Early life
Too was born in Kuala Lumpur to Too Choo Sun. The elder Too's father, Too Nam, was involved in the Chinese revolutionary movement, and had tutored Sun Yat Sen. [1]
Too's early education was mainly in the Chinese stream, but he later attended Methodist Boys School in Kuala Lumpur. In 1938, he was the top candidate in Kuala Lumpur for the Cambridge School Certificate Examination, scoring six A1s and two B2s. He then attended a science course at the Victoria Institution, before being awarded the Federated Malay States scholarship to Raffles College in Singapore. Too attended Raffles College from 1939 to 1941, when he was elected President of the student body. That same year, the Japanese began their invasion of Southeast Asia, disrupting Too's studies. He never completed his course at Raffles College, but was awarded a war diploma in science (equivalent to a BSc) after the end of the Second World War, in 1947. [2]
In the course of his studies, Too befriended Eu Chooi Yip (余柱业). They parted ways after the Japanese invasion, and Too did not hear of Eu again until he participated in the planning of Operation Coldstore, when it emerged that Eu had joined the communists. [3]
During the war, Too spent his time at the Kuala Lumpur book club, where he read all the books available. He also took up photography; his father had given him a new camera in 1945, just before the end of the war, apparently anticipating that the Japanese currency in use at the time would soon be worthless. [4] It was also during the war and its aftermath that the communists attempted to persuade Too to join them. Several leaders of the Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA) – an organisation which would later form the bulk of the communist forces – were introduced to Too, who was even invited to join the MPAJA when they flew to London for the victory parade. Too, anticipating that this would result in his being branded as a communist, declined. Despite this, they pressed on, even introducing Too to Chin Peng, later the Secretary-General of the Malayan Communist Party. [5]
The early Emergency
In early 1951, Too joined the Emergency Information Service (EIS) as a research assistant. He was soon promoted to Chinese Assistant to the Head of the EIS, where he became frustrated by a lack of documents for analysis. Purporting to be doing so in the name of the Head of the EIS, he issued a directive requiring every scrap of paper recovered from enemy communist combatants in the ongoing Malayan Emergency be forwarded to headquarters. [8]
Around 1952, it was the opinion of the EIS that the communists were on the verge of giving up their insurgency. However, Too's analysis of the situation indicated that the communists were only narrowing the focus and scope of their activities in certain areas, while actually expanding them in others. Too relied on certain documents classified as "Top Secret" – a classification that would typically limit access only to expatriate British officers – that he had been shown by the head of the EIS, who then endorsed Too's report. [9]
That same year, a new Director General of Information, A. D. C. ("Alec") Peterson, was appointed by Gerald Templar. Peterson was seen by Too as being less co-operative with locals, and Too resigned in "utter disgust" in 1953 at his perceived interference with his work. Too, who had been involved in the authoring and distribution of propaganda leaflets, went as far as to complain to a General that the interference of the British was as if a civilian had been deploying the army's soldiers. In Too's view, the British were unacquainted with the realities on the ground of preparing propaganda, a view he believed found validation after Peterson left Malaya in 1955. [10] An alternative view of Peterson's role, and relationship with Too, can be found in other studies of the period, such as Kumar Ramakrishna's: Emergency Propaganda: The Winning of Malayan Hearts and Minds, 1948–1958 (Richmond, Surrey: Curzon, 2002). Before leaving, Peterson warned the new Head of the Psychological Warfare Section, O. W. Wolters, about Too, whose "Tooism" was in Peterson's view more threatening than communism. Nevertheless, Wolters soon made contact with Too, and invited him to rejoin the government in 1955. Too would serve in the Psychological Warfare Section on a contract to be renewed every two years. A caveat of this was that because he was not considered a "permanent" public servant, Too would be ineligible for a pension. The following year, Too replaced Wolters, becoming the first Malayan Head of the Psychological Warfare Section. [11]
As part of his work in the Psychological Warfare Section, Too crafted a campaign to turn public opinion against the communists. The communists mainly drew on support from Malaysian Chinese, who in Too's view would not be swayed by traditional government appeals along the lines of "Look chaps: The government is going to collapse and the communists are going to win." Too argued that the Chinese would think: "Fine. Thanks for the information. We will go to the winning side." Instead, Too's proposal was to tell the Chinese that "These communists are very bad. They come and rob you of your money, of this, of that. You don't like it, surely?" To win support for the controversial Briggs Plan, which relocated the dispersed Chinese villagers to fenced and guarded "New Villages", Too presented the New Villages as a way to give Chinese villagers an excuse to refuse aid to the communists. When communists asked for supplies, Chinese villagers could express support for the communists but insist they could not smuggle supplies out because of the guards. [12]
Too also adopted the communist tactic of sending "eyes and ears" to monitor the opinions of villagers, giving him a direct and unfiltered view of public opinion. Too's propaganda strategy emphasised the common man, rather than the insurgents; he believed it was more important to gain the support of the public than to convince the communist guerillas to defect. Nevertheless, he was heavily involved in developing the leaflets used to convince communist defections. Amongst Too's innovations was the usage of inconspicuously coloured instead of brightly coloured paper for leaflets, so that the communist rank-and-file would not be noticed by their superiors when they picked up the leaflets. Too avoided a "preachy" approach in drafting the leaflets; his style was described as: "Don't preach. Don't theorize. Never say 'I told you so.' No propaganda based on hatred." Too also focused on a factual approach in his propaganda leaflets, which often comprised information such as the names of recently surrendered communist soldiers, lists of mistresses of party leaders (a privilege resented by many rank and file), and photos of communist casualties. [13]
Baling peace talks
In 1955, the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) called for peace talks with the government of the autonomous Federation of Malaya, led by Tunku Abdul Rahman. The prevailing view in British intelligence was that this was a sign that the communists were nearly defeated, and on the verge of giving up. Too disagreed, insisting that certain documents had been mistranslated by the British, while others had been ignored. He predicted that if the preliminary overtures of the MCP found public acceptance, the MCP would go further and start dictating terms, such as insisting that the British be excluded from the negotiations. This later proved to be correct. [14]
It was later agreed that the Tunku and other senior government officials would meet with Chin Peng and a few other elite leaders of the MCP in the town of Baling, Kedah. To prepare for the talks, the British held a private "dress rehearsal" to anticipate what moves Chin Peng might make; Too played the part of Chin Peng. Too correctly predicted that Chin Peng would use the negotiations as a means to communicate with the general Malayan populace. Instead of speaking to the Tunku, he would choose his words to appeal to the Malayan people and humiliate the government of the Federation – his remarks throughout the negotiations would be released in full to the press. Too's predictions were conveyed to the Tunku, who was thus able to neutralise the effect of Chin Peng's actions during the talks. [15]
As a result of his successful efforts at psychological warfare, Too was promoted to Head of the Psychological Warfare Section, a post he would hold until his retirement in 1983. In January 1957, Sir Donald MacGillivray, the outgoing British High Commissioner, awarded Too his medal as a Honorary Member of the Order of the British Empire. On 31 August 1957, the date of Malaya's independence, Too was among the first recipients of the Johan Mangku Negara (Champion of the Defence of the Realm) by the first Yang di-Pertuan Agong. [16] The Emergency was officially declared as over in 1960.
The Singapore mission
In 1962, Malaya was preparing to merge with the British colonies of Singapore, Sabah, and Sarawak to form Malaysia. Singapore was a hotbed of communist radicals at the time, with communists dominating the rank and file of the governing People's Action Party (PAP) as well as the opposition Socialist Front. The communists strongly opposed the merger, because they would be unable to manipulate a Malaysian government based in Kuala Lumpur and led by the anti-communist Barisan Nasional (National Front). To gain the appearance of public support, the PAP announced a non-binding referendum on merger to be held on 1 September 1962. [17]
The head of the Singaporean government, Lee Kuan Yew, asked for assistance from the Tunku in carrying out a propaganda campaign to win support for merger. The Tunku acquiesced, sending Too on a secret mission to Singapore, where he would advise Lee. [18] Too's analysis of the situation suggested that support for the PAP was waning because the communist-infiltrated campaign personnel of the PAP made promises to voters that the government could not keep. Too also blamed "Lee's personal arrogance" for worsening affairs. [19]
Too suggested that the PAP cast the referendum as a choice between a communist government and a PAP government of Singapore as a state in Malaysia, painting the choice of communism as one of disaster. He also favoured gaining the support of the Chinese majority of the electorate through persuasion of leaders of the Chinese Chamber of Commerce to support merger. Eventually, the referendum succeeded, with over 70% of the votes cast supporting merger. [20]
While in Singapore, Too was also influential in affecting the timing of Operation Coldstore. The Malayan, Singaporean and British governments all favoured a massive crackdown on the communist leadership in Singapore. However, the Singaporeans and British wanted the crackdown to occur after merger had been effected, so they could claim it had been the doing of the federal government in Kuala Lumpur. However, Too noted that the governments of Indonesia and the Philippines were both opposing merger, citing as one ground the ostensibly "Malay Government" of Malaya, which led to fears that the federal government might oppress the non-Malay minorities in Malaysia. (See ketuanan Melayu .) Operation Coldstore, if carried out after merger, would thus create a propaganda victory for the Indonesians and Filipinos. Too expressed his views to both Tun Abdul Razak, the Deputy Prime Minister of Malaya, and the Tunku himself. Both men agreed, and as a result Operation Coldstore took place in February 1963, seven months before the formation of Malaysia. [21]
The Malayan Emergency(1948–1960) was a guerrilla war fought in British Malaya between communist fighters of the Malayan National Liberation Army (MNLA) and the military forces of the Federation of Malaya, British Empire and Commonwealth. The communists fought to win independence for Malaya from the British Empire and to establish a communist state, while the Malayan Federation and Commonwealth forces fought to combat communism and protect British economic and colonial interests. The term "Emergency" was used by the British to characterise the conflict in order to avoid referring to it as a war, because London-based insurers would not pay out in instances of civil wars. The MNLA referred to the conflict as the Anti-British National Liberation War.
Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra Al-Haj ibni Almarhum Sultan Abdul Hamid Halim Shah was a Malaysian statesman and lawyer who served as the first prime minister of Malaysia and the head of government of its predecessor states from 1955 to 1970. He was the first chief minister of the Federation of Malaya from 1955 to 1957. He supervised the independence process that culminated on 31 August 1957. As an independent Malaysia's first prime minister, he dominated the country's politics for the next 13 years.
The United Malays National Organisation ; abbreviated UMNO or less commonly PEKEMBAR, is a nationalist right-wing political party in Malaysia. As the oldest national political party within Malaysia, UMNO has been known as Malaysia's "Grand Old Party".
Chin Peng, born Ong Boon Hua, was a Malayan communist politician, guerrilla leader, and revolutionary, who was the leader and commander of the Communist Party of Malaya (CPM) and the Malayan National Liberation Army (MNLA). A Maoist, he led the CPM as secretary general from 1947 until the party's dissolution in 1989.
Barisan Sosialis was a political party in Singapore. It was formed on 29 July 1961 and officially registered on 13 August 1961 by left-wing members of the People's Action Party (PAP) who had been expelled from the PAP. The prominent founding members of the Barisan were Lee Siew Choh and Lim Chin Siong. It became the biggest opposition party in Singapore in the 1960s and the 1980s.
PAP–UMNO relations refers to the occasionally-turbulent relationship between the People's Action Party (PAP), the governing party of Singapore since 1959, and the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO), the leading party of the Barisan Nasional coalition which governed Malaysia from 1955 to 2018 and has governed it since 2020. The two parties' relationship has impacted Malaysia–Singapore relations given the countries' geographical proximity and close historical ties.
Lim Chin Siong was a Singaporean politician and union leader active in Singapore in the 1950s and 1960s. He was one of the founders of the governing People's Action Party (PAP), which has governed the country continuously since independence. Lim also used his popularity to galvanise many trade unions in support of the PAP.
The Malayan Communist Party (MCP), officially the Communist Party of Malaya (CPM), was a Marxist–Leninist and anti-imperialist communist party which was active in British Malaya and later, the modern states of Malaysia and Singapore from 1930 to 1989. It was responsible for the creation of both the Malayan Peoples' Anti-Japanese Army and the Malayan National Liberation Army.
Operation Coldstore was the code name for a covert anti-communist security operation that took place in Singapore on 2 February 1963, which was then an internally self-governing state within the British Empire. It led to the arrest of 113 people, who were detained without trial pursuant to the Preservation of Public Security Ordinance (PPSO).
General elections were held in Singapore on 30 May 1959. They were held under the new constitution and were the first in which all 51 seats in the Legislative Assembly were filled by election. This was the first election victory for the People's Action Party (PAP), as they won a landslide victory with 43 seats. The party has remained in power ever since.
The self-governance of Singapore was carried out in several stages. Since the founding of Singapore in 1819, Singapore had been under the colonial rule of the British. The first local elections on a limited scale for several positions in the government of Singapore started in 1948 following an amendment to the Constitution of Singapore.
Singapore, officially the State of Singapore, was one of the 14 states of Malaysia from 1963 to 1965. Malaysia was formed on 16 September 1963 by the merger of the Federation of Malaya with the former British colonies of North Borneo, Sarawak and Singapore. This marked the end of the 144-year British rule in Singapore which began with the founding of modern Singapore by Sir Stamford Raffles in 1819. At the time of merger, it was the smallest state in the country by land area, but the largest by population.
The Communist insurgency in Malaysia, also known as the Second Malayan Emergency, was an armed conflict which occurred in Malaysia from 1968 to 1989, between the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) and Malaysian federal security forces.
In December 1953, the British colonial government in Singapore passed the National Service Ordinance, requiring all male British subjects and Federal citizens between the ages of 18–20 to register for part-time National Service. The deadline for registration was on 12 May 1954 and those who failed to register would be either jailed or fined. On 12 May 1954, students from the Chinese Middle Schools did not register themselves for National Service. In light of the impending deadline for registration and with requests from the Chinese students, Chief Secretary William Goode would later meet representatives from the affected student body in the government house on 13 May 1954.
The Baling Talks were held in northern Malaya on 28 and 29 December 1955 in an attempt to resolve the Malayan Emergency situation.
Eu Chooi Yip was a prominent member of the anti-colonial and Communist movements in Malaya and Singapore in the 1950s and 1960s. Eu Chooi Yip was born in Kuantan, Malaysia.
The Special Operations Volunteer Force was a special program developed by the British and Malayan authorities during the Malayan Emergency. The unit existed from 1952 until the end of the Emergency in 1960.
The Malayan Peoples' Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA) was a communist guerrilla army that resisted the Japanese occupation of Malaya from 1941 to 1945 in World War II. Composed mainly of ethnic Chinese guerrilla fighters, the MPAJA was the largest anti-Japanese resistance group in Malaya. Founded during the Japanese invasion of Malaya, the MPAJA was conceived as a part of a combined effort by the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) and the British colonial government, alongside various smaller groups to resist the Japanese occupation. Although the MPAJA and the MCP were officially different organisations, many saw the MPAJA as a de facto armed wing of the MCP due to its leadership being staffed by mostly ethnic Chinese communists. Many of the ex-guerrillas of the MPAJA would later form the Malayan National Liberation Army (MNLA) and resist a return to pre-war the normality of British rule of Malaya during the Malayan Emergency (1948–1960).
The University Socialist Club was a left-wing student group active from 1953 to 1971 that played an important role in the politics of colonial Malaya and post-colonial Malaysia and Singapore. Members of the club played a significant role in bringing independence from the British Empire and in debates over the shape of the post-colonial nation. The club was instrumental in the formation and early success of the People's Action Party (PAP) and later, the Barisan Sosialis Party. Prominent members of the Club included Wang Gungwu, S.R. Nathan, Poh Soo Kai, Sydney Woodhull, Lim Hock Siew, and Tommy Koh and M. K. Rajakumar.
The Malaysian Communist Party (MCP) was a merger of the Communist Party of Malaya/Marxist-Leninist (CPM-ML) and the Communist Party of Malaya/Revolutionary Faction (CPM-RF). Both factions split out from the Malayan Communist Party in the 1970s. MCP traced its roots to splinter groups amongst communist guerrillas in southern Thailand in the 1970s. The party conducted armed struggle in the Malaysian-Thai border areas between 1983 and 1987. The former CPM-RF members lay down their arms on 13 March 1987 and the former CPM-ML members lay down theirs on 28 April 1987. It eventually accepted a deal for cessation of hostilities with the Thai military and its cadres were resettled in 5 'friendship villages'.
Malaysia 
