No material damage to most of the IAF airfields, with only the runways at Amritsar getting cratered and a radar station destroyed.[4] Most airfields repaired within same night.[5]
Operation Chengiz Khan was the code name assigned to the preemptive strikes carried out by the Pakistani Air Force (PAF) on the forward airbases and radar installations of the Indian Air Force (IAF) on the evening of 3 December 1971, and marked the formal initiation of hostilities of the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971. The operation targeted 11 of India's airfields and also included artillery strikes on Indian positions in Kashmir. The targets were the Indian Airbases of Amritsar, Ambala, Agra, Awantipur, Bikaner, Halwara, Jodhpur, Jaisalmer, Pathankot, Bhuj, Srinagar and Uttarlai and air defence radars at Amritsar and Faridkot.
Not withstanding the multiplicity of targets, the Pakistani air strikes were ineffectual and failed to inflict any material damage to the IAF air fields, only cratering the runways at Amritsar and destroying a radar station.[4][6] The PAF reportedly lost four aircraft during the raid.[4]
In an address to the nation on radio that same evening, then Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi held the air strikes to be a declaration of war against India and the Indian Air Force responded with initial air strikes the same night, which were expanded to massive retaliatory air strikes the next morning. Statements released by both nations the next day confirmed the "existence of a state of war between the two countries", although neither government formally issued a declaration of war.
Pakistan came under increasing criticism[9] from India, the Soviet Union, Japan, and Europe as the plight of the refugees and their impact on the Indian economy were highlighted by Indira Gandhi in the UN and on a number of global tours.[10] However, the United States and China showed little interest in the situation and actively opposed aid, intervention or support to the Mukti Bahini[11][12] (possibly fearing advancement of Soviet influence deep into South Asia[9]). India's aid to the Mukti Bahini continued unabated, and fighting between the Mukti Bahini and the Pakistani forces grew increasingly vicious. On 9 August 1971, India signed a twenty-year cooperation treaty with the Soviet Union[13] in which each promised military support to the other in the event it was attacked. This provided India cover against any possible Chinese or American intervention in aid of Pakistan if it went to war with India. To the Pakistani leadership, it became clear that armed Indian intervention and secession of East Pakistan was becoming inevitable.[14]
By October 1971, the Mukti Bahini had started launching massive raids deep into East Pakistan, with active support from the Indian Army beginning in November.[15] The situation had deteriorated to a state of active undeclared war in the East by the end of November, when Indian and Mukti Bahini forces launched offensives on both the eastern and western borders of East Pakistan. Regular Indian Army troops engaged and mauled Pakistani armour at Garibpur,[16] during which the two intruding Pakistan Air Force jets were shot down and another badly damaged in the Battle of Boyra while offensive manoeuvres were launched in Atgram against Pakistani border posts and communications centres along the eastern border. The Mukti Bahini also launched an offensive on Jessore at this time.[17] It was clear to Islamabad by this time that open conflict was inevitable, and that East Pakistan was indefensible in the long run.[18]Yahya Khan chose at this point to try to protect Pakistan's integrity and to hold India by Ayub Khan's strategy – "The defence of East Pakistan lies in the West".[19]
This policy made the assumptions that an open conflict with India would not last long due to international pressure, and since East Pakistan was undefendable, the war-effort should be concentrated on occupying as large an area of Indian territory as possible as a bargaining tool at the negotiating table. To this end, General. Tikka Khan had proposed an offensive into India, and the PAF's overriding priority was to give maximum support to this offensive.[citation needed] The initial plans for the offensive called for at least a temporary cover of air dominance by the PAF under which Khan's troops could conduct a lightning campaign deep into Western India before digging in and consolidating their positions. In order to achieve air dominance, Pakistan decided to launch an offensive counter air strike codenamed Operation Chengiz Khan on Indian airbases.
A second objective for the PAF was to conduct air interdiction against the supply routes for the Indian troops opposing Khan's proposed offensive, but these were accorded as secondary targets to be engaged after the operation started.[citation needed]
The decision to hit India with a pre-emptive air strike was taken on 30 November 1971 during a meeting among the Pakistani President, General Yahya Khan, Chief of Army Staff General Abdul Hamid Khan, and the Chief of General Staff Lt. Gen. Gul Hassan Khan.
To surprise the IAF by attacking its forward airfields when it was least expected.
To neutralize these in order to obtain at least temporary battlefield air superiority in the West.
To counter-balance the Indian numerical advantage by hitting the forward operating bases of the Indian Air Force as a measure reducing the weight of expected counterattacks on PAF's own bases.
To achieve surprise, the decision was made to strike on a Friday, the day of the jumu'ah (Muslim Sabbath), at 17:45 hrs when shifts in IAF control centers were changing. Emulating its operations' experience in battle against the Indian Air Force during the Indo-Pakistani Conflict of 1965, the decision was made to hit the Indian bases in a two-wave dusk strike followed by a number of night-interdiction missions through the night.[20] The plans for the strike also anticipated the Indians securing their aircraft in blast pens.[citation needed] Also, anticipating difficulty in target acquisition for camouflaged targets such as fuel tanks, ammunition dumps and command centers, the primary objectives set for the operation were the runways and air defense radars.[citation needed]
The II Corps offensive into Punjab
Under Chengiz Khan, Pakistan's II Corps offensive plan involved driving east from the vicinity of Bahawalnagar to cross the international border and push towards Bhatinda and Ludhiana in India's "Foxtrot Sector" or "F Sector."[22]
While describing the situation in the "F sector" of India, John H. Gill writes:
With poor dispositions and inept leadership, India's 67 Brigade lost a significant parcel of land to Pakistan's 105 Brigade despite repeated and costly counterattacks. Fortunately for India, indecision on the part of Pakistan's high command kept its potentially powerful II Corps from executing a planned offensive against India's “Foxtrot Sector” (or simply “F Sector”).
The II Corps offensive plan called for 105 Brigade and 25 Brigade to come under II Corps, while IV Corps advanced from its positions along the Ravi.[22]
The PAF had also positioned mobile radar and pre-stocked forward airfields in the proposed battle area to support the planned attack.[23]
Army headquarters ordered II Corps to shift to its forward assembly areas on 14 December and major elements of 1 Armored Division began to move the following day, while the 7 Division was also concentrating south of the Sutlej. However, by now, a major part of II Corps, 33 Division, had been broken up to reinforce Pakistani units against Indian offensives elsewhere.[24]
Thus, the II Corps offensive was deprived of approximately one third of its striking power before it had even begun.
On 16 December, Army headquarters issued new orders “freezing all movements” until further notice. Trains carrying equipment of 1 Division were unloaded, and II Corps, with its units on both sides of the Sutlej, settled in to await orders. If the operation had proceeded as planned, the corps would likely have launched their attack in the early morning of December 17. However, due to the "freeze" order, they remained on the Pakistan side of the border and were unable to cross before the cease-fire came into effect at 2000 hours on the same day.[25]
Pakistan's failure to launch the offensive in a timely manner has generated great controversy among subsequent commentators.[22][verification needed]
The first strikes
The final orders for the strike were issued at 17:30 hrs on Friday 3 December 1971. The first formations were in flight and heading for their targets by 17:40 hrs. Officially, it was announced via government channels that the airstrikes were launched in response to attacks along the western border on Pakistan Rangers' outposts by regular troops of the Indian army, which the Indian Air Force was providing support to.[10] The Indians would later deny any engagement on the Western Front.[10] However, the Indian air defence radars failed to detect the approaching formations. The first indications for the Indians of the impending assault was the roar of the strike aircraft over their airfields,[20] while in Delhi, the air-raid sirens were the first indications for newsmen, gathered for the daily brief of the East-Pakistan situation, that something was going on.[10]
The first of the strikes were mounted against Pathankot Airbase. Led by a flight of two Mirage IIIs (a reconnaissance craft and a strike escort)[20] a six-plane wing of F-86F Sabres flying from Murid and led by Wing Commander S N Jilani hit the airbase with unguided rockets and dropped several 125kg bombs. The main target of this strike was the runway, which was damaged and took the Indian ground crew several hours to repair. These missions went unopposed since the IAF had not scrambled any interception, and faced only anti-aircraft fire. Pathankot was covered by interceptors from Adampur following this first strike during the time it took the ground crew to repair its runway.[5]
At 17:45 hrs, four Mirages flying from Sargodha and led by Wing Commander Hakimullah attacked Amritsar Airbase.[citation needed] Hakimullah's flight was armed with two 500kg bombs each, which the strike used efficiently hitting the first 300m of the runway and cratering it enough to leave it nonoperational for several hours.[26][27] However, the Amritsar runway was repaired within the same night to receive detachments of Mig 21s and Su-7 that flew against Rafiqui airbase the next morning. A second strike of two F-104 Starfighters, led by Wing Commander Amjad H Khan hit the P-35 radar station at Amritsar, rendering it inoperable for nearly an hour. Two Sukhois then took off from the one remaining serviceable lane of the runway, moments before it was bombed by a passing B-57 Canberra.[5]
Within forty-five minutes of these strikes, Pakistani troops had shelled India's western frontier and were reported to have crossed the border at Punch in the state of Jammu.[10]
Followup counter-air strikes
The third wave of the PAF counter air strikes were directed to strike Ambala, Agra and Halwara around 18:00 hrs and continued in single or two-plane formations through the evening until at least 22:30 hrs. These strikes involved fifteen B-57 Canberras, four T-33s, and one C-130. The B-57s flew seven single-plane sorties. These caused significant damage, especially in Uttarlai, and Halwara and impeded IAF's preparation for retaliation.
Ambala Airbase was a hit by a two plane B-57 formation led by Wg. Cdr. Rais Rafi. The flight hit the runway with eight bombs, causing minor damage.
Like Ambala, Agra Airbase, which lay deepest among the PAF's targets that evening, was struck by a two-plane B-57 formation led by Wg. Cdr. Yunus and followed by Flight Lieutenant Mazhar Bukhari. The bombs dropped by Yunus did not explode. Rais Rafi explained the old age of the bombs as the reason for their ineffectiveness as these were supposed to be used in the Second World War.[28] The first Indian counter strikes launched that very night included the Canberras of No.5 Sqn[29] based at Agra.
Sirsa was hit by Sqn. Ldr. Alvi with bombs equipped with time-delayed fuses, damaging the runway heavily and forcing the runway to be closed for the rest of the night.[26]
Four T-33s from A-Flight No.2 Squadron, led by Sqn. Ldr. Qureshi, hit Uttarlai, causing damage to the runway. These were launched at the same time as the second strike over Srinagar. Uttarlai was attacked a second time later that night by Wg. Cdr. Akhtar. The net damage to the runway was significant enough to keep the runway closed for six days and for the taxiway to be used instead.[5]
In the south, Sqn. Ldr. Ishtak Qureshi's bombs hit the underground power cable at Jaisalmer, cutting off the power supply and telephone connection for six hours. At the same time, Jodhpur was hit by two B-57s led by Sqn. Ldr. Sohail Mansur while Jamnagar was hit by Flt. Lt. Ejaz Azam.[5]
As Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi addressed the nation on radio shortly after midnight[30] informing about the Pakistani attack, the Indian Air Force struck back. By 21:00hrs, the Canberras of the No.35 Squadron and No.106 Squadron, as well as No.5 and No.16 squadron were armed and ready for attacks deep into Pakistan. These flew against eight Western Pakistani airbases: Murid, Mianwali, Sargodha, Chandhar, Risalewala, Rafiqui, and Masroor. In total, 23 combat sorties were launched that night, inflicting heavy damage to Sargodha and Masroor airbases.[20] The PAF units stationed on these airfields had to operate from taxiways for the following two days.
Through the night the Indian Air Force also struck the main East Pakistani airfields of Tejgaon, and later Kurmitola. At the same time, the Indian Air Force was deploying additional aircraft to its forward airfields for the strikes that were to follow the next morning. Within days, India was able to achieve air superiority.[31][14]
Analysis
Of its stated objectives, the PAF was unable to neutralize the Indian Air Force in the west,[10] which on its part had dispersed its aircraft in hardened aircraft shelters, suffering only minor damage to a few aircraft.[32]
Trying to catch the Indian Air Force napping, Yahya Khan, launched a Pakistani version of Israel's 1967 air blitz in hopes that one rapid attack would cripple India's far superior air power. But India was alert, Pakistani pilots were inept, and Yahya's strategy of scattering his thin air force over a dozen air fields was a bust![33]
The Battle of Longewala was one of the first major engagements in the western sector during the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971, fought between assaulting Pakistani forces and Indian defenders at the Indian border post of Longewala, in the Thar Desert of Rajasthan. The battle was fought between 120 Indian soldiers accompanied by four Hawker Hunter and three HAL Marut fighter-bombers and 2,000–3,000 Pakistani soldiers accompanied by 30–40 tanks.
The Battle of Boyra was a ground and aerial battle that was fought on 22 November 1971 between the India and Pakistan.
Air Chief Marshal Pratap Chandra Lal, DFC was the Chief of Air Staff (CAS) of the Indian Air Force (IAF) during the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971. He served in the IAF from 1939 until his retirement in 1973. He was the CAS at the time of Operation Chengiz Khan, the preemptive strikes that were carried out by the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) that marked the formal initiation of hostilities of the war.
No. 7 Squadron IAF operates as a Special Munitions Delivery and air superiority unit. Based at Gwalior AFB, No. 7 Squadron forms a part of 40 Wing AF, Central Air Command.
East Pakistan Air Operations covers the activity of the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) and Pakistan Army Aviation units in former East Pakistan during the Bangladesh Liberation War. The operations involved the interdiction, air defense, ground support, and logistics missions flown by the Bangladesh Air Force, Indian Air Force, and the Indian Navy Aviation wing in support of the Mukti Bahini and later Indian Army in Bengal.
The No. 3 Squadron IAF (Cobras) of the Indian Air Force (IAF) operates as a Close Air Support (CAS) and reconnaissance unit. Currently based at NAL Air Force Station, it falls under the Western Air Command, and forms the 46 wing of the IAF.
Operation Jackpot was a codename for three operations undertaken by the Bengali Mukti Bahini in former East Pakistan against the Federation of Pakistan at the climax of the Bangladesh Liberation War.
The Indian Air Force was established on 8 October 1932 independently of the army and navy and in a similar format to the British Royal Air Force. It had been a recommendation of the Skeen Committee, which had been tasked to look into demands for the Indianisation of the Indian army. Its first squadron was raised on 1 April 1933.
The history of aviation in Bangladesh began with kites, the traditional heavier-than-air man-made object, that is flown by one or more people while staying on the ground. The first recorded manned flight was arranged by the Dhaka Nawab Family in 1882, which resulted in the death of the flyer.
During the Indo-Pakistani war of 1965, the Indian and Pakistani Air Forces engaged in large-scale aerial combat for the first time. In the air war, which took place in September, both air forces conducted thousands of defensive and offensive sorties over Indian and Pakistani airspace. Both India and Pakistan claimed victory in the air war; Pakistan claimed to have destroyed 104 Indian aircraft and lost 19, and India claimed to have destroyed 73 Pakistani aircraft and lost 35 of its own. The air war ended in a stalemate.
The Indian Army had no standby force ready in 1971 with the specific task of attacking East Pakistan, one of the many reasons why India did not immediately intervene after Pakistan launched Operation Searchlight in March 1971. Indian Army's Eastern Command was tasked with defending the northern and eastern borders and fighting the insurgencies in Nagaland, Mizoram and Naxalites in West Bengal at that time.
The Eastern Command of the Pakistan Army was a corps-sized military formation headed by a lieutenant-general, who was designated the Commander Eastern Command. After the partition of India by United Kingdom, the Islamic Republic of Pakistan was divided into two territories separated by 1,000 miles (1,600 km). Most of the assets of the Pakistan armed forces were stationed in West Pakistan; the role of the Pakistan armed forces in East Pakistan was to hold that part of the country until the Pakistani forces defeated India in the west. The Pakistan Army created the Eastern Command, with one commander in the rank of Lieutenant General responsible for the command. The armed forces, had drawn up a plan to defend Dhaka by concentrating all their forces along the Dhaka Bowl.
Prior to Bangladesh Liberation War in 1971, India had no plans for large scale military action in East Pakistan. Since the Sino-Indian War of 1962, the primary objective of the Indian Army Eastern Command was the defence of the Indian northern and eastern borders, defending the "Shiliguri Corridor", and on combating insurgencies raging in Mizoram, Nagaland, Manipur and the Naxalites in West Bengal.
The No. 24 Electronic Warfare Squadron, nicknamed the Blinders, is an electronic warfare unit of the Pakistan Air Force equipped with DA 20EW Faclons. It is the PAF's only Electronic Warfare squadron and undertakes EW, ECM and ESM missions while also training Pilots, Air Defense controllers and engineering officers in EW environments.
The Mukti Bahini, also known as the Bangladesh Forces, was the guerrilla resistance movement consisting of the Bangladeshi military, paramilitary and civilians during the Bangladesh Liberation War that transformed East Pakistan into Bangladesh in 1971. They were initially called the Mukti Fauj.
The Bangladesh Freedom Honour is the highest state award given by the government of Bangladesh for foreigners or non-nationals. The award was posthumously conferred on former Indian prime minister Indira Gandhi on 25 July 2011. The award recognises her role as an ally during the Bangladesh War of Liberation and her capacity to manage such a complex regional war. A Bangladeshi national committee had nominated her for the special honour for her "unique" role in "offering training to freedom fighters and refuge to millions of people who fled the country and building world opinion for Bangladesh's independence". Indian National Congress Party president Sonia Gandhi, the daughter -in-law of Indira Gandhi, received the award from Bangladeshi President Zillur Rahman at a grand ceremony in Dhaka attended by Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina and nearly 1,000 top dignitaries.
Adampur Airport, is a domestic airport and an Indian Air Force base serving the cities of Jalandhar and Hoshiarpur in Punjab, India. It is located 6.7 km (4.2 mi) from Adampur town in Jalandhar district, 28 km (17 mi) from Jalandhar and 27 km (17 mi) from Hoshiarpur. It just beside NH-3. As it lies just between the cities of Jalandhar and Hoshiarpur, it serves both the cities. The airport was required by the Doaba region of Punjab for facilitating commercial operations, as the other two main airports of the state at Amritsar and Chandigarh are 100 and 145 km distant, respectively.
Kilo Flight was the code name for the Mukti Bahini combat aviation formation during the Bangladesh Liberation War in 1971. It consisted of one DHC-3 Otter plane and one Alouette III helicopter, both carrying rocket pods and machine guns for launching hit-and-run attacks on Pakistani targets, and one DC-3 Dakota for logistical missions. 9 Bengali pilots and 58 ex PAF personnel formed the unit under the command of Group Captain A. K. Khandker in September 1971. The aircraft were supplied by Indian Authorities and the formation was led by Squadron Leader Sultan Mahmud under the operational control of IAF base Jorhat. The unit started training in October 1971 at Dimapur in Nagaland, and this unit was the first to launch airstrikes on Pakistani targets in East Pakistan on December 4, 1971, by attacking oil depots at Narayanganj and Chittagong. In total the unit flew 90 sorties and 40 combat missions between December 4 and 16, 1971. After the war, this unit formed the core of the nascent Bangladesh Air Force.
Squadron Leader Ghani Akbar SJ ,is a retired Pakistani fighter pilot and officer in the Pakistan Air Force. He is best known for taking part in the devastating blitzkrieg on the Pathankot airbase in India during the 1965 Indo-Pakistani War, in which he doubled back and initiated a second attack on the airbase against the orders of his commanding officer Sajad Haider. Additionally, his formation destroyed 13 Indian aircraft including nine MiG-21s.
The Sargodha Satellite Fields is a complex of four airstrips – Sargodha, Chota Sargodha, Wagowal and Bhagatanwala. The complex was originally built by the Royal Air Force and is located in Sargodha, Punjab Province, Pakistan.
References
↑ Hiro, Dilip (2012). Apocalyptic Realm: Jihadists in South Asia. Yale University Press. p.143. ISBN978-0300173789.
↑ Ganguly, Sumit (April 2002). Conflict Unending: India-Pakistan Tensions Since 1947. Columbia University Press. p.67. ISBN9780231507400.
↑ Riedel, Bruce O. (2012). Deadly Embrace: Pakistan, America, and the Future of the Global Jihad. Brookings Institution. p.10. ISBN978-0815722748.
1 2 3 4 5 "My years with the IAF" by Air Chief Marshal P C Lal
↑ Batabyal, Guru Saday. (20 December 2020). Politico-Military Strategy of the Bangladesh Liberation War, 1971 (illustrateded.). Taylor & Francis. p.17. ISBN9781000317664.
↑ Remarks of President Richard M Nixon on 10 April 1971 at State Department signing of Biological Weapons Convention.
Every Great Power must follow the principle that it should not directly or indirectly allow any other nation to use force or armed aggression against one of its neighbors.
↑ Singh, Mandeep (2020). Anti-Aircraft Artillery in Combat, 1950–1972: Air Defence in the Jet Age. Air World. p.208.
Further reading
Donaldson, Robert H. (June 1972), "India: The Soviet Stake in Stability", Asian Survey, 12 (6), University of California Press: 475–492, doi:10.2307/2643045, ISSN0004-4687, JSTOR2643045 .
Kapur, Ashok (June 1972), "Indo-Soviet Treaty and the Emerging Asian Balance", Asian Survey, 12 (6), University of California Press: 463–474, doi:10.2307/2643044, ISSN0004-4687, JSTOR2643044 .
Lal, Pratap Chandra (1986), My Years with the IAF, Casemate Pub & Book Dist Llc, ISBN8170620082 .
Faruqui, A (2001), "Failure in Command: Lessons from Pakistan's Indian Wars, 1947–1999. Defense and Security Analysis, Volume 17, Number 1, 1 April 2001, pp. 31–40(10)", Defense & Security Analysis, Routledge, part of the Taylor & Francis Group, ISSN1475-1798 .
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Indian Air Force Pratap Chandra Lal 
Pakistan Air Force Abdul Rahim Khan 
