Silicon shield

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Silicon shield is the principle in geopolitical relations regarding Chinese unification that the semiconductor industry in Taiwan is important enough to global economic prosperity that it would deter an attempt by China to seize Taiwan by force, and if not would induce foreign powers, particularly the United States, to defend Taiwan in order to preserve the stability of the semiconductor supply chain.

Contents

Background

Taiwan's semiconductor industry accelerated in the 1990s, with the foundry model, when manufacturer TSMC began manufacturing chips to American designs. [1] By the end of the decade, the industry was sufficiently matured that the term "silicon shield" had been used in commentary in the context of economic risks of a Chinese invasion. [2] TSMC's manufacturing and design capabilities continued to advance, and by the 2020s its facilities in Taiwan manufactured the most advanced chips in production. [3] As a whole, Taiwanese manufacturers accounted for about 60% of all semiconductors manufactured globally in the early 2020s, by multiple estimates, and TSMC produced over 90% of the most advanced generation of chips. [4] [5]

In 2019, Chinese dictator Xi Jinping threatened to invade Taiwan. [6] In 2025, it was revealed that China was building at least five new huge bridge barges which appear to be tailor made for the amphibious assault of Taiwanese beaches. [7] These bridge barges have the capability to anchor into the seafloor and extend a bridge 393 feet to the beach head, allowing the unloading of tanks and trucks from ship to shore. China has for decades claimed Taiwan as part of its sovereign territory through the One-China Policy.

In 2022, amid the global 2021-2023 inflation surge, Democratic President Joe Biden said the US would respond militarily if China tried to invade Taiwan. [8] A Chinese invasion of Taiwan would drastically increase the cost of semiconductors. [9] Later in 2022, US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi visited Taiwan, which caused a surge of violations of Taiwan's airspace from the Chinese military. [10] In the years since, under Republican President Donald Trump, the US has walked back claims of a military response regarding a Taiwan invasion and appears to be using a policy of strategic ambiguity. [11]

Principle

According to the New York Times, "Taiwan has relied on its dominance of the microchip industry for its defense," and that, "because its semiconductor industry is so important to Chinese manufacturing and the United States consumer economy, actions that threaten its foundries would be too risky." [12] The logic behind the principle relies on the collective dependence of the global economy on the chips manufactured in Taiwan, particularly China and the United States, the other two primary players in a potential Taiwanese armed conflict. While American industry accounting for only 12% of global chip production in 2021, American companies remained prominent in development while outsourcing the production, and Taiwanese companies accounted for about 65% of this contract manufacturing in the early 2020s. [4] In parallel, Chinese development of domestic semiconductor technology lagged, forcing its manufacturers of computer hardware to import the required chips, including over $100 billion worth of Taiwanese chips in 2021. [13] The collective dependence by all parties is deep enough that a United States government analysis found a potential Taiwanese conflict in the form of a blockade by China would cost the global economy as much as $2.5 trillion, [5] while a report from Bloomberg projected a cost of $5 trillion. [14]

The potential effects of a conflict are presumed to support a continuation of Taiwan's independently governed status quo by incentivizing restraint by China, as a result of its dependence on steady supplies of chips from Taiwan, and the interest of foreign powers in intervening to prevent a disruption to their imports. [5] As a result, Taiwan's government has referenced the value of its semiconductor industry in protecting its sovereignty; President Tsai Ing-wen referred to the industry as supporting national security, and her government considered it to be a "divine mountain that guards the nation" [13] [3] while her successor Lai Ching-te suggested that other global powers had an incentive to prevent a conflict. [14]

In 2022 President Joe Biden again went as far as to threaten China with war if they tried to invade Taiwan. [15] However, Biden also passed the CHIPS and science act which provided about $50 billion in subsidies for manufacturers, including TSMC, to build chip production facilities in the US.

By 2025, the shield was seen as being at risk due to the turn in administrations under Donald Trump towards domestic manufacturing and economic protectionism. [16] The second Trump administration prioritized American manufacturing beyond that of Biden, leading TSMC to announce further investments, including factories capable of producing its latest generation chips. [14] Additionally, US export controls on technology developed by American companies led to a ban on the sale to China of certain chips for use in artificial intelligence applications, a move seen as providing further incentive for China to invest in its domestic chip industry. [5]

Reception

In 2022 Matthew Pottinger challenged the existence of a Silicon Shield arguing that China does not behave in ways which appear rational to audiences in democratic countries. [17]

See also

References

  1. "Silicon Island: Assessing Taiwan's Importance to U.S. Economic Growth and Security". Center for Strategic and International Studies. 10 January 2025. Retrieved 23 November 2025.
  2. "A 'Silicon Shield' Protects Taiwan From China". The New York Times. 29 September 2000. Retrieved 23 November 2025.
  3. 1 2 "Asia's Chip Giants Hustle to Maintain Their Edge Over the U.S." The Wall Street Journal. 4 June 2024. Retrieved 23 November 2025.
  4. 1 2 "The World Relies on One Chip Maker in Taiwan, Leaving Everyone Vulnerable". The Wall Street Journal. 19 June 2021. Retrieved 23 November 2025.
  5. 1 2 3 4 "Taipei Fears Washington Is Weakening Its Silicon Shield". Foreign Policy. 17 February 2023. Retrieved 23 November 2025.
  6. Kuo, Lily (2019-01-02). "'All necessary means': Xi Jinping reserves right to use force against Taiwan". The Guardian. ISSN   0261-3077 . Retrieved 2025-11-24.
  7. Sutton, H. I. (2025-01-10). "China Suddenly Building Fleet Of Special Barges Suitable For Taiwan Landings". Naval News. Retrieved 2025-11-24.
  8. Gan, Kevin Liptak,Donald Judd,Nectar (2022-05-23). "Biden says US would respond 'militarily' if China attacked Taiwan, but White House insists there's no policy change | CNN Politics". CNN. Retrieved 2025-11-24.{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
  9. Orlik, Jennifer Welch, Jenny Leonard, Maeva Cousin, Gerard DiPippo, Tom (2024-01-11). "If China Invades Taiwan, It Would Cost World Economy $10 Trillion". Insurance Journal. Retrieved 2025-11-24.{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
  10. "China Reacts Aggressively to Pelosi's Taiwan Visit | Arms Control Association". www.armscontrol.org. Archived from the original on 2025-08-13. Retrieved 2025-11-24.
  11. guillermo. "The Return to Strategic Ambiguity: Assessing Trump's Taiwan Stance - Foreign Policy Research Institute" . Retrieved 2025-11-24.
  12. Barnes, Julian E. (26 January 2022). "How the Computer Chip Shortage Could Incite a U.S. Conflict With China". The New York Times . Archived from the original on 26 January 2022. Retrieved 27 January 2022.
  13. 1 2 "'The Eye of the Storm': Taiwan Is Caught in a Great Game Over Microchips". The New York Times. 29 August 2022. Retrieved 23 November 2025.
  14. 1 2 3 "Taiwan's "silicon shield" could be weakening". MIT Technology Review. 15 August 2025. Retrieved 23 November 2025.
  15. Ni, Vincent (2022-09-19). "Joe Biden again says US forces would defend Taiwan from Chinese attack". The Guardian. ISSN   0261-3077 . Retrieved 2025-11-24.
  16. Sacks, David. "Trump's Trade Policy Feeds Taiwan's Growing U.S. Skepticism | Council on Foreign Relations". www.cfr.org. Retrieved 2025-11-24.
  17. Staff Writer. "'Silicon shield' not enough: expert". taipeitimes.com. Taipei Times. Archived from the original on 17 January 2023. Retrieved 17 January 2023.