Lt. Col Ziaur Rahman (CO, Z Force Brigade) Lt. Col Khaled Mosharraf (CO, K Force Brigade) Lt. Col K M Shafiullah (CO, K Force Brigade) Major Rafiqul Islam[2] * Major A.T.M Haider * Major C. R. Dutta * Major Mir Shawkat Ali
§ indicates events in the internal resistance movement linked to the Indo-Pakistani War. ‡ indicates events in the Indo-Pakistani War linked to the internal resistance movement in Bangladesh.
After Pakistan Army drove the Bengali resistance across the Indian border at the conclusion of Operation Searchlight, the Indian Army implemented a supply and training operation for the Mukti Bahini from 15 May 1971, with the goal of sending an ever increasing number of trained fighters to attack Pakistani forces and sabotage military and economic assets to demoralize the Pakistani soldiers and disrupt their supply network. This enterprise was dubbed "Operation Jackpot".
The third operation was designed by Lt. Gen Sagat Singh, commander of the Indian Army IV Corps, attached to the Eastern Command, and the Bangladesh forces operating in his operational area. These forces fought against the Pakistani forces in Sylhet, Comilla, and Chittagong as part of the overall campaign from 21 November to 16 December 1971.[6]
After the postponing of the session National Assembly of Pakistan, the High Command was authorised by the Yahya administration to launch the military operation (codename: Searchlight and Barisal) in March 1971 in a view of curbing political opposition instigated by the Awami League– which had won majority in the 1970 elections and would have formed next civilian government of Pakistan had the army not intervened.[4] The Pakistani Armed Forces launched Operation Searchlight on 25 March 1971 in a bid to take control of East Pakistan and subdue all resistance (political or otherwise) against the West Pakistani authorities. By mid of May, the Pakistan Authorities in East Pakistan, with the crucial support provided by the Pakistani military, had been in control of maintaining the writ of government in major areas of East, and the Mukti Bahini, under attack from Pakistan Air force and armed military units, started to retreat across the border into India.[7] By the middle of June, Pakistani army had driven the remnants of Bengali army and Para-military units, who had been supported by the civilians, across the border into India.[8] The Mukti Bahini, formed around the defecting Bengali soldiers with civilian volunteers, started a guerrilla campaign.[9]
Prelude
The central government in India decided to open its Eastern border with East Pakistan on 27 March, and started to admit millions of Bengali refugees and political dissidents into India, housing them in specialized camps.[10] After the crackdown, Tajuddin Ahmad met with Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi on 3 April 1971 and asked for all possible aid,[11] by which time the Indian government had already opened East Pakistan border and the BSF was offering aid to the Bengali resistance. The Bangladesh government in exile was formed by the Awami League leadership on 17 April at Meherpur in Kushtia, which confirmed Col. Osmani as commander of Mukti Bahini (regular armed forces and insurgents) under the authority of Prime Minister Tajuddin Ahmad.[12] Since March 1971, the local supply of weapons and ammunition were initially overseen by the India's Border Security Force (BSF) and BSF had even made disorganized incursions in Bangladesh, with little success.[7] On 15 May Indian Army Eastern Command took over the task of training and supplying the Mukthi Bahini, this was aided by the support teams of BSF.[1]
Indian Army dubbed the operation to support Mukti Bahini "Operation Jackpot", setting up a coordinated enterprise under the Eastern Command for meeting the material support, logistical, and training needs, and to some extent, lend operational support and planning advice.[1][2] At the operational stage at the Indian Army's Headquarters in New Delhi, Maj. Gen. Onkar Singh Kalkat oversaw the operation for two months before the operational command was assumed by Maj. Gen. B. N. 'Jimmy' Sarcar.[13]
The operational setup and execution of plan
The border areas around East Pakistan was divided into six logistical sectors, each to be commanded by a brigadier from the Indian Army.[13]
The Indian logistical sectors for this operation were:
Alpha (HQ: Murti Camp, West Bengal), C.O. Brig. B. C. Joshi.
Bravo (HQ: Rajgaunj, West Bengal), C.O. Brig. Prem Singh.
Charlie (HQ: Chakulia, Bihar), C.O. Brig. N. A. Salik.
Through this network, Mukti Bahini forces communicated with the Mukti Bahini Headquarters Exiled in Kolkata and coordinated all supply, training and operational efforts for the war. Lt. Gen. J. S. Aurora, commander of Eastern Command, was overseeing the entire operation.
Effectiveness and importance
At the beginning of stage of the Jackpot, the operation was crucial is sustaining the activities of Mukti Bahini, which had engaged in series of insurgent attacks, political assassinations, and sabotage all over the (then) East Pakistan, and their success debunked the Yahya administration's claims of successfully establishing peace and stability in Eastern region, as news of the insurgency was picked up and publicized by the international press.[4] The Indian Army's Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI) was well aware of the Navy SEALs and the Army Special Forces, therefore planned a careful operation with the Mukti Bahini Leadership to launch a series of attacks to sabotage the civil and military infrastructure, inflict casualties on Pakistani forces and demoralize Pakistan armed forces personnel the before the Indian Army officially engaged both the Pakistan Army and Pakistan Navy in Eastern Pakistan.[4]
Despite limitations and challenges rising from the state of the Indian transport network, availability of supplies, differences of opinion of guerrilla training methods and the decision of Bangladesh government to train the maximum number of guerrillas in the shortest possible time,[14] which may have caused supply shortages and often arming of only 40% to 50% of the newly trained guerrillas with firearms,[15] Bangladesh government in exile managed to field 30,000 regular troops and 100,000 guerrillas and run a campaign that would destroy or damage at least 231 bridges, perform 122 acts of sabotage on railway lines and 90 electric stations,[16] disrupting the logistical/supply system of the Pakistani forces, and kill at least 237 officers, 136 JCOs and 3,559 soldiers of the regular army during April to November 1971,[17] and an unspecified number of Police, West Pakistan Rangers, EPCAF and Razakar members, and wound several thousand soldiers. The success and intensity of guerrilla operations after August had also lowered the morale of the Pakistani army and by November, they chose to remain in their bases whenever possible,[17][18] and the contribution of the guerrilla warfare to the final victory was enormous despite the challenges.[14]
Background: Naval Commandos
At the conclusion of Operation Searchlight and Operation Barisal, the Pakistan Army and Navy had driven the Mukti Bahini into India, where they entered a period of reorganization during June and July 1971 to train guerrillas, set up networks and safe houses in the occupied territories to run the insurgency and rebuild the conventional forces. Col. M. a. G. Osmani divided the country into 11 sectors, while planning to send 2,000–5,000 guerrillas inside Bangladesh every month with 3/4 weeks training to hit all targets of opportunity, while build up the regular force to seize territory in Sylhet,[19][20] Indian officials suggested fielding a force of 8,000 guerrillas with regular troops in leadership position with three or four-month's training.[21] The solution was to activate the hitherto inactive Sector No. 10[22] as a special sector for naval commandos with Col. Osmani in charge from 13 May onwards,[23] and this Naval commando force was to be trained as per the Indian suggestion, acting as an elite force for attacking riverine and seabourne targets.
Col. Osmani's initial strategy of sending 2,000–5,000 guerrillas inside Bangladesh every month since July and hitting the border outposts[24] with regular battalions had not yielded expected results for various reasons.[25] By July–August, Pakistani commanders were confident that they have contained the "Monsoon offensive" of the Mukti Bahini.[26][27] As the pace of military operations in Bangladesh slacked off, the civilian morale was adversely affected,[28] which prompted East-Pakistan administrative authorities to claim that the situation had returned to "normal". In response to this declaration, the Mukti Bahini launched 2 operations: (1) Guerrilla attacks in targets in Dhaka by a crack commando group trained by Major ATM Haider (ex-SSG commando), and (2) the simultaneous mining and damaging of ships in Chittagong, Chandpur, Mongla and Narayanganj on 15 August, which became known in Bangladesh and international media as "Operation Jackpot".
Mukti Bahini riverine activity
Bangladesh is crisscrossed by numerous wide rivers and, during the April–October monsoon flooding, about 300 additional navigable channels.[29] The movement and logistics of Pakistan army largely depended on their control of the inland waterways, and of the Sea ports. Mukti Bahini did not operate a separate naval wing during March–June 1971. River craft were requisitioned as needed. The Pakistan Navy and Air Force sank one such craft, MV Ostrich, during Operation Barisal on 26 April,[citation needed] while Pakistani gunboats sank 3 boats commanded by Mukti Bahini on 5 May 1971, at Gabura.[30]
Pakistan naval preparations
The importance of waterways was not lost on Pakistan Eastern Command. After the launch of Operation Searchlight and the successful conclusion of Operation Barisal, General A. O. Mittha (Quarter Master General of Pakistan Army) had recommended the creation of a port operating battalion for Chittagong, in addition to separate River Transport and River Marine Battalion to operate an augmented Cargo and Tanker flotilla.[31] These steps were not implemented, the Army commandeered civilian water crafts for logistics and posted Army and Razakar personnel to guard various ferries, bridges, ports and other naval installations. Pakistan Navy established a Marine Academy in June 1971 to support riverine operations.[32]
Rear Admiral Mohammad Shariff had only 4 gunboats (PNS Comilla, Rajshahi, Jessore and Sylhet) and a patrol boat (PNS Balaghat) in East Pakistan, while the navy remodeled 17 civilian ships into gunboats by adding 12.7/20mm guns, and .30/.50 caliber Browning machine guns.[33] These boats joined the fleet by August 1971, while several other boats had been fitted with 40X60 mm Bofors guns and .50 calibre machine guns in Khulna and Chittagong dockyards to serve as patrol boats.[34] A few hundred officers and 2,000 crewmen were posted in East Pakistan in 1971. 300 Bengali seamen were transferred to West Pakistan as a precaution after 25 March 1971, while Special Service Group Navy (SSGN) teams were posted in East Pakistan under Commander David Felix.
Naval Commando Training and preparations
A graphical representation of Bengali Naval Commando activities against Shipping in East Pakistan in 1971. A generic representation, not all geographic features are shown.
The river transport system was vital for economic activity given the primitive state of the road and railways system of East Pakistan. Major Jalil, Colonel M. A. G. Osmani and Indian Commander Bhattachariya in collaboration with top regional commanders established the secret camp, codenamed C2P, in Plassey, West Bengal on 23 May to train volunteers selected from various Mukti Bahini sectors (Bangladesh was divided in 11 operational sectors for Mukti Bahini operations) for this purpose. Initially 300 volunteers were chosen,[35] ultimately 499 commandos were trained in the camp. The training course included swimming, survival training, using limpet mines, hand-to-hand combat and navigation. By August 1971, the first batch of commandos were ready for operation. The Camp Commander at C2P was Commander M. N. Samanth, Training Coordinator was Lt. Commander G. Martis, both from the Indian Navy, while 20 Indian instructors along with the 8 Bengali submariners became trainers.[23] Pakistani Intelligence agents scouted the camp in June and July but Indian security measures prevented any harm to the camp and apprehended all infiltrators.[34]
The Bangladesh naval commando operation that was called "Operation Jackpot" was precipitated by events in Toulon, a coastal city of southern France. The operation was planned to take on Naval Special Service Group of the Pakistani Navy, after it had conducted several other operations. In 1971, there were 11 East Pakistan naval submarine crewmen receiving training there aboard a Pakistani submarine. One commissioned officer (Mosharraf Hassain) and 8 crewmen decided to take control of the submarine and to fight against Pakistan. Their plan was disclosed, however, causing them to flee from death threats made by Pakistan's Naval Intelligence. Out of the 9 crewmen, one made his way to London, the others managed to travel to the Indian Embassy in Geneva, Switzerland. From Geneva, embassy officials took them to New Delhi on 9 April, where they began a program of top secret naval training at C2P.
The operation was planned in the last week of July, under tight security. Information on river tides, weather and East Pakistani naval infrastructure and deployment was collected through the Mukti Bahini. Selected commandos were sent from C2P to forward bases in Tripura and West Bengal, where a final briefing was given to them. Mukti Bahini in Sector No. 1 assisted the group going to Chittagong, Sector No. 2 aided the groups going to Chandpur and Narayanganj and Sector No. 9 assisted the group targeting Mongla. Each commando carried a pair of fins, a knife, a limpet mine, and swimming trunks. Some had compasses, 1 in 3 commandos had Sten guns and hand grenades, the group leaders carried a transistor radio. All the groups carried their own equipment to their targets and after entering Bangladesh between 3 and 9 August, reached their destinations by 12 August, using the local Mukti Bahini network of safehouses. A pair of songs was played in India Radio (Akashbani) at specific times to convey the intended signal for commencing the operations.[36] The first song (Amar putul ajke prothom jabe shoshur bari) was played on 13 August, the second song (Ami tomay joto shuniyechilem gan tar bodole chaini kono dan)[37][38] on 14 August. The result of this operation was:
Chittagong: Sixty commandos were divided into 3 groups of 20 each, but one group failed to arrive due to Pakistani security on time. Out of 40 commandos, 9 refused to take part,[39] while 31 commandos mined 10 ships instead of 22 initially planned[40] on 16 August[citation needed]. Between 1:45 and 2:15am, explosions sank the MV Al-Abbas, the MV Hormuz and the Orient barge no. 6, sinking 19,000 tons of arms and ammunition along with damaging/sinking 7 other barges/ships.
Chandpur: 20 commandos were sent to mine ships at Chandpur.[41] Two commandos ultimately refused to take part, the other 18 divided into 6 groups and mined 4 ships.[42] 3 steamers/barges were damaged or sunk.
Narayanganj: 20 commandos conducted the sabotage operation. Four ships were sunk or damaged.
Mongla: 60 commandos went to Mongla port. This team was divided into 5 groups of 12 members each. Ultimately 48 commandos mined 6 ships at Mongla. Twelve commandos had been sent on a separate mission.[43][44]
The simultaneous attacks on Pakistan naval shipping assets on 16 August destroyed the myth of normalcy in East Pakistan when the news was flashed in the international media. Pakistan Army investigation concluded that no one had imagined Mukti Bahini capable of conducting such an operation.[45]
Assessment of Naval "Operation Jackpot"
Not all Naval commando missions were met with success. Tightened security prevented any operations in Chittagong after the first week of October,[46] while four attempts to damage the Hardinge Bridge failed.[47] Some Commando teams were ambushed and prevented from reaching their objectives.[48] Misfortune and miscalculation caused some missions to fail.[49] Security measures prevented any sabotage attempts on the oil depots at Narayanganj, Bogra, Faridpur and Chittagong, and Mukti Bahini managed to damage the oil depots at Chittagong and Naryanganj using an Alouette Helicopters and a Twin Otter plane on 2 December 1971.
In total, 515 commandos received training at C2P. Eight commandos were killed, 34 wounded and 15 captured during August–December 1971.[50] Naval commandos managed to sink or damage 126 ships/coasters/ferries during that time span, while one source confirms at least 65 vessels of various types (15 Pakistani ships, 11 coasters, 7 gunboats, 11 barges, 2 tankers and 19 river craft by November 1971).[51] had been sunk between August–November 1971. At least 100,000 tons of shipping was sunk or crippled, jetties and wharves were disabled and channels blocked, and the commandos kept East Pakistan in a state of siege without having a single vessel[52] The operational capability of Pakistan Navy was reduced as a result of Operation Jackpot.
Naval commandos killed in Operation Jackpot
Commando Abdur Raquib, who was killed during the Foolchhori Ghat Operation
Commando Hossain Farid, who was executed during the second Chittagong operation. He was captured by Pakistani army, who tortured him to death by placing him inside a manhole and bending his body until his vertebral column was shattered.
Commando Khabiruzzaman, who was killed in second operation in Faridpur
Commando Sirajul Islam, M. Aziz, Aftab Uddin, and Rafiqul Islam, nothing further is known about them.
Naval commandos who received Bangladesh 'National Hero Award' Recognition
Mosharraf Hossain- Bir Uttam (His honour was revoked by the ruling Government of Bangladesh)
Mohammad Khabiruzzan- Bir Bikrom
Momin Ullah Patwari- Bir Protik
Shahjahan Kabir- Bir Protik
Faruq-e-Azam- Bir Protik
Mohammad Rahmatullah-Bir Protik
Mohammad Mojjamel Hossain- Bir Protik
Amir Hossain- Bir Protik
Operation Hot Pants
After the operation of 16 August, all commandos returned to India. After this no pre-planned simultaneous operation was launched by the Naval Commandos. Instead, some groups were sent to destroy specific targets, and other commandos began to hit targets as opportunity presented itself.
Major Jalil, Commander of Mukti Bahini Sector No. 9 had obtained permission from Premier Tajuddin Ahmed to form a naval unit in August[54] and had requested four gunboats to Commander M. N. Samanth. In October 1971 Kolkata Port Trust donated two patrol crafts (Ajay and Akshay) to Mukti Bahini. The boats underwent a month-long refitting at Khidirpur dockyard at the cost of 3.8million Indian Rupees[55] to carry two Canadian 40X60 mm Bofors guns and two light engines and eight ground mines, four on each side of the deck in addition to 11 ground mines.[56] Renamed BNS Padma and Palash, the boats were crewed by 44 Bengali sailors and 12 Naval commandos, the boats were officered by India Navy personnel and handed over to Mukti Bahini on 30 October 1971. Bangladesh Government in Exile State Minister Captain Kamruzzaman was present when the boats were commissioned by Kolkata Port Trust chairman P. K. Sen. Lt. Commander KP Roy and K. Mitra on Indian Navy commanded the boats. The mission for Bangladesh Navy flotilla was:[55]
Mine the Chalna port entry point
Attack Pakistani shipping
Escorted by an Indian Navy frigate, on 10 November these boats successfully mined the entrance of Mongla port. They also chased the British ship "The City of St. Albans" away from Mongla on 11 November 1971.[57]
Indian Army IV corps operation (21 November 1971 – 16 December 1971)
Final Indian Army operational plan in November 1971. A generic representation, some unit locations are not shown. Indian IV Corps operation may have been known as "Operation Jackpot".
The plan of operation for the Indian Army IV corps (8 Mountain Div., 23 Mountain Div., 57 Mountain Div. and "Kilo Force") may have been codenamed "Operation Jackpot". The opposition forces included the Pakistani 14th Infantry division defending Sylhet, Maulaviabazar and Akhaura, the 39th ad hoc division in Comilla, Laksham and Feni and the 97th independent infantry brigade stationed in Chittagong. Indian army had seized salients in the Eastern border from 21 November 1971. After Pakistan launched air attacks on India on 3 December, the Indian army crossed the border into Bangladesh. By the end of the war on 16 December 1971, the Indian army had isolated and surrounded the remnants of the 14th division in Sylhet and Bhairabbazar, the 39th division was cornered in Comilla and Chittagong, with all other areas of Sylhet, Comilla, Noakhali and Chittagong clear of enemy forces. Part of the corps had crossed the Meghna river using the "Meghna Heli Bridge" and using local boats to drive towards Dhaka when the Pakistani army surrendered.
Ayub, Muhammad (2005). An army, Its Role and Rule: A History of the Pakistan Army from Independence to Kargil, 1947–1999. RoseDog Books. ISBN9780805995947
Hassan Khan, Lt. Gen. Gul (1978). Memories of Lt. Gen. Gul Hassan Khan. Oxford University Press. ISBN0-19-547329-9. Bengali Translation: 'Pakistan Jokhon Bhanglo' University Press Ltd. 1996 ISBN984-05-0156-9
The Bangladesh Armed Forces are the combined military forces of the People's Republic of Bangladesh. It consists of the three uniformed military services: the Bangladesh Army, the Bangladesh Navy and the Bangladesh Air Force. The Armed Forces are under the jurisdiction of Ministry of Defence of the Government of Bangladesh, and is directly administered by the Armed Forces Division of the Prime Minister's Office. The President of Bangladesh serves as the Commander-in-Chief of the Bangladesh Armed Forces. It has the third-largest defence budget in South Asia and according to the Global Firepower index, The Bangladeshi Millitary is the 37th strongest Millitary in the Worldit is the third most powerful military force in South Asia. Border Guard Bangladesh and Bangladesh Coast Guard are under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Home Affairs during peacetime, but during wartime they fall under the command of Bangladesh Army and Bangladesh Navy respectively.
The Bangladesh Liberation War, also known as the Bangladesh War of Independence, or simply the Liberation War in Bangladesh, was a revolution and armed conflict sparked by the rise of the Bengali nationalist and self-determination movement in East Pakistan, which resulted in the independence of Bangladesh. The war began when the Pakistani military junta based in West Pakistan—under the orders of Yahya Khan—launched Operation Searchlight against the people of East Pakistan on the night of 25 March 1971, initiating the Bangladesh genocide.
Operation Searchlight was a military operation carried out by the Pakistan Army in an effort to curb the Bengali nationalist movement in former East Pakistan in March 1971. Pakistan retrospectively justified the operation on the basis of anti-Bihari violence carried out en masse by the Bengalis earlier that month. Ordered by the central government in West Pakistan, the original plans envisioned taking control of all of East Pakistan's major cities on 26 March, and then eliminating all Bengali opposition, whether political or military, within the following month.
Bir Uttom is the second highest award for individual gallantry in Bangladesh after the Bir Sreshtho and the highest gallantry award for a living individual.
Muhammad Ataul Gani Osmani, was a Bengali military leader. Osmani's career spanned five decades, beginning with service in the British Indian Army in 1939. He fought in the Burma Campaign during World War II. After the partition of India in 1947, he joined the Pakistan Army and served in the East Bengal Regiment, retiring as a colonel in 1967. Osmani joined the Provisional Government of Bangladesh in 1971 as the commander-in-chief of the nascent Bangladesh Forces. Regarded as the founder of the Bangladesh Armed Forces, Osmani retired as a four-star general from the Bangladesh Army in 1972.
Armed Forces Day is observed in Bangladesh on 21 November. This signifies the day in 1971, when the members of the Bangladesh army, navy and air force were officially united and launched joint operations against the Pakistan occupation forces. On 16 December 1971, the Pakistani Army of 93,000 surrendered to the allied force of Bangladesh army, ending the Liberation War of Bangladesh.
The Bangladesh Liberation War started on 26 March 1971 and ended on 16 December 1971. Some of the major events of the war are listed in the timeline below.
East Pakistan Air Operations covers the activity of the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) and Pakistan Army Aviation units in former East Pakistan during the Bangladesh Liberation War. The operations involved the interdiction, air defense, ground support, and logistics missions flown by the Bangladesh Air Force, Indian Air Force, and the Indian Navy Aviation wing in support of the Mukti Bahini and later Indian Army in Bengal.
Bangladesh's military history is intertwined with the history of a larger region, including present-day India, Pakistan, Nepal, Bhutan and Myanmar. The country was historically part of Bengal – a major power in South Asia and Southeast Asia.
On 25 March 1971, the Pakistani military, supported by paramilitary units, launched the military operation to pacify the insurgent-held areas of East Pakistan, which led to a prolonged conflict with the Bengali Mukti Bahini. Although conventional in nature during March–May 1971, it soon turned into a guerrilla insurgency from June of that year. Indian Army had not directly supported the Bengali resistance but had launched Operation Jackpot to support the insurgency from May 1971.
The Indian Army had no standby force ready in 1971 with the specific task of attacking East Pakistan, one of the many reasons why India did not immediately intervene after Pakistan launched Operation Searchlight in March 1971. Indian Army's Eastern Command was tasked with defending the northern and eastern borders and fighting the insurgencies in Nagaland, Mizoram and Naxalites in West Bengal at that time.
The Eastern Command of the Pakistan Army also known as III Corps was a corps-sized military formation headed by a lieutenant-general, who was designated the Commander 3 Corps. After the partition of India by United Kingdom, the Islamic Republic of Pakistan was divided into two territories separated by 1,000 miles (1,600 km). Most of the assets of the Pakistan armed forces were stationed in West Pakistan; the role of the Pakistan armed forces in East Pakistan was to hold that part of the country until the Pakistani forces defeated India in the west. The Pakistan Army created the Eastern Command, with one commander in the rank of Lieutenant General responsible for the command. The armed forces, had drawn up a plan to defend Dhaka by concentrating all their forces along the Dhaka Bowl.
Prior to Bangladesh Liberation War in 1971, India had no plans for large scale military action in East Pakistan. Since the Sino-Indian War of 1962, the primary objective of the Indian Army Eastern Command was the defence of the Indian northern and eastern borders, defending the "Shiliguri Corridor", and on combating insurgencies raging in Mizoram, Nagaland, Manipur and the Naxalites in West Bengal.
Operation Barisal was a code-name of naval operation conducted by Pakistan Navy intended to take control of the city of Barisal, East Pakistan from the Mukti Bahini and the dissidents of the Pakistan Defence Forces. It was the part of Operation Searchlight.
The Mukti Bahini, also known as the Bangladesh Forces, was the guerrilla resistance movement consisting of the Bangladeshi military, paramilitary and civilians during the Bangladesh Liberation War that transformed East Pakistan into Bangladesh in 1971. They were initially called the Mukti Fauj.
Z Force, also known as Tura Brigade, was the first military brigade of Bangladesh Forces formed during the Liberation War of Bangladesh in 1971 under Major Ziaur Rahman along with the consent of the revolutionary government of Bangladesh in exile. The brigade was formed with the 1st, 3rd and 8th Battalion of East Bengal Regiment on 7 July 1971. It is the first ever complete brigade formed during the Liberation War of Bangladesh in 1971.
The Crack Platoon was a special commando team of the Mukti Bahini which was formed in 1971 during the Bangladesh Liberation War. It was formed by young members of Mukti Bahini which carried out commando operations in Dhaka and its surroundings and led by Major Khaled Mosharraf. The commandos were mostly students and civilians, received guerrilla training later in the training camps for Mukti Bahini and then engaged in battle against Pakistan Army.
Kilo Flight was the code name for the Mukti Bahini combat aviation formation during the Bangladesh Liberation War in 1971. It consisted of one DHC-3 Otter plane and one Alouette III helicopter, both carrying rocket pods and machine guns for launching hit-and-run attacks on Pakistani targets, and one DC-3 Dakota for logistical missions. 9 Bengali pilots and 58 ex PAF personnel formed the unit under the command of Group Captain A. K. Khandker in September 1971. The aircraft were supplied by Indian Authorities and the formation was led by Squadron Leader Sultan Mahmud under the operational control of IAF base Jorhat. The unit started training in October 1971 at Dimapur in Nagaland, and this unit was the first to launch airstrikes on Pakistani targets in East Pakistan on December 4, 1971, by attacking oil depots at Narayanganj and Chittagong. In total the unit flew 90 sorties and 40 combat missions between December 4 and 16, 1971. After the war, this unit formed the core of the nascent Bangladesh Air Force.
Captain Mohan Narayan Rao Samant, MVC was an officer of the Indian Navy, who was awarded with the Maha Vir Chakra, India's second-highest war-time gallantry award. Samant played an important role in the covert operation called Naval Commando Operation X, which was instituted in 1971 during the Bangladesh Liberation War. Samant had also served as the first commanding officer of the submarine INS Karanj after being appointed to that post in 1969. After the 1971 war ended, he became the first temporary Chief of Naval Staff of the newly-created Bangladesh Navy.
The NAP-Communist Party-Students Union Special Guerrilla Forces was an armed force active in the Bangladesh Liberation War. It was organized jointly by the National Awami Party (Muzaffar) (NAP), Communist Party of Bangladesh and the East Pakistan Students Union. Its commander was Mohammad Farhad, with Pankaj Bhattacharya serving as deputy commander. Per the account of Moni Singh, the NAP-Communist Party-Students Union Special Guerrilla Forces had some 5,000 fighters at its peak.
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