![]() | This article may require copy editing for grammar, style, cohesion, tone, or spelling.(September 2024) |
Preterintention in criminal law is a legal institution representing a specific factual context: [1] [2] "This refers to when an act or an omission goes beyond the intention of the perpetrator who wanted to carry out a minor event". [3] It derives from Latin 'praeter intentionem', [4] which means "beyond intention". [5]
Preterintentional offence may also be referred to as result-conditioned [6] [7] or consequentially aggravated . [8] A common form of preterintentional offence is bodily harm resulting in death, in which the defendant intended to harm the victim but did not intend to kill. [9] [10]
Preterintentional offence as a distinct legal concept is found chiefly in penal systems of the civil law tradition. [11] It arises from the legal principle under which a criminal intent created strict criminal liability for all resulting harm praeter intentionem. [12] [13] Other legal systems have limited a defendant's criminal liability to situations where the defendant negligently (Germany § 18 Stgb; [14] Austria § Stgb [15] ) [16] or recklessly [17] caused the preterintentional harm. [18]
Penal systems of the common law tradition generally do not use the concept etymological of preterintentionality, [19] but some common law systems impose criminal penalties for praeter intentionem harms under imputation models such as felony murder [20] [21] or as involuntary manslaughter. [22]
Strict criminal liability [23] for preterintentional offence can be traced back to the doctrine of "versari in re illicita", [24] [25] and found application both in the criminal law of ancient Rome, [26] [27] and in the canon law of the Roman Church. [28] [29]
In Roman law [30] [31] the perpetrator of a criminal act who unintentionally committed a more serious but causally connected offence [32] was still punished for the preterintentional crime, [33] without it being basically necessary to establish willfull intent to commit the more serious offence: [34] it was sufficient to ascertain that the preterintentional outcome had been caused by an intentional act. [35] [36]
A preterintentional offence requires an intentional act or omission in violation of criminal law. [37] [38] However, this intentional criminal conduct does not have to be successful: a mere intentional attempt at offence can be sufficient. [39] The judge can condemn the Agent for the preterintentional outcome caused by the intentional criminal conduct, even if only attempted. For example: A with a threatening attitude makes a sudden movement of his arms with a closed hand towards B, and the latter with a reflex movement avoids the blow but stumbles and, falling to the ground, hits his head and dies; the intended crime of assault against B is only attempted and not completed, but A is still responsible for the preterintentional homicide of B. [40] A criminal attempt, in addition to being sufficient, [41] is also indispensable for the agent to be convicted of a preterintentional offence: a conduct capable of causing death must logically be capable of injuring or beating. [42]
Conversely, an attempted preterintentional offence is logically impossible: [43] if the preterintentional event does not occur, there is no preterintentional offence, and the perpetrator is responsible only for the intended lesser offence, because that is the only offence they committed. [44]
Because a subject cannot be punished twice for the same act, [45] the penalty is determined taking into account both the offence intended and the preterintentional offence committed. [46]
Some countries, [47] in order to adapt preterintention to the principle of subjective responsibility (no one can be punished criminally unless as a result of voluntary or at without caution), [48] consider preterintention as a form of mixed mental state: [49] the intent supports the conduct of the lesser crime, and the criminal negligence supports the preterintentional consequence. [50]
In other countries, faithful to the ontological nature of praeter intentionem, [51] [52] it is a form of intentional crime [53] aggravated by the unintentional event which is attributed to the author even if theydid not want the event ultraintentional: [54] thus introducing a form of objective responsibility. [55] [56]
The main example of this form of liability is preterintentional killing, [57] which occurs when a person, with actions aimed at hitting or harming, unintentionally causes the death of a person: [58] the agent will be liable for objective responsibility, or fault for the laws that require it, for the death event. [59] For example: A argues with B and intentionally punches him, B falls to the ground and dies: A only wanted to punch him and absolutely did not want to kill him. [60]
In praeterintentional homicide the term "killing" is used and not that of murder (as in intentional homicide): in order to underline the agent's unwillingness to kill. [61]
Preterintentional homicide can mature under certain factual circumstances, and therefore the penalty will be aggravated according to the type of circumstance ascertained by the judge: for example, the Italian [62] legislator regulates the aggravating circumstances of preterintentional killing in art. 585 penal code, [63] and the French [64] one in art. 222-8 penal code. [65]
Another hypothesis generally provided for by the law is preterintentional abortion, [66] which occurs when the agent, with actions aimed at causing injury, causes, as an unintended effect, the interruption of pregnancy. [67] For exmample, A argues with C and intentionally punches her, causing C to fall to the ground and miscarry. Tizio only wanted to punch C but did not want to cause the miscarriage of the child in her womb.
Then there are the preterintentional offences in the broad sense: [68] intentional crimes aggravated by an unwanted harmful or dangerous event, [69] which reproduce the typical preterintentional criminal progression: [70] intentional unlawful conduct that produces a more serious involuntary offence. [71] For example: A intentionally slaps his daughter D, and D suffers serious injuries so much so that she goes to the hospital; in the following days D dies from complications from infections on the injuries sustained. [72]
The concept of preterintentional offence is recognized by many countries: [73]
Other legal systems that recognize preterintentional offenses: Colombia (Art. 24 penal code), [89] Uruguay (Art. 18 penal code), [90] Nuevo León (Art. 29 penal code), [91] Ecuador (Art. 26 penal code), [92] South Africa, [93] Somalia (Art. 24 penal code) [94] and Venezuela. [95]
Some legal systems have rejected preterintentional offenses and the underlying doctrine of versari in re illicita, [96] as reflecting a strict liability approach incompatible with modern constitutional guarantees: in some countries including Spain, [97] Sweden, [98] and Switzerland, [99] preterintentional offenses have been split into their intentional and unintentional parts, and therefore defendants are charged with a voluntary crime for the intentional act (simultaneity offences), [100] e.g. grave bodily harm, and an involuntary crime for the resulting unintended harm, e.g. negligent homicide. [101]
Countries of the common law tradition have typically followed a comparatively flexible approach to specific cases of praeter intentionem offenses. [102] In United States criminal law, depending on the state, ultraintentional offenses may include felony murder and voluntary manslaughter. [103] [104] In English criminal law the offenses beyond intention are generally punished where there is sufficient similarity between the intended crime and the result ultraintentional. [105] This approach is justified based on the doctrines of "unforeseen mode", "mistaken object", and "transferred fault". [106]
Praeter intentionem are the circumstances of the action that do not immediately – as fontes moralitatis – enter the action's moral characterization
«Thomas proposes that for the ethical assessment of an act, three aspects require attention: what the agent does (the deed or object), the circumstances in which the agent does it (the when, where, how, to whom, and with what), and the end or reason for which the agent acts (1-11 q.18 a.1). Of the aspects of an action that make up its integral goodness or its disintegrated badness, the intention of the end is a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for a complete evaluation of the act.»
eum qui dat operam rei illicitae teneri de co quod praeter ejus intentionem et cognitionem contingit
Preterintentionality: The extenuating circumstances envisaged in the 1848 Code include the case of someone who intended to cause harm, though not the harm really caused by that person but another less serious one (Article 9, 3d). It is Joaquin Francisco Pacheco who best defines this case: "Here we deal exclusively with facts that exceed the purpose but which derive from a criminal purpose."
The injury is on the intended victim but the resulting consequence is so grave a wrong than that intended. This is called PRAETER INTENTIONEM. Best example - is the act of a husband who slapped his wife causing her to fall on the ground, hitting her head on a hard pavement rendering her unconscious and thereafter died. The husband is liable for parricide. His wrongful intent was only to cause injury but the wrongful act done was greater - the killing of his wife. Praeter intentionem lowers criminal liability.
If John commits a felony, that is, a serious crime, and Jim's death results from this, John is responsible for the most serious form of murder even if Jim's death was neither foreseen nor foreseeable by him. It is a bit like our preterintentional homicide, but the penalties for felony murder in common law countries are much more severe.
«Under the Italian PC, there is only one form of crime involving an unintentional act: involuntary manslaughter (omicidio preterintenzionale) (Article 584 PC).»
This has a Latin tag, versari in re illicita, and in its widest form it argues that anyone who decides to transgress the criminal law should be held liable for all the consequences that ensue, even if they are more serious than expected.
Si clavi percussit, aut cucuma in rixa, quamvis ferro percusse-rit; tamen non occidendi animo, leniendam poenam ejus, qui in rixa casu magis quam voluntate homicidium ad-misit (L. 1. § 3. D. ad leg. Corn. de sic. et venef.).
l. Increasing attention should be paid to the causes and conditions that facilitate the commission of negligent crimes in the contemporary world. Particular importance is attached to the study of the conditions surrounding the commission of reckless crimes in the transport sector, particularly in road traffic, as well as in other areas of social life where acts of recklessness pose a greater danger to essential social and individual values, in particular safety at work, the use of new types of energy and materials and environmental protection. 2. Action against criminogenic factors that contribute to the commission of negligent crimes, as well as public education aimed at encouraging a sense of duty and adherence to and appreciation of standards of care, can be considered the primary strategy in the prevention of negligent crimes. 3. (a) The decision whether a negligent act should be criminalised or decriminalised should take into account all aspects of the impact of such a decision on economic, social and other factors in the concrete context of social developments. (b) Cases of extremely socially negligent conduct, which result in damage to social and individual values and well-being, should be considered as breaches of criminal law. (c) Negligent acts of lesser gravity should be treated as administrative or civil sanctions. Social and educational measures should be widely used in relation to the prevention and deterrence of such less serious negligent acts. 4. (a) Criminal liability for negligent acts must always be in accordance with the principle of culpability with its subjective element under previous legislation based on conduct that breaches the standards of care in view of the seriousness of the harm caused, foreseen or foreseeable, as well as (where provided for by law) the degree of dangerousness of such breach. (b) No person should be punished because of the unintended consequences of his act or, if at all, only if he foresaw or could have foreseen such consequences. 5. Sanctions for negligent offences should take into account the alternative forms of sanction available, as well as the characteristics of the offender. Generally, penalties other than imprisonment should be used, and when a custodial sentence is imposed, semi-detention or similar measures should be used. Exemption from punishment but a requirement of community work or education could also be used. 6. Scientific research in the field of negligent acts should be conducted on an interdisciplinary basis, with particular attention to the study of its causes and the conditions in which it occurs, the typology and classification of offenders and the development of adequate and multiple preventive measures. The genesis of the behavior of criminal negligent conduct should be studied using data from sociology, criminology, psychology and other social sciences. In the future, it would be desirable to develop international collaboration and coordination of efforts of researchers and experts from different countries in the field of prevention and reduction of negligent crime.
The most radical expression of objectivism can be found in Holmes, who, asserted that the law did not consider, and need not consider, in administering punishment what in fact the accused intended but that it imputed to him the intention that an 'ordi-nary man', equipped with ordinary knowledge, would be taken to have had in acting as the accused did". The general rule that has imposed itself in Anglo-Saxon - as well as in Continental criminal law is, quite to the contrary, the requirement of intent and foresight of consequences, but that general rule must be qualified in many important cases (for example, concerning the punishment of preterintentional manslaughter).
It is a structural element of the human experience as we know it.
When it is said, therefore, that the morality of an action must first be evaluated on the basis of its ends, that is essentially to say that it be evaluated on the basis of the agent's intentions, assuming the agent has actually willed the end toward which the action intrinsically leads. This action may have consequences the agent did not intend, but for which at least in many cases he is held responsible. Legal systems sometimes employ the notions of crimes that are "preterintentional" or due to negligence: the punishment (though less severe than for intentional or premeditated crimes) is fitted to the consequences even those not willed by the subject. Remaining within the bounds of ethical discourse, we can see in this fact the insufficiency of a criterion of moral judgment based solely on intentions, often conveyed in the maxim, "It is the intention that counts." This does not suffice because intention does not of itself suffice to justify action morally. In other words, just as "the end does not justify the means," so "the end does not justify the consequences." Hence it is clear that consequences have a genuine moral relevance." Traditional ethics was not unaware of the problem of consequences. It considered an action morally wrong if it had a foreseeable negative effect, in accord with the principle that the wrong should not only not be pursued, but also strictly avoided. Thus, actions with foreseeable negative consequences must be rejected. This is evident. A serious problem arises, however, when the action is not in itself morally indifferent, but has a positive end - perhaps highly positive, or in accord with duty while negative consequences are also foreseen.
John Gardner originally argued that if the criminal law puts D on notice that this will be the consequence, the requirements of the rule of law are fulfilled
Felony murder is a useful doctrine because it reaffirms to the surviving family of a felony-homicide victim the kinship the society as a whole feels with him by denouncing in the strongest language of the law the intentional crime that produced the death.
Under the Italian PC, there is only one form of crime involving an unintentional act: involuntary manslaughter (omicidio preterintenzionale) (Article 584 PC). The Code states that 'whoever provokes the death of a man through acts aimed at beating him or causing personal injuries to him' is subject to punishment. Here, the offender's intention is to batter or cause personal injuries, not death. However, the consequence of the conduct is ascribed to the perpetrator even though he did not want to cause the death
Article 43 PC establishes that: A felony: is preterintentional, or beyond the intention, when the act or omission is followed by a harmful or dangerous event more serious than that desired by the actor;
Dutch criminal law knows several 'result-qualified offences', in which the death of another person is an aggravating circumstance if such death can – in law – be seen as a result of the offence in question. Examples can be found (among many more) in [...] art. 302 s.2 DPC (grievous bodily harm) [...] . In case of a result-qualified offence, causation is assessed in two steps. With the offence of art. 300 s.3 DPC in mind as an example, first a causal relationship has to be established between the defendant's conduct and the victim's bodily harm. The second step is whether there is causation between the bodily harm and the victim's death. It should be noted that Dutch criminal law does not require proof of negligence in this second step. Cases like these can give a good insight into the way causation is established in Dutch criminal law. An example is a case in which the Court of Appeal could prove that the defendant had caused bodily harm (art. 300 DPC), but could not find evidence that showed that the victim had died as a result of the harm.54 In carrying out a theft, the defendant had suddenly clasped an arm around the neck of the victim and he had also bitten him. The victim died shortly after. According to the Court of Appeal, no causal relationship could be established between the inflicted bodily harm and the death that followed. The Court of Appeal reasoned that the victim had been 46 or 49 years, and had suffered from heart diseases, while at the time of the commission of the offence, the victim had used cocaine. The violent conduct in itself could not have caused the death of the victim, or have increased the chance of dying, according to the Court of Appeal concluded that there had been a real opportunity that the victim would have died without the bodily harm. The Supreme Court, however, ruled that Court's reasoning of its decision that the death could not reasonably be attributed to the defendant had been incomprehensible, with regard to the Court of Appeal's findings concerning the victim's predisposition. The victim's predisposition seemingly did not put a bar to the attribution of the result of the victim's conduct to the defendant.
concurrence of offences
Links
https://www.britannica.com/topic/criminal-law/The-elements-of-crime
https://www.oed.com/dictionary/preterintentional_adj?tab=meaning_and_use