and bar, and guards were handpicked by Escobar.[37]
From La Catedral, Escobar continued directing operations. In July 1992, after the murder of two associates inside the prison, the government ordered his transfer to a conventional facility. Forewarned, he escaped on 22 July 1992, initiating a nationwide manhunt.[38]
Death and collapse of the Medellín Cartel (1993)
Following his escape, Colombian security forces, with U.S. DEA and CIA assistance, intensified operations against him. A vigilante group known as Los Pepes (Los Perseguidos por Pablo Escobar) also targeted his associates and assets.[39]
On 2 December 1993, Escobar was located in Medellín’s Los Olivos neighborhood. Surrounded by police, he attempted to flee across rooftops but was shot and killed. Debate persists over whether the fatal shot was fired by police or self-inflicted.[40]
Escobar’s death marked the collapse of the Medellín Cartel. Its surviving elements were absorbed by the Cali Cartel and later the North Valley Cartel. Analysts note that while Medellín’s dominance ended, Colombia’s role in the cocaine trade persisted through more decentralized networks.[41]
Aftermath and legacy
Fragmentation of Medellín cartel
Following Escobar’s killing in December 1993, the Medellín cartel rapidly disintegrated. By the mid-1990s, the rival Cali Cartel assumed dominance of the cocaine trade until its leadership was dismantled between 1995 and 1998.[12][42]
Public image and funeral
Escobar’s cultivated “Robin Hood” image retained influence in parts of Medellín, where some residents remembered his charitable works. An estimated 25,000 people attended his funeral at Montesacro Cemetery, reflecting his polarizing legacy as both trafficker and benefactor.[42] Reports of popular veneration—including prayers to Escobar as a quasi-folk saint—remain contested and largely anecdotal.[43]
Legal and political revelations
Virginia Vallejo testimony
In July 2006, journalist Virginia Vallejo, a former partner of Escobar, offered testimony to Colombian authorities in the reopened case against ex–justice minister Alberto Santofimio Botero, alleging that he had encouraged Escobar to order the 1989 assassination of presidential candidate Luis Carlos Galán.[44][45] Portions of Vallejo’s taped declaration aired on Colombian television (RCN) in 2006–2007, drawing wide public attention.[46]
Vallejo’s testimony became one element in a complex evidentiary record that also included statements by former Medellín Cartel member Jhon Jairo Velásquez (“Popeye”) and other materials evaluated by the courts. In 2007 a specialized criminal court convicted Santofimio of homicidio con fines terroristas and sentenced him to 24 years’ imprisonment;[47][48] the Tribunal Superior de Cundinamarca reversed on appeal in 2008,[49] but on 31 August 2011 the Supreme Court of Colombia (Sala de Casación Penal) set aside the acquittal and reinstated the 24-year sentence in Radicado 31761.[50][51] Contemporary coverage and later court relatorías confirm the Supreme Court’s action and the legal characterization of the crime as terrorist homicide.[52][53]
Scholars and legal observers note that while Vallejo’s statements were influential, the Supreme Court’s 2011 ruling rested on the totality of the evidence and the Court’s reassessment of credibility and corroboration across witnesses; it did not hinge solely on a single testimony.[54] Vallejo subsequently cooperated as a witness in other high-profile cases and relocated to the United States with assistance facilitated by U.S. authorities for security reasons.[55][56]
Palace of Justice siege
On 6–7 November 1985, M-19 guerrillas seized Colombia’s Palace of Justice in Bogotá, taking scores of hostages, including members of the Supreme Court. The army’s retaking of the building resulted in a fire and heavy casualties; over 100 people were killed, including 11 Supreme Court justices, along with guerrillas and civilians.[57][58]
The Truth Commission on the Palace of Justice (2010) concluded that the M-19 bore responsibility for initiating the unlawful attack and taking hostages, and that during the subsequent retoma state forces committed serious human-rights violations, including enforced disappearances of individuals who had exited the building alive.[59] In 2014, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights held Colombia internationally responsible for enforced disappearances, torture, and related violations committed by state agents during and after the retaking operation, ordering reparations.[60]
Colombian courts have reached mixed outcomes in individual criminal cases arising from the siege. Gen. (r) Jesús Armando Arias Cabrales, commander of the 13th Brigade during the retoma, was convicted for aggravated enforced disappearance and ultimately saw his 35-year sentence upheld on cassation by the Supreme Court in 2019 (later procedural petitions for review were denied).[61][62] By contrast, Col. (r) Luis Alfonso Plazas Vega—initially convicted in 2010—was acquitted by the Supreme Court in 2015 for lack of proof tying him to disappearances, illustrating the evidentiary challenges that have characterized the case.[63][64]
Several journalists and witnesses—including Vallejo—have alleged that Escobar or the Medellín Cartel helped finance the M-19 operation to pressure the Supreme Court on extradition; Vallejo has publicly claimed Escobar mentioned providing around US$2 million in cash, arms, and explosives.[65][66] However, no Colombian court or the Inter-American Court has issued a final judgment establishing Escobar’s direct financing of the siege as a proven fact; the 2010 Truth Commission report details M-19 planning, weapon sources (including Central American channels), and state abuses but does not make a definitive judicial finding on cartel funding.[67] Academic and human-rights analyses therefore treat cartel-financing claims as plausible but unproven, distinct from the established findings regarding M-19’s responsibility for the unlawful seizure and the state’s responsibility for disappearances and other violations during the retoma.[68]
Family
Escobar married María Victoria Henao in 1976; they had two children, Juan Pablo (later Sebastián Marroquín) and Manuela.[42] Henao and her children fled Colombia in 1995, later settling in Argentina under assumed identities. She was charged with money-laundering in 2018 but denied wrongdoing.[69]
Juan Pablo Escobar has published memoirs and appeared in the documentary *Sins of My Father* (2009), seeking reconciliation with victims’ families.[70] His writings denounce his father’s violence.[71]
Other relatives, including his sister Luz María Escobar, have organized symbolic gestures of reconciliation, such as public memorials for victims.[72]
Religion
Escobar was raised Roman Catholic, a common background in mid-20th century Antioquia. Accounts of his adult religiosity vary: some clergy described him as outwardly devout, while others emphasized the dissonance between his religious observances and his criminal activity.[73]
Properties and legacy
Hacienda Nápoles and hippos
Escobar’s principal estate, Hacienda Nápoles, was located outside Puerto Triunfo, Antioquia. The 7.7 square mile property included a colonial-style mansion, private airstrip, bullring, sculpture garden, artificial lakes, and a zoo with hundreds of exotic animals ranging from elephants and giraffes to ostriches and hippopotamuses imported from Africa.[74] The estate became a symbol of Escobar’s excess and was used for cartel meetings, smuggling operations, and demonstrations of wealth.
Following Escobar’s death in 1993, the estate was seized under Colombia’s Extinción de Dominio asset-forfeiture laws. After years of abandonment and looting, parts of the property were redeveloped into a family-oriented theme park, featuring a water park, museum spaces, and memorials to Escobar’s victims. Authorities have emphasized the park’s repurposing as part of Medellín and Antioquia’s broader strategy to discourage narco-tourism and redefine Escobar’s legacy.[75]
Among Hacienda Nápoles’ most lasting legacies were four hippopotamuses imported in the 1980s for Escobar’s private zoo. After his death, the animals were left unattended because of the logistical and financial challenges of relocation. By the early 2000s, they had reproduced and dispersed along the Magdalena River basin, creating the first known feral population of hippos outside Africa.[76]
Surveys in the 2010s estimated at least 40 individuals; by the early 2020s, estimates ranged from 80–120, with population models warning that numbers could exceed 1,000 by 2050 if unmanaged.[77]
Ecologists and the Colombian government have expressed concern that the hippos pose significant risks to native biodiversity, including competition with manatees and capybaras, alteration of aquatic vegetation, and potential pathogen transmission. However, local communities and parts of the Colombian public often view the hippos as charismatic and beneficial for tourism, complicating management efforts.[78]
Authorities have attempted varied strategies including surgical sterilization, dart-delivered contraceptives, and selective culling, but each approach has faced logistical, financial, and political obstacles.[79] In 2023, Colombian officials proposed relocating dozens of hippos to sanctuaries in Mexico and India, though the plan raised questions about feasibility and ecological ethics.[80]
The Escobar hippos remain one of the world’s most unusual cases of invasive megafauna, illustrating the long-term environmental consequences of narco-era extravagance.
Other properties
Escobar’s properties outside Hacienda Nápoles also became focal points for debate over memory and narco-tourism.
The six-story Edificio Mónaco in Medellín’s El Poblado district, initially built for Escobar’s family, was gutted by a Cali Cartel car bomb in 1988. It remained abandoned for decades but drew foreign tourists seeking Escobar’s legacy. On 22 February 2019, city authorities demolished the structure at the urging of Mayor Federico Gutiérrez, replacing it with a park commemorating thousands of cartel victims, including four presidential candidates and more than 500 police officers. President Iván Duque stated the demolition was intended “not to glorify the perpetrators, but to honor the victims,” underscoring Medellín’s efforts to distance itself from Escobar’s image.[81]
Escobar also owned a 6,500-square-foot waterfront mansion on North Bay Road in Miami Beach, Florida. Built in 1948, the home was seized by the U.S. federal government in the 1980s and demolished in 2016.[82]
He maintained a Caribbean retreat on Isla Grande, the largest of the Islas del Rosario near Cartagena, which included a mansion, swimming pool, and helicopter pad. After his death, the compound was abandoned and fell into disrepair.[83]
Escobar Inc
In 2014, Roberto Escobar and Swedish associate Olof K. Gustafsson founded Escobar Inc in the United States, asserting “successor-in-interest” claims to Pablo Escobar’s name and likeness.[84]
Pablo Escobar: My Father (2016), by Juan Pablo Escobar, translated by Andrea Rosenberg.[90]
Pablo Escobar: Beyond Narcos (2016), by Shaun Attwood, tells the story of Escobar and the Medellín Cartel in the context of the failed War on Drugs; ISBN978-1537296302
Manhunters: How We Took Down Pablo Escobar (2019), by Stephen Murphy and Javier F. Peña, former DEA agents on the hunt for Pablo Escobar in the 1990s.[91]
American Made: Who Killed Barry Seal? Pablo Escobar or George HW Bush (2016), by Shaun Attwood, tells Pablo's story as a suspect in the murder of CIA pilot Barry Seal; ISBN978-1537637198
News of a Kidnapping, (original Spanish title: Noticia de un secuestro) non-fiction 1996 book by Gabriel García Márquez, and published in English in 1997.
Films
Two major feature films on Escobar, Escobar (2009) and Killing Pablo (2011), were announced in 2007.[92] Details about them, and additional films about Escobar, are listed below.
Blow, a 2001 American biographical film based on George Jung, a member of the Medellín Cartel; Escobar was portrayed by Cliff Curtis.
Pablo Escobar: The King of Coke (2007) is a TV movie documentary by National Geographic, featuring archival footage and commentary by stakeholders.[93][94]
Escobar (2009) was delayed because of producer Oliver Stone's involvement with the George W. Bush biopic W. (2008). As of 2008, the release date of Escobar remained unconfirmed.[when?][95] Regarding the film, Stone said: "This is a great project about a fascinating man who took on the system. I think I have to thank Scarface, and maybe even Ari Gold."[96]
Killing Pablo (2011) was supposedly in development for several years, directed by Joe Carnahan. It was to be based on Mark Bowden's 2001 book of the same title, which in turn was based on his 31-part Philadelphia Inquirer series of articles on the subject.[88][89] The cast was reported to include Christian Bale as Major Steve Jacoby and Venezuelan actor Édgar Ramírez as Escobar.[97][98] In December 2008, Bob Yari, producer of Killing Pablo, filed for bankruptcy.[99]
Escobar: Paradise Lost (2014) a romantic thriller in which a naive Canadian surfer falls in love with a girl who turns out to be Escobar's niece.
American Made (2017), American action-comedy film loosely based on the life of Barry Seal; Escobar was portrayed by Mauricio Mejía.[101]
Weird: The Al Yankovic Story (2022), American biopic parody loosely based on the life of "Weird Al" Yankovic; Arturo Castro portrays Escobar who is depicted as a Weird Al fan who kidnaps Weird Al's girlfriend, Madonna, to lure him to play at his fortieth birthday party. Weird Al instead murders him.
Escobar served as the basis for four action films in the 1990s.
Street Fighter (1994), an adoption of the video game franchise whose main villain, M. Bison, has a drug kingpin/terrorist background similar to Escobar.
Con Air (1997) featured a major antagonist named Francisco Cindino, whose actor, Jesse Borrego, studied Escobar for the role.
Face/Off (1997), another Nicolas Cage film, where the main antagonist, Castor Troy, is also a drug kingpin-terrorist based on Escobar.
Television
In 2005, Court TV (now TruTV) crime documentary series Mugshots released an episode on Escobar titled "Pablo Escobar – Hunting The Druglord".[103]
One of ESPN's 30 for 30 series films, The Two Escobars (2010), by directors Jeff and Michael Zimbalist, looks back at Colombia's World Cup run in 1994 and the relationship between sports and the country's criminal gangs — notably the Medellín narcotics cartel run by Escobar. The other Escobar in the film title refers to former Colombian defender Andrés Escobar (no relation to Pablo), who was shot and killed one month after conceding an own goal that contributed to the elimination of the Colombian national team from the 1994 FIFA World Cup.[105]
Caracol TV produced a television series, El cartel (The Cartel), which began airing on 4 June 2008 where Escobar is portrayed by an unknown model when he is shot down by Cartel del Sur's hitmen.
Also Caracol TV produced a TV Series, Pablo Escobar: El Patrón del Mal (Pablo Escobar, The Boss of Evil), which began airing on 28 May 2012, and stars Andrés Parra as Pablo Escobar. It is based on Alonso Salazar's book La parábola de Pablo.[106] Parra reprises his role in TV series Football Dreams, A World of Passion and in the first season of El Señor de los Cielos. Parra has declared not to play the character again so as not to typecast himself.
RTI Producciones produced a TV Series for RCN Televisión, Tres Caínes, was released on 4 March 2013, which Escobar is portrayed by the Colombian actor Juan Pablo Franco (who portrayed general Muriel Peraza in Pablo Escobar: El Patrón del Mal) in the first phase of the series. Franco reprises his role in Surviving Escobar: Alias JJ.
Also in 2013, Fox Telecolombia produced for RCN Televisión a TV Series, Alias El Mexicano, released on 5 November 2013, which Escobar is portrayed by an unknown actor in a minor role.
A Netflix original television series depicting the story of Escobar, titled Narcos, was released on 28 August 2015, starring Brazilian actor Wagner Moura as Pablo.[107] Season two premiered on the streaming service on 2 September 2016.[108]
In 2016, Teleset and Sony Pictures Television produced for RCN Televisión the TV Series En la boca del lobo, was released on 16 August 2016, which Escobar is portrayed by Fabio Restrepo (who portrayed Javier Ortiz in Pablo Escobar: El Patrón del Mal) as the character of Flavio Escolar.
On 24 January 2018, Netflix released the 68-minute-long documentary Countdown to Death: Pablo Escobar directed by Santiago Diaz and Pablo Martin Farina.[110][111]
Killing Escobar was a documentary televised in the UK in 2021. It concerned a failed attempt by mercenaries, contracted by the Cali Cartel and led by Peter McAleese, to assassinate Escobar in 1989.
Fox Telecolombia produced in 2019 a TV Series, El General Naranjo, which aired on 24 May 2019, which Escobar is portrayed by the Colombian actor Federico Rivera.
In 2022, National Geographic produced a documentary, Pablo Escobar: Man vs. Myth. The documentary highlighted the many crimes committed by and for Escobar.
Music
The 2013 song "Pablo" by American rapper E-40 serves as an ode to the legacy of Pablo Escobar.[112]
The 2016 album The Life of Pablo by American rapper Kanye West was named after the three Pablos who inspired and represented some part of the album, with one of them being Pablo Escobar.[113]
Dubdogz's "Pablo Escobar" (feat. Charlott Boss), released in 2020, has garnered more than 5.6 million views for its official music video.[114]
The 2018 hit single Narcos by the Atlanta-based rap group Migos from their album Culture II makes references to Pablo Escobar as well as the Medellin Cartel, and the Netflix series Narcos.[115]
References
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 Bowden, Mark (2001). Killing Pablo: The Hunt for the World's Greatest Outlaw. Atlantic Monthly Press. ISBN 978-0-87113-783-8.
1 2 Abadinsky, Howard (2010). Drug Use and Abuse: A Comprehensive Introduction. 8th ed. Belmont: Wadsworth. ISBN 978-0495814412.
1 2 3 Bagley, Bruce (1988). "Myths of Militarization: The Role of the Military in the War on Drugs in the Americas". Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs. 30 (2/3): 43–74. doi:10.2307/165986.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Thoumi, Francisco E. (2003). Illegal Drugs, Economy, and Society in the Andes. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. pp. 88–90. ISBN 978-0801873900.
1 2 Chepesiuk, Ron (2003). Drug Lords: The Rise and Fall of the Cali Cartel. Fort Lee: Barricade Books. ISBN 978-1569802386.
1 2 3 Esch, Andrew (2002). "Escobar, Pablo Emilio." In: Levinson, David (ed.). Encyclopedia of Crime and Punishment. Thousand Oaks: Sage. ISBN 978-0761922582.
↑ Office of National Drug Control Policy (1998). What America's Users Spend on Illegal Drugs, 1988–1998. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office.
1 2 3 Salazar, Alonso (2001). La parábola de Pablo: Auge y caída de un gran capo del narcotráfico. Bogotá: Planeta. ISBN 978-9586148690.
1 2 Alda, Rafael; Espinosa, María Victoria (2019). "The Social Legacy of Pablo Escobar: Between Myth and Memory." Latin American Perspectives. 46 (6): 106–124. doi:10.1177/0094582X19865335.
↑ Miller, Toby (2017). "Narcoculture on Screen: Netflix and the Global Drug Trade". Television & New Media. 18 (6): 531–548. doi:10.1177/1527476417690000.
↑ Salazar, Alonso (2001). La parábola de Pablo. Editorial Planeta. pp. 42–44.
↑ Bowden, Mark (2001). Killing Pablo. Atlantic Monthly Press. pp. 24–27.
↑ Thoumi, Francisco (1988). "The Colombian Illegal Drug Industry". Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs. 30(2/3): 99–100. doi:10.2307/165986.
↑ "Profile: Pablo Escobar". BBC News. 2 December 2012.
↑ Lee III, Rensselaer (1991). The White Labyrinth: Cocaine and Political Power. Transaction Books. pp. 85–88.
↑ Gootenberg, Paul (2008). Andean Cocaine: The Making of a Global Drug. UNC Press. pp. 281–283.
↑ Sullivan, Jim (24 August 1990). "DRAGO PLAYS A BAD GUY, BUT A SNAPPY DRESSER". Boston Globe (THIRDed.). p.42.
↑ "Mugshots | Pablo Escobar – Hunting the Druglord". snagfilms.com. 2005. Archived from the original on 24 October 2017. Retrieved 24 October 2017. This episode follows Escobar on his journey to becoming the Columbian Godfather.
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